Windows 2000 Gets Common Criteria Certification
Qnal writes "e-Week is reporting that Microsoft Windows 2000 has been awarded Common Criteria Certification.. Read more of the propaganda here. Basically, according to the article Any user running Windows 2000 with Service Pack 3 is running exactly the same system that was evaluated. The Common Criteria certification is an internationally recognized ISO standard established for evaluating the security of infrastructure technology products. Too bad it takes 3 Service Packs..."
Watch out for the EULA on service pack 3, its a killer.
Read their earlier report as well. CC accredation is a running certification, for a specific configuration.
"Flyin' in just a sweet place,
Never been known to fail..."
Microsoft Windows 2000 has been awarded Common Criteria Certification.
Sounds like Windows 2000 is the lowest common denominator.
"I have opinions of my own, strong opinions, but I don't always agree with them." -- George H. W. Bush
This kind of certification is a great thing for people running Win2K.
But I have to wonder if Microsoft's upgrade cycle will cause those people to lose official support for Win2K unless they upgrade to XP or whatever's next very soon now?
A lot of enterprises do a lot of time-consuming testing before they rollout something like Win2K, which is probably the first reasonable OS from MS.
It'd be a real shame if all that testing and certification gets thrown out the window because MS doesn't feel its customers aren buying upgraded products fast enough.
"Provided by the management for your protection."
Hopefully the amount of hoops common criteria makes you jump through will be enough to 'persuade' microsoft into just keeping win2k around instead of EOLing it.
But linux still doesn't have it, does it? I'd rather have service packs, than have to hand-apply the hundreds of patches that are put out each year. How does linux handle masses of patches? New kernel build's? That's essentially all a service pack is.
Any user running Windows 2000 with Service Pack 3 is running exactly the same system that was evaluated
Which doesn't nearly going into counting all the fun software that finds inconstencies, holes, and breaches in windows, not to mention finding their own. Often, it's the new software or hardware that breaks an OS.
How about a fix to "DLL hell", where windows can obtain online a list of known DLL versions, and can be updated by software manufacturers as to which are compatible. From previously working in a software certification branch, I know that DLL and modular conflicts often cause a lot of the instability between apps or when installing new applicatons.
Ok did the 3 Service Packs statement rub anyone else the wrong way? Or was it just me?
Another article, more in-depth as to the prereqs for certification:
First we critize MS when their securtity fails, now that their security is improving we still critize their efforts. Grow up.
Besides, a more secure Win2K should mean a better Net for everyone. If these boxes can stay locked down and free of trojans, in theory we shoul see a decrease in attack/hack attemps.
Just for the record, there is NO "off the record" record.
Make a record of that.
Too bad it takes 3 service packs...
Yea, because we all know that open source software never needs to be patched. Yep, it's all 100% secure from the start. All open source software is versioned in whole number increments with no point releases for bugs. It's positively magical!
Gag me with an overstuffed penguin doll...
What Linux really needs is the equivalent of Windows Update so you can get a full listing of what needs to be updated.
With the rollout of UnitedLinux due anytime now, I hope they implement something akin to Windows Update so we don't waste valuable time chasing down manually every important software update to your Linux installation.
Propaganda?
I say bollocks.
Win2k with SP3 got an ISO certification for achieving a certain level of security. This is were the news ends. This is also where the person who presented the article behaves as a Linux/OSS groupie, serving FUD.
The MS OS got a certification, which to some means a lot, to others, nothing. But to actually go as far as calling the whole shebang as propaganda is outrageous
Correct me on this, but I don't remember Linux getting an ISO certification about anything.
The way the whole affair was presented, reeks of OSS selfrighteous geekiness, smallmindedness and fantacism.
You're A Debian user, right?
/. Where the truth
" Any user running Windows 2000 with Service Pack 3 is running exactly the same system that was evaluated"
Their test system had two 120Gig HDs full of fansubbed anime and was running at 100 cpu doing divx encodes ?
Well, they said "exactly the same system".
Wait, did they mean my exact system ? How do I sue them for wasting my cpu cycles running benchmarks ?
This post was nearly funny. Blame the cough syrup.
graspee
Common criteria does not mean secure. There are multiple levels of the common criteria that mean different things. It doesn't appear that the article states the level achieved.
Common criteria is quite complicated - to understand what common criteria really means, you'll need to read some things that are NOT posted at Microsoft. This may mean that they basically implement what they have documented, or that they implement a specific feature set.
In the last year or so, it's become fashionable to use the word "propaganda" to describe anything one reads or hears that makes one uncomfortable. The word was already so subjective as to lack value, but it's now hit complete worthlessness.
If there's something untrue or illogical with the Microsoft page, say so. Throwing in an unsupported "propaganda" is just chickenshit. Unless you figured there was a certain amount of negative spin that had to be added to a Microsft succcess story to get it posted, which is a forgivable gaming of the system.
What I'm listening to now on Pandora...
Comment removed based on user account deletion
Read the description on the CC web site, and you'll see that the evaluation was for the development process, and that only part of the impementation was tested at all. (I wonder which part?)
All of which, while interesting to some, is in the 'so what' category. Security is not a cert, or a product. Security is what you do.
For example, Windows NT 3.5 was certified to the NIST 'C2' level (basically, C2 means you have separated the users and require a login). But there was no problem building a 'B2' level (mandatory access control) system with NT3.5; you just had to add some software and hardware to plug the holes.
So these certs are of no use except to PR flaks. And trolls.
Too bad it takes 3 Service Packs..."
/. wants to maintain any level of credibility as a technology site (not a blind MS-bashing site) then it shouldn't post comments like this.
Name any OS that hasn't gone through hundreds of patches before it's reached certain levels of security, stability, or predictability. Quite frankly, if
There is no longer anything that can be done with computers that is nontrivial and clearly legal. -- Paul Phillips
The set of features is (I think) the protection profile (PP). Not sure exactly what the PP is here - the press releases were rather vague, but it may be the commercial adaptation of the old military C2 (discretionary access control).
Before passing judgement, we need to know what the evaluated configuration looked like - what other software was included, what networking features were enabled, etc.
I suspect the reason Linux (or OpenBSD or FreeBSD...) have not applied for this is that it costs money. I'm sure MS paid SAIC a nice bundle for this work. A BIG difference between the Common Criteria and the old Orange Book evals. Under the Orange Book (the old C2), the gov't paid, the trade-off being that they took their sweet time doing the eval. Now we have private labs doing the work - more quickly, but there is always the issue of whether the payment biases the results.
FYI, here is what the Common Criteria says about EAL4:
EAL4 - methodically designed, tested and reviewed EAL4 permits a developer to maximize assurance gained from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices. Although rigorous, these practices do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. It is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs, and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs. An EAL4 evaluation provides an analysis supported by the low-level design of the modules of the TOE, and a subset of the implementation. Testing is supported by an independent search for vulnerabilities. Development controls are supported by a life-cycle model, identification of tools, and automated configuration management.
"dope will get you through times of no money better than money will get you through times of no dope"
To get a common criteria certification, in addition to the thousands of dollars (>$40,000) you have to spend, you have to specify what your system does and then prove that it does it.
So, as I have not seen the specifics of Microsoft's CC case (which I doubt we'll see the full report), a certain company could say "Product X is a workstation operating system that does not allow UserA to see UserB's documents" and then Product X would be certified as having accomplished that.
There are different guidelines for different products, including firewalls and network management equipment and software.
You get a CC cert when your product DOES WHAT YOU CLAIMED IT WOULD DO IN THE APPLICATION.
There is NO third-party security guidelines for the products, as in the SANS guidelines or anything else.
You write up the application, make your security-related feature claims, and pay your fee. The product is given to a lab for testing.
The point of the CC is to get gov't and contractors to look at products based on what jobs and specific requirements those products can fill in their IT solutions. It's not really a security cert in the way "Windows is secure" would make you think. It's "Here's the list of security-related requirements you can fill with this product".
--mandi
Now back to your carrying on. Yes, I worked on a product that was to be CC'd.
My god, I've just had it. I submitted this news, but with an unbiased, informative write-up. That took a whole 4 minutes to get rejected.
0 2/10-29CommonCriteriaPR.asp 0 2/1029CommonCriteriaFAQ.asp
.Net server should be relatively quick to certify. They are from the same code base as Windows 2000 with mostly cosmetic changes and relatively minor system tweaks.
n /news/bulletins/cccert.asp for more info.
For the record, here's Microsoft's remarkably FUD-free press release: http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2002/Oct
The FAQ tells all about the CC and what it really means: http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2002/Oct
This is huge:
1) The CC certification is a globally accepted ISO standard (ISO-IEC 15408) established for evaluating the security features and capabilities of information technology products. 14 countries accept it as the method for evaluating the security claims of IT products and systems.
2) Just "running service pack 3" does not mean you are running a system that is at the same level of security as those evaluated. Microsoft has several documents (enumerated below) that describe how to set up, use, and administer a CC evaluation ready system.
3) Yes, Windows 2000 is on Service Pack 3 with a few post-service pack hot fixes. My Red Hat installation has at least as many fixes applied to it, and it's not even DoD "Orange Book" certified, let alone evaluated to any international standard of security.
4) There are three very helpful checklists Microsoft released with this announcement:
I) Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration User's Guide describes how to use a secured system in a secure way. All organizations should be sharing this information with their users. Anyone running Windows 2000 or later should read and follow this.
II) Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Administrator's Guide tells administrators how to run their system once it's been securely configured. If all Windows 2000 admins read this and the next document there'd be fewer security incidents out there.
III) Common Criteria Security Configuration Guide tells you what steps need to be taken to properly configure a CC evaluation worthy system. It is very simple, especially with the templates Microsoft provides, but it is more complex than "apply service pack 3 then drink a beer".
These checklists will hopefully alleviate the problem of clueless admins incorrectly configuring and administering Windows 2000 systems.
5) Windows XP and Windows
The baseling is this: no other company has certified such a detailed procedure for assuring the ongoing security of their operating system products. Not linux, not BSD, no one. Windows 2000 is the first.
This isn't just a locked box in a closet with no net connection certification. Several Dell and Compaq systems were evaluated in real world situations. From an interview with Microsoft's Security and Server executives: "...directory service, Kerberos, single sign on, file system encryption, VPN functionality, policy-based network management, desktop management, and more. To our knowledge, Linux has not been evaluated for any protection profiles under Common Criteria."
For the record: I run Redhat-based LAMP servers and OpenBSD-based border-gateways. I wish they'd get their acts together and get evaluated; it'd be nice to have an honest-to-god standards-based evaluation of their security.
I guess I'm done.
See http://microsoft.com/windows2000/server/evaluatio
obviously no deficiencies vs. no obvious deficiencies
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
October 29, 2002
SAIC Awarded Common Criteria Certificate for Microsoft Windows 2000 Operating System Evaluation
(MCLEAN, VA) Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) today announced that it has received a National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) Common Criteria certificate for successfully performing the evaluation of the Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system. SAIC's Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) performed the evaluation and received the certificate at the Federal Information Assurance Conference (FIAC) 2002 in College Park, Md.
"SAIC is proud to have contributed to this Common Criteria milestone event and congratulates Microsoft for attaining this significant achievement in computer security," said Duane Andrews, SAIC corporate executive vice president.
The Windows 2000 operating system evaluation was conducted in accordance with ISO 15048 Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) Level 4 Augmented requirements and was evaluated against the Common Criteria Controlled Access Protection Profile, which is consistent with the commercial-level information security requirements for the Department of Defense (DoD). An EAL4 is the highest evaluation rating that a commercial CCTL can perform and Windows 2000 is the first operating system to achieve an EAL4 rating under the United States Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS).
"The SAIC CCTL took on a complex challenge, and we were successful in completing the evaluation of the Windows 2000 operation system," said Tammy Compton, co-director of the SAIC CCTL, and the leader of the evaluation team. "The common criteria evaluation methodologies we used were applied to Windows 2000 without using evidence from any previous evaluations. This led to the completion of one of the more challenging projects we have conducted, and we are confident of more successful evaluations in the near future."
"We have embraced the Common Criteria evaluation process from its inception, because we saw the high quality bar for security we could provide to customers," said Bill Veghte, corporate vice president, Windows Server Group, Microsoft Corp. "With CC certification and the support resources we are releasing today, customers now have an internationally-recognized template for Windows 2000 that enables them to build an IT system for secure computing beyond that of any other commercially-available platform today."
Located in Columbia, Md., the SAIC CCTL is a division of SAIC's Secure Business Solutions and was accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) in August 2000. SAIC CCTL was one of the first commercial laboratories to be listed in the NIAP's CCEVS. SAIC's Secure Business Solutions provides security solutions for networks and business systems. Its 500 engineers can assess, test, design, certify, deploy, and manage solutions for information and physical security, and train organizations to be a core part of overall security solutions.
"God fights on the side with the best artillery." - Napoleon, Marshal of France - speaking truth to power
- Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Communications
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Privacy
- Protection of the TOE Security Functions
- Resource Utilisation
- TOE Access
- Trusted Path/Channels
Is all that's required for the certification. Does the OS have the right features with a configuration policy that sets those features properly.It's sad that it's miles away from the default install, and most sysadmins won't take the effort to implement them.
Also, buffer overflows aren't part of the certification. Although, I would make a strong claim that a buffer overflow in a process running as System violates Protection of the TOE Security Functions
This is a boring sig
Too bad Linux isn't cerfitied at all.
/. editors. If I had wanted mud slinging news I would have checked out the local political race, or any one of the national tabloids. It would also be different if /. put a satirical flavor on every headline then the "Too bad it takes 3 Service Packs..." sort of comment would have been humourous. Instead I find it tiring and all to common.
/.'s readers' roll is to review, evaluate, and comment on the story thereby giving other readers some insite, food for thought, background information, and/or research needed for them to make informed decisions. If the /. editors feel it necessary to throw in such comments then they should keep them off the headlines and post their feelings like the rest of us do.... in the comments.
Thank you for saying this. No, this is not flamebait nor it is an attempt to bash Linux/MS/OS_whatever. I was quite disgusted by the fact that the editor felt it necessary to throw in that cheap quibble on the front page of the story.
No I am not a MS/Linux/OSX/CowboyNeilOS crusader. It would not have mattered which OS the story was referring to. The comment was cheap and unnecessary, and in my mind it degraded the apparent level of professionalism of the
MS Should be given some credit for the efforts of achieving the level of standards necessary to aquire any type of internationally recognized certification. This goes for any other development team/group achieving similar goals.
/.'s roll should be to report the news in a non-bias way while the
damnedIfIknowHowToUseAn'Or,Merlin.
Interesting thing is, /. was never set up to be a definitive news source, from what I understand. It was (and still is) a few guys throwing stuff that interests them up on the web. By spending a lot of time on the site, you're in essence buying in to their [sometimes twisted] take on things. If you want a different flavor of propoganda, you either go somewhere else or create your own.
The FACT is, that it has taken 3 service packs and a huge amount of public thrashing to get the OS to the point that it can be certified.
As to whether the certification means anything, that's up to each of us to decide for ourselves. My Win 2000 will remain firewalled off from the rest of my network, while I use what I feel to be more secure OS's to get the job done.
And too bad it only takes 1 service pack: they're cumulative in nature. Install Win2k, and if your install media wasn't updated to SP3 already, apply SP3 yourself.