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Akamai: How They Fought Recent DDoS Attacks

yootje writes "Infoworld is running an interesting article about Akamai and the DDoS attack that hit the network of Akamai Tuesday. According to this article one of the defenses of Akamai is the big diversity of their hardware: 'We deliberately use different operating systems, different name server implementations, different kinds of routers, different kinds of switches, different kinds of CPUs, and especially, different operational procedures.' So says Paul Vixie, architect of BIND and president of the ITC." Yootje points to another article on this subject as well, this one at Internetnews.com. Update: 07/07 19:38 GMT by T : Note that Vixie's quote here is actually presented out of context; he was commenting by way of contrast on the diversity of the root DNS servers, not Akamai's content-serving system.

22 of 231 comments (clear)

  1. Trade-Off by cynic10508 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The diversity of hardware and software may be an IT nightmare but I think this shows how effective it really is. Now all we need is a concise cost/benefit analysis.

    1. Re:Trade-Off by Ignignot · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Allow me to perform a concise analysis for you. Hmm... the benefits are that DDoS's have some trouble knocking you offline. What are the costs? Much higher IT costs. Also, the total number of holes in your security will be higher. Just keeping track of all windows security fixes is hard. Imagine doing that for windows, solaris, linux, osx, and bsd. On 100 different hardware setups. Some things are going to go unpatched. You're giving hackers / crackers more opportunities, not more problems.

      --
      I submitted this story last night, and it didn't get posted.
    2. Re:Trade-Off by Pharmboy · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Even with our little network (2 T1s, several servers) we do the same thing. Different OS versions, Bind builds, even Apache implimentations. NS1 is dedicated on a slow but extremely robust dual cpu box, all other boxes have a primary task and act as a back up for other tasks. At this small level, its not THAT hard to do, although it takes some preplanning and maintenance. Even the outbound linux router has an offline spare with a different version of Linux and completely different firewall/NAT configuration in case the first gets taken down.

      IMHO, when it comes to providing IT services, if you are not paranoid, you are crazy.

      --
      Tequila: It's not just for breakfast anymore!
    3. Re:Trade-Off by Tony-A · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Now all we need is a concise cost/benefit analysis.

      Life versus death?

      What you want out of backups and backup systems isn't so much that they are as good as or better than the primary systems, but that they are as independent as possible. Backing up OpenBSD to Windows 95 is not as stupid as it looks.

    4. Re:Trade-Off by bastardadmin · · Score: 5, Insightful

      If you are Akamai, your uptime isn't everything, it is the only thing.

      In their case maintaining a hybrid infrastructure makes perfect sense.
      Remote exploit in IOS? No problem, the Juniper/Extreme/Linux/OpenBSD router in failover config takes over while patching goes on.

      And if you are maintaining a massive hybrid infrastructure like that you will likely have the people and processes to handle security issues/patches.

    5. Re:Trade-Off by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

      So, in this case, not only did the submitter not read the article, but neither did the editors. I actually read the article and it was blatanly clear the the whole heterogeneous argument was *not* in reference to Akamai.

      I just have one question: what exactly do the slashdot editors do? I thought they were there to screen incoming submissions. But obviously they don't. Basically, if that's their only job, they suck at it.

    6. Re:Trade-Off by johnnyb · · Score: 4, Insightful

      However, you are preventing your entire infrastructure to being nailed by a single exploit. With a monoculture, a single flaw exploited by a worm can destroy pretty much everything. With a mixed setup, although you have more possible entrances, each one allows a lot less damage.

      If I have 1,000 troops, if I keep them all in the same fort, they will be a formidable force, unless I find the right weapon (like a nuke). If I keep them in 10 different forts spready throughout the country, although each one of them is more vulnerable individually, I have eliminated the possibility of everything being wiped out in a single blow.

  2. security by obscurity.. by klang · · Score: 4, Insightful

    nobody knows what they run, so nobody can make a decent attack ..

    1. Re:security by obscurity.. by stratjakt · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Sort of. You can know what they run, you can know you can exploit server A because it has a known vulnerability.

      But servers B, C, D, E, F, G, etc are immune to your attacks on server A. To take down the root servers, you'd need to simultaneosly come up with 12 different exploits to knock each one of them out. Which makes it 12 times more difficult.

      It's more proof of what I've always said, there is no "perfectly secure" OS in existence.

      --
      I don't need no instructions to know how to rock!!!!
    2. Re:security by obscurity.. by qtone42 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Oh, yeah. We got Death Star.

  3. intentional or not by cjwl · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I have to wonder if the diversity of systems was an intentional choice of theirs way back to face these kinds of attacks or if it just grew that way from rapid growth and having their systems spread all over.

    They survived the attack and "Oh yea, we MEANT for it to happen that way".

    I think it's spin.

  4. Submitters and Editors, RTFA! by adavies42 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    The quote on diversity is by Vixie wrt the roots servers--it's a criticism of Akamai! Jesus H. Christ, it's in the first paragraph!

    --
    Media that can be recorded and distributed can be recorded and distributed.
    -kfg
  5. This is an ad! by isaac · · Score: 5, Insightful

    This article has nothing to do with Akamai, other than pointing out that Akamai DNS is vulnerable to DOS.

    Most of this "article" is a puff-piece (or paid advert) for one "CloudShield Technologies," pimping their (vaporware) "server for applications that do deep packet processing at gigabit-per-second rates."

    -Isaac

    --
    I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. For Entertainment Purposes Only.
  6. Re:Sys admins by ron_ivi · · Score: 5, Insightful
    different operating systesm ... Wow, your sys admins and help desk must LOVE supporting that!

    I know you were trying to be sarcastic, but I bet that they indeed do prefer things this way.

    When the pager goes off at 3AM that there's a suspected new worm attacking your dos-based systems, it's nice to simply turn them off and let the other systems handle the load until morning when you can investigate the problem at your leisure.

  7. Authors should try readin the article by rgmoore · · Score: 4, Insightful
    According to this article one of the defenses of Akamai is the big diversity of their hardware: 'We deliberately use different operating systems, different name server implementations, different kinds of routers, different kinds of switches, different kinds of CPUs, and especially, different operational procedures.' So says Paul Vixie, architect of BIND and president of the ITC.

    Actually, according to the article the diversity approach is part of what's used to defend the DNS root servers, not Akamai. Vixie specifically mentions that this approach is not practical for an ordinary content provider like Akamai because, 'the cost would "drive their accountants crazy."' I'm dubious about just how helpful diversity would be against a DDoS attack in the first place. Diversity won't solve the problem of requests coming in faster than they can be processed.

    --

    There's no point in questioning authority if you aren't going to listen to the answers.

  8. Gee-Wiz hardware will never win. by twitter · · Score: 5, Insightful
    [description of magnificent gateway] For now the attackers are winning the arms race. The technology we'll need to monitor, react, and adapt in real time has yet to evolve, but it's headed in that direction.

    I wish the net was headed in the right direction, but it's not. No single site or company will ever "win". The resilience of the web lies in it's redundancy and distribution. What I see is continued centralization and creation of points of failure. As "Broadband" internet access is more monopolized and treated as a platform for mindless browsing, and smaller ISPs are destroyed, the net is being squeezed into fewer and fewer hands. This invites attacks that can not be protected against. The real solution is to let everyone run everthing they want. That's the only way to route around damage.

    --

    Friends don't help friends install M$ junk.

  9. Attacking Akamai with a DDoS... by Mr.+Neutron · · Score: 4, Insightful

    ...is like trying to wipe out swarm of gnats with a shotgun.

    --
    dinner: it's what's for beer
  10. Re:Quote misattributed by 2names · · Score: 5, Insightful
    The workplace is not a classroom, nor should it be treated as such.

    If you have not realized that every place is a classroom, then, my friend, you have not learned a single thing.

    --
    "I'm just here to regulate funkiness."
  11. nobody read anything by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

    not only did the submitter not rtfa

    the editors did not rtfa

    and after the first five posts pointing this out, it was obvious that nobody was reading the responses either.

    nobody was reading anything, and now we have a 1000 responses saying the same thing, it wasn't akamai, it was the root servers, blah blah blah.

  12. Re:Sys admins by LookSharp · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Can I ask an obvious question here?

    Who the atech-ee-double-hockey-sticks runs "dos-based" systems anymore? I thought Microsoft abandoned the technology starting in 1995, and I personally submitted the "official end of life for DOS support" article to Slashdot several years ago.

    We run heterogenious systems and support them because they provide different benefits and features for our many needs. Sometimes Windows OS servers actually are cheaper, more stable, and easier to support than their Unix counterparts. Sometimes not.

    For instance, we have WebSphere running on Solaris and AIX as an app server platform, and it is great for high volume and failover. But we spend far more time (proportionally) troubleshooting that technology (and the hundred or so servers that run it) than the .NET application servers running on Windows 2000. As an app environment .NET is stable and actually quite fast, and run on much less expensive equipment. However there are only four of them and failover between boxes is sketchy, so on the rare occasion that there is a non-code related outage, it takes longer to get the environment back up to spec.

    Just my anecdotal experience.

  13. Re:Fuck by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Also please make sure it's not a paid ad for some ByMeNow-5000 product rather than an actual article.

  14. Re:Diversity Doesn't Refer to Akamai at All by Zeinfeld · · Score: 5, Insightful
    AFAIK, all of the text that the quote from the submitter is regarding not Akamai, but BIND in criticism of Akamai. He's saying that they would have performed better had they used a more diversified network

    Paul should shut up about this topic. Companies should not go commenting about attacks made against their competitors - period.

    His statement about the root servers is way off base. Only four of the 13 servers stayed up and the software running on them did not affect the outcome in any way. Most of the servers that went down were running a version of BIND as were two of the servers that stayed up. The other two roots were running ATLAS which is the ultimate in closed source proprietary systems, nobody outside VeriSign has seen the executable, let alone the source code.

    I don't see how anyone could draw any conclusions either way on the basis of this sample. The distinguishing feature was the bandwidth available to the systems, not the software they run.

    Paul should think more and speak to journalists less.

    --
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