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Economics of File-Sharing
Umair writes "The Red Herring's got an article by me about the economics of file-sharing, which argues that the music industry should provide insurance...against itself. This is because the contract listeners sign with labels is risky - it lets labels shirk on their end of the bargain. That's why file-sharing isn't just 'theft', it's risk-sharing.
The original, longer, version of the paper is here, which argues that this a situation economists call double moral hazard."
They should just pass a law to force everyone to use 14.4K modems unless you own the totality of the music owned by the RIAA members, and still have the original bill, of course.
Or sue "teh interweb"
Both of the linked articles make a compelling case that consumers embraced file-sharing as a form of insurance in a situation of moral hazard. What the articles don't explain is why consumers would be willing to move away from file-sharing toward any of the various proposed contracts.
Anything worth doing is worth doing badly -- G.K. Chesterton
BTW, has anyone recieved their settlement check?
What if, for business reasons, the labels are more interested in their own economies of scale and brand identity than providing listeners with music they value?
I don't think the music labels are big on making themselves a brand identity. Aside from text in music videos, and small icons on cds, they are not recognizable to most. A brand identity implies that everyone knows the brand, even if they have never used the product. Coke can be classified in this way, since it is one of the most recognizable logos around. -Kilka
If we don't believe in freedom of expression for people we despise, we don't believe in it at all. -Chomsky
I'm not trying to slam on you, but you didn't read either of the articles so set yourself up. You don't understand the principal agent problem or what he means by moral hazard. When economists talk about moral hazard, they're speaking of incentives, not about going to hell. And risk sharing in this manifestation is something you're supposed to like--it upsets the labels not consumers.
The problem is with the way we buy music, but have no ability to return it if it sucks. So the music industry has no incentive to make the product satisfactory, so long as they can find a way to get us to buy it (albeit making the song good is a good way to make us buy it). So music pirates' response to this is a form of risk sharing--We diversify the risk of a song sucking over everyone who downloads it. Because we have pooled our resources and invested less in any one product, we have less unique risk (from bad mp3s). It's not a very good analogy, but it makes some sense.
This is bullcrap. If I don't care and feel no moral object to downloading music, why would 'risk-sharing' upset me. I don't even know what risk sharing is!
The moral impact of downloading music for me is ZERO, in spite of what some MBA monkey tells me. 'Risk sharing' isn't going to scare me into sharing less.
I understand the author cites Risk Sharing as a primary reason why people aren't buying music. Read the article, and you can see some definite implications of record companies' misjudgements.
The author claims that the reason why people aren't buying music is that because they don't know whether it is any good. This risk, the risk that the music you just bought for $18 totally sucks, is the risk he talks about.
When he says that people are mitigating risk via file-sharing (i.e. risk-sharing) he implies that by one person buying the cd (or taking some other cost to self, including risk of legal action) and distributing it to others, then others get to "try" the music without risk.
Of course, this brings up the fundamental problem which I believe lies within--Are people willing to pay for music? Currently Steve Jobs and others are trying to prove their particular answer.
I like having the CD. I like having the case, the nice ink on the disc, the booklet, the extras like Daft Punks download offers.
When I do download off the net, it is not infrequently followed by purchases at a store somewhere. Maybe the same songs, maybe the same artist, mabey different mixes. Stuff like VS tracks I haven't been able to find retail, certainly not in compilations.
But again, it's not a suprise to me. I first heard both TMBG and BNL off of boarrowed cassette copies. Eventually I was able to barrow a copy of Apollo 18, now I own something in the neighborhood of 20 TMBG cds have gone to concerts and lament the fact I didn't get to grow up listening to them. BNL, the story isn't too different, aside from the lower album count. I bought the Saturday Morning Cartoon CD, because it has a song called Speed Racer on it, and I thought MAYBE it'd be Go Speed Go by Alpha Team. It wasn't but the CD didn't suck either.
Which ties nicely into the article sparking this thread. I pay the distributers to find the music I want to listen to. There job is to search for me. And they failed miserably with Go Speed Go. It was a hard song to find. I spent a lot of time looking. So what exactly AM I paying them for in that case? It certainly could have been harder, but it could have been much easier too. The stuff I want is getting lost in the stuff they're telling me to want. As I suspect happens with almost everyone who's not 13 to 15.
So how to I redress that imbalance? I share, I download. If it's something I really want, I buy. Not only do I take on the responsability of searching for myself, since they've abandond me despite my willingness to spend money, and I punish them for not keeping their part of the deal. I download stuff I think friends might like. I share copies I decided I don't like to improve network availability for those who do like them. And the random good song from the people who produce one decent song, and nothing else but crap, I just keep. It's my tax on them.
When they decide to live up to their part of the bargain, I'll consider revisiting mine. They better hope I don't get too set in my ways. Habbits are hard to break.
The business model works like this:
1. Create catchy sounding music by whatever means necessary, doesn't need to be original or high quality, just needs a hook.
2. Play it on the radio and tv, push the musicians into the public eye with advertising
3. Clubs, shops, other tv/radio stations etc will start playing the song because everyone else is, at this point you have successfully made a 'hit'
4. Sell, rake in profit
After a set number of years a song will have left most peoples memories so it can be 're-released' using its original familiarity to create an instant hit, you must make sure that the re-release or re-mix has an extra underlaying beat or melody or is faster or louder so that the original pales in comparison and people will buy the new song, alternatively parts of the melody can be broken down and re-used as scrap - you will probably notice scrap melody in anything by Blue or Justin Timberlake and many others - it sounds like something you've heard before but you just cant put your finger on it.
And remember the all time rule of the entertainment industry: If it worked the first time, do it another 10
(Big Brother, PopStars, Making the Band, Generic boy/girl bands that all sound the same, teenage girls that all sound the same, Changing [rooms|places|clothes|wives], Im a celebrity [insert something here], The worlds worst x, something island x, Airport/Cruiseliner/Hospital/Cops)
PS as a brit im really sorry for Popstars, but here we now have Fame Academy 2! its much worse and they dont even have that cool guy that tells everyone they're shit. I think we just finished Big Brother 3
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"Fundamentally, I'm going to argue that consumers download music, as much to derive extra value from getting something for free, as they do because they want insurance against buying something they didn't want in the first place. File-sharing is as much about risk-sharing as it is about the 'theft' of value."
;)
The article addresses market failure through the lense of information asymmetries, moral hazard and agency costs. These explainations are classic economic (Ronald Coase) explainations of why there is a failure in the music market. Yet, the fundamental argument of this paper - that double moral hazard and information assymetries cause market failure in the music industry - misses the fundamental point of market failures in ALL information markets(software, music, art, books, etc).
Information goods resemble public goods. Consider the three tenet assumptions in properly functioning markets. The assumptions are 1) that the good is rivalrous, 2) that the good is excludable, 3) that there is full information when purchasing the good. Combinations of these three assumptions results in various types of goods, which require different economic models to solve. For instance, if the good is non-rival or non-excludable, the good is considered a public good. Some examples of public goods are public parks, the sun, air, etc. These types of goods are non-rival because your consumption doesn't deplete the good such from other users/consumers. Likewise, these goods are non-excludable because it is very hard to put a fence around it, and hence, rationing such good by a price mechanism.
Now, consider information goods in this sense. Information goods resemble public goods because they are non-rival and non-excludable. My consuming the information doesn't deplete the good and prevent others from using it and excluding others from consuming information (putting a fence around information) is very difficult. The fundamental problem within the music market is that we have a market failure from the start precisely because music is 1) non-rival 2) non-excludable.
The author tells us a story about the music market needing risk insurance, yet fails to consider the very notion of economic exchange in information goods. The problem with music is this. Consumers want music and indicate their preference for music by voting with their dollars. Yet, when the marginal cost of distributing the good is nil, and those that shouldn't be excluded from the market are being excluded, we have a problem. When you want to reward creators of music, and not exclude anyone from the market without specific reason, what is the right price you should sell your music?
I agree that there are problems with value indicators, (i.e. price of all music is the same ($12) and consumers can't reward music creators based on societal value), but I still see some fundamental flaws in his argument.
So who's working on the economic problem of information goods? Enter Suzzan Scotchmer, Brad Delong, John Zysman, Steve Weber, and Hal Varian.
These people are all Berkeley professors who discuss micro/macro level frameworks that give us tools for thought in information markets. There is an academic revolution going on at Berkeley and I'm very thankful, I am here to witness it.
For your reference, I am an undergraduate at UC Berkeley and have studied information economics for some time now. More information about me can be found here: www.dyoo.tk