Slashdot Mirror
Open Source a National Security Threat
n3xup writes "Dan O'Dowd, CEO of Green Hills Software, suggests that open source software has the capability of being sabotaged by foreign developers and should not be used for U.S. military or security purposes. He likened Linux with a Trojan Horse- free, but in the end a lot of trouble. O'Dowd thinks that unfriendly countries will attempt to hide intentional bugs that the Open Source community will have no chance of finding."
Understand the source perspective before you draw opinions. Green Hills is under threat from Linux due to the embedded software being integrated in more Government system. GreenHills is (was?) a large player in government based Embedded Operating Systems. I imagine you will see a similar stance by WindRiver maker of the popular Realtime Embedded OS VXWorks.
The threat comes from the length of time on some large government projects. Some systems have been around longer than you and me. In the proprietary world, your whole project is dependent on a set of companies staying in business for 30+ years. Now with Linux, you're no longer dependent on that string; you can leverage off the community providing updates or if necessary you as the developer can make the changes. Most people fail to say this with Linux; everyone just says hey it's free and cheap. But if you really want to sell Linux, try saying that your entire project doesn't fall on another proprietary solution, we will have the source code in hand - people will listen.
It's easy to retort GreenHills FUD by saying all changes will be baselined and a change control board will review any updates (easy enough huh).
Shouldn't this article immediately point back to other articles on
m l
how governments OUTSIDE the US are choosing open source for exactly
the same reason (who knows what M$ + NSA put in the closed windows
source that might hurt other nations)?
[World Govs Choose Linux For Security & More]
http://slashdot.org/articles/01/12/11/0132213.sht
Remember this guy? He also wrote "Linux Security: Unfit for Retrofit" ( http://www.ghs.com/linux/unfit.html )
This was covered by LWN back in May: http://lwn.net/Articles/83242/
IIRC, GHS does development on embedded XP stuff? I don't remember the details...
Yeah, can't trust those commie FOSS developers. Instead, lets invest in "America", lets give money to companies who develop software overseas anyway!*
*We wanted to buy software from only American developers, but we couldn't afford it.
In the future, I would want to not be isolated from my friends in the Space Station.
Some embedded Linux providers even outsource their development to China and Russia.
GASP! Some XYZ providers even outsource their development to ABC and DEF (insert your favorite company and terrorist sponsoring country where necessary).
It would be incredibly naive to believe that other countries and terrorist organizations would not exploit an easy opportunity to sabotage our military or critical infrastructure systems when we have been doing the same to them for more than 20 years!
I think it has been proven that closed-source development doesn't help to change the possibilities that a "mole" has been planted or that a "hole" will be discovered.
One of the greatest misconceptions about Linux is that the free availability of its source code ensures that the "many eyes" with access to it will surely find any attempt at sabotage. Yet, despite the "many eyes," new security vulnerabilities are found in Linux every week in addition to dozens of other bugs. Many of these flaws have eluded detection for years. It is ridiculous to claim that the open source process can eradicate all of the cleverly hidden intentional bugs when it can't find thousands of unintentional bugs left lying around in the source code.
And it is ridiculous to claim that a closed development enviornment will make it any different.
In addition, under the internationally recognized Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (ISO 15408), Windows has been certified to Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL 4), a higher level of security than the EAL 2 that Linux has achieved.
According to this article, obtaining EAL2 certification typically costs between $400,000 and $500,000. Looks like it is more money than security. In their infancy, why would Linux vendors decide to shell out large sums of money when the government wasn't interested in using Linux anyway?
This whole article is FUD. He's annoyed because Linux is making leaps and bounds and will possibly affect his market-share in the lucrative Defense and Aerospace industries. At least he came out and said it on his own legs and not by paying off a third party to "investigate" the "problems" with Linux and post their results to the world.
Governments should not use OS without a proper security audit. Once you can verify the nature of the code, there should be no obstruction to using it.
Downmix - The Artscene News Source!
IIRC, China has seen the source code to Microsoft Windows, whereas the U.S. government hasn't.
I think that's a pretty large security threat right there...
InThane
What if a terrorist gets a job at a software company? Where's the hope of catching the bugs then? It seems to me that closed-source software is more susceptible than open-source.
The U.S. government and military will be brought to their knees by...Finland?!
Dan O'Dowd, CEO of Green Hills Software, suggests that open source software has the capability of being sabotaged by foreign developers and should not be used for U.S. military or security purposes.
Urmm , so what operating system do you use then Dan O'Dowd? and which newspapers and websites do you read?
You're obviously using a closed source operating system that is free of viruses, worms, holes and other security problems. What might this mystery closed source operating system that you are using that doesnt pose a threat to the nations security?
Electronic Music Made Using Linux http://soundcloud.com/polyp
Hate to break it to you, but there are a lot of other places that would *love* to have US information than good ol' Osama. These other governments have money. They have the resources to hire someone to insert this code into any open source project.
As for the NSA inspecting this code -- that's all well and good. But, how often do hundreds of individuals look over OpenSource code and miss a big for awhile. "Awhile" is all it takes for a foreign government to download A LOT of information that they shouldn't have.
Contrary to popular belief, a lot of places do not like America. It's not the big lovable teddy bear that it likes to think it is. It's a great country, but it should do everything it has to do to protect itself.
Truly nothing to see here, folks. Just empty FUD that has been discredited.
This should be from the "If-you-can't-with dazzle-them-brilliance-baffle-them-with-bullshit" department.
O'Dowd thinks that unfriendly countries will attempt to hide intentional bugs that the Open Source community will have no chance of finding.
If the source is open how can there be no chance in finding bugs or whatever else they wish to put in the source?
This is clearly FUD to protect their market from the steam-roller known as FOSS. Security through obscurity is already proven faulty.
The fact is that Green Hills products are no more secure, and may well be less secure, because they don't have the "many eyes" looking at their source code. We've had trojan horse attempts in Open Source software. They get caught quickly. But even if the source is disclosed, nobody outside of their tiny company has an incentive to do productive work on the internals of a Green Hills operating system in the way that people who modify GNU/Linux do. And security audits by such a small company can't catch everything.
The best example of this has been the Borland Interbase database. This was used for airline reservations, and had a trojan horse buried in it for 6 to 9 years while it was a proprietary product. The door could have been found by anyone who did an ASCII dump of the product, but those who did kept it secret, and probably took a lot of free flights. An Open Source coder found the door some months after the database went Open Source, and had an incentive to report it - at that point he was one of the people doing productive work on the database and only wanted it to work better and more securely.
This "black hats" (people who are motivated for bad purposes) vs. "white hats" (good purpose) phenomenon is important to consider when you evaluate the security of Open Source. Generally the only people who would look for vulnerabilities in proprietary software, outside of its manufacturer, are looking to exploit them! This is hardly the case with Open Source.
Thanks
Bruce
Bruce Perens.
I seem to remember a few years ago (possibly after 9/11, but I'm not sure) there was an incident where an employee of a company that has a governement contract to write software that manages government infrastructure was suspected of terrorist links and so they had to spend tonds of time seaching through the code to make sure the suspect had not programmed a back-door into the system. (I might be misremembering the details here, but that was the gist of it) it seems that closed source is a lot easier to hide things away than open source.
http://www.popularculturegaming.com -- my blog about the culture of videogame players
(who knows what M$ + NSA put in the closed windows source that might hurt other nations)?
Cryptographic code for a start.
---
It's wrong that an intellectual property creator should not be rewarded for their work.
It's equally wrong that an IP creator should be rewarded too many times for the one piece of work, for exactly the same reasons.
Reform IP law and stop the M$/RIAA abuse.
Well, he said it all, so it must be true; even though he backs it up with nothing. This is so wrong on so many levels I don't even know where to begin. His assetions are hardly worth addressing. Therefore, pure FUD.
Ok, I'll bite just once: I doubt there is a single weapon system procured by the DoD in the last 10 years that does not have a subsatantial portion of it outsourced overseas. Most procurments now require some % of it, by contract.
Research shows that 67% of those who use the term "research shows", are just making shit up.
Lead Programmer at Major Defense Contractor: Hey, can you install this patch by the that new Pakastani contributor for our missile control module?
New programmer: Yeah, I looked at it. There was some weird code in there that I couldn't quite figure out. There was some one line Perl code with about 10,000 characters. Shouldn't we look at it? What does it do, exactly?
Lead Programmer: Naw. I don't think it really matters. I don't want to look stupid because I sure can't figure Perl out. Let's just go with the release early and often policy. We'll let the users report the bugs back to us.
---Technology will liberate us if it doesn't enslave us first.
Um, this was already tried last November. Not only was the exploit very subtle indeed but it was still detected and removed within 24 hours. This is about as effective a piece of FUD as AdTI's last effort, and it looks like they were so embarrassed by that one they are resorting to a new name. I'm guessing we won't be hearing from "Green Hills Software" again once they've been publically ridiculed either...
UNIX? They're not even circumcised! Savages!
And it doesn't have to be in the Linux kernel. The classic example (at least 10 years old) is to hack up gcc so that it examines the code it's compiling, and if it decides that it's compiling /bin/login to do things a little differently, inserting a back door where there was none before.
However, while he does have a point, it's a very myopic point. Closed source software has exactly the same vulnerabilities, except for one critical difference -- only people within the company in question have a chance of detecting the problem -- the end user will never get to see the source and see if it's compromised. Granted, most open source users do not review all the source code that they use, but at least the option is there, and for the people where security is absolutely essential (like the NSA) they almost certainly use it.
Also, for a closed source company, the problem is even worse. The backdoor (or whatever) could be introduced when the code is finally compiled for distribution, and never get checked into whatever source control system they use. So the binaries get shipped out, but NOBODY has reviewed the source code in question (except our cracker friend) and once the bug does come to light (if it ever does) the company will look at the source code and scratch it's head -- it won't even have the source code in question to look at.
America is locked in a life or death battle of Good vs. Evil. Any openness or flexibility is weakness, which will be immediately exploited by our enemies to destroy our way of life. Open source hippies might be having fun, but they're frittering away our hard-won tech lead. The Internet itself, invented by the Pentagon, has been taken over by pedophiles since Al Gore reinvented it during the fake Bubble. God told President Bush to have Bill Gates take over the Internet, and all software development, to protect us from the hackers, and get rid of spam.
Freedom is Slavery.
Ignorance is Strength.
War is Peace.
--
make install -not war
At least OSS lets the prospective user review the source code. U.S. companies are rapidly outsourcing proprietary development to foreign countries. Key infrastructure software (and firmware) is being developed in countries such as mainland China (including code used for the U.S. telecom system). Meanwhile, the U.S. military is rapidly adopting off-the-shelf components to reduce costs. But, by all means, lets ignore this, and concentrate on OSS ...
[Insert pithy quote here]
The cornerstone of open source is that it is OPEN SOURCE. The government is free to view and evaluate all the packages to their little, demonic hearts' content.
If I were a terrorist, I'd think I would penetrate a closed-source house (say, Microsoft or Green Hills) and hack some little nasties into their source.
But,, maybe that's why Dan O'Dowd isn't a very good terrorist.
:wq
Bruce
Bruce Perens.
If you were a paranoid Iranian or North Korean computer user and look at Microsoft Windows would you think the same thing? Heck, why would a Chinese user think that MS and the NSA/CIA/alphabet soup is trying to snoop them? Because MS allows a select group to look at their source?!?
At least with Open Source you have the source to ultimately check for yourself. Vendors like Novel, IBM, and RedHat are supposed to be actively looking at the source to make sure no one is slipping stuff in that doesn't belong but if you don't believe them you can do it yourself.
So you have a Mr. Dan O'Dowd trying to a terrorist ghost threat into Open Source. The problem is that the source is there for you to inspect. With Microsoft the only word you have is their word that they aren't monkeying with the OS to monitor you.
IMHO, BSD and Linux are perfect for Military and security applications. You can inspect every corner of the kernel. You can freeze on a specific version because you always have that source code. You can branch and patch as you see fit. This seems perfect for the military and security branches. With Microsoft you have to "signup" (how much money does it cost to do that?) to view the source and then what? The only proof you have is that this particular version of Windows hasn't been monkeyed with. What about the patches and hotfixes? *shrug*
When it really boils down to it are you going to believe the source you compiled, you control yourself or Microsoft? I think Mr. O'Dowd's trust is ill placed.
There are a number of issues that play a part in the Green Hills argument. First of all, let me say that I have had the experience of using Green Hills products (non-military) for the past few years now.
First of all, coming from a company that charges *a lot* of money for an OS stands *a lot* to lose from a free OS. Therefore, GH would be expected to say that a GH product is better.
The fact that GH source code is not open source does not mean that no one ever sees it. I have access to the entire source, and, if so inclined, could use that information to create an attack myself or provide the source to someone else. Remember, even though the company signed a release for the source, that doesn't mean that money talks more.
GH has, up till this point, maintained a 'top dog' status in this area. In fact, when we asked for a driver for USB mass storage, the response was 'Well, where else would you get it? It is going to cost you.'
IMHO, GH has had a bit of a mini-Microsoft status within the military embedded world. This has certainly mirrored the PC OS world - one leading OS, some neat features, but when you really look at, how many ways are there to create a GUI or an OS. Let's be honest - an OS has queues, semaphores, a file system (replaceable, in GH), etc. So we are not talking about 'rocket surgery'.
The idea of Linux not being 'military grade' would really need to be made from an independent group. This is akin to MS saying that it has the best browser or GUI. Of course they are going to say that.
I for one welcome our new [insert main topic] overlords.
He should liken any government using closed source software with the Trojans themselves, who took the *gift* without examining the contents.
If the Trojan Horse were really Open Source, it would have had a list of building materials, instructions on building the horse yourself, the number of greek warriors inside, how the warriors were armed, along with several notes from the Phoenicians commenting on the dangers of the included Greeks...
-- If god wanted me to have a sig, he'd have given me a sense of humor.
I'm a long time Linux user and have been around open-source for a long time. While the source of this article is obviously questionable, I work for a Defense Contractor and I'm here to tell you, the points raised in the article have some truth to them.
If you're selling products to the govt and those products use an operating system, the issue of being able to GUARANTEE that your code base is not and cannot be coerced is very real. Everyone has (or should have) seen the techniques used to obfuscate trojan horses by using a compiler or some other tool that makes this problem even harder.
The problem being eluded to here is about a chain of control of a code base that can be demonstrated to satisfy a DoD or other govt customer. While no process can ever be completely secure, the real point is, if you have a choice between a system that has been developed in a closed environment where you can keep an eye on everyone involved and and open-source development, the prior development is easier to verify. You can call it FUD but this is a real issue within the govt circles and WILL limit the use of Linux in certain applications.
Frank W. Miller
Even if Linux were as secure as Windows, Windows is the wrong benchmark. Defense systems should be held to a higher standard.
.. right?
:-)
As secure as Windows? He's kidding
When I worked for the AirForce, they had several instances in which systems were comprimised (desktops). Various worms came out of the blue and just hammered their network. My systems running Linux noticed it immediately. In fact I was told there was NO problem. After a few hours of watching the logs logging attacks over and over again I then noticed a general email sent out to all explaining there was a problem and instructions were provided.
As secure as Windows? God I hope not!
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires software that runs commercial (and many military) aircraft be approved as part of a DO-178B certification. DO-178B Level A is the highest safety standard for software design, development, documentation, and testing. It is required for any software whose failure could cause or contribute to the catastrophic loss of an aircraft.
Several operating systems have been DO-178B Level A certified. Until Linux is certified to DO-178B Level A, our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines should not be asked to trust their lives with it.
If Linux isn't at this level then what is the point of the article? Linux is certified for various things in the military. Whenever I stand up a server I was asked what OS I would be running. Everyone was apprehensive it would be Windows which requires a whole heap of testing before it's allowed to run in production. As soon as I told security it was either Unix or Linux they would sigh and tell me to go ahead. Much more confidence there
Has Comcast disconnected your Internet account? Same here. You can read about it at http://comcastissue.blogspot.com
this is what I posted on his article, on designnews itself, where I'm sure he will read it:
In theory, of course, you're totally right in believing this. In practice, however, you're inescapibly wrong. First, since Linux is open source, the army implementing these linux embedded systems most likely read through the code to verify it's normal behavior and lack of serious design flaws, second, terrorists nowadays do not use computers for fear of being traced by the NSA or CIA with the net, thus preventing themselves from ever contributing code to Linux. Third and last, the linux kernel development team has now a signature follow-up on the internet, to make sure that each piece of code can be traced back to it's original author. It makes it that much easier to locate the developpers of Linux. Many of them are in countries that you failed to mention, like Japan, Australia, Finland and many other western countries that the US government trusts. Besides that, the open-source community is the best bug-tracking-solving community in the world. I believe it has happened for the webserver apache when the new version was shipped out with a security flaw less than an hour later the bug was traced in the code and a patch submitted. So, even in the case of a security flaw in the linux kernel, I believe that in less than 35 minutes the army computer specialists would be able to trace and fix the flaw. And those security flaws are precisely the reason the army orders pre-series of each equipment they will use and test them for a few months with anything that they're expected to meet in combat zone, one of them being loss of OS stability, control or even total power failure and recovery. You have only looked at the theoretical part of the problem, and propose no solution to the problems you see, therefore I consider your article a big rant against opensource, not constructive criticism, which in my opinion would be true partiotism.
---- I am certain of only one thing : I know nothing else.
so, please explain to me again how open source terrorists are going to slip their malware under our noses?
This is precisely why Brazil, China, and even Germany are moving towards open-source. The US Government cannot insert backdoors into this stuff that would affect anyone not wanting to be affected, unlike Microsoft stuff. Remember the NSA keys in the Windows NT crypto libraries?
The US can continue to run Windows, be our guest, but the point is moot since much of US Government software is developed in India anyways. No back doors there, for sure.
- - - Non Caffeine Drink or Drink Error
It's possible, and HAS happened that KNOWN, and TRUSTED engineers have put bits of code that would pass initial scrutiny and still be dangerous.
Wasn't there recently an article about a router with a backdoor shipped out in its code? How about all those darn "easter eggs" floating around in Windows and Office and other programs?
I would challenge you to compile a new Intel C library using a Microsoft C compiler from 6 years ago too. Heck, compile glibc using an IRIX compiler from six years ago.
You can drag out all the scenarios you want and whether it's Linux or it's *nix or BSD or Windows you're going to have the same audit challenges and not even have access to the source code without negotiating with all your suppliers.
--- I wish I could hear the soundtrack to my life. That way I'd know when to duck.
Is this a dup? I dunno, but Green Hills FUD was discussed on groklaw at great length over 3-1/2 months ago.
I was looking through the authors citations and it seems that his quote concerning the number of vulnerabilities in Linux compared to those in Windows is pretty questionable. The database, as you can see here, has one selection for Linux and many for Windows. It seems that the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology considers components of Windows, such as Internet Explorer not to be a part of the operating system, thus listing vulnerabilities of the compenents separate from those of the OS. At the same time, Linux vulnerabilities include Sound Blaster driver issues and problems with third party software such as Symantec Antivirus.
What a bizarre article.
The statement "Yet, despite the "many eyes," new security vulnerabilities are found in Linux every week in addition to dozens of other bugs." Shouldn't one consider that the "many eyes" are the developers finding those weekly bugs? Wonder how many eyes are looking for Green Hills software bugs?
As long as people are involved, mistakes (bugs) will be made. But saying that malicious code is more likely in a product where someone CAN examine the code verses a product where no one can is just plain stupid. There is obviously an undisclosed agenda here (might that be selling a DO-178B Level A rated real time OS, aka Integrity? Getting a lot of Linux competition, eh?).
As to the standard DO-178B...the first 90% of the article is about security, then you mention DO-178B. DO-178B is not a security standard. DO-178B is a FAA safety related standard for software. Any software certified under DO-178B can still be full of unknown security holes. The standard may be required for software used in flight related applications but it does not mean the software is also secure.
The level A rating doesn't even mean "most secure" as the article seems to imply. It means that if the software crashes, it will not affect other software that is running. In other words, the software is ISOLATED, not secure.It is amazing the things companies will say when they are losing ground to a competitor.
The NSA: The only part of the US government that actually listens.
Just as parent post suggested. Except, the govenment is already auditing open source, and customizing the Linux kernel to it's own needs... Does nobody remember NSA Secure Linux?
Kinetic stupidity has a new brand leader: Allen Zadr.
Nope. Open source is still the best way to go, along with open government. When you let people hide "stuff", and when it's connected to massive political power and heaps 0 money, that's when crimes occur. The best bet is openness, bar none. It is not perfect, but it's the best design yet.
Sure, there is a threat in the Open Source movement. But, how is that threat compared to offshoring? I don't think they are any different. Yet, when a threat is something that enhances the bottom line, security concerns are not raised.
Let me comment as one who has some background in NSA/NIST/TCSEC/CC evaluated software.
... not functionality or speed or compatibility ... can come before security in any design or coding task.
If you bet your life or your country's safety, you want something like Evaluated software doing the protecting. And not just EAL4 level stuff like NT. Look at the common criteria and look at the definitions of what the software evaluation levels are appropriate for.
Evaluation at a greater than EAL4 leval means that the documentation and test development each take much more time than the coding. The Evaluation itself (assuming the vendor has all his docs and tests complete) takes twice the time of the development. The Evaluation is done in a 4 tiered process with each of the 4 entities (lab, validator, tecnical approval board and vulnerability tester) having access to the source code and to the developers documentation and to the developers themselves.
High levels of evaluation require single source development under a single set of development standards.
Code developed, in our group, is reviewed in writing by 3 of the most senior architects of the product. Each reviewer objection or concern must be satisfied until it passes to the next reviewer.
So that means that we can document that 7 security trained people or outside organizations have looked at any code that is declared "Evaluated".
The object code is delivered in a trusted distribution methodology such that there is end to end verification (including while loading and while running) that the code that was developed and evaluated is the code you are running.
Now compare the Linux method of development and distribution.
To say that the code is Linux code is locked down and tested is to say that the barn door is locked too late in the process for the kinds of things the author of this posting is citing as potentials for happening. The emphasis must be on security over all, designed in from the begining and nothing
Is every Linux improvement preceeded by a security review?
Is there a security guru that can stop ship?
Is the security guru trained in security?
Is the security guru management supported?
Developing and deploying secure software is a time consuming, expensive, specialty that only a very few companies attempt.
Linus only takes patches from the people responsible for appropriate parts of the kernel. To get a patch through requires convincing those individuals -- and they do check the patches. In my experience, getting patches into the kernel is not a trivial matter, in fact it is frustratingly difficult. Futhermore, even if you succeed in getting a patch into some esoteric driver, the less mainstream it is, the less likely it will be in an active kernel.
If the various world governments will go through the trouble to audit defense contractors' code, then they can save themselves some trouble and audit Open Source code instead; any vendor establishing from that base will require less time in audit later. If the governments do not demand an independent audit of contractors' code, then that is where you will find the weak link. With Open Source, you always have the opportunity to audit at any time, diff against previously audited sources, and compile customized code with minimal audited feature sets.
Green Hills is saying "Trust Us! Trust Us!" Open Source is suggesting you trust what you can independently verify before your own experts' eyes.
As for the tool chain issue, you are seriously glossing over the obvious -- all the statements you have made apply to proprietary vendors as well. The solution is simple: don't upgrade the tool chain until the changes pass inspection. This is standard operating procedure for all mission critical deployments.
-Hope
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2002/02/07/tech
The next part is told at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cf
The army did not take Linux out of sheer stupidity, not knowing other alternatives---the army took Linux after serious considerations of its rich and expensive experience with several other alternatives.
Mr. O'Dowd speaks of Linux being worse than Windows, and Windows being almost as bad as Linux. Looks like his Green Hills Software was part of the firs expensive exprience of the army, first losing its contracts to Windows, and then to Linux.
I find it interesting that open source software is considered a risk because individuals from other nations are allowed to participate in the development of the code...
How does this differ from corporations which provide software to the military who outsource their development to individuals from other nations?
The only difference is that the OSS model involves corporations giving up some of their control over the rights of the product and corporations don't like that.
Otherwise, the article makes assumptions of differences between OSS remote participation and outsourcing which has no material relevance.
The idea of outsourcing being more secure because security checks are done can be argued, but even security checks fail and someone who is cleared can decide to sabotage. The problem is that once someone is vetted, they are trusted. This is actually worse than the OSS model where no matter who you are, the code is reviewed with the same level of scrutiny as anyone else's code.
I can think of so many instances of calling support, having to provide my personal identifying information to an individual who was either not in my state or not even in the US.
Sounds more like a double standard of judgement from the corporate viewpoint that is prejudiced against OSS projects.
Winged Power Photography
What Dowd fails to mention, in all of this, is that Level A certification requires a detailed specification of requirements that the system must implement. These requirements must be covered by test cases that give full requirement coverage (or appropriate analysis) and structural coverage (for Level A, it is MC/DC statement coverage). The Open Source methodology is a long way from being a DO-178B compliant process, and rightly so - the rules for change control of a Level A-certified product are the exact opposite of the "release early, release often" method embraced by a typical open source program, because the development objectives are entirely different. This does not mean that an open source program can not be certified to Level A - it means that it requires a great deal of work on behalf of the organization submitting it for Level A compliance, first.
DO-178B is the most rigorous safety evaluation standard in the aerospace, automotive, or defense industries. There is no difference in the DO-178B certification guidelines for verifying a closed-source vs. open-source application. The problem that both of them have to come up with is documentation of the process used to produce the product, along with design and architectural requirements for the application that can be independently verified for full MC/DC statement coverage by an independent third party. Each application must be shown to accomodate space (memory access) and time (real-time scheduling) partitioning requirements on any device it is run on.
Most Level A OS's are a RTOS with (if you're lucky) ANSI and POSIX libraries for I/O and math. There are companies that have modified Linux for use in real-time embedded applications, but the standard Linux scheduler is not real-time, and does not perform space partitioning of application memory (which means it can be Level E, but nothing above that). If it does not affect safety-critical parameters, it doesn't have to be Level A - Levels D or E are acceptable.
A lot of other governments are moving away from Microsoft b/c they're pretty sure we're using Windows to spy on them.
Unfortunately, you can't guarantee that someone looking to subvert windows in a subtle way won't be hired by (or more interestingly, license their code to) Microsoft- so with closed source you basically get the worst of all possible worlds.
microsoftword.mp3 - it doesn't care that they're not words...
he is terminally paranoid. I understand that he has a vested interest in FUDing FOSS, but let's attack his argument for a second:
First of all, what truly important piece of software would possibly be part of open public development? I thought this was specialized enough of a field that the only people who had any competence with what you were making were already trusted anyway. Wasn't SELinux developed *inside the NSA* before it was released?
Secondly, assuming a vital piece of software WERE being developed publicly, someone trying to insert malicious code would have to make it past a few barriers, the first being the most complicated. He would have to: 1) Know what his deliberately inferior code would probably do in the finished product versus what a non-ciminal would want it to do. 2) Get it past the critical eye of a few other developers, 3) Slip through some kind of government screening. And all the while NOT make anyone suspicious.
And even then the results are not guaranteed. What is your cyberterrorist counting on? I sincerely doubt that he could have snuck a back door into the code given all those hoops. I don't think the deliberate bug can be both significant and unknown at the same time. Is he hoping that his bug will cause the software to make a slight miscalculation? Whoopty shit. Whatever agency he or she is working against will be annoyed for a little while and then fix the problem.
Even if his deliberate bug caused a catastrophic failure, it can and will be traced back to HIS contribution, and if some terrorist group stands up and says "Ha ha! Look what we did! And here's why!" (and if it's Al-Qaeda we can be almost certain of this) That man is immediately under FBI surveillance and probably arrest.
In any case, inserting a bug would be a lot of work. A lot of work for an uncertain return, and success will mean almost inevitable detection.
Why some terrorist would bother with this approach is beyond me. It's so much easier just to fill a truck with dynamite.
Lest us not forget that WE'VE been planting trojans in software shipped overseas too. I recall a story here regarding deliberately sabotaged software shipped to some Russian pipline project. As I recall, the trojaned pipeline test software was designed to operate the pipeline at 10X normal pressure and cause an explosion...which it properly did, setting back the Russian government's energy plans.
When other governments start using OSS, they may be freeing themselves of these US planted trojans. I believe THAT is the major fear of the US government... Not that they will fail to detect a foreign planted bug in some fighterjet, but that OUR planted bugs will be found by China/India/Pakastan/Iran/etc... This would also seem to explain our government's looking the other way with regard to the Microsoft settlement. Remember that the anti-trust settlement was made within a week or so of September 11. Remember also the "Green Lantern" project, where our government was activly looking for ways to co-opt peoples boxes.
Software than cannont be easily trojaned creates just one more difficulty for our spy agencies. As with the gangster who was using pretty secure encryption, the government is now forced to use things like hardware keystroke loggers (meaning they have to have physical access to the unit), sneek-and-peek, you get the idea.
The US government has an interest in keeping people using insecure systems. How easy to you think it was to open those Windows laptops captured in Afganastan? Why, the NSA had those famous "NSA-KEY" entrys to Windows!... Easy as pie. The last thing they want is for KSM and OBL to start putting strong-encrypted filesystems on their Linux laptops in Afganastan. No way to plant the backdoor!
Expect to see a lot more of this type of FUD... The US Government has plenty of time and money to make sure that their Linux systems are safe, they just don't want others using them...
That's a pretty good obscure set of circumstances. Does it mean it can't happen? No. But contrast this with proprietary methodology wherein a coder has (usually) unrestricted access to the code base. Hmmm. Sounds more plausible there!
Of course, the key thing to note here is that anyone who has to dredge the dread forumla that terrorism + open source == Disaster!!! is probably desperate to save his flagging business.
Wood Shavings!
- Godai
To say that the code is Linux code is locked down and tested is to say that the barn door is locked too late in the process for the kinds of things the author of this posting is citing as potentials for happening.
So what's stopping the DoD from taking the source code base and doing their own testing and certification on it? Considering you claim to have had a background in this, I'm surprised you didn't think of this. This may save them some time in the long run, since they don't have to go through the effort of developing the software itself.
If I decide to use a library or module from another developer (OSS or otherwise) in something that I am doing, I always take the time to test it to make sure it at least does what I want and is adequate for the task at hand. Now, my own projects don't require a terrible amount of security, but if they did, I would be certain to do some testing in that area as well.
So I just don't get your point. You don't have to develop the code yourself in order to certify it if you have the full source available to you. And then once you have certified it, after making any corrections that you need on your copy of the source, then you lock THAT down. What came out of the original source base is irrelevant at this point. It only matters what you improved upon and certified.
Karma: Frotzed (mostly due to the Frobozz Magic Karma Company)