Fed-Up Hospitals Defy Windows Patching Rules
bingbong writes "According to Network World: 'Amid growing worries that Windows-based medical systems will
endanger patients if Microsoft-issued
security patches are not applied, hospitals
are rebelling against restrictions from device manufacturers that have
delayed or prevented such updates. Device makers such as GE Medical Systems,
Philips Medical Systems and Agfa say it typically takes months to test Microsoft patches because they could break the medical systems to which they're applied. In some instances, vendors won't authorize patch updates at all.' This is the typical patch vs. crash problem. Unfortunately, the stakes here could be human lives."
Why is hospital equipment running windows? Anyone that knows anything about embedded systems with high quality requirements know that you stay away from large OSes. Even Linux is avoided unless you need tcp/ip and if you don't then its better to have a small maybe even off the shelf OS. The Key is to limit the testing requirements and limit changes, which are goofy to test a life support system just to have the latest and greatest IE 6 or 7 that you shouldn't even, have hooked to a wide-open Internet anyway.
Why are they even accessible on the internet? Seems like these should be in a secure private network unlikely to be attacked.
OK.... We now have the Food and Drug Administration in charge of computer security?
Why are these things on any sort of publicly accessable network? They should, at least, be on a private network that's physically separate from everything they don't absolutely need to talk to & firewalled all to hell.
my sig's at the bottom of the page.
Medical machines responsible for human life should never need to be patched. The software was tested at one point and should be controlled to stay at that test point until it is to be retested. For machines running windows this means they should be segregated from other parts of yoru network and should be airgap firewalled from the rest of the world. Intenet worms and email trojans shouldn't be relevant.
How is a firewall going to stop an insider from exploiting the network? Does working in a hospital magically transform a person into a paragon of morality?
I'm not a big fan of Microsoft, but I don't think the quality (or lack thereof) of their products is the issue here. I've read from their EULAs that their products are not suited towards critical applications (ie nuke facilities, life support). My point is that although a EULA is not a legally-binding contact, the fact that MS is stating in public Windows shouldn't be used in critical applications should tell you something. The bottom line is that if GE, Philips or Agfa build a medical system, they should be responsible for that product from the software up to the hardware. The fact that *they don't have control* over one of the components in their products (the underlying OS) is negligent, IMO.
I would get laughed out of court if I tried to blame a critical problem with a report I wrote on my secretary, and the same should happen with these companies if somebody's loved one dies from their irresponsibility.
Bill Clinton: Pimp we can believe in. - The Shirt!!!
Survery says... Beeep! Beeep! Beeep!
What "security" or other risk with a turnkey standalone system? I'd rather risk the remote chance of someone breaking into my room to run CAT-5 to my vitals monitor rather than a BSOD (possible REAL death in this case) because Service Pack x broke some obscure function and failed to alarm the nurse when my heart stopped.
Do the morons at the hospitals run Windows Update on the defibrillators?
The manufacturers have tested and retested and regression tested everything that goes into those medical devices (or they say, anyway), so why deviate from a known good combination without a compelling reason?
This comment does not necessarily represent the views and opinions of the author.
Firewalls won't help. If it runs Windows, some idiot's going to bring in a CD full of pictures from his latest vacation and the CD's going to be infected with MyDoom or (heck, probably and...) Sobig or any number of other nasties. Or it's going to be something he wants to print on the nice laser printer at the office.... there's a hundred ways to get infected just by clueless users.
Pretty soon, the internal network's either too busy generating random traffic to do anything else-- and even if the Big Iron of the business, the dialysis machines and heart-lung devices and all those wonderful things that better damned well not break work fine, you've still got the terminal the nurse sits in front of that keeps track of when to issue you your shot that keeps you alive spending half its time rebooting because it's got Sasser.
This is not a problem a firewall can solve, and it's pretty darned big: You can't go throwing software around willy-nilly to solve this problem (even though the real problem is that the users _are_ throwing software around willy-nilly), so you can't just go "oooh! A next-day patch from Microsoft, let's hope their two hours worth of QA before it walked out the door was good enough!".
-JDF
"Why, exactly? Because nobody would know how to hack your tiny little proprietary OS? That's crap and you know it."
The reason it the smaller the OS the less you have to test it. The whole KISS thing. Keep it simple stupid.
On a standalone ebedded system you do not need support for TrueType fonts, every printer and USB device known to man, or even video playback. On an Embeded device you often only need a few functions but those functions have to work. If you have ever programmed under windows you will find all sorts of APIs just do not work or do not work the way they are documented. Windows programers just program around these issues. You should always use the smallest OS that you can get away with for the device you are using. Linux is a good option for very flexable embedded devices. I would tend to stay clear of X and use nano-x myself.
There are many off the shelf ebeded OSs the most popular I can think of is QNX. For life critcal systems I would go for QNX over windows any day.
See my blog http://ilovecookes.blogspot.com/ for light hearted technical information.
This is just one of the many huge problems inside hospitals these days. Many people do not realize how often just a simple name and patient number gets assigned to the wrong person. Records get swapped with someone else or a gender or age gets changed. All these life threatening mistakes are human error. The problem is that the transcriptionists get paid per word. Not whether they word is correct and the document they transcribe is correct. It's also all about money and internal politics. They choose systems not based on whether its a good match for the hospital and the patients but based upon which board member is in bed with which company. They'll spend 10s of millions of dollars on a new system just because some higher up gets a kick back or has a golfing buddy. Then the system turns out to be total crap and they start the process all over. All the while they raise their cost of doing business and push it off to the patient.
Knowing what I know there is no way in hell I will ever go to a hospital unless I'm already dead. Cause they'll kill you just sitting in the waiting area.
But there are a lot of applications that are not themselves critical, but could play a part. I work for a company that does materials management software for hospitals. This stuff is tweaked for efficiency, and hospitals rely on it. It runs on Windows only. Doesn't sound quite like the importance of a pacemaker, right? Well let's say the hospital gets hit by a virus. Yes, it happens, even with firewalls. Now their materials system is fubar, and they are used to it having the right supplies on hand at the right times. If it is low on something, it reorders it automatically. Now they are screwed, and they don't have something that they really need. Someone could die.
Hospitals have to operate on razor thin margins, and they can't stock millions upon millions of dollars of everything. They look to lower their on-hands inventory as much as possible.
There is all kinds of software in the hospitals that can go horribly wrong, not just the obvious stuff.
My beliefs do not require that you agree with them.
Seriously, is the REAL problem the OS? I think the REAL problem is insecure networks. Lets think for a second about all of the Windows/IE vulnerabilities in the past several months... how many of them matter if you're not connected to a network? Windows 2000/XP in my experience has been quite good, and when properly maintained (ie: no junk installed), provides a very stable platform. No one should be "surfing the web" from the deliberation machine, nor can I really see why it would need a serious network interface.... Let alone access anything on the internet! I think what hospitals REALLY need are security experts to take a good long hard look at their network and decide what SHOULD, and what SHOULDN'T be on the LAN... and if some level of network connectivity is needed (ie: the ability to monitor equipment from across the hospital), this should be on a totally separate VLAN with NO access to the internet.... Internal routing only, no exceptions. Computers connected to this LAN wouldn't have removable media bays, so the threat of worms, etc should be mitigated by general inaccessibility.
I know everyone on Slashdot would LOVE to blame the OS, but really... the fault is not with the OS as much as it is the networking admins, and even more likely, the administration for not providing the NAs with the support they need to make a properly secure network.