SquirrelMail Repository Poisoned
SkiifGeek writes "Late last week the SquirrelMail team posted information on their site about a compromise to the main download repository for SquirrelMail that resulted in a critical flaw being introduced into two versions of the webmail application (1.4.11 and 1.4.12). After gaining access to the repository through a release maintainer's compromised account (it is believed), the attackers made a slight modification to the release packages, modifying how a PHP global variable was handled. This introduced a remote file inclusion bug — leading to an arbitrary code execution risk on systems running the vulnerable versions of the software. The poisoning was identified by a difference in MD5 signatures for version 1.4.12. Version 1.4.13 is now available."
This was the first sign of trouble: http://i23.tinypic.com/2ezqkht.jpg
...of the breech: "Aw Nuts!"
...I've never made sure to always check my MD5 signatures, but I damn sure am now.
It is by my will alone my thoughts acquire motion; it is by the juice of the coffee bean that the thoughts acquire speed
Whoever decided that sending mail by using squirrels as couriers through these series of tubes is just damn wrong. Even worse, who are these sick bastards poisoning squirrels?
If this were to happen to a proprietary application you wouldn't get an honest answer from the vendor. The bigger the vendor the worse the response.
http://www.maxineudall.com/2010/02/should-economists-be-sued-for-malpractice.html
If the vulnerability was introduced through a compromised account, is there any assurance that that account is no longer compromised? I see no mention of that.
MD5 was on the same server. What prevented the attacker from changing that as well?
If you read the article, or even the summary, it was someone checking the MD5 that discovered the poisioning. So... I'd say it certainly helped.
I love it, it it very nice on eyes as compared to SquirelMail. I do not use if regularly, but I trust it for whenever it is needed.
"Thanks for all the money you paid to us. We've used it to buy off ISO among other things" -Microsoft
Yes. The article is vague, and the title on /. is worse - implies the source repository. It seems people have been easily mislead as a result. Always read the actual article, not a 2nd or 3rd hand summary.
From there:
"The code modifications did not made it into our source control, just the final package. We are currently investigating older packages to see if they were also compromised. "
I, for one, refuse to trust my mail to any creature that can be this devious.
Actually, when 1.4.11 and 1.4.12 were released, they were uncompromised. Sometime after one of the developers' accounts was hacked, and the compromised versions were uploaded.
So, if someone (like your techies) had installed 1.4.12 within a few days of its release, chances are they would have gotten an uncompromised version. I had installed 1.4.12 a couple of hours after release, and after the compromise was found I checked and found mine was an authentic release.
I recently wrote a paper arguing that open source is more secure than closed source because finding and fixing flaws is easier in open source. I'm not sure if this incident supports or refutes that argument. In one post at SquirrelMail's blog, they say that 1.412 is compromised. In the next post, they say that 1.411(released Sept 29) and 1.412(released Dec 5) are compromised. If the time between the first compromised release and the fix is 9 days, nice job. If the time between first compromised release and the fix is 2.5 months, I'm not too impressed. Regardless, it looks like the time between discovery of the flaw and patch is only 1 day, which is pretty outstanding. Why did it take so long to find a MD5 error when the MD5 hashs and downloads are posted right next to each other for several months? Did no one check them for that long? Is this the developer's responsibility, or the responsibility of the implementing community? What measures can be taken to prevent this kind of oversight from happening again? I'm not so worried about the compromise itself - projects will get hacked. But there are safeguards to prevent this exact hack from being too effective, and those safeguards didn't work. Why not?
One thing that wasn't covered in the story...
Yesterday morning it was discovered that the 1.5.1 (development) release had been compromised as well. It hadn't been discovered until then as the hacker had modified a different file in a slightly different way. If you're running a version of 1.5.1 that had been downloaded after sometime in late November, then it would be a good idea to remove it or replace it with a SVN release (which was not compromised).
There's no official announcement yet, but 1.5.1 has been pulled from distribution and an official announcement will probably be forthcoming.
Hope this helps...
Why is this modded as a troll?
Roundcube has great potential, but it isn't nearly as mature as SM. It does seem to be getting better though. The big problem I have with Roundcube is it doesn't have plugins. No plugins = no Sieve filters (avelsieve), which is a big deal to me. No plugins = no other cool things that Squirrelmail has like importing and exporting address books from all kinds of crazy places, no admin plugins, etc...
Someday though. It has always looked and functioned way nicer than squirrelmail, it just needs more backend sysadmin goodness.