Diebold ATMs hit by Nachi Worm
red floyd writes "The Register is reporting confirmation that Diebold ATMs were hit by the Nachi worm back in August. Apparently some Diebold ATMs run XP Embedded, and got hit with a variant of the RPC DCOM worm. Seems that they hadn't yet applied the available patch."
A patch for the critical RPC DCOM hole had been available from Microsoft for over a month at the time of the attack, but Diebold had neglected to install it in the infected machines.
Nice spin, Diebold. I highly doubt these were the only unpatched machines. It's likely more accurate to say "these unpatched machines, of which there are many more, weren't well protected on their respective VPNs". Think about it: the infection had to come from somewhere, right? Other unpatched machines are probably much better protected on their respective private networks.
Trolling is a art,
From the article:
"The actual point of service terminal itself getting infected-- that's pretty crazy," said [Windows expert Marc] Maiffret. "But worms are always going to be able to infect a lot more interesting machines than individual intruders are." Moreover, before reaching an ATM network, a human attacker would likely encounter more alluring high-finance targets along the way. "They're going to have to go through a lot of juicer networks first."
Oh, yeah, that's crazy. As I recall, we discussed this very issue in a previous Slashdot story, and all the experts told us mere geeks that we were ignorant and stupid to even worry about it. Some of the most choice comments came in reply to my own post on the subject.
Now, even *after* a worm has found its way into an ATM, the "Windows Experts" say there's *still* nothing to worry about.
Well, ok... I'm not going to worry about my own personal finances, because I'll just ask the bank to reverse any bogus transactions. But if/when some savvy hacker does figure out how to infiltrate an ATM and walks away with a few hundred bucks, someone's going to come up short on their books at the end of the day...
Stressed? Me? Of course not. Stress is what a rubber band feels before it breaks, silly.
The same Diebold that has grossly insecure voting machines? The same Diebold that is abusing copyright claims and is being sued by EFF and students.
Well ain't karma a bitch Diebold?
What I am concerned about is whether or not my bank that I use uses Embedded XP for their ATMs. If so then I might have to consider switching banks. Not just because of this but because MS based systems are so notoriously insecure. Yeah yeah mod me down if you must but I'd feel much better having embedded Linux (or some other proven secure system) watching my money thank you.
FYI if you're using Union Federal you might want to start looking around now,... hehe
I'd think QNX or something else very simple and reliable would be a much better choice to rnu on ATM machines..
Wants us to trust them to run our electorate system? Lets face it, this was a VERY easily preventable oversight. These machines should have survived without patching by installing a rudimentary port blocker of some form. There is no reason RPC should be exposed by an ATM. If they are leaving ATMs wide open, i dont know how we're supposed to expect their Voting Machines to work.
The CEO said that he would do whatever he can to deliver Ohio or some place to Bush.
The same people that build machines with no paper trail for vote auditing.
They also do not patch their ATMs.
This really gives me confidence for the upcoming elections.
ACK
i know everyone always says this is a terrible mindset, but considering how many OS/2 ATM's have been hammered, there might be something to this after all.
think about the work you'd have to go through to get your hands on OS/2 code to figure out where holes might be.
then you have to write your own virus. it'll only be aimed specifically at ATM's etc.
just seems like there's a lot more legwork involved in hitting obscure OS'es.
instead, if they run XP, someone else grabs the code and distributes it. then another person writes a hack and distributes/releases that.
the end person in this case just needs to take baby steps off of the great strides of others to get a virus that can hit an ATM. sure obscurity shouldn't be a sole security measure, but it seems it would be relatively effective to me.
A new, secure, manageable BIOSwould fix their problem.
It's really Phoenix's fault.
sigs, as if you care.
And you want their equipment deciding votes, dear got if you can get a worm on the holy of holies, a cash dispensing machine. I seriously doubt that the next holy machine, a voting machine should be running Diebold systems.
Seriously people, embedded proprietary operating software (neither XP or Unix or anything widely made public) is the best way to go with these sacred machines. Worms will have a difficult (tho dare I say impossible) time working their way in. So the problems will hopefully be minimal.
In short I'm afraid, I'm very afraid
...in bed
The customers at large will; it will most likely be reflected in higher account/ATM fees. Banks will likely pass on the cost of theft just like merchants do the cost of shoplifting. Which sucks for the honest folk out there... all seventy-two of them.
//Information does not want to be free; it wants to breed.
I'm amazed that those ATMs were connected to the Internet, without apparently even a firewall to block all but necessary ports.
There's 10 types of people in this world, those who understand binary and those who don't.
My company provides vulnerability assessment and penetration testing services to financial services clients and we crack these things all the time.
:) The latest ones run either Windows 2000 or Windows XP, and have almost the same software as the Windows NT systems, just with more vulnerabilities.
The old ones run OS/2 v3.0 and a vulnerable version of sendmail, the slightly newer ones run Windows NT 4.0, with almost no patches installed and a default username and password.
Once you gain access, it is possible to directly control the hardware using the utilities already on the system, including dumping the cash drawer
At this point Diebold has not patched ANY of the RPC vulnerabilities, let alone the Messenger or Workstation bugs. Each of these ATM's is connected to an ethernet segment somewhere waiting for someone to rob it.
During the Blaster peak, a friend of mine was talking about the XP ATM's in London constantly rebooting... They put these cmd-shell-waiting-to-happen boxes directly on the Internet. Thank god for companies like Diebold and Microsoft, their problems created a market and a community that is still picking up steam.
1) Diebold produces ATMs with security holes to skim money
2) Diebold uses skimmed money to lobby for their electronic voting machines
3) Diebold uses code in voting machines to fix elections
4) Government by Diebold, Taxation by Diebold
5) PROFIT!
Funny that this banner ad was on the page when I loaded this article... It read: Making the right decision may save you millions... Making the wrong decision may cost your job
Every company makes mistakes. Running Windows XP is a mistake a lot of companies and people make.
The reason this is Slashdotworthy is that it is the same Diebold. The people who submit stories are hostile towards Diebold, and it's only to be expected that some of those hostile stories would make it through.
I'm sure a lot more vital-service machines than just those built by Diebold were hit. A story on the range of systems, maybe with ATMs as a highlight, would have been more appropriate.
Not ranting at you, just wasting karma, that's all.
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I am not a Windows Expert, but why is RPC important in an ATM? Is this something in embedded XP that should be disabled for certain applications like ATMs? If RPC should have been turned off then it's also the fault of Diebold not to configure the machines properly and MS for leaving it enabled by default.
Well, there's spam egg sausage and spam, that's not got much spam in it.
I'm amazed that those ATMs were connected to the Internet
Maybe they weren't. You needn't be connected to the internet to catch a worm. Any LAN/WAN/VPN will do.
Trolling is a art,
Despite the allure of hard cash, don't expect to see a rash of made-for-Hollywood ATM hacks -- machines around the country suddenly spitting out wads of 20s at random, said Marc Maiffret, Windows expert and "chief hacking officer" at California-based eEye Digital Security.
Hey, why not? Nachi wasn't tailored for ATMs, but it still got a few. Imagine a virus/worm that _was_ meant specificly for ATMs. I bet something like that could achieve a pretty big impact.
Ah well. Just my $.02
If these walls could talk they'd probly still ignore me. --MF DOOM
This means that after each 'correct' vote, the voting machine wires $20 to your bank account.
there's no place like ~
I remember thinking how weird it was to have my ATM suggest an exclusive opportunity to increase the length of my penis.
Just the fact that ATM machines are reachable from the public Internet is a huge cause of concern to me. A VPN connection without an intervening firewall at the ATM machine itself (which they claim they are installing now) is plain ridiculous.
You are then just hoping that none of the insiders will try to sabotage the machines, either knowingly, or unknowingly because of an infected laptop etc. They have to realize that VPN is a VIRTUAL PRIVATE network, and NOT a dedicated line, and hence, security measures have to be MUCH more stronger than if it was a REAL private connection. Does it take rocket science to figure that out?
And then there's that quote from the " Windows expert and "chief hacking officer" that malocious hackers will probably not go for ATM machines, even though they are reachable/hackable, because of other "jucier targets", presumably the bank network itself. Most malicious hackers would do it just for the fun of making an ATM machine spew out cash, if they figure out they can make it do that. That is a very lame assumption from a security expert.
And finally, for your reading convenience, here's an earlier /. story which mentions that 65% of the ATMs will be running a stripped down version of Windows by 2005.
An Indian-American Hindu committed to non-violent thought/speech/action alarmed by the global explosion of radical Islam
Around about this time I saw an ATM in Mayfair, London, with a windows error message in the middle of the screen. It was complaining that a DHCP server couldn't be found, and was happily waiting for someone to come along and click on the OK button.
Mashing the keypad didn't seem to help. I guess sooner or later they would have realised the ATM had disappeared and would have sent a tech out to press reset or something.
There's no personal data stored in an ATM. It's just a dumb terminal.
And Nachi basically makes the machine unusable.
Without specific code that target's ATMs, this is merely a generic nuisance that happened to hit what some consider a sensitive device.
Scary when you think what could happen, and frustrating when you think of the loss of trust in the security admins. But let's keep this in perspective. Nothing serious happened and it's a big step to get to where something serious will happen.
Hopefully those responsible have been sacked, and the new security llamas won't make the same mistakes.
Nostalgia isn't what it used to be.
Funny- I was just at the ATM today, and I glanced down and saw the Diebold tag. They're pieces of crap- barely a few years old, nobody cleans them, the screens are dim and usually require breaking your finger- and they're SLOW as molassis. Slow as in "I have only three or four things I can do but it still takes me a minute to give you cash"- and it can't all be explained away by network latency. Things like the machine sitting there locked up for 20 seconds or more after the last person leaves, before it will unlock the card slot. What is it doing, debating the meaning of life? It's a fucking ATM machine. It makes you wonder if the whole thing is written in really, really bad VB...or maybe Flash.
In any case- I agree with the parent. I could care less what the thing runs, as long as they're competent. The voting machines demonstrated that they're completely incompetent. This just goes to show that our suspicion that they're -also- probably incompetent at making secure ATMs.
Please help metamoderate.
We have a new record! Someone didn't even make it all the way through the article TITLE. First, it was rtfa (the linked article). Then it was rtfa (the slashdot article). Now do we need to go to rtft (read the fucking title)? The article is about diebold ATMs, not voting machines.
====
Crudely Drawn Games
I'm with you on this one...which is not to say that I agree with Diebold's business practices. However, it's not Microsoft's fault if some butthead forgot to patch their system -- the same way it's not RedHat's fault if some butthead forgot to patch their system and got owned. How can Diebold be blamed here? It's the eu's responsibility to maintain their system.
Now I don't know anything about ATM machines and associated contracts...but I assume that responsibility of maintenance either falls into the hands of the owner of the machine, or the bank issuing the cash -- not the manufacturer.
-Turkey
We're talking about a dumb terminal here, aren't we? Let the user login with his card, enter a passcode, then enter input which gets sent to a server somewhere to be processed and which sends back either output to be displayed to the user or output to be read by the machine which gives you your money.
The same criticism applies to Diebold's voting machines.
This is why Linux would be such an ideal solution. No application of Linux has impressed me more than the (now sadly defunct) Linux Router Project, simply because it demonstrated how for many tasks most of the operating system amounted to nothing more than ballast. They were able to boot a router from a floppy.
This is how I think an ATM--or a voting machine--should work. The amount of software should be kept to an absolute minimum if for no other reason than that it minimizes complexity, and in these kinds of applications, complexity is the mother of all evil.
And in the case of the voting machines, it would also greatly assist in auditing the code and making sure that what you think is executing is what's executing.
Is this truly the only Earth I can live on?
I'm amazed that those ATMs were connected to the Internet, without apparently even a firewall to block all but necessary ports.
The ATMs are not connected to the Internet. They are on an intranet, most likely with other ATMs and their database server, hopefully nothing more.
Agreed there is no firewall. The original idea was probably only to allow trusted machines onto the intranet in the first place. This follows the same logic (or lack-thereof) of people that don't use firewalls because they're behind a NAT.
The problem is allowing machines that were once on the Internet (and thus, may be tainted) onto the intranet. When some employee hooks up his laptop to work on an ATM, it probably connects to the intranet to let the database server know he's messing with it. The problem is that he was on the Internet yesterday and got infected with a worm/virus, which is now spreading itself through the intranet. The result: a tainted machine on a network that was intended only for trusted machines.
I think the idea of a Sygate firewall on every individual machine is a great idea. This will be a rather easy improvement to make (at least for new ATMs) and will give each individual ATM its own security against intranet intruders. Thus, when a tainted machine gets on the trusted network, the ATMs have (at least a little) self-defense.
Windows' strength, pretty much its only strength, is legacy compatability. But an ATM doesn't need to run Excel or some 8-year-old custom Visual Basic application that an irresponsible manager got the company locked into. Really, it's ok to use decent software for embedded projects, nothing should hold you back.
Using Windows in an ATM, sounds like a classic application of the saying: "When the only tool you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail."
"Believe me!" -- Donald Trump
For more see Jim March's comments to the CA Secretary of State here
I work at a major financial services company as well, and he's right. The entire ATM network is being migrated over to public Internet structure, and OS/2 is being phased out for XP.
*sigh*
As someone who works in a bank, I have seen a Diebold repair tech hook up his laptop directly to the ATM to do some work on it. So the laptop could have been the one that was infected.
Also you most of the program information comes from the Processing Center that is driving the ATMs which are all on a network. For example when we changed ATM Processors, the tech had to connect to the system and get a "load" from the new processing center to connect. These ATMs are connected over some form of leased line.
I am glad to know that our ATMs are running OS/2 Warp and were unaffected by this bug
I remember when the tech weenies at the post office were big Windows lovers. The post office bought the new Loral letter sorting machines that used QNX. Soon the techies were singing the praises of QNX. Never once did I see a lick of trouble with the computers. The only times the techies had to come was for upgrades and hardware troubles and periodic mandated maintenance.
photosMy Photostream
Without specific code that target's ATMs, this is merely a generic nuisance that happened to hit what some consider a sensitive device. ...
Scary when you think what could happen, and frustrating when you think of the loss of trust in the security admins. But let's keep this in perspective. Nothing serious happened and it's a big step to get to where something serious will happen
How do you know something serious didn't happen?
So the Nachi worm hit these machines, and its big and obvious, and it breaks the machines. But the Nachi worm moves by brute force; it hit these ATMs by accident. How do we know that during the time before the ATMs were hit, someone with actual, targetted, malicious intent didn't at some point hit a few of the ATMs using the same exploit Nachi did?
If someone doing it on purpose had hit the ATMs, they could have done something much more subtle. Something that wouldn't have been noticed the way the Nachi worm was, something that (given how unconcerned everyone seems about this) probably wouldn't be noticed at all, even after the Nachi incident. Something like a small patch to the ATM UI that quietly records the ATM card number, personal information, and PIN# of everyone who uses that ATM, then quietly dumps that somewhere on the internet later. It wouldn't be that difficult, and the Nachi thing simply proves its possible.
It's not a big step at all to get to the point where something serious could happen. It's barely even a step at all, as it's just a step of exactly the distance between a worm hitting an ATM at random and someone with a little bit of intent, knowledge, and time sitting down and deciding they're going to hack an ATM.
Irritable, left-wing and possibly humorous bumper stickers and t-shirts
Greer, Pfleeger, Schneier, Metzger and the rest of the contributing authors of CyberInsecurity: The Cost of Monopoly were right. This incident proves it . The most likely source of the infection is an infected laptop being plugged into the protected network. Had the ATM's been running a different operating system - even the ancient OS/2 - they would not have been infected.
It is also very interesting to note that they only found the worm because the infected machines tripped the IDS with excessive network traffic. From this we can infer:
1. A worm that was less aggressive with it's scans would probably not have been detected and could possibly still be operating today.
2. They probably don't have any host-based intrusion detection systems in place. No automated file integrity checking, no authorized process lists.
It's a good thing for us that the worm and virus writers (thus far) have been gifted programmers, but otherwise dumber than a bag of hammers. A well-written subtle worm could probably cripple most of the developed world.
Hell, they don't come easier than that:
phb to techie How quick can you get me a demo of the new embedded project?
techie to phb I can do you a really crap one in 1 hour with Visual Basic, but we will need to code the proper one in C, and that will take 3 months
phb to client The system will be ready tomorrow
Sent from my ASR33 using ASCII
A few years ago when I was a naive young UNIX programmer I came to the cash machine and got the firght of my life. There, floating over the blocky PIN login screen was a windows Illegal Error box.
Up until that moment I had always assumed the cash machines were running some specially written firmware on specially made hardware. This was a massively important and widespread system after all.
Oh - how young I was.
Aide-toi, le Ciel t'aidera - Jeanne D'Arc.
Yeah, but remember, sendmail was designed in the "good old days", when there were maybe a few hundred hosts, and people on the Net trusted each other!
The only reason we have the rights we have is that people just like us died to gain those rights. -- Cheerio Boy
If they can't even bother to patch Windows on ATMs, which is a much more competitive market, why would they secure our voting machines? The Federal Election Commission (FEC) should require an ISO9001-style process certification for all voting equipment vendors, but with more security criteria. Diebold's bank customers can fire them and recover the money, but the botched 2004 election will be an unrecoverable error.
--
make install -not war
We had a similar problem when the Nachi worm got loose on our network... After scurrying about and patching all of our desktops and servers, we still had Nachi hiding out on our network. Every time I built a new computer with an unpatched image, it got infected. In the end, the culprit was an Iomega NAS device (for those who are unfamiliar with it, this is a network storage appliance... think RAID array with a NIC.) We have two on our network. The older one, running FreeBSD kernel, had no problems, but the newer "Windows Powered" unit needed patching. For anyone dealing with this problem, nmap will be your savior. Scan your network and look for machines with TCP port 707 open running an "unknown" service. Those are your infected computers.
-- Halfabee
1. Create Nachi variation that makes diebold machines all vote republican (or only a few percent extra), including the paper ticket the voter doesn't see.
:)
2. Wait
3. World Domination.
Don't even need access to the machine, zero accountability, to the paper trail, to diebold, to the republican party, etc.
Fight it like the plague
"I don't know that atheists should be considered citizens, nor should they be considered patriots." George HW Bush
... that I read that the Bank of America will migrate all their ATMs from OS/2 to Windows. The reason for that, according to the spokeswoman, was that "Windows made it easier to secure the ATMs". I hope they know what they're doing, but if I were a BofA customer, that sure would be a reason to switch banks (my current bank -fortunately- still uses OS/2) until the security of Windows ATMs were thoroughly proven.
When you find a "proven secure" operating system, make sure you let everyone know about it. As of the 25th of November 2003, they are as common as the Unicorn and the Free Lunch. That is to say, they don't exist.
Ok, I happen to work for a fairly large financial institution that has several Diebold ATMs, although ours all run OS/2 and therefore aren't vulnerable.
That being said, and after actually RTFA, I'd say Diebold played their cards pretty close to their chest on this one, because they didn't give a lot of detail. For all intents and purposes, these machines are very "dumb". They have just enough information to operate the machinery and communicate with the host. Everything actually involving getting account information, adjusting balances for withdrawals/deposits, etc. gets done remotely. All the ATMs are "driven" by a controller that acually handles the account information.
As a result, these machines have to be in constant communication over a network with the host. In our case, this is a private network over leased lines that never gets anywhere near "The Internet". However, like I said, they are still in constant communication with the host (a.k.a. "server"), which has to be tied in to the bank's network in order to pass messages back and forth regarding user's accounts. This host runs Windows NT/2000/whatever.
Ok try to keep up now...
So, (1)the Nachi worm comes in through the Internet and infects any random machine on the network. (2) That machine starts spreading to the rest of the network, eventually (3) getting to the ATM host ("server") machine. (4) The host, through it's own private network with the ATM machines now infects all the ATMs. Before you know it, Bob's your uncle, and your totally removed from the Internet ATM machines are now infected because of one PC workstation with an opening.
Now I'm not defending Diebold here. What they did was stupid, and is exactly why we're still running an ancient OS on our machines. I'm just trying to enlighten those that seem to think their every transaction is buzzing through the open 'Net.
One only needs two tools in life: WD-40 to make things go, and duck tape to make them stop. ~G.M. Weilacher
When you can use something like this. Write the whole thing in C (not quite standard) or buy the realtime OS for it. Then you'd have only what you need and no other stuff that is a possible exploit.
Used to be that American money was real honest-to-God GREENBACKS, not some funny, furrin looking fruit color with corporate logos on it.
Use to be that banks were always built, well, like banks, heavy, solid, safe looking hulking stone fortesses.
That's what the 80's green mono monitor always said to me. "We're interested in what's known and safe and secure, not flashy video ads to sell you stamps while you wait for your cash."
Now it's all "Did you see this week's twenty? It's got Jessica Lynch and a coupon for Chik-Fil-A on it!"
the preceding comment is my own and in no way reflects the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
What worries me is that Diebold is one of the leading makers of voting machines. Are these machines also subject to such hacking?
The "Diebold Memos" circulating on the web document the insecurity of their voting machines. Also food for conspiracy theorists: Diebold CEO is a close friend of Dubya, Diebold contributed $300,000 to Dubya's last campaign, and they promised to "deliver Ohio" to Bush in the next election -- a state that has a large majority of Diebold voting machines.
: What Constitution?
QNX runs aircraft, missiles, and satellites. I would dare say that security IS a design consideration.
Linux and BSD scale down to PDA's and data recorders. You just pick your flavor and go. And first you claim Linux is bloated, and then that SELinux has no apps.
As far as a microkernel OS, I'm not sure what you are talking about. Microkernel is design feature for future expansion and development. Performance and security are on par with everything else. I think Linux has done a pretty good job of showing how a monolithic kernel can run everything from a wristwatch to a supercomputer.
Our problem is not that we have NO embedded OS's. One has to simply select the best on for the application.
"Learning is not compulsory... neither is survival."
--Dr.W.Edwards Deming
The timing on this is perfect, as I just read an article yesterday (in InfoWeek, I believe) about the effect of IBM's plan to discontinue OS/2 support on ATM manufacturers. The article was a couple of months old, but focused on them suggesting that financial institutions migrate their ATMs to Linux instead of Windows. It seems that the big ATM manufacturers (including Diebold, which featured heavily in the article) are leaning heavily toward Windows despite IBM's recommendation that they go with Linux. Their attitude is that they're running Windows on the back end, so they want it in the ATMs as well.
Well, now they're getting what they wanted, and I doubt that they'll learn from this. Large banks seem to have a monolithic mindset that's averse to anything new. They're also decidedly pro-Microsoft.
IBM offers some very effective solutions for integrating Linux-based ATMs with both UNIX and Windows-based back end systems. That companies like Diebold insist on going with insecure, unstable (I've seen an ATM stuck with a BSOD!) software for such sensitive systems is asinine.
-Cybrex
Boundless Expansion, Self-Transformation, Dynamic Optimism, Intelligent Technology, Spontaneous Order- BEST DO IT SO!
I guess they were too busy not "fixing" their voting machines to worry about that little MS patch...
Why on earth would someone buy ATMs based on Windows?
..
..
Many readers, and average ATM users do not know much about the ATM machines and their operations. And surely banking institutions prefer it that way.
First of all, there was a revolution in the banking industries about a decade ago. Back then, most of the big banks owned their own little companies to produce their own ATM machines. Those who couldn't afford to design and build their own ordered out, prayed for lucks. The old machines are proprietary, special pieces of hardware to perform a mediocre job over and over again. Every time a bank needs a new feature, it would take forever to fix or change the design. Therefore the industry moved to a generic design, generic OS and specialized software, similar to the IBM compatible model. Hence design cost, development and maintenance cost were all lowered.
There are several generic ATM makers. NCR, Siemens, Diebolds, etc... They all make generic ATM boxes consisting of cash dispenser, card reader, generic display AND a typical AT/ATX box with normal PCI slots, CD-ROM, standard NIC, etc. Each major bank then set their development teams to work on the hardware platform. After OS/2 's demise, the logical choice and the only choice would be running Microsoft Windows NT.
There are several advantages:
. Generic drivers are always plentiful.
. Special drivers to control specialized hw are supported by the manufacturers, not the banks = less cost.
. basically one single standard operating environment = quick change, fix, update = easy management.
That's said. NO bank would trust any 3rd party to develop and maintain their ATMs. They all do it themselves. That means:
. Developing their own NT environments, no stock OS install, limited install (no games, no std apps)
. Developing their own platform and applications that talk to the legacy banking networks.
. Appending complicate encryption using hardware security module (HSM) via PCI slots.
. Setting up their own automated patching and updating system (not SMS) for thousand of machines located across the country.
Hence, Diebold ATM mentioned in the article is all hogwash. The banking institution was not named, and I doubt that it would be any big ones. I believe that the machines could have been running stock OS and generic ATM apps had they belongs to those shady ATM operators that set up machines in 7/11 store and other convenient stores.
For almost all of us out there, we all have put our hard-earned money into some decent banking institutions. Right?
AccuVote results are in:
Yes: -35,002
No: 8,667,000,002
Cowboy Neal: Orangutan
The enemies of Democracy are