TSA Software Bug Creates Airport Bomb Scare

192939495969798999 writes "An article at CNN's website reports on a serious software bug at the Atlanta airport." From the article: "TSA screeners are given tests around the clock to check their alertness. Images of bombs and other suspicious devices that are hard to detect are put up on the X-ray machine, followed after a brief delay by an alert that reads, 'This is a test.' After reviewing a tape of the images, Hawley said the software failed to alert the screener of the test."

Comments

Fun with false images

[TripMaster Monkey]

I didn't know the TSA employed such software to test their screeners. This incident raises the possibility of tampering with the software to either:

1. purposely display an image of a dangerous item where none exists, inciting a scare like the one witnessed Wednesday, disrupting thousands of lives and paralyzing a major terminal, or:
   
2. display an image of an innocuous item instead of the actual image of the luggage containing a dangerous item, allowing terrorists to smuggle said items onto aircraft. Obviously, this scenario will require far more sophisticated timing of the false image than the previous scenario, but it should still be possible.
   

Given these possibilities, and given the fact that Wednesday's incident proves that such a thing is possible, I'm betting the TSA is currently debating whether or not the decision to make the scanners capable of displaying false images in the first place was a wise one.

Re:Fun with false images

[Ihlosi]

This incident raises the possibility of tampering with the software to either

3. Display "This is a test" right after Mr. Terrorists luggage containing dangerous items has passed through the X-Ray machine.

Re:Fun with false images

[apoc.famine]

Worse than that, it shouldn't be too hard to display the "that was just a test" message on a more and more frequent basis. As the screeners are already familiar with this notice, they'll probably start to become desensitized to it. Then it becomes pretty easy to slip stuff past them.

This is very, very similiar to the "click ok to continue" problem which plagues Windows, and is really the root cause of many spyware installs. If warnings are too frequent, users treat them as irritations that they need to get around rather than important info that they need to read, understand, and pass judgement on. In this case, all that needs to be done is to up the frequency, something that shouldn't be too hard to do.

Re:Fun with false images

[Daniel_Staal]

It is a wise one: it keeps the screeners from getting to bored with their jobs. Since something they have to react to comes up moderately often, they will stay alert enough to react to it. If it didn't the fact that months go by without them having to actually react to any of the bags will mean they stop expecting to react, and then stop noticing what's actually in them.

This is all standard psychology: People aren't good at finding rare exceptions in repetative data. That is one of the reasons we invented computers. Unfortunately, a computer can't spot a weird bomb, so we need an actual intelegnce manning it. That means a human. So, we play these tricks on ourselves to keep those humans working at an acceptable level.

Re:Fun with false images

[C10H14N2]

capable of displaying false images in the first place was a wise one.

I've had design meetings practically come to blows when similarly asinine suggestions were made in the context of things that by comparison were about as critical as a recipe database. Yes, you would think in "system to positively identify bombs" the flowchart box labeled "automatically and without further inquiry disregard positive image of bomb" would raise a few eyebrows. Geezuz.

Re:Fun with false images

[maxwell demon]

purposely display an image of a dangerous item where none exists, inciting a scare like the one witnessed Wednesday, disrupting thousands of lives and paralyzing a major terminal

More importantly: After enough false alarms, the screeners will more likely not react should a real bomb appear. "Oh well, surely just another software fault, just like the three we've had earlier this week. We better don't scare our passengers again ..."

Re:Fun with false images

[Illserve]

It is not only a wise decision, it is essential.

The TSA funds fundamental research in sustaining human performance in search tests to ensure that these baggage screeners are performing well.

One thing that has been found is that the human brain cannot keep searching efficiently for something that never appears, you just tend to zone out. We're not robots after all, and searching day in and day out for a 1 in a million event that may not occur for months or years is not a task we're equipped to do.

By giving the visual system periodic targets, it stays frosty. So some kind of periodic fake bomb is necessary.

Now you can do this in two ways: with real fake bombs, or images of bombs. One of these options is going to cost about 100 times as much to implement as the other and at the end of the day, if properly implemented, both will serve the same purpose. It all comes down to how much security can we get for our dollar, and paying actors to play dress up terrorists and slip fake-bombs through the baggage system is hugely inefficient compared to a software solution.

So you ca argue that the software solution is too vulnerable... but your suggestion is going to need to be accompanied by a list of other systems that can be scrapped to pay for the more costly alternative because it has to come from somewhere.

Re:Fun with false images

[advocate_one]

It is a wise one: it keeps the screeners from getting to bored with their jobs. Since something they have to react to comes up moderately often, they will stay alert enough to react to it.

does it heck... they'll still be bored to tears...just petrified of missing one of the random tests... can you imagine driving along the highway minding your own business when software in the car does an awareness check on you by popping up an image of a kid running across the road??? well this is similar...

they've got devices coming out for cars and trucks that test driver awareness far more subtly than just popping up a test picture at random... the software actually monitors the drivers eye movements and other parameters... so there shouldn't be anything stopping them from doing something similar for this x-ray scanner application...

Then again, perhaps it would be better to dump the human out of the loop altogether and rely on AI to determine if an item of luggage warrants further attention... but these days it's still cheaper to use people to do it and pay them peanuts at the same time...

Re:Fun with false images

[Daniel_Staal]

they've got devices coming out for cars and trucks that test driver awareness far more subtly than just popping up a test picture at random... the software actually monitors the drivers eye movements and other parameters... so there shouldn't be anything stopping them from doing something similar for this x-ray scanner application...

Those can tell you if the driver is awake, but not if they are paying attention. Fortunatly, someone driving a car has to pay attention fairly routinely just to stay in the lane and on the road, so 'awake == aware' (generally) in that situation.

For the this screening application, it is quite possible to be awake while not being aware. They can be fully focused on the screen and just not notice because their brain didn't realize that it had to notice. As I said; this is a well-known failing of the human mind. You are likely to see what you expect to see in a situation that closely resembles a common situation.

Oh, and yes, a good AI would be perfect for this job. Unfortunately, we don't have one good enough for it yet. An AI can spot a known weapon, but not an unknown one. A human can spot an unknown weapon. If they are awake and aware.

Re:Fun with false images

[Anonymous Coward]

No. It's nothing like the Windows "Click OK" problem at all.

With "Click OK", you are expected to respond to a warning/message box. You become desensitized to the warning and just click "OK". The system provides no feedback about this whatsoever. Click OK, and you're finished, you don't learn the repercussions of your act until weeks later (if ever).

With the airport software, the screener has to respond to images of contraband on the screen. In theory, after each test image appears, there will be a message, saying "That was just a test", providing valuable feedback, not only for the screener, but also for his/her boss, who will likely reprimand the screener if they miss any test cases.

No feedback=no learning
Feedback=learning

Re:Fun with false images

[Illserve]

It's not about testing humans for alertness, you misunderstand the purpose of the lures.

The fake bomb images are there to IMPROVE performance.

The DHS & TSA fund research into optimizing human search. This implementation is a practical application of very recent research.

I refer you to
http://search.bwh.harvard.edu/pdf/WolfePrevalenceN ature05.pdf

which is part of the research of Jeremy Wolfe's lab
http://search.bwh.harvard.edu/

Just read the first the first few paragraphs of the Nature paper I linked to understand the point.

Re:Fun with false images

[griffjon]

Or, more fun, write "this is a test" in lead on your luggage :)

Re:Fun with false images

[electronym]

Wasn't there an incident last year where a terminal had to be reprocessed after they discovered a metal detector had actually been turned off for like an hour?

Yes. Originally they reported that it wasn't even plugged in. Then they decided it was just "out of calibration." As in, "The plug was out of calibration with the electrical socket."

Re:Fun with false images

[scherrey]

Actually they do the "mystery shopper" thing too. Recently something like 21 airports were testing in this manner and 100% of them failed.

Honestly I'm not terribly concerned about safety. The ONLY reason the 911 terrorists succeeded was because of our policy of cooperating with hi-jackers which was based on the presumption that they wanted to survive the effort themselves. That policy is no more. Frankly I feel we'd be better off if everyone came on board armed with knives or sidearms (if properly trained). Regardless, any terrorist taking on a plane full of passengers these days knows he's going to be instantly attacked from all directions and shot down if necessary. We're putting way too much emphasis on things that have no measurable effect on our safety at serious detriment to our own freedoms, convenience, and financial situations.

The good news....

[tverbeek]

Fortunately the innocent traveler whom TSA employees gunned down on suspicion of being a terrorist had no immediate family, so the chances of a wrongful death lawsuit are slim.

inconvenient but reassuring

[God'sDuck]

better than the parallel-universe headline: study shows screeners oblivious to obvious bombs in test images...

Re:ROFL!

[ceejayoz]

http://geography.about.com/library/faq/blqzbusiest airport.htm

"Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport is the world's busiest passenger airport, with 77,939,536 arrivals, departures, and transfers in 1999. Atlanta bypassed #2 Chicago-O'Hare in 1998 to become the world's busiest."

There is No Software Design That Is So Good ...

[rewinn]

... that is cannot be implemented badly.

Not clever to desensitise them

[syousef]

That's insane. Images to test their alertness sure, but images of bombs? That's just plain crazy. All you're doing is desensitising them and guaranteeing that even if they're alert they won't get the adrenaline rush they should. What brainiac thought this one up?

Re:Not clever to desensitise them

[GreyPoopon]

Images to test their alertness sure, but images of bombs? That's just plain crazy. All you're doing is desensitising them and guaranteeing that even if they're alert they won't get the adrenaline rush they should.

It depends on what they do with the tests. If there are severe consequences for the operator if they miss one of the test images, then I doubt they'll be desensitized. On the other hand, if there's no consequence for being a slacker, you'll see a group of operators hudding around the display laughing at the "fake" bomb image while a terrorist walks right on through.

Re:Not clever to desensitise them

[rayde]

should they get an adrenaline rush? wouldn't that lead to potential panic? I think i'd rather if they were able to calmly react to such situations, knowing that most often it will be a test. i think they'll more likely play by the book in those situations, than do something more emotionally driven.

Re:Not clever to desensitise them

[moop]

I think it can be beneficial. I think it causes the TSA's to be more alert all of the time because they they are being measured by these tests. Thousands of people will go through the screening before a red flag item goes through. This could lull the TSA's into complacency and they could miss a real item.

I'm sure if they miss several of the test images they could get fired or reprimanded. Just like any job, once you are monitered people are forced to work better, for example my job, if a copy of my desktop was captured and sent to my boss at a random interval I would not be making this post.

Re:Not clever to desensitise them

[TrappedByMyself]

That's insane. Images to test their alertness sure, but images of bombs? That's just plain crazy. All you're doing is desensitising them and guaranteeing that even if they're alert they won't get the adrenaline rush they should. What brainiac thought this one up?

That doesn't even make any sense. This is training, you WANT people to see these things. You WANT them to have experience reacting to stuff they think is real. How do you expect them to identify bombs in suticases if they've never seen examples, especially in real world situations. Watching films in a classroom is nice and all, but not real enough. That "desensitising" comment is out of touch. You would rather them get an adrenaline rush and panic as opposed to getting maybe less of a rush, but have the experience to handle the situation?
You need to learn the difference between education and training. Education is a good start, but "first responder" types need training to know how to apply their education to a crisis situation.

Re:Not clever to desensitise them

[honkycat]

There's no indication of how often these false images are injected, so it's not clear they're being "bombarded" with false events. If it's too many and there's no penalty for missing a few, then it's a bad move. However, 99.99% or more of all airport screeners will never see a real event. It's not something you're going to get experience seeing or handling if there are not drills.

The only way to test the screeners and keep them alert is to give them events to respond to. The problem with the system as described in the article is that it sounds like only the machine knows that a fake event was generated until an audit later. Really, the people who the screener would call should be notified ahead of time that there is a fake event. That would prevent escalation. If this is done, though, there must also be an identifier of some sort attached to every image so that they don't mistake a real event report for an anticipated false one.

As long as the screeners are seriously penalized for failing to respond to any false event, this is not a bad thing. It's absolutely nothing like your "live ammo" analogy. A false positive event like that which occurred is acceptable. A few people were inconvenienced by an airport shutdown and nobody gets hurt. Imagine the consequences of a false negative.

quote from big trouble:

[Keruo]

[At the Airport Security Walk-through]
Airport Security Checker: What is this?
Snake: A garbage disposal.
Airport Security Checker: A garbage disposal?
Snake: Portable.
Airport Security Checker: You'll have to turn it on.
Snake: It's got a timer.
[turns the switches of the bomb on]
Snake: Grounds up your garbage, while you're out.

Re:quote from big trouble:

[NaDrew]

Snake: Grounds up your garbage, while you're out.

I heard he was dead.

Sounds pretty good to me

[Billosaur]

While screening carry-on luggage, a TSA employee identified the image of a suspicious device but did not realize it was part of routine testing for security screeners because the software failed to indicate such a test was under way, Hawley said.

Willie Williams, the airport's federal security director, said the screener saw something suspicious and notified a supervisor. The two manually rechecked all the bags on the conveyor belt but could not find anything resembling what was seen on the screen, Williams said.

Put aside the software failure and I'd say this was a more successful test than the actual test. I mean, if screeners know this kind of thing is going to happen every so often and they see something suspicious, they may become a bit jaded after a while and assume it's a test, even if the indication doesn't appear. This screener took no chances and called a supervisor and then went about trying to find the device. I believe that's how the system is supposed to work.

So the software failed, but in the end it didn't really fail, because it showed someone was doing their job as they were supposed to be.

Re:Sounds pretty good to me

[dubbreak]

So the software failed, but in the end it didn't really fail, because it showed someone was doing their job as they were supposed to be.

So in your opinion it didn't fail, and it's a reasonable arguement but what about from the traveller's perspective? I have been on the recieving end of a mistaken item in my bags.

airportsecurity: "What do you have in your bag that is a metal coil?!"
Me:"Nothing."
airportsecurity:"Tell us what you have in your bag that is a metal coil before we check it or we will be forced to detain you!"
Me:The only things that have any metal in that bag are a cd player and some cd's.. maybe the stack of cd's looks like a coil to you guys?
airportsecurity:"The item is NOT CD's what is it?"
airportsecurity2:"--glares-- You inisist there isn't something 12 to 14 inches long that is a metal coil in your bag? About 2 inches in diameter? Have you left your bag anywhere?"
ME"No, I mean yes I insist there isn't anything like that and no I haven't left my bag anywhere.. it was on my back!"
...

To make a long story short they surrounded me in security only to find out that they mistook which bag the "item" was in. Oh the "item", it was a candle holder, pretty cool one at that in the short time I saw it (it was a coil so that the base could be spun to bring the candle height up to keep it consistent).

The security did not even chastise the guy for bringing a large metalic item on the flight, they didn't even make him check it. This was before 911 though, back when large heavy blunt objects were safe on a plane (It was Colonel Mustard in the 737 with the candle stick!).

I did not recieve and appology. Instead I recieved a reprimand for having a keychain which was a mini-supersoaker (which I thought nothing of since it had been there a year). Yes, it could shoot water (a thimble full reserve that would get you 3-4 shots of half a meter or so), but it really was not dangerous, not as dangerours as candle holder in my opinion. I guess I could have filled it with a thimble of bleach and threatened a stewardess to get me another beer, or I'd make her blind, if she would be kind enough to stand within 50 centimeters of me and hold very still as the aim is not very accurate on a TOY WATERGUN KEYCHAIN!

Security doesn't like reason, they took my keychain.

Moral of the story: I bet it sucked for the people with the "bomb" in their suitcase.

Race conditions...

[GillBates0]

TSA screeners are given tests around the clock to check their alertness.

How frequent are these "tests" given? Once every 10 minutes...30 minutes? What are the chances that they coincide with an actual suspicious device, which the screener would then assume was part of the "test" which happened to occur simultaneously.

Re:Race conditions...

[Kjella]

How frequent are these "tests" given? Once every 10 minutes...30 minutes? What are the chances that they coincide with an actual suspicious device, which the screener would then assume was part of the "test" which happened to occur simultaneously.

I assume they "cut in" these test on the conveyor belt, meaning you see n+1 suitcases instead of n real ones. So if you see two suspicious devices and one "this is a test" message, you'll know that message doesn't cover both of them. I suppose it could happen that you saw the real one and missed the fake one, thus letting the real one pass but that already means you missed a suspicious device! And if that's already a significant problem, you already have issues without this testing.

Good!

[AntiTuX]

To be honest, I think it's a great thing. Least I know that they're following protocol. The guy did exactly what he was supposed to do.

As for the software, all software has bugs. I'm just glad that someone found out that it wasn't something terrible getting on a plane.

Brazil....

[ronfar]

JACK: Well, your A. Buttle has been confused with T47/215, an A. Tuttle. I mean, it's a joke! Somebody should be shot for that. So B58/732 was pulled in by mistake.

SAM: You got the wrong man.

JACK: (a little heated) I did not get the wrong man. I got the right man. The wrong man was delivered to me as the right man! I accepted him, on trust, as the right man. Was I wrong? Anyway, to add to the confusion, he died on us. Which, had he been the right man, he wouldn't have done.

SAM: You killed him?

JACK: (annoyed) Sam, there are very rigid parameters laid down to avoid that event but Buttle's heart condition did not appear on Tuttle's file. Don't think I'm dismissing this business, Sam. I've lost a week's sleep over it already.

SAM: I'm sure you have

JACK: There are some real bastards in this department who don't mind breaking a few eggs to make an omelette, but thank God there are the new boys like me who want to maintain decent civilized standards of terrorist eradication. We've got the upper hand for the moment, but they're waiting for us to slip up, and a little slip- up like this is just the chance they're looking for.

--- Brazil

bwahahahahah!

[Thud457]

Gee, maybe printing a picture of a bomb with lead-based paint in the skymalls catalog was a bad idea...

Audio also revealing

[FerretFrottage]

The TSA screener terminal can also be heard producing the sounds "Would you like to play a game?" as the image appeared on screen.

This is only a test...

[__aaclcg7560]

A real bomb wouldn't explode until it got into the luggage handling system. After all, how do you explain all the luggage that disappears from the airports?

Why malicious items?

[VxJasonxV]

Why put in images of bombs and such? Someone eyeballing that that isn't a screener would blow a gasket if they saw it.

How about pictures of assorted dildos/vibrators? No, I'm serious. That'll catch your eye, male or female.
How about 'to scale' midgets (wow, that sounds awful... as much of a joke as it is) fighting in a mini suitcase?
Or a very carefully and perfectly laid out bra of panty?

Seriously, give these people something they wouldn't mind seeing (well, sans the dildo/vibrator) and you'll get (1) a chuckle and (2) some extra energy for productivity.

You know, on second thought, I'm going to patent the concept, brb.

Re:Why malicious items?

[akozakie]

Even better: a nice, well laid out bra, a large dildo, and... a less exposed pipe bomb, or something like that. Now that is a test! Plus, it's likely to happen - if you're going to risk getting a suspicious item on the plane this way, the least you can do to raise your chances is provide a distraction.

Re:Why malicious items?

[LnxAddct]

You wouldn't recognize a bomb in a screening device if it was slapping you on your face. You have to be trained to pick these things out, they are usually hidden very well and shaped to look like they belong with everything else. It isn't like a cartoon, you don't see 8 sticks of dynamite tied together with an alarm clock on top. Some explosive devices I guess you might recognize just by shear suspicion and it appearing to be out of place, but a good chunk of them are much harder to decipher, especially using screening equipment. And to counter you're other point, people shouldn't be in a position to be peeking at the screening device anyway. Maybe a quick glance, but if someone is standing at the edge of the security area glaring at the screen, I think that'd be something more worth being concerned about.
Regards,
Steve

"calm" is not "desensitized"

[ScentCone]

That's insane. Images to test their alertness sure, but images of bombs? That's just plain crazy. All you're doing is desensitising them and guaranteeing that even if they're alert they won't get the adrenaline rush they should. What brainiac thought this one up?

The same ones that know that combat simulations help cops and soldier generally make more level-headed decisions. The same ones that know that simulating in-flight emergencies in flight simulators takes the "holy crap!" out of handling such things. There are VERY good reasons that you want your bag screeners to be able to react calmly or subtly to what they see on the screen in front of them. They may need to be able to signal armed support, depending on their assesment of the person in line, without Freaking Out while they're looking at their equipment. These are supposed to be professionals, and it sounds like the person involved acted like one (absent the "this is a test" message).

Re:"calm" is not "desensitized"

[syousef]

*shakes head* I can't believe lots of people are saying things like this. No offence but you have no idea what you're talking about.

To use your own example you don't simulate in flight emergencies on real flights. You do it in a controlled environment usually in a simulator. If you don't have access to that or want to do more realistic simulations you're very careful about recovery conditions (eg. you simulate an engine failure by throttling back to idle, but you don't actually cut your engine).

Similarly its only in the movies that you train soldiers and police by making them think their friend's just really been shot. In the real world you do controlled excercises that are separate to normal day to day operations to avoid psychological trauma and desensitization.

In the case of these baggage handlers they should be able to identify the bomb and calmly deal with the situation but the adrenaline should be flowing nonetheless.

I do agree with you on one thing. Yes the person did the right thing given the circumstances.

Re:"calm" is not "desensitized"

[HardCase]

To use your own example you don't simulate in flight emergencies on real flights. You do it in a controlled environment usually in a simulator. If you don't have access to that or want to do more realistic simulations you're very careful about recovery conditions (eg. you simulate an engine failure by throttling back to idle, but you don't actually cut your engine).

Unfortunately, there are plenty of situations where training has to occur in situ for it to be realistic. Obviously you're not going to perform in situ training that creates a life or death situation and this case wasn't one. At worst, it has the potential to create a very inconvenient situation and I guess that this case turned out to be just that.

As an example of in situ training, when I served in the US Navy, we had the capability of injecting simulated sensor data into the real-time sensor stream of our sonar system. The data is indistinguishable from the real thing, so the potential exists for that information to go out over the world-wide tactical data system. It was an excellent tool for training and to make sure that operators were actually paying attention to the screen - generally speaking, on a surface ship sonar watches are brutally boring, unless there is an actual target to prosecute. The downside to the tool is that if it's not used properly, a whole lot of panic can ensue for a short time (and, since shit rolls downhill...)

That particular training tool was very successful, by the way. It increased the proficiency of the operators significantly.

-h-

maybe this explains the past 5 years

[subtropolis]

Was Diebold involved with this software, by any chance?

Virtual vs. physical tests

[PTBarnum]

Way back in 1986 I had a summer job as an airport screener. Back then it was all private companies, of course, and we all got minimum wage. We didn't have the fancy computerized tests, but the supervisors (and occasionally FAA inspectors), had a collection of fake weapons/bombs that they could slip onto somebody's x-ray machine.

The operator would observe the item, stop the machine, look up, and the supervisor would then inform them it was a test. If you failed the test, you'd be disciplined. Fail too many, and you'd be fired.

You might think that this test would be too easy because you would see the supervisor approaching, but most of the time the operator is so focused on their screen that they don't look at the passengers. Still, there were only a limited number of fake items so you got good at recognizing them. It seems like these new electronic tests have the advantage of offering a much larger variety of images.

On the plus side, if you actually caught somebody trying to smuggle a bomb onto a plane, you were eligible for a massive $100 reward. I always thought the risk/reward ratio of X-ray work was too low, so I preferred to do less stressful jobs like escorting children and disabled passengers.

The Real Explanation?

[buckhead_buddy]

Having lived within broadcast of the metro Atlanta news for decades, I find the explanation that this was just a software glitch to be somewhat suspicious.

Blaming technology is an easy thing to do, and very common in Atlanta. It is an explanation that makes people laugh with frustration and lose interest quickly in the story. Even better, there's no one that has to take the fall and take the blame for the problem. It's a common tactic that's been used a lot. In a city that doesn't want to scare or blame any person or corporation, technology is an easy scapegoat.

Certainly the situation could have been a technology failure. The problem is that it took so long for them to let the public know what the cause was. The security lines were opened, what?, two hours or so after the panic that caused them to be closed. But no explanation then. No explanation came forth until the next day in fact. Either they opened up the security lines when they were unsure of what was on those screens (gleep!) or they knew what the explanation was and knew there was no real security risk. But why keep the cause secret for so long afterward if it was a simple technology error? My opinion was that they needed to find a better scapegoat; and concocting a plausible way to blame technology (as usual) took a bit of time.

While the baggage screeners might not know when random tests are run, their supervisors damn well should. If baggage inspection is a real time operation it'd be tragic if a "test" image with a fake bomb appeared over baggage with a real bomb. While the screeners are in the dark as to when the tests are run, the security system itself should clearly know when the tests are run.

Hey, here's an idea. Cut some metal words out of old scrap metal and make the phrase "This is a test" and put it inside your luggage. I wonder what kinds of things you could get through the screening system :-)

This Braniac did

[Illserve]

What brainiac thought this one up?

Jeremy Wolfe, possibly the world's foremost expert on human performance in visual search tasks did.

You can read about his research on his publications page here.

http://search.bwh.harvard.edu/recent_publications. htm

Check out the one called "Rare items often missed in visual searches. " This research, among others in the field, is funded by the DHS for precisely this purpose. May I add that the turnaround time from primary research to application is excellent. Jeremy and his lab are to be commended as an example of how pure research can contribute directly to the public good.

And why would you want an adrenaline rush anyway?

Great, I can see it now

[hypergreatthing]

A terrorist places a briefcase with a bomb inside on an x-ray machine, then places a plastic box with letters that spell out "This is a test" made out of lead.

How retarded can we get?

Worked for TSA

[Anonymous Coward]

I worked for the TSA for a year and it was important to see the images of bombs and knives and grenades to keep people on their toes. In case you're wondering about the machine itself it's a german machine running linux and is updated by zip disks. So if you want to put new images in, which they do quite often, then it is put in through there.

The bombs by the machine are often obvious and are placed in funny spots where normal packing wouldn't be, so it's usually fairly easy to identify them.

Re:ROFL!

[Pofy]

Depends on what you mean by "bussiest". If by passangers, then yes, it is ATlanta. If you mean by "moevements", that is landings and take-offs, the it is Chicago O'Hare.

http://www.airports.org/cda/aci/display/main/aci_c ontent.jsp?zn=aci&cp=1-7-46^6865_9_2__

How to sneak stuff into luggage

[jridley]

So I can put some handguns into luggage, but I need to cut out the words "this is a test" out of lead sheet and put it in the liner of my suitcase, so it'll show up on the x-ray.

I see the parody now:

[griffjon]

baggage,baggage,baggage,baggage,baggage,baggage,ba ggage,baggage, laptop laptop! baggage,baggage,baggage,baggage,baggage,baggage,ba ggage,baggage, laptop laptop!
snake! snake (this is a test)

And repeat.

Meanwhile, in the airport...

[chamilto0516]

I was there when this happened. They first closed down main security but still had security for the T-Gates open which is like trying to drain an oil tanker with a straw but I think they shut those down as well soon after. Here was the crappy part: they didn't tell you what was really going on. You entered the airport and everyone was standing around and had a different story. About an hour and a half into this, some airport cop (not a whiteshirt) comes up on his Segway with a bullhorn and reads a paragraph that said basically that there was a security incident and thanked us for our patience. That is as specific as they got! They didn't SAY anything. There was no mention of a suspicious device and when they went to open it up, they just dropped the ropes and gave us an "enjoy your flight" look.

They were real good about opening up all the security lanes to clear the backlog. Actually, I had subscribed via web to the airport line monitor service. My first page before I left to the airport was 10 minutes and this was after a buddy at the airport told me to get my butt down there for my flight early. The second page said "over 2 hours", the third was 30-45 minutes and the last said 1.5 hours to get through security. Seems like this is based on wild ass guess rather than more industrial engineering means.

User Error

[aqfire]

I'm guessing that the baggage checker didn't really notice the "This is a test" and called in to report the bomb. He'd be too embarrassed to admit it's his fault rather than the software, and it's so much easier to blame the software and get away with it, because most people don't know how it works.