Discuss BIOS and Palladium Issues With an AMIBIOS Rep

After this Slashdot discussion about the relationship between BIOS biggie American Megatrends Inc. (AMI) and Palladium appeared, we got an email from AMI sales engineer (and former Linux.com contributor) Brian Richardson, who wrote, "I am a bit concerned that the information you provided misled your readers into thinking AMI was promoting Palladium or taking some sort of anti-open-source stance. This might be due to the fact that TCPA was mistakenly equated to Palladium, or questioning how Linux would run on a TCPA-enabled system ... or by the horde of angry Slashdot readers telling us they would never buy an AMI product because we were forcing standards on them." Brian offered himself up as (his words) a "Slashdot interview victim" to clear things up.(Update by RM: And, says Brian, he's happy to answer other BIOS questions as well.) So ask, already, and let's get things cleared up. (Usual Slashdot interview rules.)

Comments

What will happen with Linux systems.

[matthew.thompson]

I understand that there should be no problems running Linux systems on these new bioses but can you promise that there will be no nasty wordings that are likely to frighten off users who are trying Linux for the first time?

Re:What will happen with Linux systems.

[matthew.thompson]

I was actually thinking of something along the lines of...

"The operating system about to be loaded does not have a valid security signature. As such it is not possible for the BIOS to prevent unsafe software from operating. Are you sure that you wish to continue loading this software."

But yours is just as good :o)

Re:What will happen with Linux systems.

[grub]

I'm worried about installing a Free OS on a new AMI BIOSd machine then having the manufacturer tell me that I'm S.O.L. for hardware support because I run an "untrusted" OS. (which is rather silly, I'll trust OpenBSD before Windows anytime, anyplace..)

Here's a simple one...

[Sheetrock]

Will Linux and other alternative operating systems continue to install and function properly on computers containing AMI BIOSes?

Re:Here's a simple one...

[jamie]

"Will Linux and other alternative operating systems continue to install and function properly on computers containing AMI BIOSes?"

In answering this question, I would ask that our interview victim clarify whether there are any circumstances under which "alternative operating systems" would need to be cryptographically signed by an authority in order to boot, and if so, who is that authority?

As Ross Anderson pointed out last year,

Now here's another aspect of TCPA. You can use it to defeat the GPL.

During my investigations into TCPA, I learned that HP has started a development program to produce a TCPA-compliant version of GNU/linux. I couldn't figure out how they planned to make money out of this. On Thursday, at the Open Source Software Economics conference, I figured out how they might.

Making a TCPA-compliant version of GNU/linux (or Apache, or whatever) will mean tidying up the code and removing whatever features conflict with the TCPA security policy. The company will then submit the pruned code to an evaluator, together with a mass of documentation for the work that's been done, including a whole lot of analyses showing, for example, that you can't get root by a buffer overflow.

The business model, I believe, is this. HP will not dispute that the resulting `pruned code' is covered by the GPL. You will be able to download it, compile it, check it against the binary, and do what you like with it. However, to make it into TCPA-linux, to run it on a TCPA-enabled machine in privileged mode, you need more than the code. You need a valid signature on the binary, plus a cert to use the TCPA PKI. That will cost you money (if not at first, then eventually).

Anyone will be free to make modifications to the pruned code, but in the absence of a signature the resulting O/S won't enable users to access TCPA features. It will of course be open to competitors to try to re-do the evaluation effort for enhanced versions of the pruned code, but that will cost money; six figures at least. There will likely be little motive for commercial competitors to do it, as HP will have the first mover advantages and will be able to undercut them on price. There will also be little incentive for philanthropists to do it, as the resulting product would not really be a GPL version of a TCPA operating system, but a proprietary operating system that the philanthropist could give away free.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Planesdragon]

You can use it to defeat the GPL.

Oh, for crying out loud.

The GPL was not, ever, ever, ever, meant to make it so buying software wasn't worthwhile. In fact, the situation outlined in the parent post is _an ideal business model_ for GPL'd software.

You keep all of the rights the GPL was designed to preserve (distributing and re-working code you buy), and there's still something worthwhile for buying the software.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[ComputerSlicer23]

No it's not about being free as in beer, however the GPL is supposed to give me code I can go tinker with, and change, and make it to my liking. Do bug fixes, and enhancements. Possible add bugs of my one. Having the one true binary that's signed kinda defeats the purpose. If I can't self sign the thing, then having the GPL'ed code is no good until I can get it signed.

Unless the BIOS has a provision of the owner of the machine to add keys to accept as legitimate signatures or disable the signature checking, having software I can change is no good. Unless there's some way for the end user to say, look I own the machine, and I'm technically competent to verify the software I trust, let me run it the source code is relatively useless.

If that mean's there's a dongle, switch or jumper that has to set up correctly, that's fine by me. Then RedHat and other major distributors can get there kernels certified and signed, and all of the other binaries out there. Then the masses can get trusted computing, and I can certify my own stuff as trusted.

Kirby

Re:Here's a simple one...

[geekee]

But if you tinker with the code, how do sw vendors providing secure media guarantee that you're not providing a compromised system? That's the point of signing the code.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[CyberKnet]

It's not about the software vendor. It's about software released as GPL that is not able to be compiled/ran as provided.

Merits and demerits of the GPL aside, I believe as it is worded that this would not be acceptable under that license...

What it comes down to for me is that it's my computer. It's my hardware. I should get to decide what runs on it, not someone else. If I don't have a way to override what someone else thinks about what should run on my computer, then I'm voting with my wallet. I'm not going to buy hardware like that until it is the ONLY thing available.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Stonent1]

You need a valid signature on the binary, plus a cert to use the TCPA PKI. That will cost you money (if not at first, then eventually).

I guess you would need your special super-duper HP branded TCPA signature-makin' compiler to make these nice binaries.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[ComputerSlicer23]

I'll point out several things. First off, cryptographic signing the binaries doesn't mean the binaries are secure. It just means it's the binary that I have is one that someone who has access to the private key has signed as the one they have certified to run.

That's it. It doesn't mean the software is secure. It does mean, that any joe user can't just run any old code they compile up. However, if they disable my ability to write shell scripts, they are screwed. SA's will not under any circumstance give up the ability to write quick little shell scripts. It'll never happen. They will vote with their wallet on that one.

So when a security hole is found in the cryptographic software, they won't be able to just download new binaries to trojan my system. However, they can still just follow the flaw they have found in all the time. They can still script up various badnesses. They will still be able to do all variety of badness to me. They just can't put a trojan'ed version of SSH on my machine to get my passwords. Instead they will script up ssh to run out of gdb, and write the passwords in the clear out of gdb, and run as per normal. Hiding what is going on will be difficult because root kits will be more difficult to install. Now all they have to do is uninstall, the binary once they have the appropriate pieces of information to authenticate to your machine. Now they just authenticate like a normal user. They are in, and can poke around all they want.

Signed binaries, only means your running binaries that you got from the vendor, that's it. It'll change how the cracks work, but it won't mean you don't get cracked. Trust me, given enough time and research a person can break into your machine using only the binaries RedHat or the Debian, or whatever vendor you use. I'll still be able to ship off your private data, I'll still be able to deface your web site. I'll still be able to compromise the CGI's. Oh wait, are you saying I've got to get the CGI's certified too. That'll never happen. Not in a million zillion years. Internal busniess processes move to fast to do that.

Signed binaries are no silver bullet. The best they can do is refuse to sign them until a full audit has happened. You don't need signed binaries for that, only install things that have had a full audit, and it's just as good security for the initial break-in. Once the intial break in happens, that's about monitoring for odd behavior, which again has nothing to do with signed binaries. Of course don't get too pissed off, if you don't get a shell with your new Linux distro.

On certain binaries, it would be nice to enforce the signatures on, like standard libraries, and the kernel. However, most people use tripwire to do that things like that. Maybe the ability for RPM's to carry around the signatures of the files they installed, then verify those signatures after the fact using read-only bootable media, with the RPM signatures on it.

Signed binaries are a good thing, but I don't see them as the end all be all of security. I don't see them as a useful tool, because they will just get in the way anyplace where you release binaries on a regular basis like I do where I work. If the signed binaries don't, they they aren't providing the security that I hear advertised for them.

Kirby

Re:Here's a simple one...

[AxelTorvalds]

Or rather, what hardware is disabled if you don't have an authenticating OS?

I don't mind if they build that stuff into a BIOS unless I'm not going to be able to use my hardware under GNU/Linux.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Panoramix]

The problem, is that since M$ controls 99.9% of the desktop market, they can pretty much cajole all the ISP's to modify their user agreements to demand that you must maintain a "trusted" computing platform in order to remain an account in good standing.

Hear, hear.

This, IMO, is the core of Microsoft's evil plan. I will even dare to say that, as much as I am interested in theis AMI guy's answers, his company is not the one with for the plan --they are merely dragged into it, and I think they can't do squat about it. You will get no relief from him.

See, I really don't think AMI, or any BIOS manufacturer, will ever make one that plainly refuses to boot a bootloader because it lacks a signature from a CA it trusts. That opens a class vulnerability in the scheme (a single CA key is compromised and you lose the whole system). Also, it is just too bloody obvious to the EFF and the likes. And it is unnecessary for the evil plan to succeed. The BIOS will always boot whatever you ask it to boot. I'm ready to take a bet on that. That is not the problem.

The problem is, the BIOS will checksum the bootloader, and store that checksum in a safe place. Furthermore, the BIOS will provide, to any program that asks for it, be it "trusted" or not, that hash, cryptographically signed with the BIOS key (btw the only key that has to reside in the BIOS, and you can bet it will be hardcoded in the silicon, not overridable). From that point on, you can build "trusted" data delivery paths entirely in software.

Here's an example: Say, you want to watch a movie trailer. So your browser connects to Universal Pictures' server, which demands cryptographic proof that it can "trust" your computer. So your media player software obtains that proof from the OS, and delivers it. What the OS delivers the hash of the media player, signed with the OS key. To guarantee the integrity of the OS, it includes the OS' hash, signed by the bootloader. To guarantee the bootloader's integrity, it includes the bootloader's hash, signed by the BIOS. Voilá, you have crypto proof that your entire system is kosher. Universal's server has only to verify that the BIOS's key is trustable, which they can do by checking it against AMI, or whatever. If that key is compromised (e.g., you crack the key of your BIOS), then they have a problem with a single individual, not a class compromise.

But the point is: you have NO say on which keys are trustable or not, because the verifying is not done by you. It is done by Universal. The best you can do is not buy Universal.

But now imagine this thread's scenario: your ISP is the one that requires proof of "trustability" before letting you connect. You will have to either (1) make your ISP include your OS's key in their trust list, or (2) switch to Windows, or (3) switch to another ISP that does not require this. But you will have option (3) for just some time: just picture the logical progression of this. Extend to almost everything else: online banking, electronic commerce, fucking email! You have MS Internet[TM], what Bill has always wanted.

And you can bet it will be eagerly adopted by banks, media companies, and the likes, because it is the single scheme that allows them to "protect" their data against their own customers. And all the time we will be scratching our own heads, wondering how we let that happen, if we, after all, successfully coerced AMI into not making a BIOS that refuses to boot Linux.

This is pure, concentrated evil. I stand in awe of Microsoft. I'm very, very concerned about this.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Planesdragon]

If you are, then how are you supposed to work on the code on a TCPA-compliant system?

You're not. You're supposed to work on a development box, that doesn't have to do things like handle movie clips or music files or porn.

If you're a professional ("day job"), you should focus. If you're an amateur, focusing can still help you.

And, of course, even if you can't have a second "trusted" system, it shouldn't be that bloddy hard to have a "trusted" and a "development" install of the same program...

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Planesdragon]

Then wouldn't that just defeat the purpose of TCPA, we can all just get developer boxs

No. Trusted Computing means that the computer is trusted by a content distributor to handle their files. You don't need to download metallica from RIAAster to test to make sure that your custom MP3 player works.

A "developer box" would be one that's untrusted, and doesn't bother to be tested because it's being changed so much. Just like development boxes in real software shops are.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Zork the Almighty]

And you can bet it will be eagerly adopted by banks, media companies, and the likes, because it is the single scheme that allows them to "protect" their data against their own customers.

And it is exactly these issues of ownership and control which have driven the open source movement this far. I do not have a lot of faith in the average persons ability to recognize the importance of this issue. What I do have faith in is peoples' greed. The media companies will not stop at requiring an OS to be "trusted". If they did, OSS users would be utterly screwed. Once they have 80% or 95% of users under their umbrella, they will begin looking at other restrictions which are less appealing to consumers. Very quickly, the issues of ownership and control will become highly relevant to the average person, and they will (hopefully, if we do our job) have a choice. Provided we stick to our beliefs, there will be an alternate world : the free world. Where your digital media can be copied, edited, and redistributed entirely at your discression. The free world may never be as flashy as the DRM-whatever world, but a flashy prison is a prison nonetheless, and people will recognize this.

The greed and arrogance of media companies will be enough to turn people against DRM, although it may take a while. We need to stick to our principles, to ensure that when the time comes there is a free world for people to choose. I'm in for the long haul, how about everyone else ?

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Panoramix]

The greed and arrogance of media companies will be enough to turn people against DRM, although it may take a while. We need to stick to our principles, to ensure that when the time comes there is a free world for people to choose. I'm in for the long haul, how about everyone else ?

Very well put, sir. Of course I'm in. I won't bend over for those greedy pieces of shit, not even drunk and stoned. And I'm sure that many others will never take this neither, even if that means starting over and building everything again, from scratch, from the personal computer to the Internet (which may well be the case: If this nonsense gets entrenched too much, chances are we'll have to build our own computers and networks to bypass it).

Anyway, I'm very glad I read your post. I'm starting to believe that there is no other way of fighting this DRM crap. And yours is precisely the attitude I hope the OSS community will take: focus on building a free world, not wasting time fighting a war that can't be won. I will be happy to participate.

(It's just that, considering what a setback this would be for OSS, the 'net and everything, this is kind of annoying, isn't it?)

Re:Here's a simple one...

[MrResistor]

Here's an example: Say, you want to watch a movie trailer. So your browser connects to Universal Pictures' server, which demands cryptographic proof that it can "trust" your computer. So your media player software obtains that proof from the OS, and delivers it. What the OS delivers the hash of the media player, signed with the OS key. To guarantee the integrity of the OS, it includes the OS' hash, signed by the bootloader. To guarantee the bootloader's integrity, it includes the bootloader's hash, signed by the BIOS. Voilá, you have crypto proof that your entire system is kosher. Universal's server has only to verify that the BIOS's key is trustable, which they can do by checking it against AMI, or whatever. If that key is compromised (e.g., you crack the key of your BIOS), then they have a problem with a single individual, not a class compromise.

So, what's stopping me, a Linux user, from getting a Windows bootloader checksum and a Windows Media Player hash and telling Mozilla (which of course appears to be IE to the outside viewer) to provide those when Universal asks?

ALL hardware can be emulated in software, and there is no way for Universal to prove that I haven't done that without sending jackbooted thugs to bust into my house and tear my system apart.

Hardware based crypto is all well and good, but no outside application has a direct line to my hardware. It MUST go through my OS first, and I control that. Therefore my hardware is whatever I tell my OS to say it is. Problem solved.

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Hentai]

ALL hardware can be emulated in software, and there is no way for Universal to prove that I haven't done that without sending jackbooted thugs to bust into my house and tear my system apart.


And, thanks to the DMCA, they can do just that!

Re:Here's a simple one...

[Panoramix]

So, what's stopping me, a Linux user, from getting a Windows bootloader checksum and a Windows Media Player hash and telling Mozilla (which of course appears to be IE to the outside viewer) to provide those when Universal asks?

A simple "nonce" in Universal's request. You know, a timestamp, a serial number, a random cookie, which is part of both the request and the response. That's the usual protection for replay attacks, which is what you are proposing (saving the real Windows hash for replaying it over and over from your Linux machine).

ALL hardware can be emulated in software, and there is no way for Universal to prove that I haven't done that without sending jackbooted thugs to bust into my house and tear my system apart.

Ah, yes. But the problem is the key, deeply embedded in the chip. You certainly can emulate the BIOS' signed-hash generation in software. But without the right key the emulation is useless. And you can probably forget about getting a good key from the warez kids: the key can very well be different for every chip, and it is not accessible without tearing the chip apart and doing some nano-surgery on it. Which is, of course, quite over our current capabilities. Yours and mine, at least.

Hardware based crypto is all well and good, but no outside application has a direct line to my hardware. It MUST go through my OS first, and I control that. Therefore my hardware is whatever I tell my OS to say it is. Problem solved.

You have not yet understood the problem. Think about it a little more. It REALLY does allow Universal, or anyone for that matter, to prove that you have, or haven't, done funny things with your computer, without sending jackbooted thugs to bust into your house and tear your system apart. You'll be amazed, and probably a bit more worried, once you grasp it.

TCPA and the future

[program21]

Ok, so this is going to be a couple of questions, feel free to pick and choose.

What sort of future do you see for TCPA? Do you see it as inevitable, or is it just a fad thing that will pass?

Assuming it does catch on, what form do you see it taking? What we all fear (only signed apps will run, non-signed apps can't access system data/data from signed apps), or some lesser form?

Re:TCPA and the future

[Threed]

Do you think this salesman (engineer or not) is going to say "My company's latest product is sure not to catch on, it should fizzle and die in a few months." As if he'd be allowed to speak at all if his answers to those questions weren't fully in sync with the party line.

I understand the sentiment, but the mod points probably could have gone to better use.

Re:TCPA and the future

[qqtortqq]

Its called a license. A driver's license. The central controlling authority who issues these licenses is your state's department of motor vehicles.

So what are the differences ...

[Alien54]

Okay. So what precisely are the differences between Palladium and your product, and what assurance do we have that it will not act as crippling ware for open source and other similar free (as in free speech) software endevors? Any thoughts on backward compatibility modes?

TCPA & Palladium

[ignipotentis]

Perhaps you can clarify the differences between the two (TCPA & Palladium). After reading up on both of them, i still find that they seem to be pretty much the same, just marketed differently.

Re:TCPA & Palladium

[Anonymous Coward]

TCPA is a platform for trusted computing whereas Palladium is a software by MS that sits on top of TCPA.
More here

Something in everyone's mind

[forged]

Will it be possible to disable on future motherboards which will implement DRM techniques ?

Re:Something in everyone's mind

[Koos Baster]

Erm. Restate/elaborate that as:

Will it be possible to disable <insert DRM feature> with absolute transparancy to essentially all of the networked community and services on future motherboards which will implement DRM techniques ?

Obviously, the answer is no, if "the networked community and services" are to include future trusted parties enabled. Therefore, AMI is fundamentally supporting Palladium, thus Microsoft, to dominate future web contents and infrastructure.

Period.

Re:Something in everyone's mind

[binaryDigit]

Well, two answers right? Either a flat NO, since turning it off could negate the usefullness of having it to being with.
br. OR, yes, but anything that expects to have it on won't run. Which for many might be a reasonable alternative.

Re:Something in everyone's mind

[geekee]

"Therefore, AMI is fundamentally supporting Palladium, thus Microsoft, to dominate future web contents and infrastructure."

I believe that will be left up to the consumer, as it should.

"Trusted" computer

[michael]

A few related questions:

a) Isn't the goal of "trusted computing" to allow entities other than the owner of the computer to control what the owner does with his/her hardware? For example, "trusted computing" applied to music implies that the music publisher gains control over what the computer owner can do with the music data files. Isn't this the exact opposite of "trust" as that word is normally used - a trusted computer is one that can't be trusted by the computer's owner to perform the tasks asked of it, because other entities have veto power over the computer's actions?

b) Companies like AMI have repeatedly claimed that they aren't part of Palladium. However, isn't it true that without AMI's trusted BIOS (and all the other components necessary to build a "trusted computer"), Palladium wouldn't work? Why does AMI think they shouldn't be held responsible for enabling Palladium and similar schemes?

c) In what way does AMI benefit, financially or otherwise, from introducing a BIOS designed to make the computer it is installed in less useful to the purchaser of the computer? Please avoid saying that this is "optional"; AMI wouldn't create this BIOS if it wasn't intended to be used.

d) What is a "sales engineer"? Is your job primarily public relations, or primarily engineering, or primarily product sales?

Re:"Trusted" computer

[Alien54]

What is a "sales engineer"? Is your job primarily public relations, or primarily engineering, or primarily product sales?

Basically a 'sales engineer' is a salesman with a technical background so that they can talk intelligently about the product without looking like a pointy haired manager. sometimes an ex-geek.

Re:"Trusted" computer

[Mitreya]

Isn't this the exact opposite of "trust" as that word is normally used -

YES!
And here is the explanation that must be quoted again and again until we all know it (quoted from http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html)

24. So why is this called `Trusted Computing'? I don't see why I should trust it at all!

It's almost an in-joke. In the US Department of Defense, a `trusted system or component' is defined as `one which can break the security policy'. This might seem counter-intuitive at first, but just stop to think about it. The mail guard or firewall that stands between a Secret and a Top Secret system can - if it fails - break the security policy that mail should only ever flow from Secret to Top Secret, but never in the other direction. It is therefore trusted to enforce the information flow policy.

Or take a civilian example: suppose you trust your doctor to keep your medical records private. This means that he has access to your records, so he could leak them to the press if he were careless or malicious. You don't trust me to keep your medical records, because I don't have them; regardless of whether I like you or hate you, I can't do anything to affect your policy that your medical records should be confidential. Your doctor can, though; and the fact that he is in a position to harm you is really what is meant (at a system level) when you say that you trust him. You may have a warm feeling about him, or you may just have to trust him because he is the only doctor on the island where you live; no matter, the DoD definition strips away these fuzzy, emotional aspects of `trust' (that can confuse people).

Remember during the late 1990s, as people debated government control over cryptography, Al Gore proposed a `Trusted Third Party' - a service that would keep a copy of your decryption key safe, just in case you (or the FBI, or the NSA) ever needed it. The name was derided as the sort of marketing exercise that saw the Russian colony of East Germany called a `Democratic Republic'. But it really does chime with DoD thinking. A Trusted Third Party is a third party that can break your security policy.

25. So a `Trusted Computer' is one that can break my security?

Now you've got it.

Re:"Trusted" computer

[radish]

But surely that means we already have Trusted Computing? Windows (and other software) has shown itself to be vulnerable to many attacks which would breach my personal security (e.g. by mailing out my private documents to random people). Seeing as my machine is capable of breaching my security, that means it's trusted. Windows is already Trusted, Linux is Trusted, IIS is very Trusted ;)

Re:"Trusted" computer

[LostCluster]

Something is trusted when it is put in a position where if it screws up, bad can things happen.

Something is trustworthy when it is thought to not be likely to screw up when it is trusted to do something.

So, when you put up your organization's website on an unpatched IIS server, that computer is trusted to serve that set of pages and not all the pages to be changed by anybody other than those people trusted enough to be authorized to do so.

However, since an unpatched IIS server has security holes that allow for the site to be either taken offline, or replaced with an undesired site, that unpatched IIS server is not trustworthy... which means it's not a good idea to put an unpatched IIS server in a trusted position. If you do, it's very possible the unpatched IIS server might fail to live up to its responsiblites, causing the bad things you didn't want to happen.

Likewise, any of the trusted people might go crazy and decide to use their password to walk right in the front door and tear the site apart. This is why its important that you select trustworthy people, and as few people as possible, to hold that password.

Re:"Trusted" computer

[geekee]

"b) Companies like AMI have repeatedly claimed that they aren't part of Palladium. However, isn't it true that without AMI's trusted BIOS (and all the other components necessary to build a "trusted computer"), Palladium wouldn't work? Why does AMI think they shouldn't be held responsible for enabling Palladium and similar schemes?"

I would say DRM allows copyrighted material to be sold digitally, which would otherwise be remanded to the "old business model" that everybody on slashdot bitches about. Therefore, claiming DRM makes your computer less useful is flawed. At the very least is does nothing less than a non- DRM computer if you choose not to use DRM content.

Re:"Trusted" computer

[Gerry Gleason]

It seems like you are deriding the way this language is being used, but it really does make sense. The idea is that you only need to trust a person, company or system if that entity has the access, authority and control to compromise system security. The trust comes in because you have to be able to trust the entities that actually have the power to break that trust.

We understand this implicitely in the kernel/user space distinction. Kernel programs and drivers are trusted not to do bad things to kernel memory because they can (usually by mistake).

The problem as I see it with the whole TCPA concept, is that the trust required is too extensive. As a practical matter, we could try to create versions of Linux that follow this standard, but because in principle, any kernel driver could snoop and interfere with any other kernel function. The only way to make guarantees is to outlaw the running of any modified drivers, and the ability to make changes is exactly why we wanted Linux in the first place.

Does anyone see any value in TCPA for Linux? Distributions could implement TCPA functions based on signing keys and key databases that are sourced from the distribution vendors. I think this could have some value in securing the platform, but in a way it is very indirect.

Re:"Trusted" computer

[Grishnakh]

It is the same thing as asking whether gun manufacturers are responsible for murders. They may be producing something that enables Palladium but they feel it call also be used for other, in the opinion, worthwhile purposes.

This is an unfair comparison, in my opinion. Guns have many uses besides unlawful murder, such as self-protection, hunting, police, military, etc.

I think a better comparison is tobacco companies being responsible for smokers' lung cancer. Tobacco has only one use: to smoke it. Smoking it causes adverse health effects. Tobacco companies can't claim that they sold tobacco with the intention of it being used for things other than smoking, and if used properly wouldn't cause adverse health effects.

TCPA is the same way. What possible use could it have other than to reduce the functionality of a user's computer, and remove the user's control over their own system?

Re:"Trusted" computer

[Grishnakh]

One could argue that war is state-sanctioned murder. As is a firing squad.

Guns do things other than killing people. 1) Target shooting. 2) Shooting animals.

If I were a gun owner, I would want to use my gun for lawful purposes, such as target shooting or home defense. I would not want to use it for murder. The gun is not taking anything away from me; instead, it's giving me extra capabilities.

TCPA does not give me, the computer user, any new capabilities at all. Instead, it takes away capabilities, such as being able to access all the data on my system, convert data between formats, etc. It gives extra control of my data to media corporations, but this doesn't help me, the user, at all.

The whole point of this argument was whether AMI could claim innocence by selling a TCPA-enabled BIOS, using the argument that it allows both good and bad uses. A baseball bat manufacturer can claim innocence because their bats are sold for the purpose of playing baseball, not cracking people's heads open. A gun manufacturer can claim the same, although their product is obviously much more dangerous, and is normally used for killing something (which is only a bad thing if it's a murder). A tobacco manufacturer, OTOH, cannot claim any innocence because their products are only used to harm people (even though their customers do buy the product willingly). Similarly, AMI's new product can only be used to harm their customers, and it's even worse than the tobacco companies because the customers don't want TCPA and never asked for it. They're only doing this in collusion with other anti-end-user companies like Microsoft and Intel, in order to possible increase their profits at the expense of freedom, and by providing something that customers never asked for.

So by this analysis, AMI is even lower than the tobacco companies. Imagine that...

Re:"Trusted" computer

[radish]

Oh please don't misunderstand, I understand the difference perfectly well, and I enjoyed the original explanation of the meaning of Trusted, very concise. What I was pointing out was that AMI et al are not promoting "Trustworthy Computing" but "Trusted Computing". I think we already have the latter, but REALLY need the former!

Trusted Computing

Not trustworthy :)

Re:"Trusted" computer

[IronChef]

d) What is a "sales engineer"? Is your job primarily public relations, or primarily engineering, or primarily product sales?

I can actually answer that because I used to be one. A SE is a guy in the sales dept. who knows enough of the technical details to answer the customer's detailed, pointed questions, questions that the actual account executive (lead sales dude who isn't technical) can't handle. In many cases the SE will work with the client to develop a Solution as a hook to get them to Close the Deal. The SE is a sales team resource though, not the deal closer. In my experience anyway.

Ideally the SE IS an engineer by training, but sometimes they are clueful non-engineers. (that was me.) Sales Engineers are sometimes called Systems Engineers too, though that term has other meanings as well.

Whatever it stands for, SE is a difficult job that requires a certain "moral flexibility" unless you truly belive in your product, like any other sales, I guess. And since I was selling Vignette, I didn't believe in the product. ;)

microsoft OS spin

[ywwg]

currently if you try to install vendor drivers on windows, the OS tells you things like "are you sure you want to use these untested third-party drivers, which will no doubt ruin your computer because you're a bad boy for not using windows." Can you assure us that linux, bsd, and all other "alternative" operating systems will be treated as _equals_ of microsoft products? Can you assure us that there will be no preferential treatment for any os, and that there won't be any "are you really sure?" messages?

Licensing

[Arc04]

Will OS manufacturers have to pay to get an "unlock code" that allows them to run their OS on the BIOS.

That would be terrible as it would kill many under funded open source OSes that aren't as big as the Linux big players.

Arc

Re:Licensing

[LostCluster]

Couldn't the underfunded OS makers just insist that their operating system is only for use on "non-DRM" hardware? So long as that still exists on the market, all is well...

Re:Licensing

[Windcatcher]

Here's a better one: will software vendors (either open-source or not) have to pay a license fee to be able to decrypt data files from competing products? What if you want to move your documents from Windows+MSOffice to Linux+StarOffice? Surely Office would use TCPA to encrypt the files.

Gasp! MS would never do something as low as that!

Interview???

[wonkamaster]

I suppose that I like reading Slashdot interviews as much as the next person, but I must ask myself "Why?" Wouldn't it be simpler to just post corrections to what was he considers misleading and/or post AMI's offical stance on Palladium?

On the Exclusionary Uses of TCPA

[the-banker]

Is it (will it be) possible to use TCPA to effectively lock-out certain operating evironments from various services (software, media, etc) solely because the operating environment is not backed by a company, and has no mechanism for paying certification fees and licenses? Specifically, could TCPA be used against free OS's like Free/Open/netBSD and Linux to prevent those users from accessing the same content users of commercial OS's can?

Re:On the Exclusionary Uses of TCPA

[Mitreya]

I might be misunderstanding the issue, but... isn't this lock-out the purpose of TCPA?
Let me rephrase my question: provided that TCPA does not discriminate against any services, and does not distinguish between those that own some paid licences and those that don't... what ELSE can it be used for?

Customization support?

[ryanr]

I actually think this feature could be useful, if done "right". Along the lines of my idea of right... will I be able to, say, install my own set of public keys in the BIOS so that I can have a system that will only boot the software that I have signed?

Re:Customization support?

[iamcadaver]

+1 The above question MUST be asked.

Also, will it prevent the flashing of the BIOS proper?

Re:Customization support?

[Muad'Dave]

...two pennies weigh ~4.996±0.014g, have a zinc core, and the face of Lincoln.

I miss the old 3.11g, 95% Cu, 5% Zn, 1982-and-earlier pennies...did you know that the new and old pennies sound different when dropped on a hard surface? The old ones 'ring out' better (clearer high harmonics). You can tell them apart without looking!

Re:Customization support?

[iamcadaver]

Whoa, sounds like a whole paperclip difference in weight too. I think the old ones spin better, too.

Re:Customization support?

[Alsee]

I actually think this feature could be useful, if done "right"... so that I can have a system that will only boot the software that I have signed?

That is one of the lies supporting TCPA/Palladium. Yes, it probably could help do that. It is a lie because because it would be almost trivial for a BIOS and/or operating system to implement that WITHOUT TCPA/Palladium.

The ONLY time you ever need TCPA/Palladium to implement something is when you want to take control away from the owner of the computer.

-

Re:Customization support?

[ctr2sprt]

Yeah, and you could implement a coarse kind of protected mode without all the CPU hardware to support it. But it's harder to do, and it's better when you have a two-tier approach where both the hardware and the software act as security barriers.

I'm not saying your point is without merit, but remember that the best security policies are built like onions, with many layers of redundant protection. Some of the features that are being talked about for the "Trusted Computing" initiative could be a useful and important part of a complete security policy (though I doubt their utility for Joe Desktop).

Re:Customization support?

[jbolden]

No you couldn't implemented trusted computing without a hardware component. A program can't tell if there is a debugger running or not. It can't tell if its being emulated. Without trusted hardware the fact that windows media player can decrypt a file means that the person who owns the computer can decrypt the file.

Re:Customization support?

[Alsee]

No you couldn't implemented trusted computing without a hardware component.

I never said you could implemnt "trusted computing". I said you could implement the feature the parent poster asked about - namely only allowing signed files to be run where the owner of the computer does the signing.

ANY "trusted computing" feature that helps the OWNER of the computer can be done without special hardware or TCPA or Palladium. TCPA and Palladium are NOT for the benefit of the owner of the computer.
You only need hardware and "trusted computing" when what you want to do is put a pair of hancuffs on the OWNER of the computer. These systems cripple the computer and restrict the owner. They do it solely for the benefit of the companies like the RIAA and MPAA and Microsoft.

-

Do you think Palladium is a good thing?

[Noryungi]

As the title says:

Do you think Palladium is a good thing? Whether your answer is "yes" or "no", please explain.

Knowing that Palladium is a Microsoft Technology, do you think AMI is making a smart move by adopting it? Again, please explain your position.

Are you afraid that Microsoft may use its position to control, not just 90% of the software used on PC, but also the overall architecture of modern machines?

Many thanks in advance.

General TC question

[j3110]

I actually like the concept of trusted computing quite a bit. So long as the user selects which code will be trusted, it has great potential for good. My question is, from your position, do you foresee trusted computing being more like web-browser applet signing applied in hardware (where the user can add and remove trust for certain companies) or more like the media industries idea (where the OS/hardware manufacturers select which code is trusted under penalty of DMCA)?

Re:General TC question

[Mitreya]

I actually like the concept of trusted computing quite a bit.

You clearly don't understand the use of word "trusted" here. read this. If you want to make it short, start from question #24.

So long as the user selects which code will be trusted, it has great potential for good.

We already have code signing and confirmation before installs. The problem is that users trust the WRONG programs. Either this will increase the number of "are you sure you want this" (not removing the problem of people making mistakes). Or, more likely, the selection of which code to trust will be relegated to BIOS/MS/etc... that would also be bad...

Re:General TC question

[j3110]

I just wanted him to define the word trusted to AMI pretty much. I have a pretty good idea of the difference between my use of the word trust, and the Media market's use of the word. :)

Some users will trust the wrong programs, its inevitable. On the other hand, I think a lot of people wouldn't. To them, it would actually be useful. You don't not make a tooth brush because some people won't brush their teeth.

What we don't have today is a "Run in sandbox" option. We really need a stricter way of defining what a program can do. Say you get an e-mail with a program attatched. It's supposed to sing and dance. You should have check boxes that will not ever let this program sing and dance again, let it sing, but not let it create a window, or let it dance, but not make noise. By no means should this program be allowed to open files or network connections. Of course you could have a dumbed down version for the not so smart that says "This program wants to open windows and play music, do you want to allow this?" Then with the virus code tries to open a file or network connection or try to talk to the mail program, it will say "This program is trying to use your email/internet connection/open files on your disk... Should I let it?" Most users I think would be ok with this. If not, at least it could be configured in the ID-10T mode where they trust someone else to verify if a program is safe. Say you set up a computer for grannie in idiot mode. She gets all her trust from your certification server, and when she needs to run something you or a buddy hasn't tested to be ok, then she calls you and you add it for her. No more viruses for grandma. Then when sites are verified, no more (or a lot less) porn for children. It's all around a good deal if it's implemented properly.

Re:General TC question

[Mitreya]

Some users will trust the wrong programs, its inevitable. On the other hand, I think a lot of people wouldn't. To them, it would actually be useful.

Do you really feel that there exists a group of people who are can chose which programs to trust and suffer only because they are not deciding who to trust? I don't understand how any BIOS support is different from simply signing the code... I thought only issues are that there are bugs in software or that people click yes without thinking.

What we don't have today is a "Run in sandbox" option.

We have all seen the "run in sandbox" option. It is called Java... I guess java applets to not present a serious threat to security, but they are so crippled as a result...

No more viruses for grandma. Then when sites are verified, no more (or a lot less) porn for children.

If you are talking about setting up a local certification server, that actually sounds like a cool idea ;). But you gotta be kidding about website verification... Website whitelisting is doomed. You would have to precertify each website your grandma wants to see?

Re:General TC question

[j3110]

Well... the hardware implementation is because there are bugs.

Java isn't crippled(not SUN Java)... there are just a lot of crippled Java developers. All the really good Java programmers are working on the server side. What you have left are the people that just got their degree, and don't have a clue. Then the UI sucks, not because of the controls or interface, but because there is noone that can both program and design a UI. LUXOR (XUL for Java) is coming along, and may help this. Then there is Webstart(less broken every day) which will get rid of the run in a box problem, as well as it asks everytime the program needs more security and is required to be signed in order to have any security. It's a neat idea that will probably make it somewhere someday.

Local certification servers will probably be a popular idea, mostly in coorperations. They will demand this once other signing is up.

I'm not talking about whitelisting sites. It's more of a require digital signatures on sites in order for them to display thing. If they have a digital signature, then even search engines could have the signatures built into the query responses. Even responses to searches could be filtered based on the signature. They could fake the signature, but a search engine that did that would be blacklisted. (definately not whitelisted)

There are a lot of sites, but this ensures that children can use the internet with parental supervision, and the end user knows with a degree of certainty that the site is authentic. Defaced sites probably wouldn't get signed. (pretty much just sign the HTML before it can be displayed, not stupid https that works on the connection instead of the content.. securing connections is stupid in comparison to securing the content. If credit cards had public keys, we sure wouldn't need https Get a public key from Visa for a Card, then with a smart card chip, you could ask the card for a verification number (signature of the biller's account number and ammount to transfer))

It may not be feasible, but I guess the crypto-geek inside me would love to see encryption and signatures in places that they may not belong :) I think cryptographic monitors that require special glasses to read would be cool, but maybe I'm just a bit too paranoid or to easily excited by encryption.

Re:General TC question

[autopr0n]

We have all seen the "run in sandbox" option. It is called Java... I guess java applets to not present a serious threat to security, but they are so crippled as a result...

Java applets were crippled by Microsoft, and mostly Netscape's crappy implementations, not by their sandbox. Java applets can access more resources if the user wants to allow it, and can even be restricted to spesific files and hosts for internet access.

So it's not Palldium...

[inerte]

But does your company have any plans to implement a "security measure" similar to Palladium?

And what if Microsoft releases a software that needs it, won't AMI need to adopt it so it can run the "DRM features"?

How will Linux, or any other "non-trusted" software run on your hardware?

Acronyms

[Anonymous Coward]

Do you have any funny acronyms for AMIBIOS?

Re:Acronyms

[iapetus]

With all the anti-Microsoft feeling that we're likely to see on this topic, and the pretension that so often accompanies it, might I suggest:

Bias? Moi?

How can we confirm that NO BS is in your BIOSes

[nenolod]

Are you going to release the source? Will the BIOS be auditable? Will the BIOS code contain some sort of monitoring code? Will the BIOS contain spyware? All of these questions are important... and how will we be able to confirm your answers to them?

Can we really take the word of a conglomerate? Will you be able to ensure that what you are saying is accurate?

Modern conglomerates usually misrepresent their products if they think it will generate more customers. How can we be sure that you wouldn't be doing this to us?

Re:How can we confirm that NO BS is in your BIOSes

[Mitreya]

Will the BIOS code contain some sort of monitoring code?

Only to catch terrorists...

Will the BIOS contain spyware?

Never! It will contain some select offers from our partners and collect some information to customize and improve your booting experience

Can we really take the word of a conglomerate?
Will you be able to ensure that what you are saying is accurate?

No.
Our EULA will take care of that.

Modern conglomerates usually misrepresent their products if they think it will generate more customers. How can we be sure that you wouldn't be doing this to us?

As the courts become less and less of a threat for a corporation (and already a 0-threat to a corporation from an individual). There is NO way to be sure. Unless all the non-entry level employees in the company will be made to sign all these statements...

A question....

[Lord_Slepnir]

How many hours will it take after the first Palladium boards hit the market for someone to crack it and have linux running on it? Should I have put an 's' onto hours?

Re:A question....

[martyn s]

Yes. As in "Zero Hours"

Shouldn't it be:

[Nurlman]

AMIBIOS or NOT?

Re:Shouldn't it be:

[W32.Klez.H]

AM I BIOS OR NOT

Lockout

[rtkluttz]

Be truthful. Is there even the slightest chance that someone other than me will be able to say what will run (or more importtantly will NOT run) on a PC that contains this technology? I'm not talking about purchased software that locks me out directly in one way or another due to licensing issues. But can this technology be used to stop me from exercising fair use rights if I decide to get around those blocks in purchased software? Or will they hinder me from writing my own code to do what I want, or downloading and compiling/running someone elses code?
If ANY of these CAN be a side effect of this technology, it is bad. There are stumbling blocks, of course, but no one will have ultimate say over what does or does not run on my own computer.

.

Advantage

[TedCheshireAcad]

What is the advantage to me, a Linux using consumer, to buying your product over those of your competitors?

Re:Advantage

[Windcatcher]

You get to never be able to run any future versions of MS Office under WINE, as Linux won't be able to provide authentication for the app, which will require a trusted PC. While this may be a blessing if you're familiar with OpenOffice, grandma won't be as eager to migrate to Linux if she can't run Office, which is the main reason she bought her PC.

Simply put, AMI has absolutely no choice in the matter. Microsoft will announce that Palladium Office will require TCPA (or will run in crippled mode otherwise), and AMI has to therefore be compatible with it if they wish to stay in business.

Perhaps MS should have been broken up after all. It seems that what we have here is the OS monopoly being used to preserve the Office monopoly.

Re:Advantage

[Windcatcher]

Correction: using the office monopoly to preserve the OS monopoly.

Re:Advantage

[jbolden]

Frankly if the reason you bought a PC is to run a Windows only app (like MS office) they you probably should be using Windows as your OS. The same way that if the reason I buy a computer is to execute JCL's supporting PFS autodocument construction from DB2 I should be running Z-OS(new name for MVS), or if I buy a computer to execute VaXBasic scripts against RDB I should be running VMS, and if I buy a computer to run Final Cut Pro I should be running OSX. I might be able to get around these problems; AIX has PSF, JCL and DB2; there is a VAXBasic emulator which is open source and Oracle can fake RDB; but why bother with that headache?

Linux offers an excellent Unix which runs on a huge range of platforms. Linux offers an excellent range of apps for a wide variety of purposes.

A better question about Grandma is does she want office or office functionality?
If she merely wanted office functionality than in a few years (maybe) Open Office would be an alternative (though I hope apps like LyX win and not Open Office which is IMHO highly overrated). If by Office she just really means something like Microsoft Works than Open Office gives her that level of features today.

Boycott actions against TCPA?

[DocSnyder]

Isn't AMI afraid of many many people boycotting any products of TCPA-friendly vendors? In the near future, "voting with their money" will be the only chance for millions of PC users to fight against TCPA.

Re:Boycott actions against TCPA?

[melonman]

Can we ask him if, in stark turnover terms, he would be more afraid of people not being able to use the next generation of MS products on his company's products?

Refunds/Opt-outs

[ninewands]

Given the existence of The LinuxBIOS Project and the fact that the Linux kernel does not require a ROM-BIOS once the kernel is up and running, what will be AMI's position on refunds if a significant fraction of the Linux userbase starts installing LinuxBIOS and returning the BIOS chips. Will AMI make the refund, or will they give us the runaround that Microsoft and the hardware OEMs did on the question of Windows refunds?

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[binaryDigit]

Wouldn't the BIOS be considered a more fundamental part of the hardware. EG, if you don't need your floppy, you wouldn't expect Teac to give you a refund if you removed it from your computer and mailed it back to them? That and unlike a copy of an OS, how much is the BIOS as a factor of cost on a machine, would it even be worth the effort to get this refund even if it were offered?

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[Ageless]

Okay, now hear this! In the "Real World" you can't randomly pull things apart and ask for a refund. Computers are not different than other products. If I buy a box of tissues and only use half of them I can't return the other half for a refund.
If I buy a phone that has a caller id function but I don't subscribe to the service I can't pull the LCD and pry the caller id chips out and ask for a refund.

Damn, read the shit you type before submitting it and try to remember exactly when it was that you lost all semblence of sanity.

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[m0rph3us0]

There is no agreement you can refuse when purchasing an AMI BIOS, or at least I've never encountered a EULA with an AMI BIOS. I don't see why AMI should have to refund you for a piece of equiptment you willingly bought.

Have you asked Ford lately to refund you for their engine if you decieded to put a new engine in?

The problem with the MS Windows thing is that there is a EULA and MS refuses to sell you the license unless you agree to the EULA, so in the event that you don't agree to the EULA no purchase has taken place and they have your money and you have no product resulting in them owing you money.

The situation is no where near the same with AMI, replacing a working product with something else is not a valid reason for return.

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[iamcadaver]

It will soldered to the board, how can you ask for a refund after destoying the product be removing it?

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[LostCluster]

No, actually, the phrase on Lay's potato chips products is "Satisfaction Guarenteed" which says that if you can claim that the bag of chips is not to your satisfaction, they promise you a full refund. Yeah, you can't do that if they didn't make that promise, but they did.

Likewise with Microsoft. In order to get a legal shrink-wrap EULA, they must offer a way to decline the EULA. So, the EULA instructs that you indicate acceptance by using the software, and indicate rejection by promptly returning the software to the place of purchase for a full refund.

AMIBIOS will step into this mess if they start releasing BIOS products that need an EULA, as presently they're just being sold as part of a piece of hardware. (Have ever seen an EULA for a motherboard?) DRM might just send them over that bridge...

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[ShavenYak]

Has anyone ever tried returning a bag of Lay's chips, mostly (or completely) eaten, claiming that they were not satisfied? It would be interesting to see what kind of hoops they make you jump through to get your refund.

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[iamcadaver]

Maybe you missed the part that read something like: ..will be a seperate chip soldered to the motherboard until it is migrated to the CPU itself...

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[LostCluster]

I think the label is clear that you mail the wrapper (complete with the stamped portion that tells them when and where they made the chips) to an address on the label to claim the refund.

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[AxelTorvalds]

Damn, read the shit you type before submitting it and try to remember exactly when it was that you lost all semblence of sanity.

Do you mind if I start using that as my sig?

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[Ageless]

I would be honoured, but please never respond to my posts with it! ;-)

Re:Refunds/Opt-outs

[ninewands]

Grandparent post moderation totals: Flamebait=1 (???), Interesting=5, Overrated=2, Total=8

Quoth the parent poster:

Damn, read the shit you type before submitting it and try to remember exactly when it was that you lost all semblence of sanity.

And MY post got modded down as flamebait???

My Question Is:

[cca93014]

How do you sleep at night?

No, I have not RTFA, I'm just taking the piss, ok?

Portability of software/licenses with TCPA

[naarok]

Will TCPA compliant machines make it more difficult for a user to updgrade CPUs or change computers? Do you see users having to re-confirm their identity with external sources because the identity of their computer has changed? (I know this already happens, I just see it becoming more pervasive in the future and am afraid more software vendors will begin to license by specific computer).

Performance hit

[oliverthered]

I assume that data pathways with be signable or encripted in some way. What performance hit will the [operating system] take when using trusted system? e.g. How much extra data is added to form a signiture, what methods are used for signing. and how will this benifit the end-user.

How would AMI response to market pressures?

[CodeShark]

How would AMI respond to pressures from companies such as Microsoft, Intel, Sun, or to the combined companies in the MPAA or RIAA if those companies insisted that AMI only release "DRM compliant" BIOS chips, etc.

Would AMI disclose that such pressures were being placed on them, or would this type of fact be kept hidden from consumer groups or individuals, etc. until it was too late for us to effectively respond?

Re:How would AMI response to market pressures?

[CodeShark]

I respecfully disagree. AMI is engaged in a business venture to sell BIOS chips for (I assume) x86 platforms, and their main consideration has to be those who have the most influence on the sales of x86 chip sets -- namely Microsoft and Intel, followed by a few of the others.

The FBI, et. al are much more concerned with privacy related issues, not what you can see on your own computer system.

Options?

[ncc189]

Will AMI (and the TCPA) allow owners of these "trusted" computers to turn off or disable the features that are being discussed? Will we as users of our hardware be able to control what features are on and what features are not, or will these choices be up to Microsoft and its partners(TCPA)? How is AMI addressing these issues of choice and control?

Have customers asked for TCPA features?

[Sloppy]

AMI rep, the reason I think some people view your company with suspicion, is that we think it is unlikely that an AMI customer has asked for TCPA's "features." I suspect that anyone who is cooperating with that effort, is somehow being influenced by forces other than traditional market forces.

So maybe you can set me straight: do you think your customers want TCPA? If so, why? Who are these customers? If this a case where customers are not the same as users?

Re:Have customers asked for TCPA features?

[iamcadaver]

Because the same question is phased as:
"Would you like to be able to rent and watch movies over the internet?"

Answer: Yes. I would too.

You have to pair this TCPA and DRM thing with the fact that the box in question will likely resemble a TiVo. The days of the PC are numbered, and there are less then 500 of them to go.

Once this is mainstream, you'll kiss goodbye the day of $40 motherboards. More like $400, if not more, for these archaic component breadboards.

The TV makers will likely take over the motherboard market, and the chassis market will go the way of the dodo.

Except it. Linux will live on in embedded devices and universities, until maybe it is made available again via a signed VMWARE-like application. Or whole distributions might one day be a web application, which is already in the works.

Re:Have customers asked for TCPA features?

[intermodal]

That was an awful lot more eloquent than I would have put it...mine would be more along the lines of slapping anyone involved upside the head and demanding to know, "Why the hell would I want something like this? no, ME. Why do I want this? I don't even like/watch/takepartin movies, label music, or television. I just want a computer that does whatever the hell I tell it to do."

Re:Have customers asked for TCPA features?

[iamcadaver]

Single-function gadgets do have their market, but can you really not see what the benefits of truly universal machines in the hands If the masses are?

The point is that it will be argued this way to congress, by paid lobbiests:

No DRM: no movies on demand, no interactive television, more viruses, more risk to US information networks

With DRM: new businesses, new instant polling data ( huge for a politician ), video on demand, less SPAM... secure tracking of financial transactions for taxing
Do you think you could make the arguement that this is not what the masses want? Do you think it would be loud enough to pull the dollar signs from congress' eyes?

Or does that thought frighten you?

As a UNIX/Linux System Administrator, an X10 hobbiest, and a rabid TV timeshifter: It terrifies me that I can imagine a hundred ways they will pass this as law, and not one way we can stop it. I think you have just prompted me to donate to the EFF. I wish Lessig had a donation pool.

Software.

[13Echo]

Do you intend to require some sort of a per-operating system licensing fee to operating system companies, in order to profit on the inclusion of these "features"? E.g. Will Microsoft be giving you royalty payments for each machine that includes this AMI BIOS and gets their OS installed with these supported "features"? What position does this put your company into in terms of trying to also force open source OS companies (like RedHat) into paying these licenses?

A question.

[DAldredge]

Will you be able to tell the truth in your answers or will your answers have to be 'cleaned up' by the AMI PR dept first?

Non-Linux, non-Microsoft operating systems

[aridhol]

I see many people worried about Linux not working with Trusted Computing. What I'm wondering is if other operating systems will work. It has often been the case that something will come out for Windows, then get ported to Linux because they are the most visible minority group.

One of the operating systems I use is FreeBSD. Will that still be usable, or will it be forced to deal with substandard or non-existant drivers (think NVidia until recently). I also use QNX. Will that work? How about a new OS that will be created sometime in the future?

What the hell is a sales engineer?

[lpontiac]

(not intended as an interview question, more as a comment in the form of a rhetorical question)

Re:What the hell is a sales engineer?

[geekoid]

A engineer who happens to be a smooth talker.

Re:What the hell is a sales engineer?

[finkployd]

A friend of mine is a sales engineer. He got his BS in EE and went on to get his MBA. He has all the training and intelligence of an engineer and all the weasel-speak training of a salesman :)

No, seriously, they are people who are brought in to sell things that your average car salesman who got his undergrad degree in sales&marketing would not be able to understand, let alone sell. Plus they tend to make a butt load of money to boot.

Finkployd

The crux of "trustworthy computing"...

[Doug Neal]

... is, who is doing the "trusting"? In Microsoft's vision of it it certainly isn't the end user, it's them. Or other copyright owners.

TCPA is fundamentally a sound technological concept, but wide open for abuse. If it could be used for the user's benefit to prevent against viruses etc, then that's great.

What I'm saying is that the owner of the computer should be able to override the trust relationships - assert that the code is trusted (by them). The owner of the computer should have the ultimate veto. After all, it is theirs. Does AMI's plans for a TCPA implementation have this in mind?

How will I be affected???

[josepha48]

How will I be affected by TCPA? I run several machines at home some running NetBSD, FreeBSD, Linux, and Windows. I generally build my machines, unless they are given to me by my employer (or its a laptop), and even then I reinstall the OS or install my own OS of choice. (Whatever I'm in the mood to run at time of install or what works). If I buy a new Motherboard from AMI with TCPA will I stil be able to do this? Will I have to do special tricks to get this done or will it be just like it is now?

What makes you think?

[codepunk]

So really what makes you think myself as a customer want's even anything close to that on one of my motherboards?. The possibility of future misuse is to great for me to even consider it. I can tell you as both a corporate and private customer that it is not wanted in any shape or form. The mere mention of supporting it frankly makes my skin crawl with disgust. If this is how you choose to release your products I choose not to participate with my dollars.

Re:What makes you think?

[theLOUDroom]

Right on!

The only reason for TCPA / Palldium is to prevent the actual owner of a computer from having full access to its hardware. Any other benefit they claim is something that could be implemented in software (ex: writing an extension to the linux kernel so that it will only execute binaries signed with a certain public key).

The only reason to do all of this in hardware is to prevent the end-user from being able to modify the system as they sees fit (ex: modifying the code so that a user can sign his own program to do what he wants to with the DRM'ed err...umm TCPA'ed part of his machine.

I hope they loose a lot of money on this :)

People don't want crippled technology.

Something has been bothering me......

[Anonymous Coward]

Can you address why you think it is that the open source community has taken Palladium as _such_ a scary proposition?

Then, building on the above answer, can you explain why the open source community has only yelled and screamed about how evil Palladium is, rather the doing what they preach others should do? (Which is, of course, create an open source, trusted architecture (i.e.: TCPA) which protects/promotes consumer rights over and above the rights of corporate media groups.)

Or (if the above is not possible) can you at least explain why building an open source TCPA structure is not possible?

Straight-up products?

[LostCluster]

No matter how many DRM technologies AMIBIOS does adopt, can you promise that AMIBIOS will continue to offer DRM-free BIOS products?

Two versions

[AlgUSF]

Why can't we have two versions of the BIOS?

K901 (Trusted Computing enabled)
K901B (Trusted Computing disabled)

And enable users to crossship the chips if they want a different version...

Missing Idea

[GreatOgre]

I think the idea that most of us our missing is this. Most PC users buy their computers from Dell, Gateway, or some other big vendor. These vendors will ultimately sell TCPA/Palladium enabled computers. So, the real question should be: In the future will those of us who build our own systems be able to escape the issue of having TCPA/Palladium on our systems courtesy of the big players?

Hardware vendors

[cybermace5]

Since a BIOS is only part of a motherboard: what steps will hardware vendors have to take, in order to incorporate your BIOS? Will they have to adhere to certain hardware design rules or controls in order to maintain the TCPA? Is there going to be a licensing procedure for hardware manufacturers?

Technology can be used for good and evil

[defile]

As we all know, technology can be used for the purposes of both good and evil. Here are things that I consider good about where TCPA is going, along with the evil.

Good

• Users can protect their computers from viruses or other unapproved malware.

Evil

• The BIOS can be feasibly configured to only boot only "approved" code.
• By extension, "approved" code means that the Operating System must be a fresh, "blessed" install from a certain large proprietary software vendor.
• Developing this further, this means that this certain large proprietary software vendor's OS can cease to function if any unapproved modifications are made to the system.
• This gives the vendors, and anyone they do business with, incredible control over our PCs and the user is incapable of doing a damn thing about it unless they violate the DMCA and face criminal prosecution.

There are many advantages for the hardware/software/content vendors if this is realized, but few of them seem consumer driven: the erosion of fair use, the control of speech, taking a cut of every e-commerce transation, eliminating standards and competition.

Undoubtedly, your shareholders will push you to cooperate with the software/content vendors because it means big money for them and anyone who plays ball, but for us, it means we lose a lot. PR will say that it stops pirates from raising music/movie prices, and that it means ISVs can produce software that can't be warezed, no more cheating in online games, no more child porn, ad infinitum, and it's all for our own good.

Unfortunately, the potential for abuse is extraordinary, and the last thing I want to see is more of my friends being locked up because they do something with their computers that some company doesn't agree with. And right now it looks like AMI wants just that to happen.

Yes, right now your BIOS may offer choice, but hardware vendors seem committed to building an infrastructure that one day can make it very easy to eliminate this choice.

Please explain why we do want TCPA, why we should support your company, and how we can be assured that our colleagues don't go to jail just for believing they still control systems they bought. Also, please explain why the system we have now is so inadequete.

Thank you.

Re:Technology can be used for good and evil

[jmu1]

user is incapable of doing a damn thing about it unless they violate the DMCA and face criminal prosecution.

I do have a solution. Most folks won't like it, as I've voiced my opinion on the matter before and have been flamed... Buy something else. Jump the PC ship. Save up and buy the "other" hardware out there. You can still run your programs(although modified slightly)...I promise. Plus, the upshot is that prices will inevitably go down as more folks are jumping said ship.

Re:Technology can be used for good and evil

[Reziac]

And how long before those "other ships" knuckle under, especially if that's the only way to continue to get -- oh, say, Photoshop and Office for the Mac?? (See, I can hear you thinking. :)

They won't knuckle under, you say?? How long before those "other ships" are locked out of basic services (like internet connectivity) if they don't??

Re:Technology can be used for good and evil

[Reziac]

PS. By weird coincidence, as I posted the above, my randomized WinAmp playlist arrived at "Sink the Bismarck". I think it's a Sign. :)

Re:Technology can be used for good and evil

[newt]

Good

* Users can protect their computers from viruses or other unapproved malware.

You don't seriously believe this, do you?

Let me put it this way: Microsoft and a hoard of third-party software vendors try their hardest to prevent malware TODAY, and yet they fail.

So tell me how, exactly, a digital signature on a piece of software prevents, say, a buffer-overflow attack. Or a scripting bug. Or any of the other countless bugs which viruses exploit, have always exploited, and will always continue to exploit?

When Windows NT came onto the market, MS touted memory protection as a defence against viruses -- But virus writers just treated it as a hurdle to be jumped over, and we still have viruses on Windows systems today. I see nothing in TCPA which will change that; The only thing TCPA achieves is control over my systems ceded to people I don't know or trust. The "T" in TCPA means that RIAA and MPAA trust my computer, it doesn't mean that I trust it.

- mark

Re:Technology can be used for good and evil

[jmu1]

Very true.

However, I do think that if the forces that be notice a large percentage of their previous victims, er consumers had moved to a different market, would consider the possibility that they made a mistake.

Then again, it could work just like with the whole Windows/alternatives bit... not enough folks make the switch.

Re:Technology can be used for good and evil

[Reziac]

I think it will depend directly on how much of their market they can consider as "locked in" vs profit margins. After all, Apple has lost 80% of its relative market share over the past decade, and doesn't seem to regard that as a bad thing (at least, not enough to change their basic business model).

One problem is, there really AREN'T enough true alternatives. While consistency for a majority of users is a good thing, it has had the side effect of locking down what's realistically available in the desktop. And it's pretty much the same when it comes to basic components like BIOS, CPU, and hard disk. There simply aren't all that many ships to jump TO. And it only takes ONE getting major market penetration via an OEM to get that ship a big chunk, and maybe eventually exclusive use of the harbour. That means Windows on the desktop, and for many years, that meant [ick] Phoenix in the OEM BIOS.

AMI is in a little different position in that it's a major player (but by no means a monopoly) in the clone motherboard market, which itself has a steady 40% of the PC market. Whether this position is strong enough that they'll listen when we clone buyers and builders scream about restrictive BIOS behaviour, that remains to be proven. If it's NOT strong enough, then they might well knuckle under in the name of keeping other big players happy. But there is hope, since consumer screams (mainly from the clone crowd) did nix the P3 UID thing. And AMI has, in my observation, generally been a sensible company (tho the annoying graphical BIOS interface was a glaring exception).

Re:Technology can be used for good and evil

[jmu1]

/me Shudder

Phoenix... boy did I ever dislike them.

You are absolutly correct in that we haven't really enough strong alternatives, although that is changing(albeit slowly). Apple is one of those exceptional companies who has an exceptonal managment team. They have continually made money when they seemingly should not. They've done so by mostly listening to their current customers. Yeah, they've made some real bonehead mistakes, but it never really broke their stride(let's forget about ol what's his name and the death of the Newton). I do think that the OEM market is going to listen more to what the TCPA board and Microsoft have to say, however. Mainly because although a hoard of people use alternative operating systems(and other softwares even in the Windows environment), more run Microsoft's software than any other on the planet. That is a large constituency. If they don't cater to that market, they will lose out to those that will.

As for the P3UID situation, that was at a time when civil liberties were becoming a household name. In the current atmosphere of fear, nothing is sacred. I wouldn't be surprised if congress didn't start sending signals to Intel to reinstate the UID program(if it ever did stop... I've not used an Intel chip in my own machine since they first announced that debacle). I just don't think that the public has quite the voice they once did.

Re:Technology can be used for good and evil

[Reziac]

Didn't exactly thrill me when Phoenix ate Award, either :( Phoenix BIOSs have always sucked, and they've sure had some slimey ideas in recent years (no BIOS flash updates unless you pay $70 each; placing advertising in BIOS that can be updated via internet -- yeah, I really want unknown code being downloaded to my BIOS whenever someone else wants to do so!!)

I actually trust AMD *less* than Intel, especially after some stuff AMD said about potentially incorporating DRM in their CPUs. Not helped by AMD's blatant dishonesty wrt the fatal bug in the Sept.98 batch of K6-2 CPUs (I had inside info on the bug, which they never publicly acknowledged). Anyway, I buy Intel CPUs exclusively, because of that and more for various technical reasons. My motherboards can disable CPUID in BIOS, and I'm inclined to trust that, having never seen any evidence to the contrary (and since Intel tends to clean up their act after a good public bitchslapping, better than do many other companies).

But back to the issue at hand.. I think bigger companies are more easily swayed by public opinion -- they feel like they have more to lose if they piss off a big and proven marketshare, so diving into an unproven market seems less attractive. Whereas smaller companies are more in need of new markets, and more likely to grasp at straws (or at evil schemes like DRM) if they think that will gain them a new and exclusive market.

Where AMI is in the market game remains to be seen.

I'm a little blurry on the details here....

[Malor]

If I understood the prior articles correctly, TCPA should provide a basic keystore, an authentication mechanism, and enough checking to insure that the boot sector is signed.

If I want to install a new boot sector, do I generate my own key, install that, and self-sign the boot code? Or do the LILO or GRUB teams have to get a key issued and then sign things themselves?

Who has ultimate control over the keys? CAN I install my own, or is it centralized somewhere? Who does TCPA *ultimately* trust? How can I be *certain* that it doesn't trust anyone I don't want it to? If I screw up and lose my key, how I recover access to the system?

I assume there must be some master, uneraseable keys in TCPA; I just can't imagine that you'd ship it without implicitly trusting Microsoft, and I distrust Microsoft very much. And if there are recovery keys in there, do I have to ship my machine away to some lab to replace a lost key, or can I do it myself? And if there IS a master, unerasable key available for recovery purposes, why can't virus writers just sign their code with that key instead?

Re:I'm a little blurry on the details here....

[BeBoxer]

If I understood the prior articles correctly, TCPA should provide ... enough checking to insure that the boot sector is signed.

I'm amazed at how common this meme has become despite the fact that it is completely false. TCPA in no way dicates what code can run on the machine. The "security" it offers works in pretty much the reverse fashion. The TCPA BIOS hashes the bootloader and saves that hash in a secure place. That allows the bootloader to verify that it really did run first. The bootloader can then hash some portion of the OS, and then load and execute it. The OS can then verify that the boot process really was TCPA-BIOS->Correct bootloader->Unmodified OS. And more importantly, the OS can have the BIOS give it a cryptographic "proof" of this fact to hand to other programs or web sites.

What does this mean for Linux? Probably nothing. Linux could make use of this functionality, but my guess is it probably won't. The fact is that unless your code actually bothers to check the TCPA state of the machine, it just doesn't matter.

On the other hand, Palladium might make some things a little trickier. Since the bootloader is part of the TCPA chain of trust, it's highly unlikely that Palladium will be able to enter it's "secure" mode if you are using LILO or grub. So if you are somebody who actually dual-boots you will probably have to have an official Microsoft bootloader on /dev/hda and LILO or whatever on /dev/hda1 (for example) and have the Microsoft bootloader pass control to your Linux bootloader. Or just don't run Windows.

Could Microsoft abuse this to try to prevent users from dual booting? Sure. But they could easily prevent people from dual booting today if they wanted to. It's just that it would be such a blatantly anti-competetive move that even Microsoft would have a hard time pulling it off. They could refuse to boot thru LILO. They could complain and offer to "fix" any non-FAT or NTFS partitions at every boot. They could use browser version strings to control access to updates on their web site and bring DMCA charges against browsers which circumvent that by pretending to be IE. TCPA doesn't really make it easier to Microsoft to screw with people who dual boot. It's already trivial today!

Re:I'm a little blurry on the details here....

[BeBoxer]

My question to you is: what use, then, does TCPA serve?

Microsoft(tm) wants to position Windows as the premier content viewing platform for digital media. One way of doing this is to get the media companies to "trust" Windows. Specifically, the media cartel want to be able to have some certainty that the end user hasn't modified the operating system from it's original state. Sure, Microsoft can include software checks but these are trivially circumvented.

Enter TCPA. The BIOS acts as a "root of trust" (their term) which can be used to verify that the operating system has not been modified by the user. The TCPA BIOS will be audited, manufactured by trustworthy companies, and not easily modified by end users. The BIOS records the hash of the bootloader, which records the hash of the operating system loader, etc. etc. The goal being to force people who want to circumvent the operating system security to use hardware cracks. Presumably that's the only way to get the media cartel to "trust" your platform. And if all the online media is only available under Windows, that's big cha-ching for Microsoft going forward. Not to mention making things like product activation much more resiliant. Isn't that reason enough?

why does Microsoft need TCPA if Microsoft is not planning to introduce features into Windows which are only available via MS-approved boot loaders? This would be an anti-competitive move, yes,

Microsoft will introduce features which are only available thru a certified bootloader. That's the whole point! You can't very well pretend that the operating system is running in a known secure state if it's running inside of VMware, now can you? But like I said, at worst that will just mean that you'll have to the Microsoft bootloader to get to LILO. A pain perhaps, but not something that is likely to be seen as anti-competetive.

Instead of getting our panties up in a knot, we should be trying to figure out how to make use of the new features TCPA will provide. Like how about a secure partition which can't be mounted/decrypted if you're computer is booted from a floppy? Or how about a distribution like Debian using this to ensure that package submissions only come from fully-patched up-to-date systems? Or for that matter, allowing clients downloading updates to verify that the server hasn't been rooted! Now that would be cool.

Why are BIOSes closed source?

[mcelrath]

Having recently had a lot of trouble with my laptop's BIOS, on an issue that I could most certainly fix if I had access to the code... I started wondering what benefit AMI and other vendors have by keeping BIOS code secret? I can think of none whatsoever.

An open-source TCPA BIOS might go a long way to alleviating the fears of the open source community, since we could see exactly what it is you're forcing on us. And hey, no doubt you'd get a few bug-fixing patches in return for your efforts.

So, is an open-source BIOS a possibility? (TCPA or otherwise)

-- Bob

OpenBIOS

[Anonymous Coward]

http://www.freiburg.linux.de/OpenBIOS/

Here is s solution for those not wanting to give up theyre hardware control.

Editorial responsibility

[The Bungi]

This is the text of the original article submission:

An anonymous reader writes "American Megatrends announced its 'trusted computing' Palladium BIOS on Jan 6. It seems that the encrypted BIOS' integrity will be verified by a special chip or flash ROM, and will in turn verify the 'authenticity, integrity and privacy' of the boot loader and the operating system. Does that mean such machines may refuse to boot any other non-'trusted' OS? After all, the list of supporting corporations include AMD, Intel, IBM, and HP, of whom we heard quite favourable statements about Linux (just for example -- *BSDs will be equally affected) so far."

Perhaps this should have been posted in the Ask Slashdot section instead of News. Or maybe it's time to create a new section: Unsubstantiated And Potentially False Rumors That Might Damage Reputations Of Companies And Individuals.

Oh, and don't forget to browse the article with a +5 threshold. Let's hear it for informed, focused opinion floating to the top of the pile.

A bit more editorial responsibility would have been called for here because this sort of thing is essentially libel, not to mention pure and simple FUD. Now AMI has to subject itself to a Slashdot interview so that the record can be set straight. Does anyone else find this slightly troubling?

Re:Editorial responsibility

[EpsCylonB]

It's ok to have an Opinion.

E-mail sent to marketing@ami

[LarsG]

Brian,

I sure would hate to be in your shoes right now. Putting yourself in front of a firing squad voluntarely takes guts.

I sent an e-mail to marketing complaining about AMI supporting TCPA, and got the standard reply in return. My answer is below, and I am still waiting for a reply.

Umbertina E. Vezzani wrote:

Hello Laars,

You can already find TCPA-enabled products on the market but they have a different BIOS.

I am perfectly aware of that, and that is why I don't buy IBM laptops any more.

The Security subsystem is intended for those users who want an extra security protection that is valid even outside the OS.

The motherboard and system manufacturers will specify their system features, so I believe you will certainly be able to choose the features you want. I really don't think you will buy a motherboard with a hidden feature or "fritz".

I am not afraid of hidden features. TCPA is merely the scaffolding which enables building "trusted applications"/"trusted clients". What I am afraid of, is how software vendors and the content industry will (ab)use TCPA.

As for the reference to "fritz" - I think Ross Anderson went a little bit over the top in his critisism of TCPA. A much better overview of some of the technical problems with TCPA can be found here (I fully endorse Mr. Arbaugh's suggestions):
http://www.cs.umd.edu/~waa/TCPA/TCP A-goodnbad.pdf

TCPA is meant to answer to a demand of security from users, not something else.

What demand exactly? TCPA doesn't solve any of the major security problems.

TCPA only answers the question "has the basic components of this system been changed?", and makes it possible for 3rd parties to verify the state ("trustworthiness") of a system.

The majority of security problems are on the OS or application level - macro/scripting vulnerabilities, virii, buffer overruns and similar. TCPA doesn't provide a solution for any of those. In fact, a software sandbox like Java or running certain applications in vmware virtual machines provides better protection against those real world problems.

What exactly is TCPA supposed to solve? Don't give me some marketing fluff about "enhancing security for the user". I want cold, clear, technical examples of real world security problems that TCPA is supposed to solve.

Also, which users are demanding TCPA? Users want protection against virii and similar, but TCPA doesn't solve those problems. Who are the end users that demand something like TCPA?

I also believe that, if there is a solid foundation to the concerns for privacy people is expecting, the TCPA itself will improve its specification to address those concerns.

So there is a real chance the next revision of the TCPA spec will include proper anonymous certificates a'la Chaum instead of the current "please trust the privacy CA" solution?

It must be noted that AMI has not announced support for Palladium. Palladium is an initiative by an OS entity that is slated for the future.

I know that. I also know that there is considerable disagreement going on between the Palladium and the TCPA proponents.

To be honest, TCPA is a better specification than Palladium. However, TCPA does provide the scaffolding required for building "trusted systems" - i.e., that a 3rd party can control what is happening on my computer. TCPA is a Pandora's box - if abused, it could have a devastating effect on both innovation, privacy and consumer rights.

Regarding the limitations of a system with TCPA I would offer the link below to the public specification for further information on compatibility with different OS's, and hardware. Based on that spec we can tell you that it does not limit the ability to run Linux (or any other open source solution).

How is that supposed to make me feel good? I know that it is possible to disable (most of) TCPA. I know that my computer will continue to work even if the TCPA subsystem tell other computers out there that my computer has zero "trustworthiness".

However, once digital commerce, streaming media and other online content start demanding TCPA enabled clients you are effectively a second rate citizen on the 'net and are locked out of a lot of content if TCPA is disabled on your computer.

So:
1) TCPA does not provide true anonymity (you have to trust the privacy CA).
2) The scaffolding provided by TCPA can be abused by those who want to disable the Turing completeness of computers and instead turn them into locked down interactive content delivery platforms.
3) The market effect will force people to use TCPA and TCPA enabled "trusted clients" even if they don't want to.
4) TCPA is advertised as a security solution, but does not solve most of the real world security problems.

With kind regards,
Lars Gaarden

Platform owner

[briancnorton]

Since microsoft is kind of vague on details about Palladium, I will hit you with a TCPA question. In the TCPA FAQ, it states that "Platform Owners" will decide which software runs on their platform. Who exactly is a "Platform Owner" and does microsoft have a simmilar "feature in palladium"

I gotta ask...

[salesgeek]

Who does AMD see as it's customer? Is it end users or computer manufacturers? Do end users care about DRM? What about computer manufacturers?

$G

Authentication for palladium

[briancnorton]

What is the authentication scheme for palladium? Is it something like MS passport? How does the motherboard gain authentication from the OS?

Do you see mandatory TCPA and/or Palladium

[dpilot]

This is it, in the fewest words. Others have danced around the question, but IMHO this is really it.

I understand that if I want to play MPAA or RIAA content, I may need to have a DRM OS, probably Palladium, and it will need to be on a system with a TCPA BIOS.

But what if I want to just boot Linux (or trusty old Win98SE) to program or play games?

Will I be permitted to run an "untrusted" computer, or is it only a matter of time until the only new computer is a trusted computer that will only run a trusted OS?

So why SHOULDN'T we boycott AMI?

[StevenMaurer]

I am a bit concerned that the information you provided misled your readers into thinking AMI was promoting Palladium or taking some sort of anti-open-source stance.

It plainly is anti open-source.

TPM has no benefit to end users. All it does is give Microsoft an argument to use with ISVs as to why they shouldn't develop products for open source platforms. They can say: "If you ever release your product for Linux, some people will disassemble it. But with our "trusted" OSes, you'll never have to worry about crackers, because we don't let our customers control their own machines".

It's a powerful argument. There may even be a few ISVs stupid enough to fall for it. (Most ISVs don't go out of business from cracks, they die when Microsoft itself uses its monopoly power to sieze the market the ISV developed.)

But it's all a moot point. Why shouldn't we be trying to nip this in the bud? Why shouldn't we be spreading the word to everyone we know that people who buy AMI will very soon have to accept whatever draconian "Clickthrough" is on the software package, giving up their legal rights for no consideration whatsoever?

In short, why shouldn't we be trying to drive AMI out of business?

Sounds like a plan to me.

I dual boot...

[(H)elix1]

I dual boot my box to run a couple different flavors of Windows and Linux. (removable hard drives). Will the BIOS auto detect something that supports the Palladium and turn it on, or will I have to drop into the BIOS and change the 'enable palladium' settings every time. I expect a future cut of Windows to require such a thing to be enabled before it runs.

In short, if the boot sector is not 'trusted' by AMIBIOS will the default behavior be boot with a warning or not boot until the BIOS changes?

(Disclaimer: For the record, this is a feature I want to see die the same way Intel's CPU identification did. I'll be one of those dragging my feet making existing hardware and software last longer than I usually do hoping the market corrects the situation.)

Will you take the pledge?

[Royster]

Will AMI pledge not to make DMCA claims against Open SOurce projects? If you do not, why should we believe a word you have to say?

In plain English (so my mom would understand)

[paranoic]

Just what problem is this trying to solve?
Why can't my computer be trusted?
Is this trying to fix a fundamental flaw in operating systems?

Real Questions

[Qzukk]

1) What does it take (steps,costs including any IP licensing fees) to make OS Foo boot on a TCPA computer?

2) What does it take (steps, costs including licensing fees) to make application Bar run on Foo? On any other OS?

Ignoring rampant paranoia, these are the questions that will actually affect open source development. It comes down to how much will it cost for us to run our programs?

Access to HARDWARE

[Windcatcher]

If I run an alternative OS (Linux, DOS, etc.) will I have complete and unfettered access to MY HARDWARE on the PC that I OWN? This includes access to motherboard peripherals as well as total access to ALL peripherals on the PCI/Video/other bus.

If the answer is no, or if I get a wishy-washy "well, sort of, but..." then please enumerate those components I will not be able to access and WHY I CAN'T BE TRUSTED TO ACCESS MY OWN HARDWARE.

Re:Specs, API, drivers

[CoolVibe]

BIOSes are slow by nature, don't bet on it.

Chosen questions, chosen answers.

[mmol_6453]

You can't intellectualy accept a company's published "stance" because said company has the ultimate option of misleadingly rewording, or even omitting, information that the public would find unappetizing. In a popularity-based publication, asking a specific list of questions usually attempts to lock them down into responding with a very narrow range of answers. Some political talk shows go so far as to re-ask the question if they didn't get the answer they want. (This is what they call "playing hardball.")

While you have to take what is said with a grain of salt in any case, some organizations, such as Republicans, Democrats and Microsoft, are in high enough positions to reword questions to a less damning, or even advantageous form. As an example, have you ever heard an interview where the interviewee was asked a piercing question, and he made it sound like the interviewer was a foolish idiot?

Just out of wondering...

[MickLinux]

... way back in the days of Windows 3.1, I noticed that my AMIBIOS code for interrupt 9 (I think it was that... keyboard direct hardware service, anyhow) was byte-for-byte identical to significant sections of Windows' keyboard.drv code.

Now, I used that similarity to find a gap, where I could put special codes in my notebook computer's keyboard code to disable the keyboard while my scanner took data [it was a bug workaround]. But to this day, I wonder: did AMIBIOS know about this? Did they license it to Windows? Or was this just a case of "no, we didn't know, but they stole it"?

File formats!!!

[Windcatcher]

There's another lurking evil, and I really think this is the big one. Microsoft wants to protect their MS-Word near-monopoly (near? who an I kidding?) and TCPA+Palladium is a way of locking people into MS Office forever. Want to read that document that you converted to Palladium Office? You'll have to use a Microsoft product, because Office will require TCPA and it just used your motherboard to encrypt that file so that no other office software can read it.

What? You work for Sun and want to get StarOffice to read the new, improved, .DOC files? Forget it. They're encrypted with a key, and obtaining that key without Microsoft's permission is a DMCA violation. Oh, but you can license the ability to read those files, for a huge fee. What? You want to edit them too? Prepare to pay a king's ransom.

Want to edit documents on your Palm(tm)? You must buy Microsoft Office for Palm, as Documents to Go won't work any more. Or maybe MS will tell you to go pound sand and buy a nice, new pocket PC that's running a Microsoft OS. Flip a coin on that one...it depends on how bad MS might want Palm out of business.

IMHO, that's the real purpose of TCPA+Palladium. Anti-competitive tactics on steroids.

Compatibility with Garage "Hacks"

[Catiline]

I'm a hobbyist who builds his own computer, writes his own software, and (on rare occasions) will build hardware components (as in: with solder and chips). What assurance do I have that your "Trusted Computing" initiative won't interfere with my projects? Interference here is defined as reducing the operational capacities -- including networking features -- of the computer or reducing my ability to develop to my needs. In a way this is four separate questions: how software, Trusted vendor hardware, pre-Trust vendor hardware, and home-built hardware integrate into the "Trusted Computing" architecture.

Technical Explanation of BIOS Settings

[doppleganger871]

I have been doing research on BIOS settings for many years, and I have found good articles on what the settings do, and how to tweak them for the best performance/stability mix. But, I would like to know if the BIOS manufacturer itself would be able to provide an in-depth manual of all the BIOS settings, and what exactly they do. All the manuals that come with motherboards are very short on explanations, and I would like to see someone within the company actually explain to us hardware enthusiasts the down 'n dirty, nitty gritty, dirt under the rug, needle in a haystack type of information that we could use to make our computers run the absolute best they can. Because, as we all know, optimizing software and firmware is a lot cheaper than upgrading parts.

-Jay

Re:Technical Explanation of BIOS Settings

[anonymous cupboard]

I guess one of the issues is that the BIOS settings go together with the chipset so interpretations vary depending upon the motherboard.

However, I agree with the point. Someone should provide this information and I'm certain a lot of it already exists in the documentation provided by the BIOS manufacturer to the motherboard manufacturer.

How do you feel about TCPI?

[stinkydog]

Will the next computer you personally buy implement these features?

Who will you give access to your machine (Microsoft, RIAA, MPAA, Homeland Security)?

When the thought police come to round up us 'Criminals' that will not give up our 'untrusted' systems will you be able to sleep at night?

SD

Re:How do you feel about TCPI?

[Reziac]

You say,

"Who will you give access to your machine (Microsoft, RIAA, MPAA, Homeland Security)?"

Erm... I believe you meant to say,

"Who will give you access to your machine (Microsoft, RIAA, MPAA, Homeland Security)?"

Why should we trust you?

[bshowalter]

Palladium and any other DRM-enabling doodad are products that are inherently designed to enable vendors who do not trust their customers to exercise some degree of control over how those customers use the vendors' products. At the same time, those vendors expect customers to trust that the use of DRM products will not result in side effects that may be detrimental to users' freedom to use legally obtained products as they see fit provided such use is within the law.

Since AMI appears to be taking the side of those vendors who feel they cannot trust their customers, why should we as customers trust AMI to create products that do not infringe upon our rights as customers? Why should we not take our business to vendors who are willing to trust that we will not do anything illegal with their products, instead of assuming up front that all customers have some sort of illegal intent?

Re:Why should we trust you?

[kevinank]

Since AMI appears to be taking the side of those vendors who feel they cannot trust their customers, why should we as customers trust AMI to create products that do not infringe upon our rights as customers? Why should we not take our business to vendors who are willing to trust that we will not do anything illegal with their products, instead of assuming up front that all customers have some sort of illegal intent?

I'm frankly amazed that anyone can make the baldfaced claim that Palladium is only about security for the users and expect to be believed. The applications for limiting user control of computing devices are inherent in the technology, just as security is not. Take a couple of hours to compare Palladium's feature set against last year's CERT and Security Focus alerts, and count how many of them would have been averted by Palladium.

Buffer overflows? No help from Palladium. Scripting abuse? No help from Palladium. Distributed denial of service attacks? No help from Palladium. Exploitation of bugs in web applications? No help from Palladium. Burying trojan horse code in the build scripts of popular security programs? No help from Palladium.

Just what is this supposed security platform supposed to be secure against?

Clarification

[Rayonic]

The poster partially answers his own question:

> Who are these customers? If this a case where customers are not the same as users?

AMI sells to motherboard manufacturers, not to end users. But the question still stands, who are these companies that are asking AMI for these features?

Simple.

[Andy Dodd]

Either
a) It's signed by you
b) It's signed by someone you trust

I don't see this BIOS as being a major problem if it allows for self-signing with a), and for you to choose who is on your b) list.

i.e. if Sourceforge has a signing authority, can I add them to my list of trusted software sources? Or must all software be signed by Veri$ign?

Net weight

[King of the World]

Often people describe the control that Microsoft has over office file formats as one of massive legacy. They have the 90% of the office market and in practice it's impossible not to deal with the format.

Palladium claims to have the freedom to choose whether you want to connect to another palladium machine. This freedom is at an individual level, in the same was I can choose to use Abiword.

If Palladium achieves mass market how will my freedom not to use Palladium be possible? Will it be like having the Freedom to speak Esperanto?

why is this a problem?

[nusuth]

I would know my woody isn't signed anyway, no problem there. But I'd rather have bios telling me my new ArkLinux 4.2 is really signed or not.

Is TCPA/Palladium is making de facto-contracts?

[Kjella]

What I find most interesting is how Palladium is advertized as having features like letting content creators (e.g. a person sending you an e-mail) control what you can do with it (automatic deletion, no forwarding, no printing).

However, we never get a say in this, we never agree to any such "contract". If your company is producing a product as part of a system designed to disempower me in favor of a machine, does it really surprise you that I don't like it?

TCPA/Palladium has never been about how I, the end user can come in control of my machine, because I am already in total control (up to the limitations of my tools). TCPA can for me, at best, be a hardware version of a "sandbox", where I control what resources are availible to a given program. But such programs already exists in software and has no need for hardware backing.

Many people have compared TCPA to being a program running in Ring -1 (Ring 0 being the OS kernel). The only thing it can control in addition to what the OS already can control, is what runs in Ring 0. So why do you need to control what runs in Ring 0? Answer me that.

Because you can't trust me, isn't it?. Isn't that what it's all about? Having a trust chain that I can't break. So the content, and my machine can negoiate a deal, without me ever getting a say. So that they two can decide, regardsless of rights granted by law (like fair use and first sale), when, how, where and what I can see, hear, use and do. And you don't find that offensive?

Kjella

Ahh but it's software

[grahamsz]

Hang on a second - I'm not 100% sure but I strongly suspect that you license you bios software from AMI (much like any other software you never actually buy it).

This is no different than when a manufacturer only ever supplies a machine with windows preinstalled. I think some people have actually had refunds because they never used the installed os.

Should be interesting to see if AMI abuse their monopoly position to try and stop manufacturers supplying machines with alternate bios's

Cheezus, I should be an editor...

[Kjella]

...I don't even proofread my own headilnes. Also, "regardsless" should be "regardless". What? You mean there's a preview button?

Kjella

You don't watch UK news

[DrSkwid]

Jeremy Paxman wins a Royal Television Soceity Award for his grilling of Michael Howard when in 1997 he asks Howard [the incumbent Home Secretary] the same question 14 times over the Derek Lewis prison affair, complete with interruptions and increasing impatience in his voice. I was watching it myself at the time with glee.

MH: I was entitled to express my views. I was entitled to be consulted.

JP: Did you threaten to overrule him?

MH: I was not entitled to instruct Derek Lewis and I did not instruct him. And the truth of it is . . .

JP: Did you threaten to overrule him?

MH: And the truth of the matter is Mr Marriott was not suspended. I did not . . .

JP: Did you threaten to overrule him?

MH: I did not overrule Derek Lewis.

JP: Did you threaten to overrule him?

MH: I took advice on what I could and could not do . . .

JP: Did you threaten to overrule him, Mr Howard?

MH: . . . and I acted scrupulously in accordance with that.

and so on

The BBC web archive of that interview in .ram format

They met again in 2002

An answer.

[Anonymous Brave Guy]

Of course. All my answers will be the [...] truth. No editorial input will be applied [unless deemed strictly necessary to guarantee appropriate standards of presentation -- Ed] between the time that [I] write the article and the time that [I] send it to [its recipient]. The PR guys promised. [No, we didn't.]

Come on, who're you kiddin'? Any reply from this guy, or anyone else writing on a subject so obviously controvserial, is going to be screened seventeen times over by PR weenies before it gets out into the wild.

Honest answers?

[Erpo]

I don't think we can expect honest answers from AMI, or any other company pushing Pd. In response to a comment warning about the unfriendly nature of TCPA/Pd on a listserv, an MS employee had this to say:

Scarey, maybe. Correct, not :-).

There is a lot of speculation here which is not based on facts. PD will
give you the capability to protect some subsets of your system from
damage. Imagine having a fire proof safe in your house. Your house can
still burn down and your safe will still protect your documents that are
stored in there. Having the safe does not enable the people who sold
you the safe know what is stored in there. And if you don't want to
have the said safe, then don't use it! Same is true of PD.

As to the original comment regarding privacy, you are seeing our attempt
to document any and all aspects of the system that could concern anyone.
So you are going to see us telling a lot more about the capabilities of
the player and this can appear overwhelming at first. The good news is
that you have full knowledge of what we do and the choice to turn one or
more of these off if your privacy is more important than the
functionality. Competitors probably do the same thing but fail to warn
you explicitly about them (and burry the detail in long EULAs).

Here is a write-up from CNET on our privacy approach in media player:
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-955514.html . As you see, it is being seen
as a very positive move and not negative at all. Here is one quote:

"If the final build looks like the software (that CNET News.com)
described, the implication is that Microsoft is taking consumer privacy
very seriously indeed and marks a big change for the company," said
Jupiter Research analyst Michael Gartenberg."

******
Microsoft


The "product" and "player" referenced above are the Windows Media Player. This came from a WM-centric listserv.

I expect similarly placating (and untrue) answers from AMI. It is my opinion that the best course of action in this case is to punish AMI as severely as possible for even taking the first step towards creating a component that conforms to either TCPA or Pd. There are two simple things any computer literate person can do to hurt AMI:

1. Don't buy their products.

2. Let them know you bought from a competitor because they dared support TCPA/Pd.

3. Let their competitors know that you're not buying AMI because of their unacceptable actions.

TCPA/Pd requires hardware and software to work. I don't think anyone is going to be convinced to stop using windows because it takes away his or her freedom (at least any more than they have in the past), and I don't think MS is going to be convinced to leave Pd out of its OSs. As I see it, the most effective way to prevent TCPA/Pd from advancing is by setting up a business environment in which hardware manufacturers are terrified at the prospect of producing TCPA/Pd compliant hardware. That, and user education, are the two things that I think have a hope of stopping TCPA/Pd.

I wrote a rather long response to the above comment, so I won't paste it here (Mozilla chokes if I try to paste 18KB into a text box), but I do plan on submitting it to the Pd faq maintainer as there are some important oportunity for MS to abuse it's power in a TCPA/Pd system that aren't covered. (e.g. MS not signing drivers for hardware devices that support competing technologies [OpenGL v. Direct3D, MPEG4 v. WM].)

The death of WINE

[Windcatcher]

Here's an interesting scenario:

- Office Palladium will require TCPA

- Linux, as an untrusted OS, won't be able to provide Office Palladium proper authentication, and Office will refuse to run under WINE.

- Windows users become reluctant to migrate to Linux since they can't run Office. (Believe it or not, Office is still the killer app for most folks).

I'm telling ya, the Office division is behind this at least as much as the content industry.

What is the driving force behind this?

[theLOUDroom]

My question is:
Why is AMI doing this?

Do they think people want their OS to be able to lock them out of certain parts of their machine?

You see, I can't really see any application for TCPA / Palladium besides taking control away from the owner of a computer. Any of the other "security" features TCPA/Palladium provides can/have been easily implemented in software. The only application that requires BIOS/hardware level modifications, is one where you are trying to prevent the person who owns the computer from have full control over it.


Lately I've been beginning to notice that some companies have internal conflicts of interest that cause them to do stupid things, which are not what consumers want. (Stupid because, they loose money because consumers go elsewhere to get hardware that isn't crippled and any piracy that was going to happen still happens anyways.)
Sony, for example. Being both a hardware company and a media company, they seem to have an internal conflict of interest: To many RIAA/MPAA types CD/DVD burners are synonymous with piracy, this must lead to internal pressure on the hardware branch of the company to try and control what people can do with Sony hardware. Ex: It's rumored that Sony DVD burners can burn Xbox games but not PS2 games, Sony Discmans have often had sub-par CDR playing ability, Sony Minidisc recorders had an annoying copy protection flag that prevented you from making many digital copies of a minidisc.

1. Does AMI have any such internal conflict of interest that is leading them to do this?
2. Or is it pressure from outside sources, and who are those sources?
3. Or does AMI think Joe-sixpack actually wants this?

This whole thing reminds me very much of the whole CPUID debacle. CPU manufacturer X starts putting unique ID numbers inside their CPU. They claim it will allow increased security for web transactions blah, blah, blah. The problem was there was not good reason why your average computer user would want a unique unchangable serial number for his computer. There was a tremendous potential for violation user's privacy and no good reason why they needed it in the first place. Why? A unique id could be implemented in software. The only reason to have it in hardware is to prevent the owner of the computer from changing /disabling it.

People didn't want them, and CPUIDs failed. Why does AMI think this is any different?

Multi-part question

[drinkypoo]

Two parts. The one I'm really interested in seeing answered: I've noticed while disassembling PC BIOS that it all appears to be very old-school style code, for instance registers are cleared by XORing themselves. How much of that tendency is from legacy code from the days when that mattered, and how much of it is just programmers doing the right thing (tm)?

Second part, and less important, what is the story with firewire booting? How hard is it to graft additional boot code onto a BIOS and present a device as a reasonable boot device to the rest of the BIOS?

Usual interview rules apply..

[gatekeep]

Now, I've been here a while, so when phrases like 'Usual interview rules apply' are tossed around, I understand the meaning.

But it occurs to me, there's probably many who don't. Why not have a page outlining the usual interview rules, and link to it when saying something like that?

Comment removed

[account_deleted]

Comment removed based on user account deletion

It was partially a good question

[nurb432]

Instead of the refund avenue, the question of if you can install your own replacement IS a good question. On both techincal and legal grounds, can we? Or are we FORCED to use the bios ( ie 'trusted' ) that is supplied to us.

what are the benifits to Open Source?

[glitchvern]

The tcpa spec states that the TPM (Trusted Platform Module) contains hashing (SHA-1), random number generation (RNG) , asymmetric key generation (RSA), and asymmetric encryption/decryption (RSA). What advantages can open source projects such as openssh and openssl take by using the TPM implementation of these algorithims instead of normal software implementations? What potential uses can open source software get out of TCPA?

Uhm, actually (Re:So why SHOULDN'T we boycott AMI)

[twl]

Trusted operating systems can be a GREAT thing, it's merely a question of who controls the TORA [trusted operating root authority]. IMHO, if I control the TORA, it gives me power over my computer that wouldn't normally be possible, even with the various mandatory access control systems available across different platforms.

All of these are software, while the TCPA system's hardware-based system, if properly implemented, will be much more resistant to attack than any software-based solution.

If you've ever typed ctrl-alt-delete on a PC, you've used a 'trusted' feature, since it generates an interrupt which cannot be trapped by usermode software. Last time I checked, ctrl-alt-delete didn't present a clear and present danger to the operation of my computer -- merely my sanity.

We should focus on the real issues -- ownership of the TORA, as well as the distribution of simple methods to regain control of your computer's TORA through simple hardware hacking, much like the chipping of games consoles that still goes on fairly freely even in these dark days of DMCA, SSSCA, etc.

[standard disclaimers: not a hardware expert, info above is provided to the best of my knowledge but details may be incorrect...]

yes would be a fantastic result

[DrSkwid]

If applied across all executables and scripts.

Especially if it could be fine grained down to a per user basis. i.e. a system wide policy of who can run what.

Then you could have root to be only available in single user mode.

Stick that up your rootkit.

hmm it's starting to sound like plan9

How could it be otherwise?

[gsfprez]

How could TCPA and Palladium NOT be intertwined?

By the various definitions of what TCPA and Palladuim calim to be and what they claim to be able to deliver to "customers" - the hardware and the software must validate each other.

If either the software or the hardware was "untrusted" in a TCPA and Palladium world, then by definition, neither can actually do any of what they claim to be able to do.

If i can run "untrusted" software on a TCPA - then TCPA couldn't be very effective.. and if i could run "untrusted" hardware with Palladium - then Palladium would be just as ineffective.

Rouge hardware and rouge software are not allowable - by the definition of trusted software and trusted hardware.

I guarantee you - much software and much hardware will never be trusted. Either because of who made it (w4r3z d00d, Apple, etc.) or who didn't make it (Intel, Micro Soft, etc.).

This is why these concerns arise.

Bootloading BIOS

[wiswaud]

As flash storage drops in price, especially wrt motherboard costs, and the way i see it, there isn't _that_ much more functionality to add to the BIOS, when will we see a nice bootloader being integrated in the BIOS (from the manufacturer), or why won't we see it?

i'm talking about integrating the equivalent of grub in the BIOS, along with maybe 16MB of flash to hold a few kernels and ramdisks. You'd also (of course) include utilities for changing the menu, loading/deleting files to/from flash, for most OSes (as this would be relatively simple code: do a nice GUI for windows but a simple command-line utility could be written that easily recompiles in linux, *BSD (including OSX), etc. - we'll do the rest and slap a GUI to call the cmdline program).
I would LOVE that, and it really doesn't seem that hard - there are indeed a few projects doing it already, it should be quite cheap for you to do, so we'd see it in motherboards off-the-shelf...
I agree it might not be able to load windows, but .... who cares. it would at least be able to include a menu item for it, if it can't hold the 'windows kernel' (however big that is - haven't got a clue).

Why stop there? why is it that there still isn't a minimalist linux system with busybox in every modern BIOS, which would allow booting a diskless station into enough functionality to at least re-partition a hard drive? That's a whole single MB of flash!

my question really is: i would have expected that by now, why don't i see it?

(please, don't flame me with "it exists already" - i want to hear the manufacturer on this! most people would never dare re-flash their BIOS with something else - they barely have the courage to flash BIOS updates from the mfgr!)

How much will it cost...

[Travoltus]

for a priest to come and exorcise this child of satan (DRM support) from an AMI Bios motherboard?

why should RHat be treated differently?

[DrSkwid]

open source OS companies (like RedHat)

as far as I can see Red Hat is a for-profit company just like any other. If they want to call a tune they have to pay the piper just like anyone else.

The volume of computing means that non "trusted" machines will be available. You don't think people like Yahoo will suddenly switch from FreeBSD to Windows because they can only find motherboards with an AMI bios?

Linux Bios one of a few

[DrSkwid]

http://www.linuxbios.org

Which is MORE important?

[MissMyNewton]

A user's rights?

OR

A "content provider's" rights?

Please don't bother answering if you're going to waffle.

Okay, Brian, serious question.

[Windcatcher]

You've said that AMI has nothing to do with Palladium. Of course, that's true. One is a BIOS, and the other is an operating system made by another company. I have no issue with that.

However, we ALL know that Palladium will run in TCPA trusted mode, and TCPA functions will be active.

So here's the question (ahem):

If:

- I, as a Linux user, want to BUY the next version of Microsoft Office(tm) and run it on my Linux box under WINE, and:

- said version of Office requires that it be run on a trusted platform (i.e. it requires TCPA authentication),

WHAT WILL HAPPEN?

I'm sure you think this is a loaded question. It is, and it isn't. It is in the sense that I suspect what the answer will be, but I want to hear you answer it. It isn't, in the sense that this is a very serious issue and has enormous ramifications for the entire industry. You see, I think that TCPA+Palladium are really schemes for killing Linux by denying it the ability to run Microsoft applications. To that end, I don't consider you accomplices, but perhaps dupes. I ask you the above question in all seriousness, and I challenge you to prove me wrong.

What do you think about Linux BIOS?

[lanner]

Dear AMI BIOS Developer

At first, I was going to ask you about how you have cooperated, if at all, with the Linux BIOS project. After all, you often have historically cooperated with Microsoft and Novell. What are you doing to help Linux?

But then it occurred to me, if Linux BIOS was successful, it would put AMI out of the BIOS software development business. Linux BIOS is a competitor of AMI.

What is your personal perspective about Linux BIOS, and what does AMI think about it?

Thank you

The LinuxBIOS Home Page
http://www.acl.lanl.gov/linuxbios/

Slashdot | Linux BIOS
http://slashdot.org/articles/00/06/14/211020 9.shtm l

# Jesse Molina

Re:What do you think about Linux BIOS?

[lanner]

Hi again

My apologies for the introduction of "Developer". It is my understanding that Brian Richardson's current title is that of a Sales Engineer.

A better term would have been, "representative."

My bad!

Who does TCPA envision the "Owner" to be?

[BeBoxer]

The TCPA standard talks a lot about the "Owner" of the system, and how the "Owner" can initialize a new system so that it will begin generating keys and such using a password set up during the "ownership" process (See Section 2.6 of the Standard). My question is: who would the "Owner" of a system normally be in plain english? The actual end-user (or their administrator)? Or would the TPM get "owned" by the hardware vendor (Dell, HP, etc.) Or the OS vendor? Or the motherboard manufacturer?

Second, will it be possible to completely reset the TPM to a non-owned state to allow used hardware to be sold "as new"? Or would the hardware refuse to allow a new owner?

opensource ?

[mmu_man]

Will you opensource your BIOS so _we_ (so-called users of trusted BIOS) will be able to verify that your product doesn't harm our privacy or infridge our legally own rights (whichever country we come from) ? So that WE can trust YOU ?

Brian, please explain to us...

[bani]

...exactly why AMI's TCPA cannot be abused by corporations to harm/lock out Open source.

Please explain to us why AMI's TCPA is a good thing for Linux.

Concerns re: Trusted Computing

[E1ven]

One of the most interesting posts I've seen regarding this subject was found at Microsoft.com

I'd love to hear how you'd address some of the points he brings up in the article.

In case the site goes down, or is changed, I've mirrored it at sq7.org/media/ms.html

My question:

[autopr0n]

WTF is a "sales engineer"?

Re:My question:

[forkboy]

Haven't you ever worked in the industry? A sales engineer is basically a tech that comes along with the sales droids to field any questions from customers that require an iota of brain power or technical skills. They also generally assist in installation/configuration of the product once someone buys it.

Sometimes this term is used on sales people that have technical skills themselves (or techs who are roped into becoming sales people) but usually the two skill sets are mutually exclusive.

Whats wrong with that?

[autopr0n]

So, they'll basicaly be saying: "set of data is verified as secure by HP, we won't cover any modifications, run them at your own risk."

It seems totaly resonable to me, and you can still share bit-perfict copies with their signatures.

That would be great for security, but...

[autopr0n]

I don't see how that could possibly be the case. It would be great for security, IE preventing breakins and the like, but it wouldn't really give anyone any DRM protection, because you could just install the public keys of cracking teams.

Like: American Megatrends Int.Basic In-Out system?

[autopr0n]

That one's a laugh riot...

Uses besides restriction

[keller999]

Say I'm an average user who knows what I'm doing on a computer. I've read enough to know that I don't like the idea of a company deciding what I can and can't do on my own system, whether it be Windows or Linux based. What specific benefits will your new BIOS give me without forcing me to do anything I don't want to that I can't get from a non Palladium-enabled/DRM capable computer?

Existing Users

[knuth]

If the powers that be at AMIBIOS are hellbent on doing this, will users of your company's BIOS be able to upgrade/update without being forced to include the Big Brother "features"?

Who signs?

[shyster]

Who will be the "trusted" signers of this code? What hoops (and dollars) must be jumped through?

Most importantly, will a system admin be able to sign code as trusted (whether his or another coder's) for all machines in his control? By extension, will an individual be able to do the same for machine(s) under their control? Or will only Verisign, Thawte, etc. be trusted?

Well stated...

[Archfeld]

It would be nice to have this option for certain cirumstances, say online gaming,or maybe electronic voting, but the loss of control far out-weighs the potential gains, and to top it off NO MATTER what assurances I was given by a for profit corp. or the current elected/appointed official we all know that given a penny potential for profit they'd sell their own children.

Re:More Key Questions

[Wesley Felter]

Yes, the TPM (Fritz) chips are tamperproof (to an extent) and each one has a unique private key.

Cars and trust

[Cato the Elder]

You do have a trust relationship with other drivers on the road. It's not 100% reliable, but law enforcement is supposed to ensure that everyone is: insured, licensed, sober, and driving a reasonably maintained car. In the cases where this is likely to break down (early morning new years, cities with high rates of uninsured drivers) I tend not to drive.

I feel the same way about computing. No, I don't have to trust every other machine and every piece of code out there, but I don't run random code or let random machines connect to mine.

Anti-competitive tactics 101

[Windcatcher]

I have to wonder:

- Introduce a new version of Office that introduces a new default file format. This is key, since in five years this file format would be ubiquitous, and the new version of Office would be required to read these files. Forget about sticking with Office 2k/XP. It isn't an option.

- Either use TCPA to encrypt the new .DOC files to disk (thus making it impossible for 3rd party apps to read them) or, if a judge won't allow it, obfuscate the file format as much as possible and use patents+legal threats to protect them (once again, to lock out 3rd party apps). The point here is to make the new version of Office indispensible. It is important to note that, even if there is a lawsuit over this against Microsoft, it could take 8 years or so for it to come to a head, and the judge may side with MS in the end anyway.

- Make this shiny new version of Office require a "trusted" platform (i.e. TCPA mode) to run with full functionality. You've just locked out Linux+WINE and made it very hard for vendors to sell or offer PC's without Windows, since they will not only be unable to run Office, they won't even be able to read the new .DOC file format.

Voila! You've managed to use your Office software monopoly to preserve your OS monopoly. Switching to Linux+WINE a few years from now will make it impossible to read documents in the new Office, without perhaps exporting those documents to some other format (which would of course by design lose some vital formatting information). It makes it really hard for companies to switch, and dissuades people from migrating since they'll have to not only leave Office behind, but their Office documents as well. It also totally breaks the ability to share documents between the Linux and Windows worlds, without first changing to a (likely inferior) common format first. While you could probably convert back to the new .DOC later, the damage will have been done as the original .DOC formatting would have been damaged or lost.

I wish I felt wrong about this, but I really believe that this is Microsoft's strategy to kill Linux. IMHO TCPA really is that dangerous--the whole thing about online music and movies is trivial by comparison (maybe it's a smoke screen).

Is this an option, or mandatory?

[dacarr]

When the article came up, I suggested that you guys would wind up plugging this in as an option set to "On" as a default. If (God forbid) Palladium were implemented, or as far as our current TCPA bit, would this be implemnted as said option that one could turn off or on as needed, to avoid conflicting with hardware?

LinuxBIOS and OpenBIOS

[LinuxOnEveryDesktop]

Presumably, the TCPA-specific parts of your new AMIBIOS8 will be intellectual property that your company will guard closely, and if not, working around it to get a LinuxBIOS/OpenBIOS working will surely be a violation of the DMCA. So how will this affect the LinuxBIOS and OpenBIOS projects?

Question:

[shepd]

Is this an attempt to prevent motherboard manufacturers who have, in the past, pirated your BIOS, from continuing to do so?

[ If so, kudos to you! ]

What?

[twitter]

You wish to ..be able to, say, install my own set of public keys in the BIOS so that I can have a system that will only boot the software that I have signed?

I'm missing something, what are you after? Why not just use the bios password feature? This would prevent the causual attacker from say booting off a floppy. If someone else already has your machine physically, they can do anything they want with the disk. If what you are after is simply to restrict code from being run, why not just use chmod? What exactly do you wish to acheive that you don't already have?

Forgive me if this one's already been asked...

[handsomepete]

Will AMI, for the forseeable future, be producing only TCPA-enabled bioses, or will a TCPA-free (as in without TCPA) bios version be available to companies who want it? If, for example, a motherboard manufacturer says, "We would like to produce this motherboard. There will be one revision called the K8-XVG-T which will have TCPA and one just called K8-XVG which is normal." would you be able to provide that or would they have to go a different route?

I'd also like to ask when a major visual overhaul of the ami bios is due, because I'm getting tired of seeing that same old menu setup, but I have a feeling the answer will be never :) I wish I hadn't gotten here so late...

What potental abuses do you see in this system?

[bonewah]

Lets say you work for microsoft and its your job to think of ways to abuse all this technology, both technologicly and legaly. Given that, what abuses do you see as possible?

Your Company

[LittleLebowskiUrbanA]

Can you describe what the atmosphere was like at your company after the initial post on Slashdot? Why has your company chosen Slashdot as your forum of choice? Does this mean we're your demographic?

SE definition depends on company

[billstewart]

Depending on the company, sometimes an SE is also involved in post-sale configuration, or helping the customer deal with installation problems, or free or paid consulting on how to solve the customer's next project or problem, or hand-holding or repairs after somebody screws up something. In some companies, those are separate functions, done by separate people, but they're also part of making the next sale in an ongoing relationship.

Fortunately, I can and do believe in the products and services I do SE-type work on :-), and to a reasonable extent, I've got a good understanding of their limits. I wouldn't do it otherwise. Ethics are a critical part of engineering. The alternative to "moral flexibility" is that you have to understand your products, and your business, and your industry, and your customer's needs, and sometimes be creative about finding solutions to problems that aren't a close match to what you'd like to sell.

That doesn't mean I think our stuff is perfect, and when there are limitations that affect the performance a customer will get from them, I'll be happy to tell them; most customers that have their engineers at meetings appreciate this, which is why the sales people bring me. Sometimes it means telling the customer's engineer "Yes, we don't handle the third left-hand flow-control-bit the way you'd like, but that's really only a 1% performance difference, and you can have your purchasing guy haggle with our sales guy over whether to buy a bigger circuit or give you a bigger discount on the price, but remember that we're handling the right-hand flow-control bits in ways that give you N% better performance than the old network did."

Linux would not need to be signed?

[p7]

I took a look at the TCPA and TPM faqs and from the looks of it, the trusted computing features can be turned off so it functions like my current system? Am I mistaken that Linux could run with out having to be signed? And Apps running under Linux could be programmed to use the TCPA certificate?

Very nice.

[Mashiki]

Please post a response as soon as you have one from AMI.

Re:Very nice.

[LarsG]

Please post a response as soon as you have one from AMI.

I'm kind of hoping that Brian will answer it.

Re:Very nice.

[Mashiki]

Time will tell, but if he does it will more then likely be censored or cleaned up by the marketdroids.

And how about older Windows, or even DOS?

[Reziac]

And for that matter, how about OLDER Microsoft OSs? Win95/98 are still in very wide use, and even DOS (both M$ and other flavours) still has a solid user base -- even among people buying NEW systems.

I've always preferred AMI BIOSs for a lot of very good technical reasons, and having an AMI BIOS has always been a prime criterion when I look for a new motherboard. Please don't make me change my mind!!

LinuxBIOS

[Paul Komarek]

Does the LinuxBIOS project even show up on your company's radar? That is, is there any concern that x86 BIOS will be (further) commoditized, and hence decrease BIOS profit margins? Where would your company go next if the bottom fell out of the BIOS market?

As an example of the decreased relevance of the BIOS in modern computing, consider how Linux (the kernel) ignores the BIOS wherever possible and goes straight to the hardware, relegating the BIOS to the boot sequence and (usually buggy) power management.

-Paul Komarek

Why do we even have a BIOS anymore?

[ChrisJones]

My question is, why do PCs even have a full BIOS anymore? Since most OSes seem to do their very best to completely ignore the BIOS (so many of them being buggy and unreliable), why do we even need them to go and initialise devices, only to have the OS rescan all the busses and initialise everything again?
Surely by now the BIOS can be reduced to something simple enough to kick off whatever bootloader is in use.

Palladium is Not TCPA; TCPA is worse

[billstewart]

Palladium is a set of Microsoft software capabilities that lets application programmers content providers have some control over what the operating system will do with their stuff and lets Microsoft provide some control over what you can do with your Microsoft-Operating-System environment. If it wants to avoid hackers working around its limitations, it also needs some hardware support, but you only get Palladium if you install the corresponding Windows versions, and you only care if you've got data files that are in Palladium formats, like whatever music/movies format MS can negotiate. If you're a Linux user, you're used to this problem; nothing to see here, you can move along.

TCPA is a different issue - it's a set of BIOS features that will only let the machine start up if it's running a certified operating system configuration (which the hardware validates as unmodified), and a set of features that let an operating system and application programs check that the system is running in TCPA-approved mode (that's a bit similar to Palladium, but still fundamentally different), and a set of things that the system won't do if it's not running a certified system. Depending on which version of the spec and proposed followons you're reading and how aggressive the implementation is, there may be things that you'd like to do that you can't do on a non-certified system - like use the sound card, or maybe the _video_, or maybe it won't boot at all, or maybe it just won't let you load kernel modules, plus it obviously won't tell the software that you're running in Trust-Us mode if you're not.

Obviously, an aggressive implementation won't fly for many Linux users, but it may still be usable by Linux _consumers_. The best case is somewhat like having a car with the hood welded shut and a security system that disables it if you mess around; you can paint it any color you'd like, and put whatever you want in the trunk, but you can't start the engine unless your seatbelt's on and you blow in the breathalyzer (which is hard to reach when you're wearing your seatbelt, of course), and if you take the radio out, the radio won't work and the car won't let you put a different radio in, so the RIAA knows you're not playing MP3-CDs in your car, but at least it isn't always tuned to MS-NBC, though if you're playing a non-RIAA-certified CD, it only plays on the tinny little mono speaker in the dashboard, not the four-way tunable woofers or the heads-up display system, and if you do tune to a different radio station, it only uses the right-hand speaker if Rush Limbaugh is on, and only uses the left-hand speakers if it's National Public Radio, and I'm sorry but you can't play Free Radio Berkeley at all...

Reading through this the big question is why?

[ninthwave]

I have read through the comments and over and over again see the question of why is AMI doing this and what does this do for the end user?

No answer given on this technology has answered that question for people. Until that is answered without untruths a large section of the community is not going to even look towards this technology.

So can you sum up what the benefits/drawbacks are of this tech for AMI and contrast and compare with the benefits/drawbacks for the users.

Please send your updated comments to marketing@ami

[Tom7]

Well, it sounds like we may be getting through to them -- consumers who understand the issues won't stand for it. Why would anyone want "features" that reduce the usefulness of a computer by giving more control to bit content-owning corporations? Send your comments to marketing@ami.com (address on the initial press release web page). Here are mine:

Just to clarify my earlier comments: It is in fact TCPA, and not just Palladium, that upsets me. Computers are just fine as they are, and you and I both know that operating systems can already implement the kinds of features ("virus protection") that TCPA claims will benefit consumers. The only use of TCPA preventing a computer user from modifying his *own* system in order to bypass "digital rights management," the software that intends to make it impossible for consumers to exercise their fair use privileges and other freedoms that we currently enjoy. I do not want to be enslaved by content owners!

Therefore, I will always buy from the last manufacturer to sell general-purpose, non-TCP-enabled computers, and I think any consumer who understands the issues will, too. I really hope this turns out to be the marketing disaster that it deserves to be.

Spinmeister Brian Richardson wrote:
"I am a bit concerned that the information you provided misled your readers into thinking AMI was promoting Palladium or taking some sort of anti-open-source stance. This might be due to the fact that TCPA was mistakenly equated to Palladium, or questioning how Linux would run on a TCPA-enabled system ... or by the horde of angry Slashdot readers telling us they would never buy an AMI product because we were forcing standards on them."