Critical VMware Vulnerability, Exploit Released
BaCa writes "Core Security has issued an advisory disclosing a vulnerability that could severely impact organizations relying on VMware's desktop virtualization software. It involves directory traversal using VMware's shared folders, and could allow an attacker access to the host system from a guest VM. Core also released an exploit for the vulnerability."
It only affects the desktop systems. Interesting to see vulnerabilities finally start cropping up in the panacea virtualization techs.
But, this isn't a very big deal.
I have played with the shared folder feature, but never saw any real advantage over just using standard networking (SMB, NFS etc.) Is there some advantage to VMware's shared folder feature that I am too blind to see?
VMware's shared folders mechanism has always been a security hole waiting to happen (VMware's own docs pretty much admit that). I don't use them on servers at all, nor on any desktop where security has anything to do with the reason I'm using virtualization.
So...do we pounce on VMWare for being closed source and therefore _obviously_ insecure, now?
Please correct me if I got my facts wrong.
I always use SSH as transfer between the host and guest environment, yes it is slower but so much saver.
Isn't the purpose of "shared folders" to allow access to the host file system from the VM?
This doesnt affect VMWare server though,which most people use in home settings (given that it is free)
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The site announcing the vuln seems rather respectful. Why on earth would they release the PoC code to the public (non-compiled and thus easy to integrate) instead of just *saying* they had tested and proven it and sent the code and their findings to VMWare? I guess it generates more clicks and thus more ad revenue, but still.
serious, even critical flaw, but still not -that- bad. A short term workaround involves turning off the file sharing feature.
And really, if you are running vmware for high security and server isolation you would NEVER have that on anyway. Because the existence of a shared folder is implicitly not isolation.
And the value in vmware is not 'high security' but 'high utilisation'. The ability to run multiple low load systems on one hardware platform, while not having to worry about package dependency, compatibility, or even that they run on the same OS. And the ease at which you can move one virtualized 'server' to another hardware instance, and other server management conviences.
VMWare as a security mechanism? Its pretty good I suppose. In theory you can approach the same level of security you would have by using separate boxes for the servers. But that's it... you can only approach, you're never going to reach parity, and you certainly aren't going to exceed it.
So VMWare is a security tradeoff... you trade a bit of security for better cash, space, and cpu utilisation.
That said, VMware security is quite good. Its a much smaller attack surface than, say, a chroot jail. But there is still an attack surface. If you want the highest possible security, dedicated hardware behind a firewall is, was, and probably always will be the best solution.
In closing, I'm sure we'll see a proper fix for this in short order.
Last time I checked, the firefox 2.0.0.12 vulnerability was still not fixed. Funnily enough, more than one people in that thread said "given it's firefox/open source/blah blah, we should expect a fix within 24 hours". Like that had happened. And all the other wonderful things to say when you find bugs in an open source project.
A load balanced network of highly available virtual servers running on my laptop...
Does that make me a bad person?
Deleted
Every piece of documentation I ever read tells you that the file sharing feature is risky and to avoid using it. Call me when they find a vulnerability in VMwaretools. I won't be surprised with that either, but other people might. The mere presence of VMwaretools on a OS tells an intruder that there is a bigger fish to catch nearby.
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I understand it's a problem if there are vulnerabilities in the desktop virtualization products. However, I am not sure how many organizations are relying on the desktop products for secure and isolated computing. Enterprises depend upon VMWare's ESX Server and the Virtual Infrastructure products to perform large scale production consolidation where security is a huge factor. In my experience, VMWare Workstation, Server and Player are used as development platforms, where isolation is not as important.
In Beta they enabled their full drag and drop by default, but turned it off-by-default after a storm of protest on the Parallels forums. The reason for the protest is that they implemented the ability to do Mac-Windows drag and drop everywhere (instead of just to and from the Windows desktop) by creating a special magic UNC path that provided full local-user access to the root of the OS X file system.
As far as I know that's still in there, for both drag-and-drop and, if I recall correctly, for their "Coherence" mode where the Windows run in a pseudo-multi-window mode integrated to the Mac user interface.
But for those of us using an ESX environment this is not a problem.
So this might not be so safe after all?
Menus: Linux=function, Windows=vendor, OS X=as little as possible. Makes a statement, don't you think?
Sherlock Holmes has escaped the Holo-deck!!!
I'm always careful to run potentially vulnerable applications like this in a secure virtual environment.
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If I read the description correctly, it's a local exploit - the advisory says it's remotely exploitable, but it sounds like a remote user would have to be able to log into your virtualized system (using something like RDP). It seems like it'd be unusual to allow remote users to connect to a virtualized OS on a desktop.
On those rare instances I run VMware Fusion, it's NATted. Fortunately the main use I have for Windows anymore is just to test web page breakage on IE.
#DeleteChrome
Just goes to show that you should always run VMWare in its own separate virtual machine (perhaps using Bochs or QEMU) to avoid security problems.
-- Ed Avis ed@membled.com
Only Windows hosts are vulnerable. Linux hosts aren't. Why is that?
Answer: On Linux, no MultiByteToWideChar conversion is necessary, so the VMware developers can't screw it up.
VMware developers are at fault, but Microsoft's complicated design shares some of the blame.
Microsoft boasts a great user interface, but the interface they provide to developers (developers, developers, Steve!) is utter crap.
Yeesh.
http://outcampaign.org/
Update: Microsoft is more at fault than I thought. Apparently MultiByteToWideChar decodes overlong forms of UTF-8, thus (irresponsibly, IMHO) violating RFC 3629 and allowing this problem to occur in the first place.
VMware should have been able to trust the OS to do proper UTF-8 decoding.
http://outcampaign.org/
lol.
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If you run one of the affected VMWare products, and have host folder sharing enabled, and run either a piece of software or a trojan horse virtual machine(i.e. that you downloaded or otherwise shared) with exploit code in in it, then that software can access your host machine with elavated privledges to at the very least the same as the logged in user on the host machine, and possibly to the administrator level.
..'s in it that are not filtered out or caught by vmware, and therefore access anywhere on the host machine with the same privledges as the VMware host software.
Essentially what it says is that the vmware host folder sharing mechanism does not properly limit access to the host machine to the mapped folders -- tricks in how MCBS-Unicode conversions take place allow a carefully encoded path to include
Workaround: Disable host folder sharing, and be careful about how much you trust shared VM's and software running on a VM image you build yourself.
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This is like a builder who builds a house without any doors or windows in a bad neighborhood while telling the buyers "YOU DON'T HAVE ANY DOORS OR WINDOWS ON YOUR HOUSE SO DON'T PUT ANYTHING VALUABLE IN HERE" and local burglars taking 5 or 6 years to realize it. You deserve to have all your stuff stolen because you didn't bother to look at your own place or take the builders warnings to heart.
This whole situation couldn't be more irrelevent, just like this comment.
This is a Microsoft only issue. Only the "windows" hosted VMware workstation is affected. Non of the Linux versions are affected. I know it could be considered flamebait, however it's just "clarification".
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