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OpenSSH Gets Even More Suspicious

If you remotely administer any computers, or need to check your email over an untrusted network, odds are you're already familiar with the wonders of OpenSSH. Markus Friedl yesterday posted a release announcement for the newest version, OpenSSH 3.3. Privilege separation in OpenSSH is now enabled by default, another sign of the entire OpenBSD project's appropriate paranoia.

90 of 293 comments (clear)

  1. Slashdot to English by ReluctantBadger · · Score: 4, Funny

    1st Official Slashdot to English Translator-matic
    • "There's a sourceforge project creating just what you're looking for..."
      "Me and a bunch of people got drunk, thought we could code, submitted the idea and produced a fancy web page. It's now two years later and the project has no files to download and is STILL on Stage 1, Planning."

    • "That's the beauty of UNIX - Lots of little tools which can be used together. Far more flexible!"
      "I've been reading UNIX in a Nutshell for SVR4 and fuck knows what any of this flags stuff is about"

    • "Linux is far more secure than Windows. My box has never been hacked."
      "I can install Red Hat from a bootable CD. The machine is not connected to a network and all I do all day is type ps, pwd and ls. I'm so l33t."

    • "You might want to try going to college and learning about this stuff!"
      "My folks are rich enough to send me off for further education. I am now in an uber-elite crowd of know-it-alls and I am here to belittle you. Fear me."

    • "Microsoft products are soooo insecure!"
      "I've spent the last two years being subjected to biased slashdot propaganda. I couldn't hack into a properly configured windows system if my life depended on it."

    • "We should file an antitrust lawsuit against Sony"
      "I've spent far too much time absorbing bullshit ideals from anarchists. The truth of the matter is, I just don't want to pay for anything whatsoever. Britney CDs should be free because I think that somehow the constitution protects my illegal copying and distribution under some freedom of speech law or fair use act. Even though I don't have to go out and buy luxury items, I'm gonna whinge and bitch anyway"

    • "Have you considered using Linux?"
      "I've only been using it for a week, and now my hardcore wannabe techno friends think I'm a guru. I now recommend it to everybody based upon what I've read at slashdot."

    • "Don't you find that parsing this bitset through the compliation alogirithm that is piped out through GCC on a command line echo really works well for logarithmically sound sine wave matcher?"
      "Somebody please shoot me several times in the head. I am fucking clueless."

    • "If they join all the state drivers licence databases together, they'll be able to track me! How do I change my identity?"
      "I'm too fucking dense to realise that this has been going on for over 15 years already, and I've just finished reading 1984. Go figure."


    1. Re:Slashdot to English by ceejayoz · · Score: 2

      Seems to me format c: would do just fine for hacking a Windows box, if you managed to get the DOS prompt...

    2. Re:Slashdot to English by netsharc · · Score: 2, Offtopic

      We managed to get the Win3.1 Program Manager open on a Windows ME that was running IE in kiosk mode in a museum. After that it was easy to get the DOS prompt open, but after typing format C: and answering the Are you sure(Y/N)? with >Y, the program ended saying, "Cannot format drive C: There are shared files."

      That answered my age old wonder of what would happen if one tried to format the drive one was running Windows out of.

      We wondered how to download and install Linux on the box too, but gave up on the problem. Later, I thought it could be done like so: we could download a distro install disk and loadlin and make loadlin load the setup program through a line in autoexec.bat. It was quite funny considering we were visitors of a Linux event being held in the museum.

      --
      What time is it/will be over there? Check with my iPhone app!
    3. Re:Slashdot to English by BlueUnderwear · · Score: 2
      That's an excellent way of getting the Museum to continue to hold Linux events.

      Linux doesn't belong into a Museum. Windows does!

      --
      Say no to software patents.
  2. More suspicious of OpenSSH? by jamus · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The way I read the headline, "OpenSSH Gets Even More Suspicious", it sounded like we're supposed to be more suspicious of OpenSSH.

    What has the world come to, where we can't even trust OpenSSH?

    Oh, OpenSSH is more suspicious of its environment! That makes more sense! :P

    1. Re:More suspicious of OpenSSH? by neuroticia · · Score: 5, Funny

      I read that too and my mind quickly said to me "Oh great, time to turn off SSH and only allow shell access to people who physically sit down at the computer.

      Then I realized that it's "suspicious" as in "the suspicious wife accused her husband of sneaking another computer into the house" and not "the actions of the husband were suspicious, leading his wife to accuse him of sneaking another computer into the house."

      Should have said "Open SSH has just become even more paranoid."

      THIS is why computers don't speak English. =]

      -Sara

    2. Re:More suspicious of OpenSSH? by vsprintf · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Complete agreement. When I read the headline, there was a sudden pang of fear. If we had to close down SSH, there wouldn't be any more working-from-home Fridays. :)

    3. Re:More suspicious of OpenSSH? by Darby · · Score: 2

      If we had to close down SSH, there wouldn't be any more working-from-home Fridays. :)

      Sure there would.
      Telnet isn't that bad.
      You just have to have your login script change your password as soon as you log in remotely.
      If you can't remember to *always* log in to the console before you go to work, then the reinstall will prove a useful lesson.

    4. Re:More suspicious of OpenSSH? by ArtDent · · Score: 2

      Maybe that was the idea.

      Isn't a headline supposed to make you want to read the article?

    5. Re:More suspicious of OpenSSH? by CowbertPrime · · Score: 2

      Well yeah. Statistically, OpenSSH has had 2x more serious security related bugs since it forked from commercial SSH. Apparently in their zest to fix what isn't necessarily broken, OpenSSH has ended up with more holes than it started with. This might be a legitimate explanation as to why they are going to separate privileges: when a month-old freenix weenie is given commit access to openssh and writes a patch but forgets to make sure he is using dynamic buffers, everyone who likes being on the bleeding edge doesn't get rooted after they upgrade.

      At one institution I am aware of, the new administration policy has been to convert from openssh over to commercial ssh because of paranoia. Furthermore, when core server software is written such that you must upgrade every few months due to vulnerabilities in the latest-and-greatest, it hinders deployment of autonomous and/or embedded systems that rely on software such as SSH. Basically, if I wanted to build either an autonomous server or embedded system today, and decided to use OpenSSH 3.1.2 - which is supposedly stable, and a remotely exploitable vulnerability is found next month, the box is pretty much screwed, especially if no one is there to administer that machine and to appropriately upgrade it.

  3. Impressive by dybdahl · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Open Source software continues to impress me after so many years. This again proves, how much better software can be, if you remove management, lawyers, sales department etc. and make good programmers work together without short-term profit in mind.

    1. Re:Impressive by Abreu · · Score: 2

      And programmers left alone would be responsible for even more feature-creep then sales or management. We always like kwel stuff, a what if we do this.. Unfortunately we must be restrained.

      Mozilla's XUL user interface, anyone?

      No offense meant, but how long would it had take to make 3 gecko-based browsers (Win,Lin,Mac) using native widgets instead of spending so much time with the kewl "write-once-bugs-everywhere" interface.

      --
      No sig for the moment.
    2. Re:Impressive by Abreu · · Score: 2

      What about one using native Win32 widgets?

      What about making that one just after finishing Gecko, instead of waiting for IE to dominate web designers until most of the web is broken?

      --
      No sig for the moment.
  4. Re:About time by RebelTycoon · · Score: 2, Funny
    Very good... You can cut and paste.

    +1 for using left hand to press [Ctrl-C/V]

    +1 for using right hand to move mouse


    -3 for redundancy and trying to act clever.

  5. SSH is magnificent! by dmarien · · Score: 4, Interesting

    When I first started using linux, I was absolutely blown away by telnet, and the capabilities for remote administration.

    Then came SSH... Not only is the grade of encryption absolute phenomenal, but the extras above and beyond remote shell's are astounding!

    X Forwarding, SCP, FTPs, etc... they all rock! I can't remember the last time I coped a file over any protocol other than SSH's scp command. WinSCP has replaced puTTY as my favorite WIN32 application, and combined with puTTY and secure shells it's now wonder how I've managed to keep my home router/server up for 180 days w/o even having a monitor plugged into it!

    Thanks OpenSSH team!

    --
    dmarien
    1. Re:SSH is magnificent! by p3d0 · · Score: 5, Informative

      Just remember to use the "blowfish" cypher for large files. It's much faster than the default 3DES.

      I use: alias scp="scp -c blowfish-cbc".

      --
      Patrick Doyle
      I mod down every jackass who puts his moderation policy in his sig. Oh, wait a sec....
    2. Re:SSH is magnificent! by demaria · · Score: 2

      Does it exist or is anyone working on AES for scp?

    3. Re:SSH is magnificent! by Sircus · · Score: 3, Informative

      SCP runs over the standard SSH protocol (either SSH1 or SSH2). All SSH security features therefore apply to SCP.

      128-bit AES/Rijndael is one of the "recommended" ciphers for SSH2, but is not supported by SSH1. 192 and 256 bit AES/Rijndael are "optional" for SSH2.

      --
      PenguiNet: the (shareware) Windows SSH client
    4. Re:SSH is magnificent! by demaria · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Thanks for the info. Something else cool, SSH with Tokens. I saw a demo at N+I on the commercial SSH 3.0 by SSH Communications. You need to have a token (such as an e-Aladdin USB eToken) plugged in during the entire session. If the token is removed, the shell instantly drops.

    5. Re:SSH is magnificent! by zootread · · Score: 2, Insightful

      As someone who used to go around cracking *NIX systems, and sniffing out login/passwords with ridiculous ease back in the early to mid 90s, I can say yes SSH is a very good thing. It was good to see sysadmins shut down their telnet daemons for good and require that people download and use a SSH client to connect to systems.

      --
      Zoot!
    6. Re:SSH is magnificent! by thogard · · Score: 2

      Because TeraTerm Pro w/ TTSSH is much better?

    7. Re:SSH is magnificent! by evilviper · · Score: 3, Informative

      An alias is not the best idea.

      Best thing to do, edit your ~/.ssh/config and stick your options in there (or machine-wide if you edit /etc/ssh/ssh_config).

      So, enter something like:

      host *
      Compression no
      Ciphers Blowfish-cbc,3des-cbc
      Protocol 2,1


      Additionally, use DSA/RSA auth, (NOT PASSWORD), and use ssh-agent so that you only need to enter your key's pass-phrase once in a while.

      Anyone that uses SSH (and doesn't yet know about scp, port forwarding, ssh-agent, key-based auth & configuration like above) should buy the O'reilly SSH book.

      --
      Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
    8. Re:SSH is magnificent! by rweir · · Score: 2, Informative

      X Forwarding, SCP, FTPs
      You think that's impressive? Have a look at the -D flag to OpenSSH >3.0: That's right, ssh can now run an encrypted forwarding SOCKS4 server!
      Goddamn!

    9. Re:SSH is magnificent! by Shanep · · Score: 2

      Hey, that is neato. Can you supply it with your own random stream for the keys? I was think of something like this recently.

      I would like a real, strong key that I could plug in and out as I need to use my machines and sessions.

      Can you supplement it's usage with an extra password to avoid the usage of that key if it gets stolen?

      --
      War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
    10. Re:SSH is magnificent! by demaria · · Score: 2

      I don't recall completely all the details about how it works, and it was about a month ago. However I thought it was pretty spiffy at the show. I'm not sure about the random stream for the keys and would rather not guess an answer, especially with security :). In the demo I saw there was a password that needed to be entered for it to work, which would affirmatively answer your second question. Check their website or call. Keep in mind this setup requires each machine to have an accessible USB port (assuming you use a USB token of course), and the commercial SSH (not OpenSSH).

    11. Re:SSH is magnificent! by dasunt · · Score: 2

      Monitor plugged into it? You have a video card in the machine? /me boggles at the thought.

    12. Re:SSH is magnificent! by evilviper · · Score: 4, Informative
      But I only want blowfish for file transfers.

      Well, you could set up seperate config entries like so:

      host mercury-scp
      hostname mercury.domain.com
      cipher blowfish-cbc
      Compression Yes

      host mercury
      hostname mercury.domain.com
      Cipher 3des-cbc
      Compression No


      3des is better (I understand) for interactive shell sessions.

      I not only don't agree, but I fail to even see any logic behind that. Blowfish is a quicker alogrithm any way you look at it... Myself, and many others, regard it as amply strong, very unlikely to be cracked (as DES was), etc. Perhaps you'd clarify why one form of encryption would be better than another for extremely similar uses.
      What's wrong with an alias?

      It's just not a clean way to do it. Perhaps if you use something like the TCL/TK frontend in the future, your alias will not work... I'm sure there are other situations where a shell alias won't work, so I say: why not just do it the proper way in the first place? Of course you can do *much* more with the ~/.ssh/config file. Or, you could make the change machine-wide by editing /etc/ssh/ssh_config.
      --
      Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
    13. Re:SSH is magnificent! by seaan · · Score: 2
      3DES is better (I understand)...

      and a responding post about Blowfish:

      Myself, and many others, regard it as amply strong, very unlikely to be cracked (as DES was)

      To answer these questions, first define "better". Blowfish is faster, and for some people that is enough. When it comes to the security of 3DES vs. Blowfish, I think it is safe to say that the jury is still out on this one. Although evilviper claims DES is cracked, I don't think this is an accurate term.

      There are only two attacks on DES that come even somewhat close to being an "crack": (1) exhaustive search and (2) an obscure oracle attack. The oracle attack has not received much mention recently, but requires a million+ carefully chosen plain-text trials before reducing DES's strength below exhaustive search levels.

      I believe evilviper was referring to the EFF's DES-cracker which performs exhaustive searches on the DES algorithm. The exhaustive search attack is based on the key length, not the algorithm. If you use a 56-bit key for Blowfish, a Blowfish cracker would exhaustively search all possible keys even faster (since Blowfish is quicker to run than DES). 3DES key lengths are 168-bits, but their effective strength is less (probably getting close to 112-bits given lots of storage for a meet-in-the-middle attack).

      So if they have comparable key lengths, is Blowfish better then DES when it comes to design? There is no easy way to tell. One way to judge is by the number of hours it has been examined, and what problems have been discovered. DES is the most publicly examined algorithm, and has stood up very well. It is hard to say, but I'm willing to bet that DES has undergone 2 to 4 orders of magnitude more scrutiny than Blowfish.

      Does that mean DES is more secure than Blowfish? No! But a cautious person could believe DES was more reliable, because it has been scrutinized so much more than Blowfish. This is the primary reason banks are moving to 3DES instead of AES. 3DES may not be fast, but it is very reliable.

    14. Re:SSH is magnificent! by evilviper · · Score: 2
      I think you have your terms mixed. When I say DES, I do not refer to 3DES... Indeed, the fact that DES was cracked is exactly why 3DES is so popular.

      Here's why I say DES was cracked:
      http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,1380 0, 00.html
      The Electronic Frontier Foundation said in a statement today that its "EFF DES Cracker," built for under US$250,000, had cracked an encoded message in fewer than three days. The old record, established using a huge network of computers, was 39 days.


      Additionally, even with a much longer key (as 3DES has), I still would not put much faith in 3DES. Just as with WEP, if one version has been found excessively vulnerable, why put faith in an updated version? ESPECIALLY, when MANY other very good encryption methods exist: Blowfish, AES (up to 256-Bit in SSH2), CAST, ARCFour (RC4) etc.

      Of course, you're welcome to disagree.
      --
      Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
    15. Re:SSH is magnificent! by seaan · · Score: 2
      The EFF "DES CRACKER" is a brute force attack, which has nothing to do with the strength of the algorithm. It consists of a whole bunch of parallel processors that can try different key ranges. Right now they are programmed to perform DES, but they could just as easily be programmed to perform some other algorithm.

      The lesson you should get from the EFF's DES CRACKER is not that something is wrong with the DES algorithm; rather it is that 56-bit keys are weak when you take into account today's computing power. If you are encrypting something important enough, you should choose an algorithm that has a larger key size.

      The 3DES algorithm uses DES 3 times (hence the "triple-DES" label), and as I mentioned before provides a key strength somewhere between 112 through 168-bits. There are a number of reasons to avoid 3DES, but so far the strength of the algorithm is not one of them.

      * Performance is one reason, DES is fairly slow by itself, and 3DES requires 3 iterations.

      * 3DES key management is comparable to other algorithms where keys are longer than the data block size, but is trickier than single-DES (because single-DES has the property that keys can be encrypted with a single data block). Naïve upgrades from DES to 3DES render many protocols vulnerable (correcting those problems contributes to how I make my living).

      * It is also important that 3DES be performed in an atomic manor, since the ability to separate the DES calls would leak information. This is just a difference in implementation (where 3DES may be more likely to have a sloppy implementation), since most algorithms would leak similar types of information if internal states were revealed.

      * You might decide that you should avoid 3DES because it is being attacked the most, and therefore is more likely to fail. Of course that would only be a benefit if the attack did not work on other algorithms. Also it may be more likely that a DES break would be made public, while breaks against lesser-known algorithms are more likely to be kept private.

      Another thing to consider is key size. DES is kind of lumpy, and does not allow a smooth set of choices (40-bit, 128-bit, 129-bit, etc.). But right now I think some of these key size differences are fairly academic (history will eventually make this statement wrong, but it will apply for a number of years). Once you start getting beyond a certain point, say 110-150 bits, exhaustive search is beyond any technology currently dreamed of. When you are looking at searches that are larger than the estimated number of atoms in the universe, it is going to take a completely different tack to break those types of algorithms.

      There are a whole bunch of ways, in theory, to break these large key algorithms without doing an exhaustive search. The most straightforward method is an algorithmic "break", where a weakness in the algorithm is found that allows it to be broken faster than exhaustive search. That is why DES (and 3DES) is popular, because this type of breaking is considered less likely to occur in this very well studied algorithm. Most likely the weakness will come in the form of a new attack type, which today's expert designers did not protect against. But there are other problems with larger key sizes, like lack of entropy. It is very difficult to obtain the high-entropy random numbers required by 256-bit keys. With today's technology, it would be much quicker (and possibly even practical) to attack the randomness of the key generator, rather that trying an exhaustive search.

      In summary, concluding 3DES is weak, merely because an exhaustive search attack has been performed against 56-bit single-DES is misguided. There are a number of good reasons to avoid 3DES, but you have not mentioned the ones I would consider valid (see above). It is interesting that you should bring up WEP, since the problems with WEP are: it was naively designed, and it was not subject to the widespread review that contributes to our state-of-the-art cryptographic designs. DES is in precisely the opposite position, because it has withstood the most rigorous reviews of any cryptographic algorithm.

      PS: Another interesting point is that 2 of the 4 algorithms you mentioned as an alternative to DES need to be approached with a bit of caution. I would recommend careful study of the current cryptographic academic research before using RC4 or CAST for important uses.

    16. Re:SSH is magnificent! by evilviper · · Score: 2
      The EFF "DES CRACKER" is a brute force attack, which has nothing to do with the strength of the algorithm.

      Well, that's a borderline statement. The DES CRACKER is possible because of chips that are specially designed to go through the DES keys quicker than would otherwise be possible. It's been quite some time since I read the technical details, so I'm not in a possition to reiterate the information. I'm sure it would not take much searching to find more information.

      I would recommend careful study of the current cryptographic academic research before using RC4 or CAST for important uses.

      I am quite well aware of RC4's history and potential problems, and would still be willing to trust it with sensitive data (as a matter of fact, an encryption system that I use on my handheld, uses a 256-bit RC4 algorithm). However, I do not have extensive knowledge of CAST, and would be far more reluctant to make use of it (*especially* considering that there are many other very good methods available).
      --
      Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
    17. Re:SSH is magnificent! by seaan · · Score: 2
      The EFF DES CRACKER did not do anything special with the DES engine in their chips (http://www.eff.org/descracker.html). Since DES is a popular algorithm, they had a good selection of hardware library routines to choose from. The main design difficulties were packing many execution engines onto a single chip, and setting up an efficient dispatching/testing architecture that coordinates and manages the parallel processing.

      In the last few years, quite a few efficient implementations of other algorithms have become more common (probably due in part to the proliferation of SSL and IPSEC accelerators). As I mentioned before, the "hard work" of managing the parallel processing has already been done, and they could easily switch the design to use some other crypto engine.

  6. Re:Even OpenBSD developers can be vain... by The_Final_Word · · Score: 4, Informative

    upgrade to Apache 1.3.26 or 2.0.39, it's an Apache problem and it is on their home page.

    http://httpd.apache.org/

    The OpenBSD folks gave a patch for the OS before the new Apache binaries were released as a work around.

    --
    The Final Word
  7. Re:No thanks by kevinqtipreedy · · Score: 2, Informative

    Trust old telnet works fine, unless you are worried about people seeing your passwords, and everything you are doing. That is the point of ssh; it encrypts what you do, including passwords so it can not be seen by people on the same network segment. Telnet send your password and everything you do right over the wire without encoding it at all. A difficult password is just as important on telnet as in is on ssh because they can still be cracked either way.

  8. Re:Necessary and useful by GreenHell · · Score: 5, Informative

    Yes, portability is...

    Of the 3 major BSD's, NetBSD's goal is to run on as many platforms as possible, FreeBSD's goal is to create a reliable, free UNIX (it may not meet your definition of free, but that's another story), and OpenBSD's goal is to provide the most secure distro possible.

    --
    "I won't mod you down - I feel the need to call you a twit explicitly, rather than by implication."
  9. Re:Even OpenBSD developers can be vain... by neuroticia · · Score: 3, Insightful

    You mean they didn't accept the patch you wrote for them!? Ludicrous. Maybe they're too busy being whipped along by people who don't give anything back to the OS community to evaluate your code. ;) I mean... You obviously feel strongly about it so you HAVE to have written a patch, no?

    If they KNOW about it, and I'm sure they do, then they'll patch it. They're not Microsoft, afterall. In the meantime, if you're not a developer, lay off the whip. Like you said- the bug is recent, if they let a few months fly by without doing anything then you can start complaining.

    -Sara

  10. Re:No thanks by Admiral+Burrito · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Telnet wins hands down. Just use a difficult password, and change it frequently.

    Except telnet does zero encryption. It is a trivial matter to sniff passwords from an unencrypted link, and inserting data is not much harder. Changing passwords frequently is kind of pointless if you are setting your new password over an insecure link.

    One-time passwords are better, but they are still vulnerable to TCP insertion attacks.

    Yes, these things have been exploited in the wild. SSH exists for a reason.

    If security problems in SSH itself worry you (and they should), privilidge-seperated ssh is the answer. By seperating the privilidged code from the code that talks to the client and defining a good interface between them, it limits the amount of stuff that can go wrong and the quantity of code that needs to be audited.

  11. Uh...? by JanusFury · · Score: 4, Interesting

    For those of us without much experience in the encryption and networking fields, anyone mind explaining exactly what this does? I read the page but I'm not sure I understand exactly what's going on.

    --
    using namespace slashdot;
    troll::post();
    1. Re:Uh...? by Accipiter · · Score: 2

      To put it simply:

      Encrypted Telnet.

      --

      -- Give him Head? Be a Beacon?
      (If you can't figure out how to E-Mail me, Don't. :P)

    2. Re:Uh...? by PacoTaco · · Score: 2, Informative

      Handling arbitrary data from the network as root is a bad thing. Basically, an attacker's exploits run at the same privilege level as the daemon they break in through. The new OpenSSH strategy uses a non-root user to do most of the work. That way, the attacker doesn't have immediate root access to your system if sshd is compromised.

    3. Re:Uh...? by LinuxGeek8 · · Score: 3, Informative

      I'm not into it that much too. But simply said it starts different processes.
      The parent process starts with root priviliges, and the child processes handle the actual connections, and do not run with root priviliges.
      For things like authentication the child communicates with the parent. Hmm, would that mean a new connection needs to authenticate itself twice then? (in 1 login) I assume so.
      If the child gets corrupted, or someone tries to break in, he will not have the root priviliges of the parent process.

      In previous ssh versions it was always running with root priviliges, even if you were logged in as user. So every exploit in openssh is immediately a remote root exploit.

      This is sort of the same model that Apache has, one root parent, the rest runs as user www or whatever.
      The same as postfix, the secure alternative for sendmail, which also runs only as root I believe).

      --
      Well, don't worry about that. We can get you back before you leave. (Dr. Who)
    4. Re:Uh...? by evilviper · · Score: 2

      I know you've got responses, but I think I've got a much more simple explanation...

      This is essentially like having an application (that need Root access) NOT SUID Root, and rather, having a simple application that it calls when it needs to do some privlidged action.

      So, think of Apache running as a non-privlidged user, and NetCat being SUID Root, and simply calling NetCat when it needs to communicate on a privlidged port, etc.

      --
      Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
  12. Re:um, inetd? by PacoTaco · · Score: 2, Interesting

    It's totally different. If you run sshd from inetd, you are still processing network data as root. If someone finds a buffer overflow (or whatever) they can execute arbitrary code as root on your system. This strategy uses an unprivileged user to do most of the network data processing, with a privileged parent process for verification and authentication. At worst, a remote attacker could only get access as the unprivileged user.

  13. Re:ssh is great by Sc00ter · · Score: 2
    uhh, -DEFAULT- is the key word. If it's not the default remote shell, installing it doesn't make it any more the default.

  14. Packet sniffing by PatJensen · · Score: 2, Interesting
    Everyone says SSH is great, because your passwords and session information cannot be sniffed and I know that - but how important is it now? You cannot sniff packets on a switched network without SPAN access or port mirroring access on the switch itself. And over multiple switches, it is not trivial to gain access to do that since multiple access ports do not receive unicast frames. Unless you were the switch administrator of all the core and access switches I don't see this happening easily.

    Is there a tool that allows you to force the switch to forward ethernet frames so they can be sniffed without switch administrator access? Please offer some information on how this is done as I'd like to have a better understanding on how this works. What platforms does the tool run on, and on what switch platforms would it work against?

    -Pat (a CCNP and MCSE)

    1. Re:Packet sniffing by GigsVT · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Who says the attack is local? Your packets cross from 5 to 20 hops before getting to their destination. Routers can be compromised, theough security weaknesses or through deliberate government interference. OpenSSH also allows for host authentication, so you know you are really talking to who you think you are. A secure transport is about more than some guy on your LAN sniffing your password.

      --
      I've had enough abrasive sigs. Kittens are cute and fuzzy.
    2. Re:Packet sniffing by sporty · · Score: 2

      What if there is one misconfigured router somewhere.. or some chucklehead in sprint wants to collect CC numbers, and they are an admin.

      Not a nice feeling, now is it. It is a bit of paranoia.. but an once of prevention is worth a pound of cure..

      --

      -
      ping -f 255.255.255.255 # if only

    3. Re:Packet sniffing by mlyle · · Score: 3, Interesting

      There are plenty of attacks that if you reside on the same virtual lan as one of the victims that allow you to intercept traffic.

      One is sending traffic from the victim's mac address, so that the switch "learns" that MAC is out your port. Port security features on switches can help fix this but are oft-unused.

      Another is ARP spoofing and using that to man-in-the-middle the session. You tell the person logging in that your MAC address is the victim host, and it cheerfully sends all packets to you. This is difficult to detect and prevent.

      In conclusion: switches do not provide security against packet sniffing attacks.

    4. Re:Packet sniffing by PatJensen · · Score: 2
      Thanks for the flame, but I don't think you understood my question. I understand the benefits and strengths of using SSH and encrypted VPN products and I use them regularly. My question was - how important is this with packet switching blocking frames that are able to be sniffed?

      -Pat

    5. Re:Packet sniffing by nr · · Score: 2, Interesting

      You can sniff switched networks as the ARP querys are sent out to the broadcast address and received by all hosts on the segment, and then you send a fake ARP replie to that ARP query fooling the victim into beliving you are the real host. Poisoning the victims APR cache with your MAC address instead of the real destionation hosts MAC address.

      There exists a sniffer tool called EtterTap that can do this automaticly for you.

    6. Re:Packet sniffing by mrmag00 · · Score: 2, Interesting

      The correct conclusion would be "Any cheap switch does not provide security against packet sniffing attacks."

      These things are nothing new, and cisco catalyst switches can be configured to prevent all of these. Of course, they come at a cost - about $1000 for bottom of the line.

    7. Re:Packet sniffing by Tuzanor · · Score: 2
      You can packet storm the switch with tons and tons of mac addresses. eventually the switch won't know where to forward packets because its database will be overflowed. The switch will then drop down to a sort of "hub mode".

      For some reason this attack is common in college dormatories. ;-)

  15. Re:Even OpenBSD developers can be vain... by swillden · · Score: 2

    Apparently, the OpenBSD team is announcing it as a "possible remote crash"... It's only a matter of days before someone is going to drop a new worm!

    Wow. If you can figure out how to exploit a remote crash to spread a worm, you're a lot smarter than I am, dude.

    --
    Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
  16. Re:DON'T LISTEN! TROJAN ADVICE! by Psiren · · Score: 2

    Everyone should know better than to accept advice from random slashdot comments!

    Like this one? ;)

  17. Ettercap (was Re:Packet sniffing) by Nonesuch · · Score: 5, Informative
    Packet sniffing traffic that crosses your ISP and then the public Internet is definitely a serious and real risk.
    PatJensen asks:
    Is there a tool that allows you to force the switch to forward ethernet frames so they can be sniffed without switch administrator access?
    There are tricks to force the switch to 'flood' ethernet frames (overflow the CAM table, etc). Two common attacks against switched segments are MAC spoofing (easily detected and protected against on Cisco) and ARP spoofing (more difficult to protect against).

    There is also a tool to permit packet sniffing, see ettercap on Sourceforge.

    Ettercap is a multipurpose sniffer/interceptor/logger for switched LAN. It supports active and passive dissection of many protocols (even ciphered ones) and includes many feature for network and host analysis.

    Ettercap is actively being used by the "black hat" community, and has been found on compromised systems on switched LAN segments "in the wild".

    1. Re:Ettercap (was Re:Packet sniffing) by PatJensen · · Score: 3, Interesting
      Thanks for the informative response. Is there a place where I can read whitepapers on the viability of CAM overflows and MAC and ARP spoofing? Does Cisco have anything available that relates to this security? I'm aware of port security (only allowing certain MAC address to join a port) and VMPS (a centralized MAC database for VLANs, network wide).

      Would either of these be helpful in prevent these types of attacks?

      Thanks again.

      -Pat

  18. Re:Even OpenBSD developers can be vain... by Styx · · Score: 2

    Trouble is, it isn't just a remote crash. See http://online.securityfocus.com/news/493

    --
    /Styx
  19. No thanks??? by Nonesuch · · Score: 5, Insightful
    kevinqtipreedy writes:
    Trust old telnet works fine, unless you are worried about people seeing your passwords, and everything you are doing.
    And you're not?
    That is the point of ssh; it encrypts what you do, including passwords so it can not be seen by people on the same network segment.
    That is one of the many points of SSH. The protocol also supports public-key authentication, so you don't need a "shared secret" (reusable password) at all. The protocol also provides authentication that you are really talking to the remote server you think you are, preventing MITM attacks (e.g. spoofing DNS so your telnet session goes through my server). SSH also offers compression, for faster file transfers. And port forwarding, including X11. and much more.

    A difficult password is just as important on telnet as in is on ssh because they can still be cracked either way.
    It is unlikely that anybody is going to bother cracking your telnet password- if they don't sniff it, then there are few scenarios where somebody has the ability to obtain the shadow file from a server but does not already have root.

    One issue with password cracking and sniffing is that it is critical to have a unique password for every site you have accounts at.

    Under SSH, I can set up systems so that password logins only work on the physical console, not over the network. I can create a strong private key (passphrase protected) and install my public key on the remote servers, using the same key for many different servers without the security issues that come from using the same password across disparate sites.

  20. Timothy by jhines · · Score: 4, Funny

    It is Timothy that we don't trust.

  21. What it does - Program, not Protocol Security by billstewart · · Score: 5, Informative
    This isn't a change to the communications protocols or any of the encryption - it's a change to the Unix implementation of the server to make it much less likely that any bugs can let someone break in. (Initially this works for OpenBSD, should be easy to port to other BSD implementations, probably to Linux and Solaris, maybe to WinNT but maybe not.) The basic way that a communications server like this works is
    • A process sits around listening to the well-known TCP port for connection requests. The process needs to be privileged for two reasons
    • The port is a system resource so only the system should be able to control it
    • When a user logs in (on Unix), their connection needs to operate with the permissions of that user, so the server needs to be root so it can start a session as any user who logs in (as opposed to a Web Server, which usually only needs access to publicly readable files.

    When a request comes in, it hands it to a subroutine that handles requests for the server to do different functions, including authentication.

    For some services, such as SSH and FTP, the server may set up multiple connections for things like transferring files, etc.You can write a server like this as one big single-threaded process, or as one big process with multiple threads if your operating system and programming environment support it, but it's more common, especially on Unix, for the main process to spin off several child processes to do the work and go back to listening for new incoming requests. In this case, it spins of one process to handle the control channel communications and that process spins off other processes to handle specific tasks like file transfers, after checking that the connection and the request are authenticated. In a simple-minded implementation, the control channel process runs as root, and any task channel processes start off as root, and maybe change their privileges to an individual user's privileges if they need to (for instance if you're using SSH to log in to a remote system.)

    The problem with this is that if there are any bugs that let a remote connection send messages with unexpected data in ways that break or take over the server process, the server is running as root so it can do anything it wants, however evil or dangerous (or if it's a minor bug that doesn't lead to a complete takeover, it may still be able to burn critical resources and stall the system or do some other denial of service attack.) Two popular kinds of attacks are sending a message that overflows a field (the result of bad protection in the C language combined with careless programming), or sending a message that asks the process to do something that the programmer didn't expect and protect against, such as setting permissions on a system file or making a user's program privileged, so that it can be exploited later, either by another communication from the attacker or by routine activities by the system or the user.

    What the new OpenSSH implementation does is takes the bottom two server processes (the control channel server and the task servers) and splits each of them into two parts that communicate with each other. One part of each processes is a master, that keeps running privileged if it needs to, and the other is a slave process that runs as a non-privileged user (either the user who's requesting the service, for tasks like logins, or as the "nobody" user) and does most of the actual work, passing messages back and forth to the master process to communicate about status and request anything that still requires privileges. This gives you a bunch of security advantages:

    • Each part of the system is smaller, with fewer functions to perform and well-defined interfaces to other parts, so you can do a better job of checking for bugs and each part can validate incoming messages before doing anything.
    • The parts of the system that need to be privileged aren't communicating directly with the remote user, only with the slave processes, so they have a much smaller set of messages to validate.
    • If there's some bug in the system that lets a remote attacker take over one of the control or task processes by sending an craftily designed message, the bug is in the non-privileged slave process, which doesn't run as root, can't do as much damage, and has a limited set of messages that the master process will accept from it.

    The rest of it is basically detail about which functions they separated into which programs, how they made sure that each piece has enough capabilities to do the job without giving it too much power that could be exploited by an attacker, and some stuff about how they validated the pieces. It's adding more complexity to the total system, but each piece is more limited in function, and the security-critical pieces are much easier to validate against bugs and malicious input.

    --

    Bill Stewart
    New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
  22. Re:Necessary and useful by __past__ · · Score: 4, Insightful
    FreeBSD's goal is to create a reliable, free UNIX (it may not meet your definition of free, but that's another story)
    I know it's probably unwise to make this up, but how exactly do you define "free" in a way it doesn't match FreeBSDs license?

    The usual complaint from people favoring the GPL is that it's not Copyleft, so it's free even for people not interested in freedom for anyone but themselves, but I think nobody - from the FSF to Microsoft - would say it is not free itself.

  23. Re:Even OpenBSD developers can be vain... by __past__ · · Score: 2

    Um, you do realize that a patch is available?

  24. Re:Even OpenBSD developers can be vain... by ostiguy · · Score: 2

    The problem is that it doesn't appear that anyone has been able to make the alleged remote root exploit work. I haven't read misc@openbsd.org this weekend, but the consensus of the list as of yesterday was that it was not a legitimate root exploit.

    And generally, since apache is not running by default, the OpenBSD team would tend to be of the mindset that if you are going to turn it on, you better stay up to speed on it.

    not speaking for the team of course,
    ostiguy

  25. Re:Security of SSH by Dwonis · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I agree. IP over SSH is a bad idea for the same reasons why TCP over TCP is a bad idea.

  26. Re:Necessary and useful by Jeremi · · Score: 5, Interesting
    but how exactly do you define "free" in a way it doesn't match FreeBSDs license? The usual complaint from people favoring the GPL is that it's not Copyleft, so it's free even for people not interested in freedom for anyone but themselves


    I think the GPL people would say that FreeBSD isn't Free in the "Free Willy" sense... GPL software cannot be captured back into proprietary software and made non-free again, whereas BSD licensed software can be (and often is). So while Linux code will always roam the wild plains, BSD code spends some of its time laboring in the Microsoft prison camps.... or something like that. :^)

    --


    I don't care if it's 90,000 hectares. That lake was not my doing.
  27. Re:Necessary and useful by Jeremi · · Score: 5, Insightful
    Code that's already out there will always be free to "roam the wild plains" ... it can't be made non-free again. People can base non-free derivative products off it but that still doesn't "un-free" the original code...


    Technically, you're correct, but in the larger view, there is a historical pattern where free code gets 'adopted' by a company, and the company adds lots of functionality to the free code, so that eventually the free code is no longer competitive, and everyone switches over to using the closed-source product. At that point, the code is no longer free (except for the "old" code which is no longer useful or used, and thus doesn't count). This is what happened to Unix in the 70's and 80's, leading to Unix's fragmentation and irrelevance as a platform. With GPL code, you don't have to worry so much about v2.0 coming out as closed-source, leaving you with a choice between staying with v1.0 or losing the benefits of open source.

    --


    I don't care if it's 90,000 hectares. That lake was not my doing.
  28. The debate itself is pointless by leereyno · · Score: 2, Insightful

    It seems to me that the entire GPL vs BSD debate is nothing more than a pastime for those with nothing better to do. Just think about it, a bunch of non programmers standing around bickering about licenses they'll never put anything out under anyway. Arm-chair quarterbacking for geeks.

    As for actual developers, well there too the debate, or at least an ongoing never-ending squabble, is essentially pointless. Each programmer or team of programmers is going to choose and use the license they like best for the reasons they consider important. They have EVERY right to make this choice as they are the one's doing the work. Whether anyone else likes it or not is completely irrelevant.

    Personally I like both licenses, but for different reasons. I see the GPL as a munition, a weapon. Putting high quality implementations of key tools and programs out under the GPL makes sure that the Microsofts of the world play nice by not being too greedy and/or abusing their customers. The downside to the GPL is that you're not going to obtain any financial gain from the products you release under it. There are rare exceptions such as RedHat, but then that company's product is a delivery system for GPL's software more than the software itself. Ultimately the value of GPL'd software is strategic, not directly economic. The GPL is most suitable for fundamental technologies that NEED to be kept absolutely open to ensure that incompatibilities don't creep in due to proprietary implementations. The BSD license is good because the code can be included in commercial programs. Now some people might start foaming at the mouth at the mere mention of commercial software. Of course these same people are usually in high school, college, or 35 and still living in their parent's basement.

    Commercial software is what makes products that don't enjoy a wide following possible. Open Source is like socialism in a way. (Actually I don't think that my comparing Open Source to socialism was a very polite thing to do. Socialism is a system by which the abilities of one person are forcibly exploited to fulfill the needs of another. It and communism are but two points along the same continuum.) The base needs of the many are fulfilled, but what about the needs of the few? Does it make sense to try and organize a project to create an open source program to track oil deposits? How about an open source medical imaging system? There are some products for which there is a very small need in terms of how many people need the product. These same people are more often than not willing and able to pay good money to see that these products get created however. Also there is the question of expertise. Programmers are not experts on the best way to do everything possible with a computer. Imagine if someone tried to create an open source implementation of SPSS. Now what if I told you that such a project existed (PSPP) and that it hasn't gone ANYWHERE. The reason is that programmers are not statisticians. Their ability to verify the correctness of their own software's out put is next to nil.

    At the end of the day both the GPL and BSD licenses have a useful function to perform. So does commerical software. Anyone who continuously argues about the role these three should play doesn't understand them in the first place.

    Lee

    --
    Muslim community leaders warn of backlash from tomorrow morning's terrorist attack.
  29. Re:DON'T LISTEN! TROJAN ADVICE! by p3d0 · · Score: 2

    Do you have a link?

    --
    Patrick Doyle
    I mod down every jackass who puts his moderation policy in his sig. Oh, wait a sec....
  30. Re:No thanks by Mr.+Flibble · · Score: 2

    No, you are out to lunch.

    Sorry, but Telnet is a severe security hole.

    Take a look at this link. The program Hunt can crash through a Telnet session and steal it. It is also possible to use a simililar attack on systems using SSH 1, which is why you should not use it.

    Also, if you have ever heard of anything such as dsnifff you know that Telnet is practically useless in terms of security. Combine dsniff and hunt and you have one crappy method of defense. I don't care how strong your password is if I can:

    1) Read it and capture it. (dsniff)

    or

    2) Simply steal the sesion, and thus have no need to type the password at all. (hunt)

    Don't take anything in security for granted. For example I know of an admin who recently decided to implement backups to a remote NFS system, thus he opened up NFS, and thus portmap (port 111) to the world through his firewall. He still has no idea why this is bad, which explains why I will be completely reinstalling his servers in a few days.

    You might not know why portmap is bad - but it is - you might also assume Telnet is ok. It is not. I have watched over 25 machines get compromised by Telnet, and I was the one who had to fix them. (I always get called in AFTER the fact - never before which I think is dumb.)

    So, operate like OpenBSD - trust no one. Trust no protocol until you have a reason to trust it to some degree. And if you don't know why portmap / port 111 is bad, you may want to look that up at the same time.

    --
    Try to hack my 31337 firewall!
  31. There is a better way to fix one of these problems by thogard · · Score: 4, Interesting

    You must be root to bind to any port <1024 as a form of "security" however this stupid rule has been the way in for most internet based security problems in the Unix world. Some systems (like Soalris) allow you to turn it off and that lets any process bind to any port but that has issues as well.

    The correct solution is you let a process bind to any port >1024 and any port where the port number is in its group list. This means you put apache process owner in group 80 and 443 and then it can bind it its needed ports no matter who it runs as. Wiht the linux 2.0 kernal this required changing some of one line.

    As far as the other problem of becoming someone else, there are no clean solutions to that but I think it would make sense to allow any process id 10 to become someone else. You also need to allow for some id's to give away files. The problem with this is that it intoduces magic numbers into the system which is bad.

    Based in this, you could set up the ssh user as uid 1 in group 22 and it could bind to port 22 and then become any other user (or maybe any userid > 100). Bind would be running as user 53 with group 53 and have no special privs. The Apache user id would be in group 80 & 433 and its version of suexec would be uid 2 so it could change ownership to any user > 100 to run their cgis.

  32. Re:Necessary and useful by einhverfr · · Score: 2

    One of the primary tenets of OpenBSD and NetBSD is security, correct? This is just another little bit of bytecode that improves security even more...

    Absolutely. Now if only we can get Microsoft to use unprivilaged children for IIS, we might be getting somewhere.

    Not that I am advocating child labor (well, children of Daemons maybe ;))

    --

    LedgerSMB: Open source Accounting/ERP
  33. Re:ssh is great by Shanep · · Score: 2

    If your *nix doesn't use ssh by default for remote logins, maybe it's not worth using that *nix, if that is a measure of their security policies.

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
  34. Re:DON'T LISTEN! TROJAN ADVICE! by styrotech · · Score: 2, Funny

    Blowfish is inherently insecure, ANY FILE LARGER THAN 1024KB YOU TRANSFER CAN BE DECRYPTED BY ANY 13 YEAR OLD WITH A POCKET CALCULATOR!

    Hmmm... I tried that out, but it didn't work for me. I'm pretty sure the calculator is okay, do you think my 13 year old is faulty?

  35. Re:oxymoronic by Shanep · · Score: 2

    If you are going to make a blanket statement comparing security and reliability of open vs. closed source software, then I think you should compare the best of both Worlds.

    I'll start with the open source World and suggest OpenBSD, 5 years without a remote hole in the default install. You can read that as, an extremely secure kernel, with an extremely secure network stack and general system layout.

    I'll leave the closed source contender up to you to present to us. ; )

    Anyone idiot can look at "Open Source Done Wrong (tm)" and then say look, OSS is shite, but then any idiot can be a source of open source (or closed for that matter).

    The best of breeds should be shown before the average and worst.

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
  36. Re:Even OpenBSD developers can be vain... by Shanep · · Score: 2

    1. OpenBSD does not start httpd by default.
    2. The exploit opens up a terminal that appears to be a root term, but is actually a fake. It only has nobody privs.

    If you don't read the lists, then look at the archives. The exploit is humorous, but against Apache. The OpenBSD crew don't write Apache, they just fix it when it breaks.

    The most stable OS to be running it on, would be OpenBSD.

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
  37. Re:Even OpenBSD developers can be vain... by Shanep · · Score: 2

    Yeah, a fake root term that is actually run as nobody via a service they don't enable by default.

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
  38. Depends on what you want. by Kludge · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Many of us who transfer large amounts of data over the internet (TBytes worth) don't care about people decrypting our files. (To you my files would like random numbers anyway.)

    We only really care about safegaurding the authentication process. In fact I would love to see a feature in scp where only the authentication is encrypted and all other data transfers are not.

  39. Re:DON'T LISTEN! TROJAN ADVICE! by Shanep · · Score: 2

    Would you like to elaborate and become the first person with cryptanalysis which shows a weakness in Blowfish and thus enjoy the spoils of your elite mental power? You are about to knock Bruce of his pedestal and render his works suspect?

    No? I thought not.

    PS, moderators, the parent post is not "Insightful", it is one of either "Funny" or "Troll" depending on your mood and knowledge of Blowfish and typical Slashdot Anonymous Coward posts. I would lean towards Troll and moderate him down into the rest of the noise.

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
  40. Re:There is a better way to fix one of these probl by tigga · · Score: 2, Informative
    Well, it's something like Network ACLs..

    And it's done, for example in MicroBSD - http://www.microbsd.net

  41. Re:Security of SSH by fferreres · · Score: 2

    They have already told you what modification they recomend. Go make them and patch them yourselve :) That'sanother bonus of open source. You don't have to wait for someone else, you can do it yourself.

    But SSH is fine, nobody will steal your password unless they know they can profit well from it. (Furthermore, plain bugs are more easily exploitable than cryptography weaknesess).

    --
    unfinished: (adj.)
  42. Garbage by batdragon · · Score: 2, Informative
    1. I'd rather have a 2n length key to encrypt an n length chunk, rather than an n-length key to encrypt a 2n length chunk.
      Helps spread the bits of "randomness" a little further. Why would you like it the other way around? Sounds insane.
    2. What information have you found that proves blowfish is insecure? Links or your own cryptanalysis are welcome.
    3. Anyone who wants some actual facts about blowfish should start here. I doubt if the AC who posted the parent will produce anything to refute the specs.
  43. Re:There is a better way to fix one of these probl by DavidTC · · Score: 3, Informative
    The first solution would have made sense, except for the fact group ids are not that changable on production systems. There probably already is a group number 80. But it's a nice start, someday you'll invent ACLs. However your second suggestion is the silliest thing I've ever heard.

    The problem is that ssh can change to any user it wants. That's the PROBLEM, that's the reason that bit was seperated out and away from the network traffic bit. It's not a solution.

    Making it where the process id X (Where X is supposed to be sshd), can change to anyone else, is pretty much a negative solution to the problem, because now people can get root even after it's dropped privs. Not to mention now you cannot restart sshd if you need to, because it has to be pid X. And god help you when the kernel people come up with yet another 'fake' process that runs when the kernel starts, using no memory but taking up a pid.

    And there is functionally no difference between being able to change to any user except root and being able to change to root. If you can change to the sysadmin's non-root account you can get root trivially by trojaning 'su', or, if he's very paranoid, by trojaning his shell.

    --
    If corporations are people, aren't stockholders guilty of slavery?
  44. Re:oxymoronic by Shanep · · Score: 2

    Security? A comparison of 2001 CERT advisories shows that closed source software constituted 72%.

    Stability? Netcraft shows that the web servers with the top 10 average and the top 19 maximum uptimes are Open Source.

    Open source allows people who are passionate about coding to code great things in large groups. They get great stability and security through honest desire and mass co-operation.

    Closed source allows people who are passionate about money to code profitable things in small groups. They get money through marketing. Being closed allows them to brush problems under the carpet in the hope that they won't get noticed until after that products lifetime. Or even claim that problems are merely "theoretical", until someone posts a "BeSysAdm.exe".


    source availability has little to do with the security or reliability of software.

    I have been supporting closed source software for the past 9 years and I've been using open source software for about 5 years, supporting for about 3.

    Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD has NEVER crashed on me in normal circumstances (I have managed to make Linux crash when tweaking and building custom kernels). I could never say this about any closed source software I've supported. Netware is pretty stable, but can't touch FreeBSD from what I've seen.

    OpenBSD is secure because Theo and friends

    Of course, but plenty of fixes and alerts come from people who are simply able to read the source and "friends" come into the stable due to being able to read it in the first place.

    this security comes at a steep cost ((re)training, missing features, maintenance).

    Learning OpenBSD for someone who is knowledgable about network security is far from steep learning.

    Very few machines can be made useful running only the "default install".

    Even in light of the recent vulnerability, Apache actually has a good security history. The last time it was mentioned in a CERT advisory was 1996. IIS has been mentioned 8 times since. Then there's Qmail...

    Compare, what?

    Oh I don't know, compare the comparative?

    IIS? NT/2000?

    Open source also allows fixes to come very quickly. Often the person who was able to find the exploit, also supplies a patch to fix it. If not, it often comes within a day or even hours. Can you find a closed source hole that was fixed in hours?

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
  45. Re:oxymoronic by Shanep · · Score: 2

    So what? That might mean that closed source software has wider deployment.

    It is actually a statistic of holes, not a statistic of reported exploits.

    It might mean that closed source software is scrutinized more closely.

    Open source is an easier target to find holes but also to fix holes. Closed source gets security via the wrong reasons. Obscurity.

    It might even mean that closed source software is used in more places where security matters.

    Once again, it is a statistic of holes, not a statistic of reported exploits.

    The bottom line is that the distinction closed/open should make very little difference when evaluating the security aspect of any particular installation.

    And guns don't kill people, it just makes it easier for people to kill people. Open source doesn't make security, it just makes it easier for people to make secure code. Do you think hundreds of thousands of eyes reviewing code is not better than a typical corporate team of eyes?

    alldas.org defacement statistics [alldas.org] per OS place Linux, an open source OS, at 22%, while Solaris, which is closed source, clocks in at 4%.

    These are incidents and worst case ones at that. Anyone can baddly admin a server and chances are that those that do are doing it with Linux more than Solaris. You can after all, accidentally get into Linux from a visit to your local newsagent.

    The numbers I have been giving show capabilities of software. Unless the admins fixed broken code without giving it back, the admins here are irrelevant. You are showing worst cases which can easily be bad admin.

    I also note that you failed to answer my question: if open source makes for secure software, then why do we need something like OpenBSD at all? Why are not all open source OS's as secure as OpenBSD?

    Not all open source projects are focused on security to those levels. I firmly beleive that the average open source software is more secure and has less bugs than closed source, it does not need OpenBSD, some people do though because OpenBSD takes security to a step above everything else. OpenBSD is an extra move forward in security.

    The bottom line is that the distinction closed/open should make very little difference when evaluating the security aspect of any particular installation.

    Any particular installation that uses open source, has the source to scrutinize and fix. Any particular installation that uses closed source, has to hope there are no holes and then when holes do become apparent they have to hope for a quick fix, which rarely happens.

    Again, irrelevant. It might mean that open source people will go to great lengths to avoid rebooting their machines.

    If those systems were exploitable, they would have been exploited. A server with almost 4 years uptime shows stability if you ask me.

    It might even mean that open source software is conservative/stagnant.

    Conservative as in putting security before features? They get the jobs done. Mail gets relayed, web pages get served, files get downloaded. Yet they don't get owned anywhere near as much.

    Unless the reboots actually hurt business there is no inherent advantage to long uptimes.

    Some installations required stable systems 24/7.

    Great stability and security are achieved by paying a lot of attention to stability and security.

    Of course.

    The development method is strictly secondary.

    The development method can either make the job easy or hard.

    What can I say. Try harder. For example take a look at how Linux MM will happily let a process run amok with a high probability of wrecking the box.

    Are we still speaking comparitively? If you choose a worst case I will choose Microsoft. But please, look at my .sig for my opinion of Linux MM. My primary OS of choice is OpenBSD, but Linux has been very reliable for me, even with occasional broken MM, much more reliable than I have experienced with closed source OS'.

    That might be true, but is hardly any consolation if OpenBSD does not do what you need it to do.

    OpenBSD is a secure foundation for running some open source services that have shown to be more secure than their closed source counterparts.

    What about the 13 Apache vulnerabilities [apacheweek.com] since 1999?

    33% were Win32 specific, how interesting that an open source project has a hard time becoming secure running in a closed source environment.
    40% were specific to modules or other support programs.
    27% were Apache itself.

    Easy. Ping of death was fixed within 48 hours on Windows. I'll grant that the Linux fix got there faster.

    Most people take "hours" to mean hours less than 24, since 24 becomes "days".

    So what?

    You're either exposed or out of action until the hole is fixed. Thats what.

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
  46. Re:Necessary and useful by Mark+Bainter · · Score: 2
    This is what happened to Unix in the 70's and 80's, leading to Unix's fragmentation and irrelevance as a platform.

    Ok...this is just wrong. Early unix was proprietary, not free software.

    With GPL code, you don't have to worry so much about v2.0 coming out as closed-source, leaving you with a choice between staying with v1.0 or losing the benefits of open source.

    This is not entirely correct. Granted, someone can't just take GPL'd code and make a new proprietary version of it w/out the original author's permission, but it /can/ be done by the author, or it could happen through the author dual-licensing the product.

    Example: Author writes Software and licenses version 1.0 under the GPL. Six months later, he releases version 2 binary only, new proprietary license.

    Or: he dual licenses it under BSD and GPL. Now it is subject to the same risks as BSD software.

    Or: He licenses it under some custom license to a specific company in exchange for some compensation.

    Obviously, using the GPL doesn't guarantee a free version 2.0. Just a free version 1.0, and the ABILITY to have a free 2.0 through someone else forking the code if nothing else. Guess what, a BSD 1.0 guarantees the same thing.

    --
    "No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare."
    --James Madison
  47. Re:No thanks by Mark+Bainter · · Score: 2
    Good thing everyone uses switches.

    Considering your later name-calling one would think you'd take the time to get a clue before spouting off.

    First, not everyone uses switches. And even when they do, it is largely only at the local and remote points. intermediate hops happen at ROUTERS. Regardless, it is not all that difficult to sniff on a switched network either. Switches are not impervious to network attacks. Do some research.

    And for that matter, there is encrypted telnet.

    Encrypted telnet doesn't even come close to providing the features ssh does. Encrypted telnet is better that straight telnet, but not by much.

    --
    "No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare."
    --James Madison
  48. Re:oxymoronic by Shanep · · Score: 2

    I have every reason to believe that this kind of review never actually happens.

    I watch it happen regularly in the mailing lists I am subscribed to.

    Linux, which has far more people working on it than OpenBSD, is not more secure than OpenBSD

    You are comparing two open source systems, one which is focused on security and the other which is not. Two very different code bases. You need to ask why Linux is not as secure as OpenBSD? You should be asking why the Microsoft World is regularly damaged by viruses and exploits and the open source World is less so.

    Which shows that proper administration is much more important to the security of a system than the question whether that system runs open or closed source software.

    Of course admin is the most important aspect of any sites security and stability. But choosing systems that you need to assume to be secure is not a good admin choice.

    Personally I believe that even if this were true, closed source software easily makes up for it in features and support (e.g. documentation).

    OpenBSD has great docco. Pitty people don't use it.

    Does that "average" include all the stillborn projects at Sourceforge?

    Obviously it includes mature projects that mirror closed source applications.

    You want to posit this kind of argument that there is such as thing as "perfect security", and that OpenBSD (and other open source software) exemplifies this.

    I have never stated anything that slightly suggests that I beleive there is any such thing as "perfect security". There is no such thing.

    But that is bunk. Unix security is lackluster at best. It is the typical "good enough" type system. Windows NT, Solaris and AIX offer far more flexible and powerful security models -- if you need them.

    Does this mean that you put OpenBSD and/or Linux under the umbrella of "Unix" but not Solaris and AIX?

    Would you like to elaborate on these more flexible and powerful security models?

    Does Windows crash when you load in Mozilla?

    Windows networks come crashing to their knees when a user receives an infected email. You have got to be joking.

    Like, such as, irony of ironies, with the current OpenSSH hole? Did you check the source to see where the alleged vulnerability is at? Do you know people who did? I'd be interested to hear.

    Rare occurance. Yes. Yes. And it has been fixed quick smart too.

    Furthermore it is interesting to note that SSH, the topic under discussion, was originally conceived and delivered as a commercial product. Not a strictly "open source" one.

    And looking at the track record, perfected by the OpenBSD crew via open source.

    Not because I "believe" it to be secure, or even because I necessarily think it is "best of breed".

    Closed systems at my local stock exchange proved to be unreliable while I supported their backup site. I don't think or believe (in the religious sense) in OSS security or stability, I know it from experience.

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
  49. Re:oxymoronic by Shanep · · Score: 2

    You are the one who claimed security and open source go hand in hand. But apparently they don't.

    I never said OSS is a guarantee of security. My stance is that open source allows security and stability to be easier to implement than closed source. Unless you include obscurity as a security measure, which I don't.

    It means that there is no open source software that is certified for use in some of the most security-conscious environments, despite your insistence that open source development must lead to more secure software.

    Yeah, and NT4 was certified to the point where it could not be connected to any network, must have no removable media and have the POSIX layer removed! Software gets certified through payment for that certification. Who has paid to have a free BSD or a Linux distro certified? Lack of this does not show lack of security.

    The point is, what is the cost of having your network go down once every so often,

    It's not just network downtime, it could be corporate IP loss or exposure, public embarassment, loss or exposure of customer property leading to liability, etc.

    versus lacking all the features Outlook & Office provide in the mean time.

    People and companies serious about security, who use MS products for example, end up disabling and avoiding many of these "features".

    Well, tell me about it. This is all about sharing, right?

    I actually do read through source, along with books like Applied Cryptography (I've been into digital electronics since the 80's, starting with Navy Weapon systems) and have an unhealthy interest in building hardware pseudo random number generators. I read the source because I am interested. I didn't find the hole because software security is not my forte, but I am but one person. Someone did find the hole, which is easy to close.

    No, it was perfected via painstaking attention to detail. In all those years nobody ever found the bug, which pretty much kills your "hundreds of thousands of eyes" theory.

    But it was found, outside of the OpenBSD developers. We are looking at a single uncommon incident here too. Though the hole is uncommon, the discovery, quick workaround and subsequent fix is not.

    Here's a single incident that also proves nothing... Windows NT Cripples US Navy Cruiser

    My stance is that open source makes finding and fixing bugs easier and I have seen it first hand as a beta tester of open source video card drivers. Where people outside of the developers where submitting code or pointers to broken code. John Carmack made an extended visit to our list, fixed code and made the drivers faster. He was not invited personally, he just dived in to open code. Something he or anyone else would not have been able to do if they were not a part of it as a closed source project. I've heard he did this for other cards which have open source drivers also.

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
  50. Re:oxymoronic by Shanep · · Score: 2

    Maybe not, but the lack of even fairly rudimentary auditing and event monitoring tools and the lack of software to make sense of this data does.

    SWATCH, NOCOL/NetConsole, LogSurfer, Netlog, Analog, Snort, HostSentry, Shadow, MOM, The Hummingbird System, AAFID.

    Are you serious?

    "living on the fringe"

    Have you used Star Office 6 or open office? I have used SO6 beta, it is pretty amazingly just about there. All we need now is decent groupware and I think an MS free World will be much easier to swallow for people who "need" the features.

    I am confident that they will initially run into similar security issues.

    You are confident. I am confident. I don't think the open guys will fall into traps that allow a document to execute (via interpretation or otherwise) code not related to the app that document is intended for.

    So maybe you can point me in the right direction.

    I'm sure you've seen the goings on by now.

    People like him are exceptional, not the norm.

    Yes, however there are a lot of exceptional coders in this World who do look at open source. The types who tend to read code and contribute patches, tend to be above the norm anyway. There are plenty of them.

    The point is it happens on the closed source side of the fence as well, and there is less of a dependance on Great Leaders there.

    The point is, that the exceptional video driver developers who normally write closed drivers for Windows of one of the largest most respected video card makers, had their open source driver improved by an uninvited outsider, thanks to the driver being open source.

    It wasn't just Carmack stamping out bugs either.

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?
  51. Re:oxymoronic by Shanep · · Score: 2

    Yes, I like open source as well. But whether it leads to better products in any particular aspect depends on a person's needs and wants

    As an example I'm sure you've probably already seen, here is an example of open source software being more secure than closed source, where convenience is not hurt.

    Open source on top.

    Security here, is basically ranked as highest to lowest, which turns out to be open to closed. Naturally, as one would expect, the open source project which focuses on security is at the top of the lot.

    In the open source world, someone might implement a PRNG thinking it is strong. One day, someone discovers that it is not very strong by looking at the source or looking at the output statistically. They might complain that it is not strong, leading to a better PRNG being written by the original author, or as is typical with open source, someone with greater expertise may submit code that is stronger, which gets used.

    In the closed source world, someone (or a team) might typically be hired to program a PRNG as an "expert" of math programming. So his expertise is trusted, he implements his expertise, his random streams turn out to be VERY pseudo, as analysed, spoofing attack tools become available and the admins and closed source programmers scratch their heads in wonder at these attacks. Finally, after it becomes publicly known that the closed source is weak (usually through open source advocates who present analytical evidence), the closed source programmers embrace the BSD license as a "God send" and then proclaim industry leadership through innovation. ; )

    This is just a bag of disjointed tools that might, with effort, be coaxed into doing what needs to done -- I say this as a user of some of the tools you've mentioned.

    Because most of them do an excellent job without graphs? : ) I kinda prefer getting SMS paged with critical alerts and emailed with all alerts greater than "odd behaviour". Sitting looking a graphs 24/7, or having some team paid to do this is not my idea of effective event monitoring.

    For example, Windows NT (just to give an example) allows you to monitor the behaviour of virtually every kernel object and graph them against time. I am not aware of similar capabilities in any of the tools you have mentioned

    Some people who go further than waiting for the next service pack, don't need graphs. Where they are useful, they are usually present.

    Or what about auditing trails, such as who accessed what how when?

    Proper admin would advocate the usage of sudo, which logs nicely and proper usage of file permissions. If you're sufficiently concerned about security then logs can be made impossible to tamper with electronically. Printing logs to line printers is very common in Bank and Stock Exchange data centers. Been there, done that. Or if this is over the top for your systems, you might like to log to an OpenBSD syslog server which is configured to only allow appending to logs even for the root user. Doing that via a serial connection that does not accept logins for that little extra security? Or perhaps logging to WORM is more your style?

    It's already happened. We started the whole #!/bin/sh thing after all. All we need now is a a convenient way of preserving file attributes and a convenient way of opening email attachments and we are in a world of hurt.

    If a Unix user logs in as a normal user on a system that has been kept up to date with security patches, little can be damaged. Perhaps some of their own files will be lost or exposed if they use an insecure mail reader. If they're logging in as root, on a system that is not up to date security wise, while reading mail with an insecure mail reader, then they deserve what they get. I'm guess the point between discovery of this weak mail reader and the fix would be a very thin slice of time if the history of open source security is anything to go by.

    --
    War crimes, torture, lies, illegal spying... Would someone give Bush a blowjob, already, so he can be impeached?