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Spyware/Adware Prevention In Large Deployments?
foQ writes "I work in the IS department for a ~2000 networked computer environment across 10 locations. As with most people, we have experienced serious problems with spyware/adware. We have SpyBot and Ad-Aware installed on most computers, but this doesn't prevent the computers from getting these programs and only sometimes properly removes all of them. Is there a tool that we could push out to all the PCs to basically do what anti-virus programs do and block these programs from running and clean them from the computer?"
I took a look at enterprise antispyware software for a client and particularly liked Webroot's Spy Sweeper Enterprise product. It provides centralized management and automatic deployment though you can do it manually as well. Definition upgrades as well as version upgrades of the sofware is also automated. Take a look at this page from their website. Lavasoft also has an enterprise product that is pretty good though I think Webroot has a slight edge.
http://www.busyweather.com/
besides freezing them?
I usually dont reccomend upgrading antivirus programs to my clients, but the latest round of 2005 versions basically have adware in with their virus defs. Not sure about the corporate level stuff, but almost all the major consumer AVs do.
Sounds like the same problem we face--4k client PCs in five locations--and we don't have too good of a solution.
We're currently taking a two-pronged approach. First, for the big baddies like Gator or Bonzi, we use Altiris Notification Server to find them and block their execution. This works tolerably well, but it's a reactive process--for me to block a spyware app, I have to know about it, and it has to be something of which I can deny exeuction (so, no browser helper objects).
Second prong is a managed install of Spybot S&D--we're enterprise licensed and maintain our own update server. We stick Spybot S&D in our base loads and force it to run on a schedule, automatically updating itself and running non-interactively. This catches lots, but can sometimes interfere with the users' work.
There is also an ongoing user education effort, consisting of mandatory training and constant reminders about how spyware works and how one gets infected, but that's about as hopeless as bailing the ocean with a kid's toy bucket. I'm long past the point of hoping that the general user population can learn about how not to get infected with spyware; I'm resigned to spending the rest of my days hearing about how someone in Marketing was hitting the gambling sites at lunch and picked up yet another malware app.
Use FireFox instead of Internet Explorer. www.mozilla.org
Though this is a quick way to get a "+5 Informative", it is not a valid solution to most Adware/Spyware/Malware exploits. The majority of this software is installed as part of another application. For instance, the notorious "Internet Optimizer" and "Gator". Running FireFox does nothing to stop an ignorant user from falling for a snappy ad and installing something bad on their workstation.
I'm not defending IE, I'm just pointing out how it does not apply in this particular case and Mozilla will, by no means, be the end all of web-related tragedies.
Why is a normal user allowed to install programs in the first place?
Because that computer thing is meant to be USEFUL
RelevantElephants: A Somatic WebComic...
A man who can't pronouce "nuclear arsenal" shouldn't have one -sig ends here.
Assuming you have to run Windows, first remember there are multiple steps that you'll likely have to take with no silver bullet. Consider these 10 steps as a spring board:
The first step is to put in place policies (where possible) on domain controllers that prohibit both the installation of BHOs and of other software by anyone other than Administrators. Given that many, many bits of spyware (I'll go out on a limb and say most) work as (so called) "browser helper objects", don't let people install them at all. Other software Administrators can install when needed. It's actually fairly easy to do.
Second, where possible, deploy W2K or XP, and...
Then, third, where possible, yank people's admin privs. In virtually all cases, with a bit of good ol' trial-and-error, you can successfully adjust users' permissions to take away admin from most folks. Let's face it, most people SHOULD NOT have the ability to have admin on their own machines.
Fourth, where possible, dump IE.
Fifth, do some short SMALL GROUP tutorials about the evils of spyware and how it works. (I found this to be surprisingly useful for teaching users about passwords.)
Sixth, where possible, dump IE.
Seventh, consider netbooting the workstations and storing users files on fileservers. That way the OS you give 'em is the OS they get and it's always the same every day. (Tell them to think of it as life imitating art as in "50 First Dates", where they get a fresh start every day....)
Eighth, where possible, dump IE.
Ninth, go with something many of the folks here have/will recommend in terms of enterprise-based anti-spyware/anti-virus/anti-?????? software. I used Norton Corporate Edition in a fairly recent gig, and while that particular version didn't check for sypware, there are a number of solutions others are proposing that will. (The Corporate Edition is critical to your sanity--you can manage the AV software on *all* desktops via a central console.)
Last, and not least: dump IE.
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Running 'Nix is like owning a Lightsaber. It's "a more elegant weapon for a more civilized time."
You need to stop them before they are able to install one peice of code on the system.
1). You can do a few things, namely locking the computers down using the Microsoft Policy Editor (as I am sure you are aware of it's existance).
2). Make sure that no user has administrative access, and that downloading / installing programs is not allowed - if they need programs, that is what their roaming profile is for.
3). Also keeping a image available of every system so that you can restore to a known good working point
4). Invest in a decent SAN and keep the roaming profiles there, ALL documents should be kept on the SAN / roaming profile so that re-imaging the computers when they do get things on them does not cause valuable work to be lost.
Perhaps suggest hiring a freelance IT guy who knows how to do such things if you do not, there are plenty here who need the work.
If you can get to the control panel, display settings, look in the C: drive, change IE options, etc, you're doing things wrong, it's not locked down enough.
Yes it's a pain for the users, but it does alleviate the potential of corporate espionage (don't beleive it doesn't exist, it most certainly does) and also spyware/adware/etc screwing up your computers.
These are just the basics but it's worked fine for the company I work for, after some user adjustments it's actually not that bad. The only thing you loose is the storage on the clients, and possibly a big investment in a SAN ranging from 1TB on up, which can be moderately expensive.
http://www.fsckin.com/
My solution is simple.
No user can write to the registry in the common spyware places. All access to write to the ares of the registry that is commonly attacked by spyware is removed by GPO. That is - no unapproved shell extensions, no BHO add access, no new Explorer bars, no ability to modify the Winsock32 stack, no install priveleges. All apps are deployed through GPOs. There is a white list of approved ActiveX in general and BHO controls.
Spyware usually requires BHO access to tap into IE. Removing that access is good. White list enables the ability to provide desirable BHOs, such as Google and Yahoo bars, as well as internally developed apps.
Leonid S. Knyshov
Find me on Quora
I manage an active directory domain and I've taken care of the major offenders through group policy.
First, I attempt to download the spyware much like any user would. When I get the prompt asking me to approve this installation, I view the certificate that it was signed with and save the certicate to the file.
Next, I add that certificate to the list of banned certicates domain wide. It works great and fixes the problem of people installing spyware without knowing it.
Any time you have to deal with a technical issue that involves user interaction as a component of success, you will need to propose to management, a policy that bolsters the behavioral aspect of the solution; Users need to be made, by management, to have some degree of awareness and culpability for virus and spyware infections.
"Frequent-fires" users will be compelled to learn some digital hygine.
Most large and medium-sized businesses operating today have some sort of policy on sexual harassment/hostile workplace/conflict of interest/Internet and PC usage policy, etc. Generally, users understand that these policies are for eveyone's protection - With ~2000 PCs in the mix... This is definately where you should start... Policy Covers Your Ass.
On the technical side:
1. Router logs, intrusion detection, and sniffing as trending tools to show your boss what's up with traffic.
2. Good, solid desktop images/ app pushes/ GPO's - harden the Registry, Security Policy, individual apps as necessary. Beyond that - when a machine is sufficiently infected, it should be replaced with a re-imaged one --- it can be faster than cleaning, and is a hell of a lot more complete. This also reinforces the notion of users not storing important things locally.
3. Helpdesk tracking software - What users/machines/network segments are continually having the same problems? Does Human Resources need to be the next step for some people?
4. Desktop management software - provide your boss with stats on just what kind of crap is showing up.
5. If you must use/develop software that may enable or even contain spyware, you have a particularly tricky problem that concerns both company policy and IT best practices.
Of course, you know your boss, I don't... How you implement these suggestions is different for everyone. To some, it may seem draconian, to others, quite lax.... To some, budgets will not allow the necessary attention - for others, this kind of focus could perhaps justify a budget increase.
Oh... And consider the broswer's role in the business - what is an acceptable $$ loss for a preventable issue? Have you already spent that?
My $.02