Major ISPs Injecting Ads, Vulnerabilities Into Web
Rebecca Bug writes "Several Web sites (Wired, eWEEK, The Washington Post) are reporting on Dan Kaminsky's Toorcon discussion of a serious security risk introduced when major ISPs serve ads on error pages. Kaminsky found that the advertising servers are impersonating, via DNS, hostnames within trademarked domains. 'We have determined that these injected servers are, in fact, vulnerable to cross-site scripting attacks. Since these servers are being injected into your trademarked domains, their vulnerability can be used to attack your users and your sites,' Kaminsky said, identifying EarthLink, Verizon and Qwest among the ISPs."
I first read it as "Major ISPs Injecting Aids", but then found I wasn't very far off.
Well, I'd say it's domains you can lay claim to by trademark, there's been cases where domain squatters have been forced to turn over domain names. That's generally been when the company has a unique name (i.e. not like apple) that the squatter is basicly just blocking. In any case, I guess the point was just "big, important sides are being faked".
Live today, because you never know what tomorrow brings
forgetting the whole http protocol forever and dusting off the good old Gopher, I bet no ISP has any idea on howto inject into THAT :)
Wow nice that URL above set off my avast scanner. Redirects to nimp.org
Pancakes. Oh I blew it.
Verizon's DSL service, at least in Philadelphia, redirects DNS lookup failures by default. I found this out after mistyping some URL or other. Looking into it, they do have a way to opt out of this "service" -- although if you're not at least reasonably competent with making TCP/IP configuration changes on a home router, don't bother; it involves looking up and modifying IP addresses. Not a big deal to most /.ers, I'd say, but a nightmare for the general public.
Perhaps if there's enough coordinated consumer demand, we could create a market for a certified "standard Internet connection" -- which gives a public IP (static or DHCP) and unfiltered, unadulterated 'Net access -- no port blocking, no bandwidth throttling, no DHCP redirects, no PPPoE or other strange "install-this-software-to-connect-to-the-Internet" schemes. Just gimme a basic 'Net feed terminating in an Ethernet port, thankyouverymuch.
Also, apparently I have yet to "decide" whether I want to choose MSN, AOL, or Yahoo for my "Internet Experience." Such a decision might well take me a while, Verizon...
Paleotechnologist and connoisseur of pretty shiny things.
I can see doing this for nonexistant domains, but doing it for sub-domains is treading on very thin ice. When someone registers a domain they've been entitled to control over all the sub-domains and serving ads on their domain like this could very easily be argued as a major break of trademark law. It was a seriously braindead decision as suddenly it's no longer a victimless crime, and the victims may have the money to afford lawyers in this case.
This is Dan -- glad you're all enjoying!
There's more data here:
http://www.doxpara.com/DMK_Neut_toor.ppt
And this is what I sent (many, many) affected sites:
IOActive Security Pre-advisory: Non-Neutral Major ISP Behavior Injecting Security Vulnerabilities Into Entire Web
Dan Kaminsky, Director of Penetration Testing, IOActive Inc.
Jason Larsen, Senior Security Researcher, IOActive Inc.
Executive Summary: A number of major broadband ISP's have deployed advertising servers that impersonate, via DNS, hostnames within your trademarked domain. We have determined that these injected servers are, in fact, vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting attacks. Since these servers are being injected into your trademarked domains, their vulnerability can be used to attack your users and your sites. Due to recent activity by Network Solutions, we believe this vulnerability will be discovered shortly, and we will thus be unveiling this matter on Saturday, April 19th, at the Seattle Toorcon security conference. We believe that the security hole is reasonably straightforward to fix, either by temporarily disabling the advertising server, or by resolving the error condition that allows Cross-Site Scripting. We are contacting the affected ISP's to address at least the security issue in play. The fundamental trademark violation issue is outside our scope, however, we encourage you to pay close attention to this case, as the fundamental design of these advertising systems requires direct impersonation of your protected marks.
Details: We would prefer to keep the names and mechanisms required for this vulnerability under wraps, at least for the next few days, while the ISP's in question manage and mitigate the security implications of this behavior. We can confirm the following attacks have been verified to work against your site, via this XSS vulnerability:
A) Arbitrary cookie retrieval. Any web page on the Internet can retrieve all non-HTTP-only cookies from your domains.
B) Fake site injection. A victim can be directed to "server2.www.realsite.com" or "server3.www.realsite.com", which will appear to be a host in your domain. We believe any phishing attempts from this perfect-address spoofed subdomain are more likely to be successful.
C) Full page compromise. A victim can be directed to your actual HTTP site, with all logged in credentials, and our attack page will still be able to fully manipulate the target site as if we ourselves were the victim. Note, while we cannot attack HTTPS resources, we can prevent upgrade from HTTP to HTTPS. This may affect any shopping carts within your sites.
We believe this behavior is illustrative of the risks of violating Network Neutrality. Indeed, it is our sense that the HTTP web becomes insecurable if man-in-the-middle attacks are monetized by providers -- if we don't know what bits are going to reach the client, how can we control for flaws in those bits?
We do not believe the vulnerability is intentional, only the injection. We were partially involved in the discovery of the Sony Rootkit some time ago; we recognize this pattern. That case resolved itself reasonably, and we are hopeful this one can be managed well as well. If your technical, press, or legal staff has any comments on this matter, please feel free to contact us at dan.kaminsky@ioactive.com. This is a matter that strikes at the core of the viability of HTTP as a medium for business, and we are committed to defending this medium for your operations. Thank you!
Yours Truly,
Dan Kaminsky
Jason Larsen
Couldn't a company "fix" this by setting up wild card dns so that any "mistyped" url will still get resolved by DNS, thus making this particular attack/injection by the ISPs impossible?
Also, the company could display ads, or some other thing on THEIR DOMAIN, instead of letting the ISPs do this?
Would this be horribly wrong if the companies themselves (ebay, paypal, etc) were displaying ad pages for subdomains?
Any site owners who don't want ads injected into their pages can place a copyright notice in small print at the bottom of each page, saying something like:
It would take just a few site owners to add these notices and get injunctions served against any ISPs indulging in page-tampering, for ISPs to give up on the whole deal.
-- In the beginning was the WORD, and the WORD was UNSIGNED, and the main(){} was without form and void...
do not click.
DRM: Terminator crops for your mind!
Actually, the copyright owners of said domain CAN, and SHOULD demand ALL revenues that the ISP derived off of the serving of said ad pages, and any other related income they received as a result of said copyright violations.
I keep saying, this is like the NAFTA and WTO, they can be tools for the masses or for the masters, but so far, only the so called "masters" have used them. Peons will be peons.
" What luck for rulers that men do not think" - Adolf Hitler
Oops, did I forget to mention?
By hijacking the website, ANY possible damage that is incurred by the person visiting the website, that could not have occurred from said website, can and should be used to hold the injecting ISP's liable for "fraud", "wire fraud", "internet fraud", "conspiracy to commit fraud", "electronic fraud" along with any "accessory to fraud" charges that can be used. It isn't double jeopardy if they are tried for criminal trespass to chattel, though that might take someone with more knowledge of common law copyrights than I have. So hit them for criminal charges, and then sue them for damages.
One big ISP getting put out of business would teach the rest a pretty important lesson. "Stop fucking with Joe, he fucked back without even needing a lawyer. Joe's not very nice to assholes who impersonate him and put his customers at risk."
" What luck for rulers that men do not think" - Adolf Hitler
You realize OpenDNS also throws up ads when you mistype a URL, right? That includes subdomains, by the way.
I just read Slashdot for the articles.
http://www.cgisecurity.com/articles/xss-faq.shtml
Believe me, if I started murdering people, there would be none of you left.
Hmmm. I've seen a lot of these troll redirects recently. Is there a way that Slash can display the domain that the link is redirecting to instead of the domain of the link itself? So far all of these links have the redirected domain somewhere in the URL, which is how I've been able to avoid them.
Duped? I feel duped, but not in that way.
I have been trying to get an article about Phorm onto the front page for ages.
Maybe I should have tried this angle.
How about a compromised adserver on the Phorm network?
Every BT, Virgin and Carphone Warehouse customer would have malware foisted upon them by their ISP.
News for American nerds, maybe. UK nerds might like to know about things like this without having to check the Phorm files at El Reg.
Do not meddle in the affairs of geeks for they are subtle and quick to anger