Discuss BIOS and Palladium Issues With an AMIBIOS Rep

After this Slashdot discussion about the relationship between BIOS biggie American Megatrends Inc. (AMI) and Palladium appeared, we got an email from AMI sales engineer (and former Linux.com contributor) Brian Richardson, who wrote, "I am a bit concerned that the information you provided misled your readers into thinking AMI was promoting Palladium or taking some sort of anti-open-source stance. This might be due to the fact that TCPA was mistakenly equated to Palladium, or questioning how Linux would run on a TCPA-enabled system ... or by the horde of angry Slashdot readers telling us they would never buy an AMI product because we were forcing standards on them." Brian offered himself up as (his words) a "Slashdot interview victim" to clear things up.(Update by RM: And, says Brian, he's happy to answer other BIOS questions as well.) So ask, already, and let's get things cleared up. (Usual Slashdot interview rules.)

Comments

What will happen with Linux systems.

[matthew.thompson]

I understand that there should be no problems running Linux systems on these new bioses but can you promise that there will be no nasty wordings that are likely to frighten off users who are trying Linux for the first time?

Re:What will happen with Linux systems.

[matthew.thompson]

I was actually thinking of something along the lines of...

"The operating system about to be loaded does not have a valid security signature. As such it is not possible for the BIOS to prevent unsafe software from operating. Are you sure that you wish to continue loading this software."

But yours is just as good :o)

Here's a simple one...

[Sheetrock]

Will Linux and other alternative operating systems continue to install and function properly on computers containing AMI BIOSes?

Re:Here's a simple one...

[jamie]

"Will Linux and other alternative operating systems continue to install and function properly on computers containing AMI BIOSes?"

In answering this question, I would ask that our interview victim clarify whether there are any circumstances under which "alternative operating systems" would need to be cryptographically signed by an authority in order to boot, and if so, who is that authority?

As Ross Anderson pointed out last year,

Now here's another aspect of TCPA. You can use it to defeat the GPL.

During my investigations into TCPA, I learned that HP has started a development program to produce a TCPA-compliant version of GNU/linux. I couldn't figure out how they planned to make money out of this. On Thursday, at the Open Source Software Economics conference, I figured out how they might.

Making a TCPA-compliant version of GNU/linux (or Apache, or whatever) will mean tidying up the code and removing whatever features conflict with the TCPA security policy. The company will then submit the pruned code to an evaluator, together with a mass of documentation for the work that's been done, including a whole lot of analyses showing, for example, that you can't get root by a buffer overflow.

The business model, I believe, is this. HP will not dispute that the resulting `pruned code' is covered by the GPL. You will be able to download it, compile it, check it against the binary, and do what you like with it. However, to make it into TCPA-linux, to run it on a TCPA-enabled machine in privileged mode, you need more than the code. You need a valid signature on the binary, plus a cert to use the TCPA PKI. That will cost you money (if not at first, then eventually).

Anyone will be free to make modifications to the pruned code, but in the absence of a signature the resulting O/S won't enable users to access TCPA features. It will of course be open to competitors to try to re-do the evaluation effort for enhanced versions of the pruned code, but that will cost money; six figures at least. There will likely be little motive for commercial competitors to do it, as HP will have the first mover advantages and will be able to undercut them on price. There will also be little incentive for philanthropists to do it, as the resulting product would not really be a GPL version of a TCPA operating system, but a proprietary operating system that the philanthropist could give away free.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Planesdragon]

You can use it to defeat the GPL.

Oh, for crying out loud.

The GPL was not, ever, ever, ever, meant to make it so buying software wasn't worthwhile. In fact, the situation outlined in the parent post is _an ideal business model_ for GPL'd software.

You keep all of the rights the GPL was designed to preserve (distributing and re-working code you buy), and there's still something worthwhile for buying the software.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[ComputerSlicer23]

No it's not about being free as in beer, however the GPL is supposed to give me code I can go tinker with, and change, and make it to my liking. Do bug fixes, and enhancements. Possible add bugs of my one. Having the one true binary that's signed kinda defeats the purpose. If I can't self sign the thing, then having the GPL'ed code is no good until I can get it signed.

Unless the BIOS has a provision of the owner of the machine to add keys to accept as legitimate signatures or disable the signature checking, having software I can change is no good. Unless there's some way for the end user to say, look I own the machine, and I'm technically competent to verify the software I trust, let me run it the source code is relatively useless.

If that mean's there's a dongle, switch or jumper that has to set up correctly, that's fine by me. Then RedHat and other major distributors can get there kernels certified and signed, and all of the other binaries out there. Then the masses can get trusted computing, and I can certify my own stuff as trusted.

Kirby

Re:Here's a simple one...

[ComputerSlicer23]

I'll point out several things. First off, cryptographic signing the binaries doesn't mean the binaries are secure. It just means it's the binary that I have is one that someone who has access to the private key has signed as the one they have certified to run.

That's it. It doesn't mean the software is secure. It does mean, that any joe user can't just run any old code they compile up. However, if they disable my ability to write shell scripts, they are screwed. SA's will not under any circumstance give up the ability to write quick little shell scripts. It'll never happen. They will vote with their wallet on that one.

So when a security hole is found in the cryptographic software, they won't be able to just download new binaries to trojan my system. However, they can still just follow the flaw they have found in all the time. They can still script up various badnesses. They will still be able to do all variety of badness to me. They just can't put a trojan'ed version of SSH on my machine to get my passwords. Instead they will script up ssh to run out of gdb, and write the passwords in the clear out of gdb, and run as per normal. Hiding what is going on will be difficult because root kits will be more difficult to install. Now all they have to do is uninstall, the binary once they have the appropriate pieces of information to authenticate to your machine. Now they just authenticate like a normal user. They are in, and can poke around all they want.

Signed binaries, only means your running binaries that you got from the vendor, that's it. It'll change how the cracks work, but it won't mean you don't get cracked. Trust me, given enough time and research a person can break into your machine using only the binaries RedHat or the Debian, or whatever vendor you use. I'll still be able to ship off your private data, I'll still be able to deface your web site. I'll still be able to compromise the CGI's. Oh wait, are you saying I've got to get the CGI's certified too. That'll never happen. Not in a million zillion years. Internal busniess processes move to fast to do that.

Signed binaries are no silver bullet. The best they can do is refuse to sign them until a full audit has happened. You don't need signed binaries for that, only install things that have had a full audit, and it's just as good security for the initial break-in. Once the intial break in happens, that's about monitoring for odd behavior, which again has nothing to do with signed binaries. Of course don't get too pissed off, if you don't get a shell with your new Linux distro.

On certain binaries, it would be nice to enforce the signatures on, like standard libraries, and the kernel. However, most people use tripwire to do that things like that. Maybe the ability for RPM's to carry around the signatures of the files they installed, then verify those signatures after the fact using read-only bootable media, with the RPM signatures on it.

Signed binaries are a good thing, but I don't see them as the end all be all of security. I don't see them as a useful tool, because they will just get in the way anyplace where you release binaries on a regular basis like I do where I work. If the signed binaries don't, they they aren't providing the security that I hear advertised for them.

Kirby

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Panoramix]

The problem, is that since M$ controls 99.9% of the desktop market, they can pretty much cajole all the ISP's to modify their user agreements to demand that you must maintain a "trusted" computing platform in order to remain an account in good standing.

Hear, hear.

This, IMO, is the core of Microsoft's evil plan. I will even dare to say that, as much as I am interested in theis AMI guy's answers, his company is not the one with for the plan --they are merely dragged into it, and I think they can't do squat about it. You will get no relief from him.

See, I really don't think AMI, or any BIOS manufacturer, will ever make one that plainly refuses to boot a bootloader because it lacks a signature from a CA it trusts. That opens a class vulnerability in the scheme (a single CA key is compromised and you lose the whole system). Also, it is just too bloody obvious to the EFF and the likes. And it is unnecessary for the evil plan to succeed. The BIOS will always boot whatever you ask it to boot. I'm ready to take a bet on that. That is not the problem.

The problem is, the BIOS will checksum the bootloader, and store that checksum in a safe place. Furthermore, the BIOS will provide, to any program that asks for it, be it "trusted" or not, that hash, cryptographically signed with the BIOS key (btw the only key that has to reside in the BIOS, and you can bet it will be hardcoded in the silicon, not overridable). From that point on, you can build "trusted" data delivery paths entirely in software.

Here's an example: Say, you want to watch a movie trailer. So your browser connects to Universal Pictures' server, which demands cryptographic proof that it can "trust" your computer. So your media player software obtains that proof from the OS, and delivers it. What the OS delivers the hash of the media player, signed with the OS key. To guarantee the integrity of the OS, it includes the OS' hash, signed by the bootloader. To guarantee the bootloader's integrity, it includes the bootloader's hash, signed by the BIOS. Voilá, you have crypto proof that your entire system is kosher. Universal's server has only to verify that the BIOS's key is trustable, which they can do by checking it against AMI, or whatever. If that key is compromised (e.g., you crack the key of your BIOS), then they have a problem with a single individual, not a class compromise.

But the point is: you have NO say on which keys are trustable or not, because the verifying is not done by you. It is done by Universal. The best you can do is not buy Universal.

But now imagine this thread's scenario: your ISP is the one that requires proof of "trustability" before letting you connect. You will have to either (1) make your ISP include your OS's key in their trust list, or (2) switch to Windows, or (3) switch to another ISP that does not require this. But you will have option (3) for just some time: just picture the logical progression of this. Extend to almost everything else: online banking, electronic commerce, fucking email! You have MS Internet[TM], what Bill has always wanted.

And you can bet it will be eagerly adopted by banks, media companies, and the likes, because it is the single scheme that allows them to "protect" their data against their own customers. And all the time we will be scratching our own heads, wondering how we let that happen, if we, after all, successfully coerced AMI into not making a BIOS that refuses to boot Linux.

This is pure, concentrated evil. I stand in awe of Microsoft. I'm very, very concerned about this.

TCPA and the future

[program21]

Ok, so this is going to be a couple of questions, feel free to pick and choose.

What sort of future do you see for TCPA? Do you see it as inevitable, or is it just a fad thing that will pass?

Assuming it does catch on, what form do you see it taking? What we all fear (only signed apps will run, non-signed apps can't access system data/data from signed apps), or some lesser form?

So what are the differences ...

[Alien54]

Okay. So what precisely are the differences between Palladium and your product, and what assurance do we have that it will not act as crippling ware for open source and other similar free (as in free speech) software endevors? Any thoughts on backward compatibility modes?

TCPA & Palladium

[ignipotentis]

Perhaps you can clarify the differences between the two (TCPA & Palladium). After reading up on both of them, i still find that they seem to be pretty much the same, just marketed differently.

Something in everyone's mind

[forged]

Will it be possible to disable on future motherboards which will implement DRM techniques ?

"Trusted" computer

[michael]

A few related questions:

a) Isn't the goal of "trusted computing" to allow entities other than the owner of the computer to control what the owner does with his/her hardware? For example, "trusted computing" applied to music implies that the music publisher gains control over what the computer owner can do with the music data files. Isn't this the exact opposite of "trust" as that word is normally used - a trusted computer is one that can't be trusted by the computer's owner to perform the tasks asked of it, because other entities have veto power over the computer's actions?

b) Companies like AMI have repeatedly claimed that they aren't part of Palladium. However, isn't it true that without AMI's trusted BIOS (and all the other components necessary to build a "trusted computer"), Palladium wouldn't work? Why does AMI think they shouldn't be held responsible for enabling Palladium and similar schemes?

c) In what way does AMI benefit, financially or otherwise, from introducing a BIOS designed to make the computer it is installed in less useful to the purchaser of the computer? Please avoid saying that this is "optional"; AMI wouldn't create this BIOS if it wasn't intended to be used.

d) What is a "sales engineer"? Is your job primarily public relations, or primarily engineering, or primarily product sales?

Re:"Trusted" computer

[Mitreya]

Isn't this the exact opposite of "trust" as that word is normally used -

YES!
And here is the explanation that must be quoted again and again until we all know it (quoted from http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html)

24. So why is this called `Trusted Computing'? I don't see why I should trust it at all!

It's almost an in-joke. In the US Department of Defense, a `trusted system or component' is defined as `one which can break the security policy'. This might seem counter-intuitive at first, but just stop to think about it. The mail guard or firewall that stands between a Secret and a Top Secret system can - if it fails - break the security policy that mail should only ever flow from Secret to Top Secret, but never in the other direction. It is therefore trusted to enforce the information flow policy.

Or take a civilian example: suppose you trust your doctor to keep your medical records private. This means that he has access to your records, so he could leak them to the press if he were careless or malicious. You don't trust me to keep your medical records, because I don't have them; regardless of whether I like you or hate you, I can't do anything to affect your policy that your medical records should be confidential. Your doctor can, though; and the fact that he is in a position to harm you is really what is meant (at a system level) when you say that you trust him. You may have a warm feeling about him, or you may just have to trust him because he is the only doctor on the island where you live; no matter, the DoD definition strips away these fuzzy, emotional aspects of `trust' (that can confuse people).

Remember during the late 1990s, as people debated government control over cryptography, Al Gore proposed a `Trusted Third Party' - a service that would keep a copy of your decryption key safe, just in case you (or the FBI, or the NSA) ever needed it. The name was derided as the sort of marketing exercise that saw the Russian colony of East Germany called a `Democratic Republic'. But it really does chime with DoD thinking. A Trusted Third Party is a third party that can break your security policy.

25. So a `Trusted Computer' is one that can break my security?

Now you've got it.

Re:"Trusted" computer

[radish]

But surely that means we already have Trusted Computing? Windows (and other software) has shown itself to be vulnerable to many attacks which would breach my personal security (e.g. by mailing out my private documents to random people). Seeing as my machine is capable of breaching my security, that means it's trusted. Windows is already Trusted, Linux is Trusted, IIS is very Trusted ;)

Re:"Trusted" computer

[LostCluster]

Something is trusted when it is put in a position where if it screws up, bad can things happen.

Something is trustworthy when it is thought to not be likely to screw up when it is trusted to do something.

So, when you put up your organization's website on an unpatched IIS server, that computer is trusted to serve that set of pages and not all the pages to be changed by anybody other than those people trusted enough to be authorized to do so.

However, since an unpatched IIS server has security holes that allow for the site to be either taken offline, or replaced with an undesired site, that unpatched IIS server is not trustworthy... which means it's not a good idea to put an unpatched IIS server in a trusted position. If you do, it's very possible the unpatched IIS server might fail to live up to its responsiblites, causing the bad things you didn't want to happen.

Likewise, any of the trusted people might go crazy and decide to use their password to walk right in the front door and tear the site apart. This is why its important that you select trustworthy people, and as few people as possible, to hold that password.

Re:"Trusted" computer

[Grishnakh]

One could argue that war is state-sanctioned murder. As is a firing squad.

Guns do things other than killing people. 1) Target shooting. 2) Shooting animals.

If I were a gun owner, I would want to use my gun for lawful purposes, such as target shooting or home defense. I would not want to use it for murder. The gun is not taking anything away from me; instead, it's giving me extra capabilities.

TCPA does not give me, the computer user, any new capabilities at all. Instead, it takes away capabilities, such as being able to access all the data on my system, convert data between formats, etc. It gives extra control of my data to media corporations, but this doesn't help me, the user, at all.

The whole point of this argument was whether AMI could claim innocence by selling a TCPA-enabled BIOS, using the argument that it allows both good and bad uses. A baseball bat manufacturer can claim innocence because their bats are sold for the purpose of playing baseball, not cracking people's heads open. A gun manufacturer can claim the same, although their product is obviously much more dangerous, and is normally used for killing something (which is only a bad thing if it's a murder). A tobacco manufacturer, OTOH, cannot claim any innocence because their products are only used to harm people (even though their customers do buy the product willingly). Similarly, AMI's new product can only be used to harm their customers, and it's even worse than the tobacco companies because the customers don't want TCPA and never asked for it. They're only doing this in collusion with other anti-end-user companies like Microsoft and Intel, in order to possible increase their profits at the expense of freedom, and by providing something that customers never asked for.

So by this analysis, AMI is even lower than the tobacco companies. Imagine that...

microsoft OS spin

[ywwg]

currently if you try to install vendor drivers on windows, the OS tells you things like "are you sure you want to use these untested third-party drivers, which will no doubt ruin your computer because you're a bad boy for not using windows." Can you assure us that linux, bsd, and all other "alternative" operating systems will be treated as _equals_ of microsoft products? Can you assure us that there will be no preferential treatment for any os, and that there won't be any "are you really sure?" messages?

Licensing

[Arc04]

Will OS manufacturers have to pay to get an "unlock code" that allows them to run their OS on the BIOS.

That would be terrible as it would kill many under funded open source OSes that aren't as big as the Linux big players.

Arc

Re:Licensing

[Windcatcher]

Here's a better one: will software vendors (either open-source or not) have to pay a license fee to be able to decrypt data files from competing products? What if you want to move your documents from Windows+MSOffice to Linux+StarOffice? Surely Office would use TCPA to encrypt the files.

Gasp! MS would never do something as low as that!

On the Exclusionary Uses of TCPA

[the-banker]

Is it (will it be) possible to use TCPA to effectively lock-out certain operating evironments from various services (software, media, etc) solely because the operating environment is not backed by a company, and has no mechanism for paying certification fees and licenses? Specifically, could TCPA be used against free OS's like Free/Open/netBSD and Linux to prevent those users from accessing the same content users of commercial OS's can?

Customization support?

[ryanr]

I actually think this feature could be useful, if done "right". Along the lines of my idea of right... will I be able to, say, install my own set of public keys in the BIOS so that I can have a system that will only boot the software that I have signed?

Do you think Palladium is a good thing?

[Noryungi]

As the title says:

Do you think Palladium is a good thing? Whether your answer is "yes" or "no", please explain.

Knowing that Palladium is a Microsoft Technology, do you think AMI is making a smart move by adopting it? Again, please explain your position.

Are you afraid that Microsoft may use its position to control, not just 90% of the software used on PC, but also the overall architecture of modern machines?

Many thanks in advance.

General TC question

[j3110]

I actually like the concept of trusted computing quite a bit. So long as the user selects which code will be trusted, it has great potential for good. My question is, from your position, do you foresee trusted computing being more like web-browser applet signing applied in hardware (where the user can add and remove trust for certain companies) or more like the media industries idea (where the OS/hardware manufacturers select which code is trusted under penalty of DMCA)?

Re:General TC question

[Mitreya]

I actually like the concept of trusted computing quite a bit.

You clearly don't understand the use of word "trusted" here. read this. If you want to make it short, start from question #24.

So long as the user selects which code will be trusted, it has great potential for good.

We already have code signing and confirmation before installs. The problem is that users trust the WRONG programs. Either this will increase the number of "are you sure you want this" (not removing the problem of people making mistakes). Or, more likely, the selection of which code to trust will be relegated to BIOS/MS/etc... that would also be bad...

So it's not Palldium...

[inerte]

But does your company have any plans to implement a "security measure" similar to Palladium?

And what if Microsoft releases a software that needs it, won't AMI need to adopt it so it can run the "DRM features"?

How will Linux, or any other "non-trusted" software run on your hardware?

How can we confirm that NO BS is in your BIOSes

[nenolod]

Are you going to release the source? Will the BIOS be auditable? Will the BIOS code contain some sort of monitoring code? Will the BIOS contain spyware? All of these questions are important... and how will we be able to confirm your answers to them?

Can we really take the word of a conglomerate? Will you be able to ensure that what you are saying is accurate?

Modern conglomerates usually misrepresent their products if they think it will generate more customers. How can we be sure that you wouldn't be doing this to us?

Re:How can we confirm that NO BS is in your BIOSes

[Mitreya]

Will the BIOS code contain some sort of monitoring code?

Only to catch terrorists...

Will the BIOS contain spyware?

Never! It will contain some select offers from our partners and collect some information to customize and improve your booting experience

Can we really take the word of a conglomerate?
Will you be able to ensure that what you are saying is accurate?

No.
Our EULA will take care of that.

Modern conglomerates usually misrepresent their products if they think it will generate more customers. How can we be sure that you wouldn't be doing this to us?

As the courts become less and less of a threat for a corporation (and already a 0-threat to a corporation from an individual). There is NO way to be sure. Unless all the non-entry level employees in the company will be made to sign all these statements...

A question....

[Lord_Slepnir]

How many hours will it take after the first Palladium boards hit the market for someone to crack it and have linux running on it? Should I have put an 's' onto hours?

Shouldn't it be:

[Nurlman]

AMIBIOS or NOT?

Re:Shouldn't it be:

[W32.Klez.H]

AM I BIOS OR NOT

Lockout

[rtkluttz]

Be truthful. Is there even the slightest chance that someone other than me will be able to say what will run (or more importtantly will NOT run) on a PC that contains this technology? I'm not talking about purchased software that locks me out directly in one way or another due to licensing issues. But can this technology be used to stop me from exercising fair use rights if I decide to get around those blocks in purchased software? Or will they hinder me from writing my own code to do what I want, or downloading and compiling/running someone elses code?
If ANY of these CAN be a side effect of this technology, it is bad. There are stumbling blocks, of course, but no one will have ultimate say over what does or does not run on my own computer.

.

Advantage

[TedCheshireAcad]

What is the advantage to me, a Linux using consumer, to buying your product over those of your competitors?

Refunds/Opt-outs

[ninewands]

Given the existence of The LinuxBIOS Project and the fact that the Linux kernel does not require a ROM-BIOS once the kernel is up and running, what will be AMI's position on refunds if a significant fraction of the Linux userbase starts installing LinuxBIOS and returning the BIOS chips. Will AMI make the refund, or will they give us the runaround that Microsoft and the hardware OEMs did on the question of Windows refunds?

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[Ageless]

Okay, now hear this! In the "Real World" you can't randomly pull things apart and ask for a refund. Computers are not different than other products. If I buy a box of tissues and only use half of them I can't return the other half for a refund.
If I buy a phone that has a caller id function but I don't subscribe to the service I can't pull the LCD and pry the caller id chips out and ask for a refund.

Damn, read the shit you type before submitting it and try to remember exactly when it was that you lost all semblence of sanity.

My Question Is:

[cca93014]

How do you sleep at night?

No, I have not RTFA, I'm just taking the piss, ok?

Portability of software/licenses with TCPA

[naarok]

Will TCPA compliant machines make it more difficult for a user to updgrade CPUs or change computers? Do you see users having to re-confirm their identity with external sources because the identity of their computer has changed? (I know this already happens, I just see it becoming more pervasive in the future and am afraid more software vendors will begin to license by specific computer).

Performance hit

[oliverthered]

I assume that data pathways with be signable or encripted in some way. What performance hit will the [operating system] take when using trusted system? e.g. How much extra data is added to form a signiture, what methods are used for signing. and how will this benifit the end-user.

How would AMI response to market pressures?

[CodeShark]

How would AMI respond to pressures from companies such as Microsoft, Intel, Sun, or to the combined companies in the MPAA or RIAA if those companies insisted that AMI only release "DRM compliant" BIOS chips, etc.

Would AMI disclose that such pressures were being placed on them, or would this type of fact be kept hidden from consumer groups or individuals, etc. until it was too late for us to effectively respond?

Options?

[ncc189]

Will AMI (and the TCPA) allow owners of these "trusted" computers to turn off or disable the features that are being discussed? Will we as users of our hardware be able to control what features are on and what features are not, or will these choices be up to Microsoft and its partners(TCPA)? How is AMI addressing these issues of choice and control?

Have customers asked for TCPA features?

[Sloppy]

AMI rep, the reason I think some people view your company with suspicion, is that we think it is unlikely that an AMI customer has asked for TCPA's "features." I suspect that anyone who is cooperating with that effort, is somehow being influenced by forces other than traditional market forces.

So maybe you can set me straight: do you think your customers want TCPA? If so, why? Who are these customers? If this a case where customers are not the same as users?

Software.

[13Echo]

Do you intend to require some sort of a per-operating system licensing fee to operating system companies, in order to profit on the inclusion of these "features"? E.g. Will Microsoft be giving you royalty payments for each machine that includes this AMI BIOS and gets their OS installed with these supported "features"? What position does this put your company into in terms of trying to also force open source OS companies (like RedHat) into paying these licenses?

A question.

[DAldredge]

Will you be able to tell the truth in your answers or will your answers have to be 'cleaned up' by the AMI PR dept first?

Non-Linux, non-Microsoft operating systems

[aridhol]

I see many people worried about Linux not working with Trusted Computing. What I'm wondering is if other operating systems will work. It has often been the case that something will come out for Windows, then get ported to Linux because they are the most visible minority group.

One of the operating systems I use is FreeBSD. Will that still be usable, or will it be forced to deal with substandard or non-existant drivers (think NVidia until recently). I also use QNX. Will that work? How about a new OS that will be created sometime in the future?

The crux of "trustworthy computing"...

[Doug Neal]

... is, who is doing the "trusting"? In Microsoft's vision of it it certainly isn't the end user, it's them. Or other copyright owners.

TCPA is fundamentally a sound technological concept, but wide open for abuse. If it could be used for the user's benefit to prevent against viruses etc, then that's great.

What I'm saying is that the owner of the computer should be able to override the trust relationships - assert that the code is trusted (by them). The owner of the computer should have the ultimate veto. After all, it is theirs. Does AMI's plans for a TCPA implementation have this in mind?

How will I be affected???

[josepha48]

How will I be affected by TCPA? I run several machines at home some running NetBSD, FreeBSD, Linux, and Windows. I generally build my machines, unless they are given to me by my employer (or its a laptop), and even then I reinstall the OS or install my own OS of choice. (Whatever I'm in the mood to run at time of install or what works). If I buy a new Motherboard from AMI with TCPA will I stil be able to do this? Will I have to do special tricks to get this done or will it be just like it is now?

What makes you think?

[codepunk]

So really what makes you think myself as a customer want's even anything close to that on one of my motherboards?. The possibility of future misuse is to great for me to even consider it. I can tell you as both a corporate and private customer that it is not wanted in any shape or form. The mere mention of supporting it frankly makes my skin crawl with disgust. If this is how you choose to release your products I choose not to participate with my dollars.

Something has been bothering me......

[Anonymous Coward]

Can you address why you think it is that the open source community has taken Palladium as _such_ a scary proposition?

Then, building on the above answer, can you explain why the open source community has only yelled and screamed about how evil Palladium is, rather the doing what they preach others should do? (Which is, of course, create an open source, trusted architecture (i.e.: TCPA) which protects/promotes consumer rights over and above the rights of corporate media groups.)

Or (if the above is not possible) can you at least explain why building an open source TCPA structure is not possible?

Straight-up products?

[LostCluster]

No matter how many DRM technologies AMIBIOS does adopt, can you promise that AMIBIOS will continue to offer DRM-free BIOS products?

Missing Idea

[GreatOgre]

I think the idea that most of us our missing is this. Most PC users buy their computers from Dell, Gateway, or some other big vendor. These vendors will ultimately sell TCPA/Palladium enabled computers. So, the real question should be: In the future will those of us who build our own systems be able to escape the issue of having TCPA/Palladium on our systems courtesy of the big players?

Hardware vendors

[cybermace5]

Since a BIOS is only part of a motherboard: what steps will hardware vendors have to take, in order to incorporate your BIOS? Will they have to adhere to certain hardware design rules or controls in order to maintain the TCPA? Is there going to be a licensing procedure for hardware manufacturers?

Technology can be used for good and evil

[defile]

As we all know, technology can be used for the purposes of both good and evil. Here are things that I consider good about where TCPA is going, along with the evil.

Good

• Users can protect their computers from viruses or other unapproved malware.

Evil

• The BIOS can be feasibly configured to only boot only "approved" code.
• By extension, "approved" code means that the Operating System must be a fresh, "blessed" install from a certain large proprietary software vendor.
• Developing this further, this means that this certain large proprietary software vendor's OS can cease to function if any unapproved modifications are made to the system.
• This gives the vendors, and anyone they do business with, incredible control over our PCs and the user is incapable of doing a damn thing about it unless they violate the DMCA and face criminal prosecution.

There are many advantages for the hardware/software/content vendors if this is realized, but few of them seem consumer driven: the erosion of fair use, the control of speech, taking a cut of every e-commerce transation, eliminating standards and competition.

Undoubtedly, your shareholders will push you to cooperate with the software/content vendors because it means big money for them and anyone who plays ball, but for us, it means we lose a lot. PR will say that it stops pirates from raising music/movie prices, and that it means ISVs can produce software that can't be warezed, no more cheating in online games, no more child porn, ad infinitum, and it's all for our own good.

Unfortunately, the potential for abuse is extraordinary, and the last thing I want to see is more of my friends being locked up because they do something with their computers that some company doesn't agree with. And right now it looks like AMI wants just that to happen.

Yes, right now your BIOS may offer choice, but hardware vendors seem committed to building an infrastructure that one day can make it very easy to eliminate this choice.

Please explain why we do want TCPA, why we should support your company, and how we can be assured that our colleagues don't go to jail just for believing they still control systems they bought. Also, please explain why the system we have now is so inadequete.

Thank you.

I'm a little blurry on the details here....

[Malor]

If I understood the prior articles correctly, TCPA should provide a basic keystore, an authentication mechanism, and enough checking to insure that the boot sector is signed.

If I want to install a new boot sector, do I generate my own key, install that, and self-sign the boot code? Or do the LILO or GRUB teams have to get a key issued and then sign things themselves?

Who has ultimate control over the keys? CAN I install my own, or is it centralized somewhere? Who does TCPA *ultimately* trust? How can I be *certain* that it doesn't trust anyone I don't want it to? If I screw up and lose my key, how I recover access to the system?

I assume there must be some master, uneraseable keys in TCPA; I just can't imagine that you'd ship it without implicitly trusting Microsoft, and I distrust Microsoft very much. And if there are recovery keys in there, do I have to ship my machine away to some lab to replace a lost key, or can I do it myself? And if there IS a master, unerasable key available for recovery purposes, why can't virus writers just sign their code with that key instead?

Re:I'm a little blurry on the details here....

[BeBoxer]

If I understood the prior articles correctly, TCPA should provide ... enough checking to insure that the boot sector is signed.

I'm amazed at how common this meme has become despite the fact that it is completely false. TCPA in no way dicates what code can run on the machine. The "security" it offers works in pretty much the reverse fashion. The TCPA BIOS hashes the bootloader and saves that hash in a secure place. That allows the bootloader to verify that it really did run first. The bootloader can then hash some portion of the OS, and then load and execute it. The OS can then verify that the boot process really was TCPA-BIOS->Correct bootloader->Unmodified OS. And more importantly, the OS can have the BIOS give it a cryptographic "proof" of this fact to hand to other programs or web sites.

What does this mean for Linux? Probably nothing. Linux could make use of this functionality, but my guess is it probably won't. The fact is that unless your code actually bothers to check the TCPA state of the machine, it just doesn't matter.

On the other hand, Palladium might make some things a little trickier. Since the bootloader is part of the TCPA chain of trust, it's highly unlikely that Palladium will be able to enter it's "secure" mode if you are using LILO or grub. So if you are somebody who actually dual-boots you will probably have to have an official Microsoft bootloader on /dev/hda and LILO or whatever on /dev/hda1 (for example) and have the Microsoft bootloader pass control to your Linux bootloader. Or just don't run Windows.

Could Microsoft abuse this to try to prevent users from dual booting? Sure. But they could easily prevent people from dual booting today if they wanted to. It's just that it would be such a blatantly anti-competetive move that even Microsoft would have a hard time pulling it off. They could refuse to boot thru LILO. They could complain and offer to "fix" any non-FAT or NTFS partitions at every boot. They could use browser version strings to control access to updates on their web site and bring DMCA charges against browsers which circumvent that by pretending to be IE. TCPA doesn't really make it easier to Microsoft to screw with people who dual boot. It's already trivial today!

Why are BIOSes closed source?

[mcelrath]

Having recently had a lot of trouble with my laptop's BIOS, on an issue that I could most certainly fix if I had access to the code... I started wondering what benefit AMI and other vendors have by keeping BIOS code secret? I can think of none whatsoever.

An open-source TCPA BIOS might go a long way to alleviating the fears of the open source community, since we could see exactly what it is you're forcing on us. And hey, no doubt you'd get a few bug-fixing patches in return for your efforts.

So, is an open-source BIOS a possibility? (TCPA or otherwise)

-- Bob

E-mail sent to marketing@ami

[LarsG]

Brian,

I sure would hate to be in your shoes right now. Putting yourself in front of a firing squad voluntarely takes guts.

I sent an e-mail to marketing complaining about AMI supporting TCPA, and got the standard reply in return. My answer is below, and I am still waiting for a reply.

Umbertina E. Vezzani wrote:

Hello Laars,

You can already find TCPA-enabled products on the market but they have a different BIOS.

I am perfectly aware of that, and that is why I don't buy IBM laptops any more.

The Security subsystem is intended for those users who want an extra security protection that is valid even outside the OS.

The motherboard and system manufacturers will specify their system features, so I believe you will certainly be able to choose the features you want. I really don't think you will buy a motherboard with a hidden feature or "fritz".

I am not afraid of hidden features. TCPA is merely the scaffolding which enables building "trusted applications"/"trusted clients". What I am afraid of, is how software vendors and the content industry will (ab)use TCPA.

As for the reference to "fritz" - I think Ross Anderson went a little bit over the top in his critisism of TCPA. A much better overview of some of the technical problems with TCPA can be found here (I fully endorse Mr. Arbaugh's suggestions):
http://www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/TCPA/TCP A-goodnbad.pdf

TCPA is meant to answer to a demand of security from users, not something else.

What demand exactly? TCPA doesn't solve any of the major security problems.

TCPA only answers the question "has the basic components of this system been changed?", and makes it possible for 3rd parties to verify the state ("trustworthiness") of a system.

The majority of security problems are on the OS or application level - macro/scripting vulnerabilities, virii, buffer overruns and similar. TCPA doesn't provide a solution for any of those. In fact, a software sandbox like Java or running certain applications in vmware virtual machines provides better protection against those real world problems.

What exactly is TCPA supposed to solve? Don't give me some marketing fluff about "enhancing security for the user". I want cold, clear, technical examples of real world security problems that TCPA is supposed to solve.

Also, which users are demanding TCPA? Users want protection against virii and similar, but TCPA doesn't solve those problems. Who are the end users that demand something like TCPA?

I also believe that, if there is a solid foundation to the concerns for privacy people is expecting, the TCPA itself will improve its specification to address those concerns.

So there is a real chance the next revision of the TCPA spec will include proper anonymous certificates a'la Chaum instead of the current "please trust the privacy CA" solution?

It must be noted that AMI has not announced support for Palladium. Palladium is an initiative by an OS entity that is slated for the future.

I know that. I also know that there is considerable disagreement going on between the Palladium and the TCPA proponents.

To be honest, TCPA is a better specification than Palladium. However, TCPA does provide the scaffolding required for building "trusted systems" - i.e., that a 3rd party can control what is happening on my computer. TCPA is a Pandora's box - if abused, it could have a devastating effect on both innovation, privacy and consumer rights.

Regarding the limitations of a system with TCPA I would offer the link below to the public specification for further information on compatibility with different OS's, and hardware. Based on that spec we can tell you that it does not limit the ability to run Linux (or any other open source solution).

How is that supposed to make me feel good? I know that it is possible to disable (most of) TCPA. I know that my computer will continue to work even if the TCPA subsystem tell other computers out there that my computer has zero "trustworthiness".

However, once digital commerce, streaming media and other online content start demanding TCPA enabled clients you are effectively a second rate citizen on the 'net and are locked out of a lot of content if TCPA is disabled on your computer.

So:
1) TCPA does not provide true anonymity (you have to trust the privacy CA).
2) The scaffolding provided by TCPA can be abused by those who want to disable the Turing completeness of computers and instead turn them into locked down interactive content delivery platforms.
3) The market effect will force people to use TCPA and TCPA enabled "trusted clients" even if they don't want to.
4) TCPA is advertised as a security solution, but does not solve most of the real world security problems.

With kind regards,
Lars Gaarden

Platform owner

[briancnorton]

Since microsoft is kind of vague on details about Palladium, I will hit you with a TCPA question. In the TCPA FAQ, it states that "Platform Owners" will decide which software runs on their platform. Who exactly is a "Platform Owner" and does microsoft have a simmilar "feature in palladium"

Do you see mandatory TCPA and/or Palladium

[dpilot]

This is it, in the fewest words. Others have danced around the question, but IMHO this is really it.

I understand that if I want to play MPAA or RIAA content, I may need to have a DRM OS, probably Palladium, and it will need to be on a system with a TCPA BIOS.

But what if I want to just boot Linux (or trusty old Win98SE) to program or play games?

Will I be permitted to run an "untrusted" computer, or is it only a matter of time until the only new computer is a trusted computer that will only run a trusted OS?

So why SHOULDN'T we boycott AMI?

[StevenMaurer]

I am a bit concerned that the information you provided misled your readers into thinking AMI was promoting Palladium or taking some sort of anti-open-source stance.

It plainly is anti open-source.

TPM has no benefit to end users. All it does is give Microsoft an argument to use with ISVs as to why they shouldn't develop products for open source platforms. They can say: "If you ever release your product for Linux, some people will disassemble it. But with our "trusted" OSes, you'll never have to worry about crackers, because we don't let our customers control their own machines".

It's a powerful argument. There may even be a few ISVs stupid enough to fall for it. (Most ISVs don't go out of business from cracks, they die when Microsoft itself uses its monopoly power to sieze the market the ISV developed.)

But it's all a moot point. Why shouldn't we be trying to nip this in the bud? Why shouldn't we be spreading the word to everyone we know that people who buy AMI will very soon have to accept whatever draconian "Clickthrough" is on the software package, giving up their legal rights for no consideration whatsoever?

In short, why shouldn't we be trying to drive AMI out of business?

Sounds like a plan to me.

In plain English (so my mom would understand)

[paranoic]

Just what problem is this trying to solve?
Why can't my computer be trusted?
Is this trying to fix a fundamental flaw in operating systems?

Real Questions

[Qzukk]

1) What does it take (steps,costs including any IP licensing fees) to make OS Foo boot on a TCPA computer?

2) What does it take (steps, costs including licensing fees) to make application Bar run on Foo? On any other OS?

Ignoring rampant paranoia, these are the questions that will actually affect open source development. It comes down to how much will it cost for us to run our programs?

Compatibility with Garage "Hacks"

[Catiline]

I'm a hobbyist who builds his own computer, writes his own software, and (on rare occasions) will build hardware components (as in: with solder and chips). What assurance do I have that your "Trusted Computing" initiative won't interfere with my projects? Interference here is defined as reducing the operational capacities -- including networking features -- of the computer or reducing my ability to develop to my needs. In a way this is four separate questions: how software, Trusted vendor hardware, pre-Trust vendor hardware, and home-built hardware integrate into the "Trusted Computing" architecture.

Technical Explanation of BIOS Settings

[doppleganger871]

I have been doing research on BIOS settings for many years, and I have found good articles on what the settings do, and how to tweak them for the best performance/stability mix. But, I would like to know if the BIOS manufacturer itself would be able to provide an in-depth manual of all the BIOS settings, and what exactly they do. All the manuals that come with motherboards are very short on explanations, and I would like to see someone within the company actually explain to us hardware enthusiasts the down 'n dirty, nitty gritty, dirt under the rug, needle in a haystack type of information that we could use to make our computers run the absolute best they can. Because, as we all know, optimizing software and firmware is a lot cheaper than upgrading parts.

-Jay

How do you feel about TCPI?

[stinkydog]

Will the next computer you personally buy implement these features?

Who will you give access to your machine (Microsoft, RIAA, MPAA, Homeland Security)?

When the thought police come to round up us 'Criminals' that will not give up our 'untrusted' systems will you be able to sleep at night?

SD

Net weight

[King of the World]

Often people describe the control that Microsoft has over office file formats as one of massive legacy. They have the 90% of the office market and in practice it's impossible not to deal with the format.

Palladium claims to have the freedom to choose whether you want to connect to another palladium machine. This freedom is at an individual level, in the same was I can choose to use Abiword.

If Palladium achieves mass market how will my freedom not to use Palladium be possible? Will it be like having the Freedom to speak Esperanto?

Is TCPA/Palladium is making de facto-contracts?

[Kjella]

What I find most interesting is how Palladium is advertized as having features like letting content creators (e.g. a person sending you an e-mail) control what you can do with it (automatic deletion, no forwarding, no printing).

However, we never get a say in this, we never agree to any such "contract". If your company is producing a product as part of a system designed to disempower me in favor of a machine, does it really surprise you that I don't like it?

TCPA/Palladium has never been about how I, the end user can come in control of my machine, because I am already in total control (up to the limitations of my tools). TCPA can for me, at best, be a hardware version of a "sandbox", where I control what resources are availible to a given program. But such programs already exists in software and has no need for hardware backing.

Many people have compared TCPA to being a program running in Ring -1 (Ring 0 being the OS kernel). The only thing it can control in addition to what the OS already can control, is what runs in Ring 0. So why do you need to control what runs in Ring 0? Answer me that.

Because you can't trust me, isn't it?. Isn't that what it's all about? Having a trust chain that I can't break. So the content, and my machine can negoiate a deal, without me ever getting a say. So that they two can decide, regardsless of rights granted by law (like fair use and first sale), when, how, where and what I can see, hear, use and do. And you don't find that offensive?

Kjella

An answer.

[Anonymous Brave Guy]

Of course. All my answers will be the [...] truth. No editorial input will be applied [unless deemed strictly necessary to guarantee appropriate standards of presentation -- Ed] between the time that [I] write the article and the time that [I] send it to [its recipient]. The PR guys promised. [No, we didn't.]

Come on, who're you kiddin'? Any reply from this guy, or anyone else writing on a subject so obviously controvserial, is going to be screened seventeen times over by PR weenies before it gets out into the wild.

The death of WINE

[Windcatcher]

Here's an interesting scenario:

- Office Palladium will require TCPA

- Linux, as an untrusted OS, won't be able to provide Office Palladium proper authentication, and Office will refuse to run under WINE.

- Windows users become reluctant to migrate to Linux since they can't run Office. (Believe it or not, Office is still the killer app for most folks).

I'm telling ya, the Office division is behind this at least as much as the content industry.

What is the driving force behind this?

[theLOUDroom]

My question is:
Why is AMI doing this?

Do they think people want their OS to be able to lock them out of certain parts of their machine?

You see, I can't really see any application for TCPA / Palladium besides taking control away from the owner of a computer. Any of the other "security" features TCPA/Palladium provides can/have been easily implemented in software. The only application that requires BIOS/hardware level modifications, is one where you are trying to prevent the person who owns the computer from have full control over it.


Lately I've been beginning to notice that some companies have internal conflicts of interest that cause them to do stupid things, which are not what consumers want. (Stupid because, they loose money because consumers go elsewhere to get hardware that isn't crippled and any piracy that was going to happen still happens anyways.)
Sony, for example. Being both a hardware company and a media company, they seem to have an internal conflict of interest: To many RIAA/MPAA types CD/DVD burners are synonymous with piracy, this must lead to internal pressure on the hardware branch of the company to try and control what people can do with Sony hardware. Ex: It's rumored that Sony DVD burners can burn Xbox games but not PS2 games, Sony Discmans have often had sub-par CDR playing ability, Sony Minidisc recorders had an annoying copy protection flag that prevented you from making many digital copies of a minidisc.

1. Does AMI have any such internal conflict of interest that is leading them to do this?
2. Or is it pressure from outside sources, and who are those sources?
3. Or does AMI think Joe-sixpack actually wants this?

This whole thing reminds me very much of the whole CPUID debacle. CPU manufacturer X starts putting unique ID numbers inside their CPU. They claim it will allow increased security for web transactions blah, blah, blah. The problem was there was not good reason why your average computer user would want a unique unchangable serial number for his computer. There was a tremendous potential for violation user's privacy and no good reason why they needed it in the first place. Why? A unique id could be implemented in software. The only reason to have it in hardware is to prevent the owner of the computer from changing /disabling it.

People didn't want them, and CPUIDs failed. Why does AMI think this is any different?

Multi-part question

[drinkypoo]

Two parts. The one I'm really interested in seeing answered: I've noticed while disassembling PC BIOS that it all appears to be very old-school style code, for instance registers are cleared by XORing themselves. How much of that tendency is from legacy code from the days when that mattered, and how much of it is just programmers doing the right thing (tm)?

Second part, and less important, what is the story with firewire booting? How hard is it to graft additional boot code onto a BIOS and present a device as a reasonable boot device to the rest of the BIOS?

Usual interview rules apply..

[gatekeep]

Now, I've been here a while, so when phrases like 'Usual interview rules apply' are tossed around, I understand the meaning.

But it occurs to me, there's probably many who don't. Why not have a page outlining the usual interview rules, and link to it when saying something like that?

Comment removed

[account_deleted]

Comment removed based on user account deletion

yes would be a fantastic result

[DrSkwid]

If applied across all executables and scripts.

Especially if it could be fine grained down to a per user basis. i.e. a system wide policy of who can run what.

Then you could have root to be only available in single user mode.

Stick that up your rootkit.

hmm it's starting to sound like plan9

Which is MORE important?

[MissMyNewton]

A user's rights?

OR

A "content provider's" rights?

Please don't bother answering if you're going to waffle.

Okay, Brian, serious question.

[Windcatcher]

You've said that AMI has nothing to do with Palladium. Of course, that's true. One is a BIOS, and the other is an operating system made by another company. I have no issue with that.

However, we ALL know that Palladium will run in TCPA trusted mode, and TCPA functions will be active.

So here's the question (ahem):

If:

- I, as a Linux user, want to BUY the next version of Microsoft Office(tm) and run it on my Linux box under WINE, and:

- said version of Office requires that it be run on a trusted platform (i.e. it requires TCPA authentication),

WHAT WILL HAPPEN?

I'm sure you think this is a loaded question. It is, and it isn't. It is in the sense that I suspect what the answer will be, but I want to hear you answer it. It isn't, in the sense that this is a very serious issue and has enormous ramifications for the entire industry. You see, I think that TCPA+Palladium are really schemes for killing Linux by denying it the ability to run Microsoft applications. To that end, I don't consider you accomplices, but perhaps dupes. I ask you the above question in all seriousness, and I challenge you to prove me wrong.

What do you think about Linux BIOS?

[lanner]

Dear AMI BIOS Developer

At first, I was going to ask you about how you have cooperated, if at all, with the Linux BIOS project. After all, you often have historically cooperated with Microsoft and Novell. What are you doing to help Linux?

But then it occurred to me, if Linux BIOS was successful, it would put AMI out of the BIOS software development business. Linux BIOS is a competitor of AMI.

What is your personal perspective about Linux BIOS, and what does AMI think about it?

Thank you

The LinuxBIOS Home Page
http://www.acl.lanl.gov/linuxbios/

Slashdot | Linux BIOS
http://slashdot.org/articles/00/06/14/211020 9.shtm l

# Jesse Molina

Who does TCPA envision the "Owner" to be?

[BeBoxer]

The TCPA standard talks a lot about the "Owner" of the system, and how the "Owner" can initialize a new system so that it will begin generating keys and such using a password set up during the "ownership" process (See Section 2.6 of the Standard). My question is: who would the "Owner" of a system normally be in plain english? The actual end-user (or their administrator)? Or would the TPM get "owned" by the hardware vendor (Dell, HP, etc.) Or the OS vendor? Or the motherboard manufacturer?

Second, will it be possible to completely reset the TPM to a non-owned state to allow used hardware to be sold "as new"? Or would the hardware refuse to allow a new owner?

Brian, please explain to us...

[bani]

...exactly why AMI's TCPA cannot be abused by corporations to harm/lock out Open source.

Please explain to us why AMI's TCPA is a good thing for Linux.

Concerns re: Trusted Computing

[E1ven]

One of the most interesting posts I've seen regarding this subject was found at Microsoft.com

I'd love to hear how you'd address some of the points he brings up in the article.

In case the site goes down, or is changed, I've mirrored it at sq7.org/media/ms.html

Who signs?

[shyster]

Who will be the "trusted" signers of this code? What hoops (and dollars) must be jumped through?

Most importantly, will a system admin be able to sign code as trusted (whether his or another coder's) for all machines in his control? By extension, will an individual be able to do the same for machine(s) under their control? Or will only Verisign, Thawte, etc. be trusted?

Anti-competitive tactics 101

[Windcatcher]

I have to wonder:

- Introduce a new version of Office that introduces a new default file format. This is key, since in five years this file format would be ubiquitous, and the new version of Office would be required to read these files. Forget about sticking with Office 2k/XP. It isn't an option.

- Either use TCPA to encrypt the new .DOC files to disk (thus making it impossible for 3rd party apps to read them) or, if a judge won't allow it, obfuscate the file format as much as possible and use patents+legal threats to protect them (once again, to lock out 3rd party apps). The point here is to make the new version of Office indispensible. It is important to note that, even if there is a lawsuit over this against Microsoft, it could take 8 years or so for it to come to a head, and the judge may side with MS in the end anyway.

- Make this shiny new version of Office require a "trusted" platform (i.e. TCPA mode) to run with full functionality. You've just locked out Linux+WINE and made it very hard for vendors to sell or offer PC's without Windows, since they will not only be unable to run Office, they won't even be able to read the new .DOC file format.

Voila! You've managed to use your Office software monopoly to preserve your OS monopoly. Switching to Linux+WINE a few years from now will make it impossible to read documents in the new Office, without perhaps exporting those documents to some other format (which would of course by design lose some vital formatting information). It makes it really hard for companies to switch, and dissuades people from migrating since they'll have to not only leave Office behind, but their Office documents as well. It also totally breaks the ability to share documents between the Linux and Windows worlds, without first changing to a (likely inferior) common format first. While you could probably convert back to the new .DOC later, the damage will have been done as the original .DOC formatting would have been damaged or lost.

I wish I felt wrong about this, but I really believe that this is Microsoft's strategy to kill Linux. IMHO TCPA really is that dangerous--the whole thing about online music and movies is trivial by comparison (maybe it's a smoke screen).

Palladium is Not TCPA; TCPA is worse

[billstewart]

Palladium is a set of Microsoft software capabilities that lets application programmers content providers have some control over what the operating system will do with their stuff and lets Microsoft provide some control over what you can do with your Microsoft-Operating-System environment. If it wants to avoid hackers working around its limitations, it also needs some hardware support, but you only get Palladium if you install the corresponding Windows versions, and you only care if you've got data files that are in Palladium formats, like whatever music/movies format MS can negotiate. If you're a Linux user, you're used to this problem; nothing to see here, you can move along.

TCPA is a different issue - it's a set of BIOS features that will only let the machine start up if it's running a certified operating system configuration (which the hardware validates as unmodified), and a set of features that let an operating system and application programs check that the system is running in TCPA-approved mode (that's a bit similar to Palladium, but still fundamentally different), and a set of things that the system won't do if it's not running a certified system. Depending on which version of the spec and proposed followons you're reading and how aggressive the implementation is, there may be things that you'd like to do that you can't do on a non-certified system - like use the sound card, or maybe the _video_, or maybe it won't boot at all, or maybe it just won't let you load kernel modules, plus it obviously won't tell the software that you're running in Trust-Us mode if you're not.

Obviously, an aggressive implementation won't fly for many Linux users, but it may still be usable by Linux _consumers_. The best case is somewhat like having a car with the hood welded shut and a security system that disables it if you mess around; you can paint it any color you'd like, and put whatever you want in the trunk, but you can't start the engine unless your seatbelt's on and you blow in the breathalyzer (which is hard to reach when you're wearing your seatbelt, of course), and if you take the radio out, the radio won't work and the car won't let you put a different radio in, so the RIAA knows you're not playing MP3-CDs in your car, but at least it isn't always tuned to MS-NBC, though if you're playing a non-RIAA-certified CD, it only plays on the tinny little mono speaker in the dashboard, not the four-way tunable woofers or the heads-up display system, and if you do tune to a different radio station, it only uses the right-hand speaker if Rush Limbaugh is on, and only uses the left-hand speakers if it's National Public Radio, and I'm sorry but you can't play Free Radio Berkeley at all...