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HD-DVD and Blu-Ray Protections Fully Broken

gEvil (beta) writes "According to an article at BoingBoing, the processing keys for the AACS encryption scheme used by both HD-DVD and Blu-Ray video discs have been extracted, and a crack has been released. What this means is that there is now a method to extract the copy-protected content of any HD-DVD or Blu-Ray disc out there. This is different from Muslix64's previous crack, which only extracted the volume key for each disc. This new method bypasses this step and allows anyone to extract the data without first requiring the volume key."

106 of 682 comments (clear)

  1. Nice. by FatSean · · Score: 5, Funny

    In five years, when I finally buy into HD television and content, there should be an assload of free content out there to download.

    --
    Blar.
    1. Re:Nice. by alx5000 · · Score: 5, Funny

      ... as if a million RIAA execs cried out in terror and were silenced at once...

      --
      My 0.02 cents
    2. Re:Nice. by Tumbleweed · · Score: 5, Funny

      An 'assload' is the metric name for 'buttload', both of which are greater than or equal to 1 'shitload' or 'crapload', respectively. I know the whole Imperial/metric conversion thing is problematic at times, but you could've at least Googled this before asking such a silly question.

    3. Re:Nice. by stewwy · · Score: 5, Funny

      Its important to be fair and ensure both formats are equally broken.

    4. Re:Nice. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

      Actually, wouldn't the correct metric term be "arseload"?

    5. Re:Nice. by eno2001 · · Score: 4, Funny

      Well, seeing that the average ass on Slashdot is probably about three to four feet wide, two feet high (from a sitting position) and about a foot deep from front to back, that means at most eight cubic feet of HD DVDs ripped and placed online. In reality, I'm not sure what the parent poster was that happy about since eight cubic feet of DVDs is actually not that much. I would have been inclined to say, "Great! This means that when I buy into HD stuff in five years, there should be more HD content online than there have been cocks in porno actress Houston's Yoni. If you catch my drift..." A little more accurate.

      --
      -"...bad old ideas look confusingly fresh when they are packaged as technology" - Jaron Lanier (Digital Maoism on Edge.o
    6. Re:Nice. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      Editor's Note: Houston is a porno actress who was supposed to gang bang 500 men and wound up gangbanging 620 men instead. So the parent post would suggest that only 620 movies would be online in five years. I suspect that there will be many more movies online.

    7. Re:Nice. by jb.hl.com · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Why the fuck would the Recording Industry Association of America care about movies being pirated, precisely?

      (Seriously, I see this far too often on Slashdot. It annoys me. A lot.)

      --
      By summer it was all gone...now shesmovedon. --
    8. Re:Nice. by Kadin2048 · · Score: 5, Funny

      Actually, wouldn't the correct metric term be "arseload"?

      That's an Imperial assload; it's only used in Britain. It's equal to 1.24 U.S. assloads.

      --
      "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
    9. Re:Nice. by fbjon · · Score: 3, Funny
      8 cubic feet gives a cube with sides of 60,96 cm, which fits at least 5*5= 25 stacks of DVDs. With a thickness of 11,2 mm, this gives a total of 1350 DVDs. Turns out it is quite a lot after all, with a slashdotter's ass having a bandwidth of 40,5 TB/load, assuming single-sided, double layer HD DVDs.

      Latency is horrible though, for more reasons than I care to imagine.

      --
      True confidence comes not from realising you are as good as your peers, but that your peers are as bad as you are.
    10. Re:Nice. by 117 · · Score: 5, Funny

      That's an Imperial assload; it's only used in Britain. It's equal to 1.24 U.S. assloads. Your figures are incorrect, the comparative sizes of arse/asses between the two nations means that there are in fact 1.6 UK arseloads to every US assload.
    11. Re:Nice. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

      Actually, it's calculated by the internal volume, not the external surface area. We Americans are lard asses, but the British are full of shit.

    12. Re:Nice. by Xanius · · Score: 4, Funny

      There's also the fuckton and metric fuckton, thus far the heaviest units of measurements I've come across.

    13. Re:Nice. by carlmenezes · · Score: 5, Funny

      Which kinda explains why America is so focussed on oil and British ideas never float....

      *ducks* hehehe :)

      --
      Find a job you like and you will never work a day in your life.
    14. Re:Nice. by Jherek+Carnelian · · Score: 4, Funny

      Why the fuck would the Recording Industry Association of America care about movies being pirated, precisely?

      Because they have a very strong sense of empathy?

      I mean, they are suing grandmas and invalids, how can they not?

  2. OK, time to switch now! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The time has come to make the upgrade.

  3. DVD-JON by otacon · · Score: 5, Funny

    I wish Jon Johansen would have done it so he could be called HD-DVD Jon, or maybe Blu-Ray Jon.

    --
    In a world of acronyms, the words are the real victims.
    1. Re:DVD-JON by morgan_greywolf · · Score: 5, Funny

      Yeah, but now we got HD-DVD Blu Arnezami. That's at least as easy to say and remember as DVD-JON.

      What?

    2. Re:DVD-JON by definate · · Score: 5, Funny

      I wish someone named Charles could have cracked Blue-Ray so we could have Blue-Ray Charles.

      --
      This is my footer. There are many like it, but this one is mine.
  4. drm by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    years to create, weeks to break- sounds about right.

    1. Re:drm by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

      The solution is obvious, we need even tighter, more intrusive DRM!

    2. Re:drm by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Funny

      Sure! Why don't they just hook a padlock through our taints and latch us to a movie theater seat.

      Oh no! Not Howard the Duck again!!! For the love of God!!NO!!!

  5. props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by cpearson · · Score: 5, Insightful

    It puts a smile on my face knowing that a small group of unpaid media hackers are able to crack the AACS encryption scheme what tooks many developers and millions in R&D to create, in just a few short weeks.

    Vista Help Forum

    --
    Windows Vista Help Forum
    1. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

      cpearson,

      It has always been easier to destroy/crack something than to create it in the first place.

      It is not a great undertaking to break a DRM scheme. It is not comparable to cracking strong encryption (which takes lots of horse power). The basic concept of DRM is fundamentally flawed and therefore open to attack.

      DRM by its nature is both widely available and has to function on a user's local device or PC. The wide availability (unlike an encrypted message with a unique key) means the attacker has easy access both the algorithm and protected content. This mathematically greatly reduces uniqueness. One only has to setup the correct environment and observe how it functions with a legal copy. And since the DRM scheme is most likely non-unique on a copy by copy basis the affect instantly cascades. Unlike getting a randomly encrypted file you have access to the algorithm (the software) and you have access to the keys.

      The big issue in DRM is how to obfuscate your algorithm and how to keep people from getting access to the stream in the clear. Both of these tasks are next to impossible to carry out effectively.

      So anyone, even the very same "small group of unpaid media hackers" in question, would have to spend a large amount of effort trying to come up with better and better obfuscation schemes. While cracking the DRM will take far less resources, focus, or time.

      Cracking DRM is more akin to white box QA or reverse engineering.

      All that said I'm secretly glad someone stepped up and did this :-) DRM as it exists today is pointless, useless, and gets in the way of a customers fair use of something they have purchased.

      I'm willing to bet 5 years from now we will see far less DRM in use and those still using it won't be selling as much music or as many movies as those not using it.

    2. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by h2g2bob · · Score: 5, Informative

      Sorry everybody, but it's not.

      That said, they have got a player key now, so all disks published to date can be decoded.

      Each player has its own player key, and each disk accepts any player key in its list (the player key is used to decode the volume key which decodes the film).

      With this player key, they can decode any HD-DVD which has been printed already. However, as the key has now been compromised, future disks will not accept that player key. The software will have its player key updated, but the software will be tightened in an attempt to remove this loophole.

      Take a look at the archives of http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/ for a detailed discussion.

    3. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by Xugumad · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Erm, it's a simple distributed attack. While the group that succeeded was small, the cost (in man hours) of all groups that attempted but failed must also be considered, is likely not a small number.

      I think this is a fundamental problem that the people backing DRM forget. They're massively outnumbered, and it's just a matter of making it not worth the rest of the human population's time to break their stuff. So far, not gone so well for them...

    4. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by slim · · Score: 4, Interesting

      However, as the key has now been compromised, future disks will not accept that player key. Sure they can remove the compromised player key from the acceptable list. But it remains to see whether they'll actually do it. Presumably there's a decent number of blameless consumers already using that player. What's the commercial impact of pissing them off?
    5. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by D3viL · · Score: 5, Informative

      You would be correct, execpt what has been relesed is not the player key. In fact the player (device) key is one of the two that have not been released, the other one being the root key held by AACS LA. The key that has just been released and reusulted in this article is the processing key which can (and probably will) be changed for any disc authored after the previous key bacame known. The key difference is that the player key is linked to the specific player whereas the processing key is specific to the hddvd/blueray discs created with it and will continue to be valid for those discs even after new ones are produced with a new key. Relasesing a device key would be counterproductive as indiviual device keys can be blacklisted meaning if you had one you would have to break a new player device (hardware or software).

    6. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by Athenais · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Or as someone once put it, there is no cryptographic solution to the problem where the intended receiver and the attacker are the same entity.

    7. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by stile99 · · Score: 5, Funny

      Informative? INFORMATIVE?

      Man, you people better hope I don't get this one on metamod (which I suppose now I've tossed out the window, but oh well).

      This is the same head-in-the-sand crap we've been hearing for months now. "It will be ROCK SOLID! No way will anyone ever break it! This is the absolute best, most secure copy protection ever! We fin...wait, what? It's broken already? DAMN!"

      It's dead. You lost. As we all have been telling you for months now. "All is not lost, we'll change the key!" Yes. You will. And in less time than it took you to change the key, and at far lesser expense...we'll get that one too.

      Face it. We're coming to your house. If you take the numbers off, we'll just go to the house with no numbers. If you take the numbers off from the neighbor's house, we'll just come to the house next to the house with no numbers.

      You. Lost.

    8. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by interiot · · Score: 3, Interesting

      The contract for software players could require that players work just like Firefox... when a new version is found, they automatically and silently download it, and when the player is started the next time, they offer to seamlessly install it for the user. From what I've heard, this may be built in to all/most software players, making it relatively painless to force-upgrade software players at least.

      (which would mean that hardware keys are actually more valuable to extract, so maybe that's the hacker community's next step?)

    9. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by Pojut · · Score: 3, Interesting

      No, but they could very easily put the update on newly released discs....with all the space they have, I think they can spare a few zeros and ones to include software that updates the system.

      I wouldn't be suprised if this has already happend at least once or twice.

    10. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by nuzak · · Score: 3, Interesting

      I like Bruce Schneier's aphorism: trying to make bits not copyable is like trying to make water not wet.

      --
      Done with slashdot, done with nerds, getting a life.
    11. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by Mr2001 · · Score: 4, Funny

      You still believe that Mossad/CIA fairy tale? That's just a story The Man puts out to appease the people who are too smart to believe the Bin Laden hoax, but not smart enough to question anything else.

      Open your eyes and see the truth, man! 9/11 was executed by the International Male Models' Union working in conjunction with Major League Baseball. It's so obvious you probably overlooked it at first, but dig deeper. It checks out.

      --
      Visual IRC: Fast. Powerful. Free.
    12. Re:props to Muslix64 and hackers everywhere by Richard+W.M.+Jones · · Score: 4, Funny

      Presumably there's a decent number of blameless consumers already using that player. What's the commercial impact of pissing them off?

      It's HD-DVD/Blu-Ray we're talking about. I bet both of the consumers will be really pissed.

      Rich.

  6. All DRM implementations will be broken. by MartinG · · Score: 5, Insightful

    DRM is fundamentally broken by design. Ciphers of this kind rely on the attacker not getting hold of the key. At the same time, the recipient needs the key to get the data. I can never work because the attacker is the same person as the recipient.

    In effect, DRM is security through obscurity.

    How much longer will we have to put up with this crap before the media companies realise this and stop inconveniencing their customers and wasting our money and time as well as their own?

    --
    -- MartinG To mail me: echo kewyjlcxyzvjfxbqwh | tr bcefhjklqvwxyz .@adgimnoprstu
    1. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by TheSpoom · · Score: 4, Informative

      Indeed. These guys should have listened to Cory Doctorow when he was talking at Microsoft. Unfortunately, it seems they didn't get it either.

      --
      It's better to vote for what you want and not get it than to vote for what you don't want and get it.
      - E. Debs
    2. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by mrsbrisby · · Score: 5, Insightful

      It can never work because the attacker is the same person as the recipient.
      That's why TPM is being pushed by DRM proponents: TPM means your computer no longer trusts you (its owner). It means that someone that can convince Verisign to sign their key will be able to have access to all your secrets- including the ones that you do not. It already happened.

      Forget all that jibber-jabber about whether they have a right to protect their "copyrights", or even if you have any rights to copy: they clearly cannot be trusted with your secrecy and your privacy.
    3. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by spellraiser · · Score: 4, Funny

      Or things could go in the opposite direction. Just wait 'till they hear about one-time pads!

      Of course, that would mean that no one could watch their stuff, period, but hey - at least no one could pirate it either!

      --
      I hear there's rumors on the Slashdots
    4. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by Tumbleweed · · Score: 4, Insightful

      And the problem with TPM is that you still have access to the hardware. If you've got that and enough time and skill, TPM eventually won't matter, either.

    5. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by Tumbleweed · · Score: 4, Funny

      You know, if they go for one-time pad encryption for only the most popular movies, then society would probably be better off. Hopefully they could implement that right at the source - Will Farrell and Ben Stiller themselves encrypted with one-time pads. Yeah, that'd about do it for me.

    6. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by tuffy · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Security not through obscurity would be akin to keeping the decryption key from a third party so that he'll have to try and use brute force to decrypt your data. Much like how web browsers use SSL to keep packet sniffers at bay.

      In the case of DRM, the guy who wants to watch the movie is the same person that the studios are trying to keep from decrypting it. So they try and hide the decryption key in the player so the owner can't find it. Thus, DRM always boils down to finding a way of obscuring the key's location in a big game of hide-and-seek.

      --

      Ita erat quando hic adveni.

    7. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by CastrTroy · · Score: 4, Informative

      Security through obscurity means that you hide the way your security algorithm works in order to make it seem more secure than it is. Take a safe for instance. Security through obscurity would be trying to hide how the safe was designed, and trying to stop the thief from touching the safe in order to prevent them from breaking into it. A safe that doesn't rely on security through obscurity means that you could give the plans to the safe, to show how it's made, and all the mechanisms inside, as well as give him free access to the safe to try to do a bunch of things with it, and you would still be sure that he wouldn't break into the safe, short of using brute force. Common encryption algorithms like RSA are believed to be secure, even though everybody already knows how they work. The only way people know to break them, is to try all the keys. This is like trying every possible combination on a safe, in order to open it. Instead of safes which aren't really secure, that you can break just by listening to the tumblers with a stethescope.

      --

      Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
    8. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by MartinG · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Asymmetric ciphers are not security through obscurity as long as the key is not in the hands of the attacker. When used properly, the whole process is totally transparent and the attacker can see the encrypted data all day long and knows exactly how the system works but still can't get at the unencrypted data. It is not obscured at all.

      Security through obscurity is where the attacker has everything they need to get at the data but they just have a few hoops to jump through. Proper security is where the attacker has no chance because they are missing something (like a secret key)

      DRM gives the attacker the key (because the attacker is the owner of the media and they need the key to play it) but makes some attempt to hide it. All these attacks on DRM do not break the cipher or find a weakness in the crypto algorythm. All they do is find the key (it's in there somewhere) and use it to decrypt the content.

      --
      -- MartinG To mail me: echo kewyjlcxyzvjfxbqwh | tr bcefhjklqvwxyz .@adgimnoprstu
    9. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by tzhuge · · Score: 5, Funny

      Hmm... the logical conclusion is the MPAA needs site security in people's homes so they can prevent access to the hardware. They're probably working on it right now. Maybe some sort of USB powered taser would work?

    10. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by Mercedes308 · · Score: 5, Funny

      I was thinking along the lines of having the hardware on a platform in the middle of an aquarium surrounded by sharks with fricken tasers on their heads.

      --
      And no, I couldn't give a shit what my karma is.
    11. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by dpilot · · Score: 3, Informative

      I wouldn't be quite so optimistic. The difference is that at least some of the people involved in crafting TPM know something about security, as opposed to the people doing DRM and touch-screen voting machines. There has been quite a bit of art and work involved in developing tamper-resistant chips, and at least some of the TPM implementations use this art.

      Of course the devil is in the details. It's fully possible to build an insecure system around a secure TPM chip, and no doubt that's going to be done, too.

      Then again, TPM isn't bad, on it's own. It really depends on who owns the TPM. As long as I own it, it just might be good. The moment someone else owns it, then I merely pretend to own my system that has it, and that's bad. Some time ago, I picked the (M) stuff for the kernel build on my Thinkpad, and have been building them ever since. I've never used them yet, but if SOMEBODY is going to be controlling that chip, I want it to be ME.

      --
      The living have better things to do than to continue hating the dead.
    12. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by bill_kress · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Perhaps the inclusion of TPM in later OSes, chipsets and hard-drives will spur adoption of Linux (which presumably would just not enable such garbage).

      Perhaps TPM is going to be one of the best things to ever happen to our community...

    13. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by Tumbleweed · · Score: 3, Insightful

      But i would imagine that the 'solution' will never filter down to the common man as it will be so complex only a few of us will be able to control our own hardware at that point.

      Well then *fuck* the common man. If you're too stupid to be free, that's not my problem.

      I guess only the smart people get to be rebels. The rest will just be rabble.

    14. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by radtea · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Of course the devil is in the details. It's fully possible to build an insecure system around a secure TPM chip, and no doubt that's going to be done, too.

      Unless you change the laws of physics it is completely impossible to build a secure TPM chip. TPM is an inconvenience, nothing more, just like DRM. DRM, no matter how implemented, involves supplying the same person with:

      a) the ciphertext
      b) the plaintext
      c) the decryption key

      All of those things must be present on the user's system for DRM to work. TPM etc are merely means to try to make it hard for the user to access the key, and they never work. One way of thinking about it is: a TPM chip "hides" certain details inside a little bit of plastic. It is security through obscurity and nothing more, and so long as the chip emits any EM radiation the internal details will ultimately be inferable, although it is doubtful that going so far as reading internal bits via EM fields will be required.

      But if it is, we can all take comfort in the fact that Maxwell's equations aren't just a good idea: they're the law.

      --
      Blasphemy is a human right. Blasphemophobia kills.
    15. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by dpilot · · Score: 3, Insightful

      It's merely a matter of making it hard enough to stop most attacks. By the time you're sniffing on-chip signals with RF, you're way past "most". By the way, on really good secure chips there's a heck of a lot more to the package than "a little bit of plastic." Some "secure chip" packages are designed to keep the chip from being de-packaged, or to at least guarantee that the chip will be "correctly" damaged in the de-packaging process.

      I don't doubt that with a complete lab and some really good hackers, a even well-designed TPM setup can eventually be compromised.

      But I'd also assert that a well-designed TPM setup is WAY beyond the resources of DVD John, the AACS crackers, and maybe even the distributed.net efforts.

      By the way, by that last token, all security is by obscurity, because you're always hiding the key, and ultimately that's a key part of what the TPM does.

      A few quick searches on TPM can strip away most of the arrogance on both sides, the "anything will fall" side as well as the "unbreakable" side. I can't substantiate it here and now, but I suspect that TPM can be good enough to defeat any software-only attack, and would really require significant hardware resources to compromise.

      But the key point in here is a general lack of confidence in the ??AA's ability to do good encryption/DRM. At the moment, they just don't have the mindset for it.

      --
      The living have better things to do than to continue hating the dead.
    16. Re:All DRM implementations will be broken. by JohnFluxx · · Score: 3, Informative

      Just FYI, use of an electron microscope is pretty cheap too. I'm charged £35 ($70) an hour.

  7. Horseshoe racket by RichardDeVries · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Instead of spending billions on technologies that attack paying customers, the studios should be confronting that reality and figuring out how to make a living in a world where copying will get easier and easier. They're like blacksmiths meeting to figure out how to protect the horseshoe racket by sabotaging railroads.
    The railroad is coming. The tracks have been laid right through the studio gates. It's time to get out of the horseshoe business.

    Exactly.
    --
    Error 001
    Security Scan and Virus Detection do not work with your operating system.
    1. Re:Horseshoe racket by melikamp · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Content publishers are the blacksmiths, DVD's are the horseshoes, BT trackers are the railroads. This is the best analogy ever.

    2. Re:Horseshoe racket by Miseph · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Actually, it's a very good analogy. It is intended to show the futility of DRM and copy protections (stopping the railroad) by the media giants who have shoehorned themselves into forced obsolescence (blacksmiths), and point out that perhaps instead of trying to prevent copying, which they cannot do, they should find ways to profit from it any way (railroad tracks are made out of steel, blacksmiths work with steel, instead of making horseshoes, they could make railroad tracks, or even locomotive parts).

      And yes, for the record, I think it IS fair to say that hackers working on ways to disseminate data electronically faster and more efficiently are like the people who first put together the railroads: they are radically changing how we think about moving "goods" and conducting business; they also share some similar personality characteristics, such as creativity (to come up with ways to make things happen), intelligence (or do you think any dumbass can perform either task?), and vision (to imagine a way of doing things radically different than the ways that they are done now). DRM crackers may not be the guys laying the tracks or inventing the steam engine, but they ARE the guys designing comfortable passenger cars, figuring out where stations need to go, and showing people how much cheaper and easier it is to travel by train rather than taking a carriage.

      --
      Try not to take me more seriously than I take myself.
  8. I disagree by TheSHAD0W · · Score: 4, Insightful

    After reading through the article I must conclude that while the author has made decoding current discs easier, AACS has NOT been "fully cracked". The key embedded in the current software may be expired in the future, rendering this method useless for discs produced after that expiration.

    I'm not saying that this isn't a nice event, but we have further work to do.

    1. Re:I disagree by p0tat03 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      The same method used to acquire this key can be used to acquire future keys. All it takes is one determined hacker willing to rifle through his memory addresses for the key.

      I do not see a terribly effective fix for this - your key has to exist somewhere, and even in a CPU register it is still in memory more often than not.

  9. Too funny... by esarjeant · · Score: 4, Insightful

    When will the media industry learn that DRM strategies simply don't work?

    As soon as you can see or hear it, it is then possible to duplicate it. No amount of copy protection will ever be able to prevent that short of preventing consumers from accessing the material altogether.

    Learn to trust your consumers a little and focus on adding value to the material, and then people will buy your content. It might also help to provide some flexibility in the content licensing model, maybe giving people the option to upgrade DVD discs to HD-DVD for the same content may encourage them to continue buying media.

    --

    Eric Sarjeant
    eric[@]sarjeant.com

  10. Can this be fixed? by CastrTroy · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Can this be fixed by revoking a player key? Or is this a more extensive breach like what happened with DECSS? Will this work on all future discs, or does it just work on the discs that are currently being produced?

    --

    Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
  11. Doom9's Forum by yanos · · Score: 5, Informative

    It all starts here: http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=121866&pag e=6

    Later posts seem to confirm that it works for both BR and HD-DVD

  12. industry's response? by bcrowell · · Score: 4, Interesting

    So what is the industry's response to all this? Can they deal with the problem without breaking every DVD player in existence? Is the encryption completely symmetric? Can they start releasing DVDs with new keys, without creating a situation where some DVD players can read old dics, and others can read new ones? Are different keys used in Europe, U.S., etc.?

    1. Re:industry's response? by piquadratCH · · Score: 4, Insightful

      So what is the industry's response to all this?

      Lawyers, I guess.

  13. Now we get to see... by ameline · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Now we get to see how effective the key revocation system (that forms part of aacs) is going to be.

    Should be interesting...

    --
    Ian Ameline
    1. Re:Now we get to see... by awkScooby · · Score: 4, Interesting
      They won't do it. Their bluff has been called.

      Revoking keys would have a huge negative impact on the adoption of HD-DVD and Blue-Ray. Look at the backlash from the Sony rootkit -- that was something a lot of consumers were/are unaware of. It's harder to be unaware of the fact that your $900 dvd player no longer works, or your $2000 HDTV doesn't work. The inevitable lawsuits aren't worth it.

    2. Re:Now we get to see... by AnyoneEB · · Score: 4, Interesting

      They would only be revoking keys used by software players. Eventually someone will probably go through the effort to get keys out of a hardware player, but it is a lot more work to do so.

      --
      Centralization breaks the internet.
  14. All your CRAP are belong to us by sehlat · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I've said before, "safemaker, safebreaker."

    Hollywood gets ONE move in the game: "Protecting" the content.

    The rest of the world gets as many moves as it wants to get around the ConsumerRightsArentPermitted.

    So Hollywood does everything it can to make itself hated by its customers and still expects to WIN this game?

  15. Released Too Early by MrSteveSD · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I think they've made a mistake by breaking it too early. They should have waited until it was much more widespread. Then again, I would imagine it is psychologically virtually impossible to sit on a "breakthrough" like that.

    1. Re:Released Too Early by zappepcs · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Wrong! Break the DRM, Break it early, and break it often. DRM is dead, in fact it was stillborn. The foundational thinking behind DRM (or CRAP if you like) was so 'not right' that it's 'not even wrong' and it isn't getting any better. The more often the *AAs have to fight back with new DRM the more likely it is that we will see who in the governments is getting paid to support DRM, and then we will really have a target to ridicule, impeach, or tar and feather.

      The premise that all consumers are criminals is criminal in and of itself. Bear with me here. It defies logic and law to (analogy time) remove guns from citizens to prevent them from shooting people. It defies logic and good business sense to make .38 bullets that can only be used in guns made by one manufacturer. It defies the intent of the framers of the law in the US to presume that you are guilty until proven so, yet this is exactly what DRM is all about, the assumption that all consumers are guilty or would be if given even half a chance.

      Besides this, governments should not be propping up business models that are antiquated and broken. Desktop publishing put typesetters out of work, did the governments do anything? Trains put buggy makers out of work, did the governments do anything? That is only naming a couple of examples, but the governments seem hell bent on protecting certain industries. I can only conclude that those same governments are being well paid by those industries, for that is the only logical motivation for such infringements on citizen's liberties and rights.

      Now that AACS is cracked, time to follow the money and figure out who is getting paid and expose them as broadly as the DRM keys are exposed.

  16. For as long as... by DimGeo · · Score: 5, Funny

    ... there are developers clever enough to lie to the media companies that this can be done, and then get paid to do it over and over again. :) I kinda like the idea :) :) :)

  17. Open Season? by gEvil+(beta) · · Score: 3, Funny

    from the open-season dept.

    Of all the movies to pirate, why'd Zonk have to choose that one?!?

    --
    This guy's the limit!
  18. The inherent problem... by sco_robinso · · Score: 5, Insightful

    ...As most people know is that you're trying to copy protect an inherently open media format. Even in theory it's very difficult to copy protect media in a widely open, public format.

    Until vastly different technology is available 20 or 30 years down the road, all that DRM is going to amount to doing is preventing the 'average joe' from copying en-mass. They just have to make it difficult enough for the casual user to be deterred from copying the content. Look at the copy protection scheme on the iPod - it's basically useless, but it prevents grandma from copying bulk amounts on content. It's like how photocopiers are not a danger to printed media, as it's just 'too' difficult to walk up to a copier and copy things on mass. The industry just has to make it hard enough to deter joe user.

    The real problem for the recording industry comes in when now people are getting more and more saavy at copying content, and it's becoming more and more common place, and digital media sharing is now common place and digital media is now common place in the living room now. 10 years ago MP3's were just making there way on the scene and basically only very saavy users knew what an MP3 was, let alone what to do with it. What happens when 10 years from now mobile HD video players are just as common as MP3 players, and your average iPod video has a half a TB of flash storage? Copying (High-Def) DVD's at that point will be common place like MP3's are relatively common place now.

  19. The Funny Thing by s31523 · · Score: 3, Insightful

    It's funny, the whole DRM thing really seemed to come on strong after Napster was busted. In an effort to thwart the hackers and file sharing people this DRM thing kicked into high gear, yet these groups of people are probably the most savvy and creative buggers out there. The only people this DRM crap will ultimately hurt is the record/movie companies because the average Joe will just get frustrated when his new $40 HD-DVD doesn't play and gives an error of "unauthorized copy" or some crap and go off and not buy stuff any more. The hackers, I am sure, welcome the challenge and probably truly enjoy this cat and mouse game.

  20. In response by physicsboy500 · · Score: 5, Funny

    New DRM protection methods are now in the works which were cracked last week.

    --
    The original generic sig.
  21. Not Really Broken by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 5, Informative
    The guy just pulled the device keys for windvd and/or powerdvd from system memory. People have already been pulling the volume keys from memory so this was just an incremental step. The keys will be revoked (which really means that future discs will not include support for the compromised device keys, there is no actual 'taking back' of the keys as the word 'revoke' tends to imply).

    One key thing to take away from this is that the authors of the software made it really easy to pull the device keys out of memory for two reasons
    1. They kept them in variables that were physically near the variables for the volume key
    2. They zero-ed them out after use, leaving big gaping holes of zeros in memory in a place where that kind of looked funny, drawing attention to those areas
    If they are smart (and if the MPAA even give them another chance), the powerdvd/windvd authors will reimplement their AACS decryption code to never store the keys in memory. Without double-checking, I believe the keys are only 128 bits, they could be loaded into the SSE registers in encrypted form and then decrypted on chip. The authors will still need to take measures to prevent an OS context switch from storing the registers in kernel-private memory during the period in which the device keys are present, but that is not an extended period of time, presumably they can kick their priority up high enough that it won't happen without hurting the system much.

    Even that approach isn't hack-proof, but it is a lot harder to dump the cpu registers under such conditions than it is to trace memory accesses.
    --
    When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    1. Re:Not Really Broken by spikedvodka · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Even that approach isn't hack-proof, but it is a lot harder to dump the cpu registers under such conditions than it is to trace memory accesses. Not really... If you set up a VM, you can pretty much watch the registers. besides, that data has to exist somewhere in some form to get into the register
      --
      I will not give in to the terrorists. I will not become fearful.
    2. Re:Not Really Broken by TheRaven64 · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Without double-checking, I believe the keys are only 128 bits, they could be loaded into the SSE registers in encrypted form and then decrypted on chip

      Good thing Intel put in those nice debugging registers that let you dump the contents of SSE registers at arbitrary intervals (e.g. after every SSE operation by the debugged process).

      --
      I am TheRaven on Soylent News
    3. Re:Not Really Broken by badasscat · · Score: 3, Insightful

      If they are smart (and if the MPAA even give them another chance), the powerdvd/windvd authors will reimplement their AACS decryption code to never store the keys in memory. Without double-checking, I believe the keys are only 128 bits, they could be loaded into the SSE registers in encrypted form and then decrypted on chip. The authors will still need to take measures to prevent an OS context switch from storing the registers in kernel-private memory during the period in which the device keys are present, but that is not an extended period of time, presumably they can kick their priority up high enough that it won't happen without hurting the system much.

      And the solution the Doom9 guys will use to defeat this?

      Don't upgrade to the new PowerDVD.

      The cat's out of the bag. You can't put it back in now. The new key will be discovered even more easily than the old key, so there's no point even bothering with a key revocation.

      Your solution may make some future DRM scheme for a new media format a little more secure, but it's effectively over for AACS.

    4. Re:Not Really Broken by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting

      You underestimate the problem:
      Lots of media/volume/whatever keys are known.
      If a new (Windows XP) player arrives, with new title keys, it's decryption function will create the same output.
      All you have to do is to look for that output - and you are near the decryption function. Hiding it registers won't help, you might run Windows XP in an emulator, or you could write a kernel driver that generates an insane amount of interrupts and check from every interrupt.
      The only thing that might help is to abandon the idea of
      - Windows XP software players
      - Windows Vista players that play the movie at all if there is a single piece of untrusted software (debugger, performance logging, whatever) or hardware (RDMA capable nic).
      The whole tilt-bit and degrade quality stuff won't help - as far as I see the keys are identical, the degradation happens later.

      Let's wait what happens.

    5. Re:Not Really Broken by Jah-Wren+Ryel · · Score: 4, Informative

      Couldn't you still load the program into gdb and get the register values that way? Or is there something in the modern versions of MS Windows that prevents using a debugger?

      Under most versions of unix, only one debugger can attach to a process at a time. So an easy trick to prevent being debugged is to make the program attach to itself, thus locking out other debuggers. Some unices don't let a process attach to itself, but for those it may be possible to fork a child and have each process mutually debug the other. I'm not an NT programmer, but I would bet something along those lines works the same there too.

      Don't get me wrong, nothing is fool-proof (and I said so in my first post) the best these guys can do is make it difficult. So far, the windvd/powerdvd guys just wiped the device key from memory after use which is about the bare minimum - they could have done lots more without too much effort.

      --
      When information is power, privacy is freedom.
    6. Re:Not Really Broken by plalonde2 · · Score: 4, Informative
      it is a lot harder to dump the cpu registers under such conditions than it is to trace memory accesses.

      You've clearly never worked with a good hardware-assisted debugger. And virtualization makes this scenario possible without debugger hardware support.

      Even more, no matter what, the key has to make its way from the device to the CPU register. On every modern machine that transaction goes through memory. Which means that brute-force tracing from the device to the registers should be able to find it. Not necessarily easily, but quite doable.

      DRM is dead. Let's bury it.

  22. joke is on us by circletimessquare · · Score: 4, Insightful

    yes, we're all laughing because this outcome was obvious to the slashdot crowd years ago. however, the people really laughing are the blokes who sell this drm technology to the MPAA/ RIAA

    why laugh at them when you can steal their money?

    we need a committee of slashdot readers to compile a list of buzzwords and concerns of the RIAA/ MPAA, and then sell them some technovoodoo that doesn't protect them in any way whatsoever (nothing can, obviously), but continues the RIAA's/ MPAA's illusion that drm can or ever will work

    give them their false security blanket, steal their money outright, and then continue to rip them off and drive into extinction the antiquated notion of corporate media distribution channel ownership

    they need us, we don't need them. make that point explicit by bleeding them dry via all possible avenues

    win win! idiots

    --
    intellectual property law is philosophically incoherent. it is your moral duty to ignore it or sabotage it
  23. look at book publishers... by Churla · · Score: 5, Insightful

    People still buy books, including audio books and eBooks, even though photocopier exist.

    I think the recording and motion picture industries need to look at why, and follow that lead. Instead of millions in copy protection R&D, why not spend millions to improve the product? Make the product something people liked owning. (Notice how libophiles obsess over the actual tangible book?).

    The one really viable way to control it would be to mandate that all players have an internet connection and it verify the purchaser has rights to the media before playing it. Of course if people have good high speed connections to the internet there's no reason to buy the physical media, which they recording and motion picture industries simply can't abide with.

    --
    I'm a fiscal conservative, it's a pity we don't have a political party anymore
    1. Re:look at book publishers... by AJWM · · Score: 3, Informative

      And one of the big publishers of e-books, Baen Books, not only doesn't bother with DRM, they make the content available in multiple formats, and even offer entire ebooks free (see the Baen Free Library.) They occasionally put out a CD full of big name SF and fantasy books, and encourage copying (just don't charge money for it). Anything to get folks hooked ;-)

      The authors involved agree that this helps get their names out and generates demand for paper copies and paid-for e-copies of their work. The reduced overhead of e-publishing compared to paper publishing more than covers any "piracy", I guess. The "Baen's Universe" e-magazine pays the authors better rates than the current paper magazines (Asimov's, Analog, etc) do. (Don't know about the book payment side. I hope to find out first hand at some point ;-)

      --
      -- Alastair
    2. Re:look at book publishers... by cdrguru · · Score: 3, Interesting

      The problem is you are confusing analog with digital.

      Making analog copies (of a book) is time consuming and impractical.

      Making digital copies of a book - like a PDF - is easy and is done all the time. Nobody buy e-books, you just download it for free. Because one person paid for it and decided (conciously or not) to eliminate the profit from any future purchases by making it available to everyone for free.

      The problem with digital copies is there will always be someone that is hell-bent on destroying the ability of the original publisher to derive profit from future sales. Happens with software, happens with music and it will be happening more with movies.

  24. Nope, it's really cracked by suv4x4 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    After reading through the article I must conclude that while the author has made decoding current discs easier, AACS has NOT been "fully cracked". The key embedded in the current software may be expired in the future, rendering this method useless for discs produced after that expiration.

    In theory yes, but how easy do you believe it is to update all those specialized video players, all offline?

    Don't forget: the people who buy those already had to put up with paying premium for a HDTV, expensive players, and also make sure the TV, cable and player play together through HDMI.

    If you start demanding they are hooked non-stop to Internet so they can receive the daily patches, it may just be the thing crossing the line of tolerance.

    Also: the hard part is retrieving keys from pure hardware. The new keys come as firmware updates over the network.. it's even easier to update those HD-DVD/BlueRay rippers. After all, you have even the keys they encrypted the patches with: you have the player, don't you.

    All in all, the "super morphing update" ability of AACS seems more like a way for the AACS developers to claim "the war it's not over", when it effectively is over.

    Companies will refuse to use the new keys for their disks, since they will be incompatible with plenty of the players out there, the AACS creators will whine a bit about how "they could fix it but they don't wanna, not our fault", and this is where it'll end.

    1. Re:Nope, it's really cracked by FireFury03 · · Score: 3, Informative

      In theory yes, but how easy do you believe it is to update all those specialized video players, all offline?

      You don't need the hardware to be networked in order to do key revokation - all the current discs continue to work just fine, but future discs will be encoded so they cannot be decoded with this key (this is the basis of AACS key revokation).

      This is definately not "fully broken" - fully broken is when I can use the crack indefinately *without* having to get a new player and extract a key from it every so often. i.e. it involves finding a flaw in the algorithm that allows you to decode the disc without needing to extract any data from a legitimate player to do so.

  25. Here we go again... by Synesthesiatic · · Score: 4, Interesting
    Just like when the iTunes DRM was cracked, I might actually consider buying in these formats now.

    And because of that, when I put my iPod shuffle through the wash I was able to replace it with a good AAC-playing MP3 phone and flip the bird to Steve Jobs. Same thing with these...I want my media in formats I can move around and use to my liking.

    I'm not going to pay for the same content twice, ever. And if I can't get my content in a cracked DRM or DRM-free format, I'll just pirate it. That'll show 'em.

  26. Success! by FreakinSyco · · Score: 5, Funny

    The format war is over! We win!

  27. DRM still helps the DVD consortium by u19925 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Steve Jobs mentioned that iTunes DRM cannot be shared with others since sharing would compromise the integrity of DRM. The DVD DRM was cracked and now the HD-DVD and Blu-Ray are cracked as well. This doesn't mean that DRM is not helping. Even though, the DRMs are cracked, the DMCA protects these cracked DRM systems and prevents commercial products from taking advantage of the cracks. Without the DRMs (even the broken ones) and DMCA, there would have been cheap legal DVD duplicators in the market.

  28. security through obscurity by hAckz0r · · Score: 3, Insightful
    Yes, and just how obscure can a "standard" be? I have been harping on just how stupid the whole concept of DRM is, ever since Sony root-kitted everyone. Even after Gates makes all Windows boxes a "trusted system" we can just dust off the logic analyzers and hack the bios. If that does not work, vm's, and OS emulators will. There is no limit to the ingenuity of a pissed-off geek when they can't play what they just payed good money for, but only because of some arbitrary restriction embedded in the code. Just give a dedicated geek the binary and they will know _all_ the "secrets" about how it works. Thats a given. DRM by design can never logically work no matter how much time, energy, and money the designers throw into it. It is a flawed concept by design.

  29. Books by ragtoplvr · · Score: 4, Insightful

    We have the ability to copy books. Why do we not do that? Because books are cheap enough that it does not pay. Authors can still make a pile of money. Every other industry has went thru this phase. Content has to get less expensive, executives have to be reduced in number, pay cuts happen, then the industry can grow again. Resorting to DRM in any form, will be unsuccessful because, technology will overcome. The first company to recognize this, restructure appropriately, price appropriately, will win. Same as with book, computers, cars, even washing machines. My .02 Rod

  30. arms race by micromuncher · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Once upon a time I worked at a company encrypting CDs for digital data. This was over ten years ago... We too had a staged security, weak protection on key store, stronger protection on packages and data. We knew that the cost involved in high security was too high, from a functional and complexity cost POV.

    First, making the volume information secure, and file content, was pretty pointless because if you had strong security on it, it would be too slow to do anything useful. For the data, you could wait longer, but at the end of the day, all of it was moot because once either catalog or data is decrypted... its there. So, you decrypt on the fly, or use adaptive methods that attempt to hide information, it all leads to...

    The Cost of protection geometrically increases to the linear Time to break it.

    And in the end, all the protection does is buy you a little bit of time, because for every couple of guys thinking up the next best protection scheme, once it hits the world, you have 100+* the resources trying to break it.

    In the end, the best protection we came up with was something everyone hates... a hardware key that imlpemented the decryption, and sell that key with the media. Economically not viable to copy, but still does nothing once unprotected.

    --
    /\/\icro/\/\uncher
  31. The problem by nsayer · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Everyone talks about the big problem being that you have to give the key to the fellow who's going to watch the movie, but even that understates the difficulties facing DRM schemes.

    Recently, I put up a GeoCache puzzle cache. The idea was that folks would have to figure out the puzzle to find out the GPS coordinates of the cache. I was very clever and devious. I was humbled when the thing was found within 6 hours of publication.

    How was it done?

    To make a long story short, it was a "known plaintext attack." Since I am required to publicize a pair of coordinates somewhere within a couple miles of the cache (to make the geocache site's search engine work correctly - so that folks from New York won't solve the puzzle and get screwed when the cache is 2000 miles away), this lets attackers look for solutions that result in numbers "near" the posted coordinates.

    This is what makes movie DRM untenable. Since the format of the disks is publicly known (to insure that UNencrypted disks operate correctly), attackers know that they can discard solutions after decrypting very little of the ciphertext (probably just one byte).

    With sufficiently large keys, even that becomes a huge problem, but the fact that the format of the plaintext is known is still a huge advantage for the attackers.

  32. Re:Yes, someone walk us through this. by hardburn · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Poking around Doom9 thread, the processing key for all current HD-DVD discs was found.

    Looking over some example source code, the processing key is used with the encrypted C value to build the media key, which can then build the volume key, which can then decrypt the disc.

    The MPAA can revoke the processing key, but quoting from the forum:

    Some of you are missing the true meaning of this compromise. If they revoke this processing key, we just take a player compatible with a new processing key, put in one of the titles that's already cracked, and go around in memory looking for the known key. We find it, insert a new title, look in the same place and we have a new processing key.

    Essentially, it becomes a known-plaintext attack.

    --
    Not a typewriter
  33. No different than us web developers by creativeHavoc · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Web Developers and Web Content-Maker-Guys YEARS ago gave the "no right click" a try. We quickly learned that if some one wants the content off the web site, they will get it, so there is no use in trying to introduce barriers that only hurt the casual user. You don't see "no-right-click" scripts anymore, but we are still producing tons of content for the web. Much of it copyrighted, and mostly the copyright honored.

    I can't help but see this as a parent who is all too restrictive with thier child, leading the child into endless rebelion that would have been avoided if moderation was used instead of a billy club.

    --
    insight through the mind
  34. The end of software players? by guidryp · · Score: 4, Interesting

    "I do not see a terribly effective fix for this - your key has to exist somewhere, and even in a CPU register it is still in memory more often than not."

    Ummm, how about no more new keys for software players. As long as there are software players it seems obvious that it will be possible to reverse engineer what they are doing to shake out the keys. But if the industry decides that SW players are too weak, they simply revoke keys for them and don't issue new ones. The end of software players and the end of the risk.

    1. Re:The end of software players? by hardburn · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Lots of people already have next-gen disc players for their PC. They expect those players to play next-gen movie discs, because that's what they were advertised to do. Not allowing them to update keys would likely cause a class-action suit.

      Remember, the next-gen formats are still in their infant stages. Bad publicity now would likely kill them.

      Lastly, the entire justification for the heavy DRM in Vista is that they can play hi-def movies. If there are no more software players, that justification will be shown as bunk (it's bunk anyway, now it will just be obvious).

      --
      Not a typewriter
  35. Print 'em up! by Dunbal · · Score: 4, Funny

    Now it's time to print up all those T-Shirts with the Processing Key:

    09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0...

    Available for just $19.95 ;)

    --
    Seven puppies were harmed during the making of this post.
  36. Its all about the average Joe by PPalmgren · · Score: 3, Insightful

    There is a reason for DRM, even if it inherently flawed in design: to keep the average Joe buying your stuff. If they stop fighting completely, you'll end up with a flopped industry. The bigger the investment they put into DRM, the more returns they get from sales, because not everyone is computer literate. The more technical they make their schemes, the more people they get buying their product instead of stealing it. Gross value goes up, even if net stays the same. Lawsuits and copyright protection are designed to scare the AVERAGE consumer away from illegal activity and narrow the possible copyright infringement targets down to a manageable size, so they can treat it exactly like cops treat druggies: go for the dealers. Copyright protection in some form or another will never die out, because if it does, a larger percentage of the population will steal the product and it will cease being a manageable problem for them.

  37. "...trying to get content without paying for it?" by Anomalyst · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I have paid for every single DVD I own. No good deed goes unpunished, I am repeatedly subjected to unskippable previews, FBI warnings, commentary disclaimers and the same fscking flying logo and equally annoying jingle at 4 places before actually getting to the content I purchased. If I were stupid enough to buy into HD/BR I additionally lose my control over the resolution I want. This isn't about Imaginary Property rights, it's about THEIR control of MY property.

    --
    There is no right to feel safe thru security vaudeville at the expense of everyone's freedom, privacy and tax money.
  38. Re:Economics 101 (was: Cue Nelson) by CyberLord+Seven · · Score: 4, Insightful
    I consider it a victory though I don't have, nor plan to have, a High Definition player. I have an HD TV, and an XBox 360.

    Why won't I buy the $200.00 HDDVD player from MicroSoft?

    Well, I've said it before, and it bears repeatin'...

    I'll buy new content when those ASS-WIPES in Hollyweird stop putting advertisements in front of the movies on DVDs! GODDAMN, I'm SICK of wading through bullshit ads for movies that stopped playing in theatres years ago when I watch an old DVD.

    Pull out your Matrix DVD or your 2001: A Space Odyssey DVD and insert it into your DVD player or PS2. What happens? THE MOVIE starts to play, doesn't it?

    Now try that with any DVD you bought in the last three or four years. Pisses you off, doesn't it? Yeah, me too.

    They can KISS MY ASS! Even though I'm not buying their HD disks I'm still laughing my ass off at this and looking forward to more penetrations of their security. (Hey, this is Slashdot. We gotta' have pron! Just not HD Pron. Pimples and hairs where they shouldn't be. YEECH!)

    --
    We have always been at war with Eurasia!
  39. MOD PARENT Up! by tacokill · · Score: 4, Informative

    This is the real story here. Mod parent up.

    Essentially, what he is saying is this: while the crack is temporary, the method of attack is unassailable under the current model.

    That's whats important here. If keys get revoked, its a trivial matter to go get them again. The hard work has been done. Now all you have to do is follow procedures and -voila- you can crack AACS too.

    Despite other comments on this board, AACS IS cracked.

    1. Re:MOD PARENT Up! by Furry+Ice · · Score: 4, Insightful

      This is assuming the MPAA decides to allow software players to receive the new key. Granted, it would be seriously evil of them not to do so, but we *are* talking about the MPAA after all.

  40. You know, you have to laugh. by Harik · · Score: 4, Insightful

    AACS/CSS/Security through telling people "don't do that" is trivial to implement, for as good as you can possibly get it (fundamental flaw in the design) and they STILL managed to fuck it up.

    Basic concept: Encrypt a disk with a key that only the player has. If the player key is compromised, all disks are cracked.

    "fix" #1: Encrypt the disk content a random key, encrypt that disk thousands of times with a library of pre-generated keys. Assign each player a key, quit putting that key on the disk when it's found to be compromised. Of course, you now have to re-encrypt thousands of keys for every title released, leading to possible exposure of the master database.

    "fix the fix": Randomly create a single "production key", encrypt it with every player key, and give the 'blob' to every HD-DVD production facility. Now exposure is limited to one key that can be changed without exposing the master keylist.

    Except someone was terminally lazy, and only did it ONCE. So EVERYONE USES THE SAME PRODUCTION KEY. Way to go! If you gave each studio their own, then compromises would be limited to a single studio's works (that were produced before the key was changed).

    Worse, you introduce an attack vector to your management that effectively hides it's origin. Any hardware or software player could be compromised, or you could have an inside leak of the key. As long as the exploiter doesn't say "I got this key from Sony's HD-501 player" you have no idea how they aquired it. Basically, they completely and utterly shat on the key-revocation scheme, with no possible solution.

    Whoops.

    Dear MPAA: Please contact me before starting your next hairbrained content protection scheme. You can pay me millions rather then billions and I'll give you one that's not so embarassingly horrible. I'm no cryptogropher, but goddamn, it's not like you hired any security people for anything you've done yet anyway.

  41. Not true at all... by Lanoitarus · · Score: 5, Funny

    The IRS perfected it years ago... Ive been trying to decode my goddam tax return for the past two weeks and I still cant crack it.

    We should just let them handle music distribution... "Put the song title from box 34 into this box, but only on a leap year that ends in an odd number...."

  42. Re:"...trying to get content without paying for it by FritzTheCat1030 · · Score: 4, Funny

    I have paid for every single DVD I own.

    Me too, every one.

    Usually in spindles of 100.