Detecting Faked Photographs Gets Easier
nusratt writes "Some years ago, an issue of 'Whole Earth' had a convincing cover-photo of a flying saucer cruising low over downtown San Francisco in broad daylight. The accompanying feature article proclaimed that photographs can no longer be trusted as evidence of anything, because of the ease of doctoring images digitally and undetectably. Now, Dartmouth Professor Hany Farid and graduate student Alin Popescu 'have developed a mathematical technique to tell the difference between a "real" image and one that's been fiddled with.' Farid says, 'as more authentication tools are developed it will become increasingly more difficult to create convincing digital forgeries'." There's also an NYT story.
While it may become increasingly difficult to forge digital images, and even forge hard currency, the result could be of two possibilities;
1. Forgers get smart and use older cameras to take a picture of a digital forgery to pass as an original, using blurring techniques offered by physical means and lens... etc (easy)
2. Forgers quit being forgers (unlikely)
3. Alteration technologists create armor against image forgery detection algorithms (possible)
For me, I think any time spent trying to beat the detection of forgeries would be a good thing in terms of art and creativity -- not to mention the possibility of better digital growth algorithms to join layers mathematically seamlessly (which could be used in games and simulation engines for better realism). However, law enforcement agencies might try to combat the circumvention of forgery detection by charging people with crimes for only trying to make their images more realistic and improve technology. It's a messy issue, that will sort itself out over time.
In Doom 3 Bloopers, a mod I've started on, I am looking at ways of integrating realworld imagery into the mod, and this detection stuff could actually help me to better integrate my own art and images if I can find a way around it. Let's face it, if the math says it's an original, the human eye will be fooled, which is the goal of most video game design. If anyone wants to help along those lines, they should contact me!
The dangers of knowledge trigger emotional distress in human beings.
I think authentication tools make it easier. As someone who's tried a little photo manipulation in the past, I can tell you that the hardest thing is knowing when something's right. If you have an automated tool that can tell you when it's right, it becomes easier. Of course, that relies on the tools working...
While an equation to make sure that a photo is not forged is all well and good, it is self deafeating. Just like simple encryption, which is good for people with simple problems, exploring the equation will yield a way to fool it. If you have someone who truely wants to forge a photo, they probably could still defeat the check.
Now they'll be able to prove that my photo of Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam in 1983 is a fake.
Rumsfeld was really shaking hands with an alien, and Saddam was shaking hands with Elvis, but the resulting merger of the two photos was much more provocative.
You are in error. No-one is screaming. Thank you for your cooperation.
Farid and his students have built a statistical model that captures the mathematical regularities inherent in natural images.
I wonder if they've considered the potential applications in image compression?
...but it was only accurate when the photo contained an image of Admiral Ackbar.
While this might not be a problem for gross manipulations (the faked John Kerry/Jane Fonda photo being a recent example) I can imagine a class of images where subtle manipulations caused great effects and were not readily distinguishable from compression artifacts.
cheap labor conservatives - they want to keep you hungry enough to be thankful for minimum wage.
Farid's algorithm looks for the evidence inevitably left behind after image tinkering. Statistical clues lurk in all digital images, and the ones that have been tampered with contain altered statistics.
That makes sense. However, it seems like these statistics would be based on very minor details. What happens if you run their analyzer on an image that has been altered by using lossy image compression, such as JPEG compression? Lossy image compression is designed to obliterate details humans wouldn't notice; some of these details might be significant to their statistical model. Would JPEG-compressing an image make it impossible to determine its veracity? Would their software just tag all JPEG images with compression below a certain threshold as being "unnatural" (since they have been, after all, digitally altered-- just not digitally altered in a content-relevant way...)
And don't some digital cameras use lossy formats such as JPEG as their native storage format?
The article says the research is founded by the Department of Homeland Security. That means that despite the many useful possible aspects of this technology, it will probably never see the light of day. If the DHS is going to be using this technology to identify faked photos, it would be greatly in their interest for the full algorithm and its implementations to not be made available to the public-- since after all if people know what the DHS is using to determine faked photos, they can target the algorithm.
Now that I have written that, looking around, it appears I am actually wrong. If you look at Mr. Farid's personal page, it appears he will be publically presenting a paper covering the fakeness-detection algorithm. I hope the full algorithm will be presented to the academic community.
So if it detects digitally altered images, why can't we just 1) Alter the image to our heart's content 2) Print it on a high quality printer ($500- $2K at CDW) 3) Scan it back in with a nice scanner
"The object of war is not to die for your country, but to make the other bastard die for his." - Patton
If you are looking for more detailed information, along with equasions, here is a link to one of their recent publications on the topic: http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~farid/publications/sp 04.html
Run it on the goatse guy! If the results are positive I can finally start sleeping again.
There are stories about successful defense against digital photographs in criminal cases. "Enhancements" using photoshop can be considered evidence tampering. So this technique can have a life-altering implication for some people.
So good point. That does seem to be a problem. The NY Times article has more details than the other; it is worth reading.
No, it couldn't. All it can prove is that if an image is fake it has been done very well.
If A doesn't conform to the statistical distribution of B, then A isn't B (with a high degree of confidence). But if does, that doesn't mean it is B -- you might just be looking at the wrong set of identifying features. I.e. not everything with two feet and a bill is an aquatic bird; it might be the waiter.
sp04.html
ih04.html
sacv03.html
And, we have two new papers currently in review (abstracts are currently on-line, and preprints will be available soon):
sp05a.html
sp05b.html
Some of these techniques work, as some have pointed out, only on high-quality jpeg or uncompressed images, while others work on lower-quality images. We are only in the early stages of development, and are currently working to extend some of these ideas to low-quality jpeg and gif images (though this will likely be a harder problem given that the compression artifacts will overwhelm any statistical perturbation resulting from tampering). One outcome of this may be that a legal standard is set that enforces images brought into a court of law to be of a certain resolution and compression quality.
I will be the first to admit that each of the techniques that we have developed can be reverse-engineered, though doing so is more difficult for some techniques than others. It is our hope, however, that as we and others continue to develop more techniques it will become increasingly more difficult (though never impossible) to simultaneously foil each of the detection tools.