An Education In Deep Packet Inspection
Deep Packet Inspection, or DPI, is at the heart of the debate over Network Neutrality — this relatively new technology threatens to upset the balance of power among consumers, ISPs, and information suppliers. An anonymous reader notes that the Canadian Privacy Commissioner has published a Web site, for Canadians and others, to educate about DPI technology. Online are a number of essays from different interested parties, ranging from DPI company officers to Internet law specialists to security professionals. The articles are open for comments. Here is the CBC's report on the launch.
How would the authorities like to be deep inspected?
It's a hacky technology to implement QOS because folks don't like setting the QOS bits and protocol in the headers. Usually because some Microsoft firewall only allows http on port 80 (;-))
It's the use of it by the famous "men of good will but little understanding" that is bad, plus of course the use of it by men of ill will.
--dave
davecb@spamcop.net
Taking a quick look through the content at the government site, I must say I'm surprised. CC licensed content, links to external resources, a collection of international points of view. I'd be truly impressed if they'd managed to get all these folks in a room together.
Regardless, kudos to Canada for hitting the 21st century.
And I was doubly impressed to notice the absence of web beacons / analytics scripts.
inspect this! ... askjdkasjdlajsldkjaskl djaksjdklasjdklajsldaskljdaljdaslkdjalkdjalsdj ... \
D.I. is neither good or bad, it is the illegal or immoral application of the technology that is the problem. I really am amazed that no-one on a technology site noted that the heart of the debate on net neutrality is free speech, not deep inspection.
Oh, must be in the wrong thread...
Doesn't a good encryption system stop DPI from giving any useful information?
"If any question why we died, Tell them because our fathers lied."
You go for DPI.
I go for encryption, SSL, and HTTPS. Even my slowest home system can easily handle this.
"It's the height of ridiculousness to say for those 9 lines you get hundreds of millions."
Charge more for higher QoS. Give a discount for lower QoS.
MITM's. The answer to this is SSL ofcourse, and "don't allow SSL exceptions". (Don't run with scissors)
But there has to be a better way for establishing the 'CA - domain' trust. Why isn't the trust chain 'ICANN CA - country domain operator CA - registrar CA - domain'?
But first you need DNSSec anyway, otherwise you can validate the PKI chain, but not that everybody is who they say they are. (For example: Registrar CA's should only be valid on DNS records where they are listed as the Registrar.)
After that, default to https and deprecate http for bonus points.
Unencrypted data will always get you in trouble. There is no reason in the year two thousand and nine to send or receive anything over the internet without encapsulating it in a SSH or SSL tunnel. Whine all you like about performance hits, but if the technology has reached the point where your residential ISP can look inside every packet you send to see what's there - in real time - then the point has come to spend some processing power on protecting your data in mid-flight, or invest in some encryption hardware.
I'm more than half convinced that this is how everything =inside= a LAN should communicate with each other, too. The firewall should allow port 22, port 443, and drop the rest.
While we're at it, everything should be firewalled right at the VLAN, on the switch.
As the DPI box has access to, and holds records of, an extroardinary stream of data that mnust make it an incredibly tempting target for hackers. What have they put in place to prevent it being compromised?
.. boggle my mind.
Here's what I say to all you paranoid conspiracy freaks ..
go ahead and encrypt your dang traffic. The Internet companies don't really care about the CONTENT of your traffic.
Rather, they want to know what TYPE of traffic you're using - file transfer, web browsing, voice, video.
You think I'm wrong that they don't care about your content. I'm sure you think I'm wrong - because every one of you posting on this thread is f*cking paranoid.
But I can tell you first hand - they don't give a damn.
You also don't want them using DPI to sell you stuff, or to hinder access to competing products.
Fine .. they all provide opt-out capabilities for sales pitches .. and simple legislation would suffice to keep them from slowing down, say, skype, on their network.
They can do many legit things with this data. For example ..
1. Yes, they can set the QoS for you, so that video and voice can be allocated high priority, low latency resources, while file transfers can be assigned to more appropriate resources.
2. They can trend the patterns of traffic in their network, fine tuning it for the type of data being sent, and adding capacity prior to bottlenecks occurring.
3. They can more precisely understand events on their network - e.g., associating the release of a new version of some browser, or video player, or VOIP tool, or social website, etc. with a sudden rise in traffic on their network.
For them, it is all about understanding what TYPES of applications run over their network. It is NOT about reading your email or facebook profile - they really couldn't give a sh*t about that.
So, DPI technology has the potential for abuse? Sure .. and I'm sure some countries will try to take advantage of that.
Does that frighten you? OK .. then by all means, go ahead and use encryption and port hopping !!! Contrary to what 99.99% of you on this board believe - encryption and port hopping won't prevent DPI and similar technologies from identifying WHAT you're doing. It does hide the content, for sure - which is what you want, right?
So, buzz off already about this net neuter stuff. You can have your privacy. The companies can have their trending analysis tools. These things are NOT mutually exclusive.