Another Critical Microsoft Hole
gmuslera writes "Not was enough that recent vulnerability in IE that can run any program in an unpatched windows system. Now there is another
related to an ActiveX control that can make IE and IIS to run any code in the system. The Microsoft solution? kill the related ActiveX control and replace it with a safe one. The Microsoft problem? As this control is Microsoft signed, any site can require it, upload it and replace the "good" one with the vulnerable one. The final recomendation from Microsoft? Don't trust/run ActiveX controls signed by Microsoft." Gimble points to the appropriate locations on Microsoft's website: "Another buffer overrun (that allows arbitrary code to be run) has been admitted to by MS, and it affects IIS and IE on clients (but not on XP), and they have a patch available here Security Hotfix for Q329414. The kicker is that a patched system can be rendered vulnerable again by a hostile web site or HTML email. The 'solution' from MS in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02-065 recommends that you remove MS from the list of Trusted Publishers."
Doesn't this just make you excited for the prospect of Palladium and a world where all code is digitally signed? I'm tingling all over.
I'm all for code signing for authenticity, but not for code signing as execution control. Code signing should be purely an audit mechanism.
Can we please stop all this MS bashing? Every piece of software has security alerts and patches issued. Why, in a week where we have alerts for Samba, php, kde (libs and network) and apache, do we have to hear about IE yet again? Yes, we know thats its not a secure bit of software. It just makes us look like insecure teenagers if we keep bashing it like this.
*flame retardent jacket on*
That is all.
Why can't IE run in a process with reduced privaliges? Why does IE need the privalages of the current user on NT/2000 when all it does is browse the web?
Wow. Some heads must be rolling at Microsoft over this. Recommending that Microsoft be removed from the list of trusted signees? They're certainly not pulling punches on this one. It looks to me like they're placing a higher priority (with the treatment of this bug) on user security than company image. That's a first...
The reason they're in this mess is the whole "trusted computing" paradigm which they started with this signed-ActiveX stuff and are continuing with Palladium. Perhaps this will make them reconsider. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes: Who watches the watchers?
According to the MSTECH bulletin:
Why isn't it feasible to set the Kill Bit in this case?
The ActiveX control involved in these vulnerabilities is used in many applications and web pages to access data. Many applications, including third-party applications, contain hard-coded references to it; if the patch set the Kill Bit, the web pages would no longer function at all - even with the new, corrected version. As a result, the patch updates the control to remove the vulnerabilities, but does not provide a brand-new control and set the Kill Bit on the old one.
Conclusion:
-Microsoft refuses to kill itself.
how does this relate to: the story Microsoft on Security: We'll Break Your Apps
Hey... linus refused to change the behaviour of kill -9 -1 also
How is it that they implemented a cryptographic signature system and don't provide for revocation? Surely somebody's missed something here...
25% Funny, 25% Insightful, 25% Informative, 25% Troll
People don't move to something because, firstly it's something different and many people are happy to stick with something comfortable. Secondly many people don't see the point in downloading something that they already have installed ("it works for me, why do I need anything else?" mentality) and finally, for many people they never experience the nasty possible ill-effects of these security alerts.
Sure, plenty of people were hit by Code Red but it never really affected them. Sure it affected their computer, but as far as their documents were concerned - there was no change.
Until we see a security alert that does cause damage to personal files and does roam rampant in the wild, the average Joe Blow user doesn't give a toss whether or not there 6 or 6000 security alerts.
Avantslash - View Slashdot cleanly on your mobile phone.
The problem is that unless you remove Microsoft from the list of trusted publishers, a malicious web site or e-mail message can reinstall the vulnerable version without your knowledge or consent.
To me, this proves that digitally signed code, that is, "trusted systems" are absolutely no guarantee of security. Bad code can be signed.
Doesn't anyone consider this a mysterly convenient way to incourage the masses of windows users who won't drop them to move over to XP? All the news sources highlight that XP isn't vunerable.. yeah.. not with THIS flaw. I wondered how long it would be before they started admitting the really bad flaws in all the other versions to move everyone towards their .net mordern os. hmph
or maybe I'm just nervous 'cause my coffee just accidently cross bred with a poison-ivy staph-infection vaccine GE plant and was recalled after I drank it
pm
** "It's not my job to stand between the people talking to me, and the ones listening to me." -- Pego the Jerk
I'm interested in seeing any other browser that can provide robust, arbitrary plug-in support without a security compromise.
Security and utility are two contestants in a zero-sum game.
Which is not to say that <insert browser here> isn't a technically superior product...
Get thee glass eyes, and, like a scurvy politician, seem to see things thou dost not.--King Lear
From MS02-065:
So, who want to bet that the e-mails we will soon see circulating will have something like:
From: billg@microsoft.com
Subject: You can safely trust me
<html><body> Please read this e-mail carefully and make sure you download the provided control.
Asking people to decide whether or not they trust somebody based on, uh, well, whatever, that's asking for disaster. People will do that based on what they see in the From-field, most likely...
Well, admittedly, I haven't touched a windows machine in a long time, so I might be totally off here... :-)
Employee of Inrupt, Project Release Manager and Community Manager for Solid
1. Yes, a lot of Slashdotters use Windows. I am using it right now. I have to, because that is what is mandated where I work. I am sure that is the case for many other people. I am sure some of the admins have to administer Windows systems. Basically, we are stuck with Windows, so we need to know this information. At home, on the other hand, I only boot up the Windows machine if I need a Quake fix.
2. We don't have to make Windows look bad, it is doing a fine job of doing that itself, thank you very much. Slashdot didn't release this alert, Microsoft did. Would you rather not know about it?
My beliefs do not require that you agree with them.
"The simplest way is to make sure you have no trusted publishers, including Microsoft."
So OK. If this signed certificates thing was a good idea to begin with, why are they suggesting people remove ALL trusted publishers?
It's only Microsoft's own certificate that can reintroduce the problem. Why would they advise removing all certificates?
Is it because they think their users are too stupid to remove Microsoft only? Are they trying to look less bad by making it look like the problem effects all publishers? Or are they simply admitting that this signed certificate thing isn't working?
Oh, if we can't run anything we want on your system, nobody else should either. pfft.
oktay
---------------
Founder of the The Free Linux CD Project
I say they revoke the certificate anyway, and re-issue the other controls with new certificates. Inconvenient? Yes. But it would fix the problem, and that's job #1 for them. If, as others have said, heads are rolling over this one, I think revoking the certificate is the least they could do.
Synergy is your friend
What we have here is a clear case of people letting their ideology interfere with their business sense. Ideology / religion seems to be the only reason anyone would not go right over to better products like Opera or Mozilla. The only value MSIE can add, beside keeping the AV and security consultants in gravy, is vendor lock in.
Microsoft is falling further behind in technology every month. Rather than trying to catch up, they've been trying to hold everyone else back. It's time for them to get out of the way and stop hindering economic growth in the IT sector.
Beta is broken and the link to classic doesn't work. Stop wasting our time or there won't be anybody left here.
Linux users know all about their bugs. They are the ones fixing them. Bugs in proprietary software are more interesting/important because they acknowledge commercial vendors inability to get working code out the door before profiting from it, a despicable but almost always necessary evil (if you're commercial and proprietary, that is).
1. Get an idea for useful softwaree
2. Write a lot of working but buggy code
3. ??????
4. Profit
Then later when you can rest assured that the investors or collectors are happy...
5. Fix bugs
And if you're a monopoly...
6. Release bug-free "Upgrade" and charge more money.
A fool throws a stone into a well and a thousand sages can not remove it.
Kind of a silly statement, since they're comparing every piece of software that runs on a linux platform to only microsoft applications. what would happen if you compared the "Linux security flaws" to flaws in every single piece of software that ever ran on Windows..
in addition, i think you'll find that since applications and libraries can be used by 3rd party applications more easily on open source systems, you have more code re-use. thus, 1 vulnerability, such as the one in OpenSSL, turns into 10 when you count in all the packages that use OpenSSL's SSL libraries. since MS closes the ssl libraries that they use with IIS, you'll find that there are probably 10 different ssl implementations on any one MS based system.
a third point is that this study counts advisories from each vendor regarding the same application as seprate advisories. so you have the following situation:
1 bug in OpenSSL affects 10 applications that use the OpenSSL libraries. advisories for those 10 applications are reported by 10 different Linux vendors. therefore, 1 bug in a piece of linux software generates 100 vulnerability reports. according to this logic, there are still roughly 100X more bugs in microsoft software alone then there are in every piece of software that is capable of running on Linux based OS's. that number is somewhat inflated, however my points are still valid, this study is turning 1 bug into many and comparing apples to oranges.