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Early Abort of Ares I Rocket Would Kill Crew
FleaPlus writes "From studying past solid rocket launch failures, the 45th Space Wing of the US Air Force has concluded that an early abort (up to a minute after launch) of NASA Marshall Flight Center's Ares I rocket would have a ~100% chance of killing all crew (report summary and link), even if the launch escape system were activated. This would be due to the capsule being surrounded until ground impact by a 3-mile-wide cloud of burning solid propellant fragments, which would melt the parachute. NASA management has stated that their computer models predict a safe outcome. The Air Force has also been hesitant to give launch range approval to the predecessor Ares I-X suborbital rocket, since its solid rocket vibrations are violent enough to disable both its steering and self-destruct module, endangering people on the ground."
As nasty as it sounds, it'll be an awesome sight to watch. Maybe in some movie..?
Does this mean they're pro-life?
Spaceflight was so much easier forty years ago...
If I'm reading this right, the Air Force is saying that in the event of a complete failure (ie, the entire thing going to hell all of a sudden) the chances of survival would be zero.
This doesn't really indicate that chances of survival would be zero in all possible emergency abort scenarios.
"linux is just DOS with a UNIX like syntax" -- Galactic Dominator (944134)
~100%?
The Old NASA wouldn't settle for anything less than =100%!
THL phish sticks
Well, there's a nail in Ares' coffin, so to speak.
By contrast, NASA is a highly political organization. It hires on the basis of affirmative action. An African-American with a degree from Texas Southern University (which is barely better than a typical ghetto high school) will be promoted before an Asian-American or a European-American with a degree from Caltech. The quality of reports and studies issued by NASA is quite low.
Slide 2 Lower Right "CAPSULE IS HERE"
Feel free to draw your own conclusion.
In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is usually crucified.
The specifics of this issue aside(since I know next to nothing about modeling solid fuel rocket explosions, and two experts appear to disagree, along with a snide comment from a commercial outfit that would probably like the contract for themselves), what sort of safety should we bother shooting for with launch systems?
Obviously, if we have the choice between a more safe and a less safe system we should, all else being equal, chose the more safe one. However, all else is rarely equal. More safety likely adds weight, design time, cost, whatever. How much safety is worth adding, before we get to the "For fuck's sake, dude, garbage collectors die on the job at twice the rate, and being crushed in a dumpster isn't exactly a blaze of glory..." point and live with the risks?
Is there some direct assertion to be made(astronauts should suffer no more than X risk, period)? Should we take an empirical look at the risks of various occupations, and peg the acceptable astronaut risk as equal to that of some similar occupation for which an empirical actual risk value is available? Should we accept very high risks; because astronauts are highly likely to be well informed volunteers who have plenty of life alternatives?
Pushing for perfect is chasing a dream. Deciding what we should be aiming for seems much more relevant.
The problem is that a parachute with a low melting point enters a region with high temperature particles. Solution: increase the melting point or move the parachute away. IIRC, in the case of an abort, the capsule is lifted away from the rocket by using additional thrusters. If they were allowed to operate for longer, then they would move the capsule further away from the flaming debris.
I have no doubt that the Ares engineers will quickly solve this (if they haven't already).
By contrast, NASA is a highly political organization. It hires on the basis of affirmative action. An African-American with a degree from Texas Southern University (which is barely better than a typical ghetto high school) will be promoted before an Asian-American or a European-American with a degree from Caltech. The quality of reports and studies issued by NASA is quite low.
what's the worst that could happen? :)
How did NASA (Need Another Seven Astronauts) manage to make a replacement for the Space Shuttle that is actually more dangerous to the crew than a Space Shuttle with loose heat absorbing titles or malfunctioning O-Rings?
Was this "design flaw" in the Apollo series and the public was not made aware that aborting an Apollo rocket would kill the crew 100% guaranteed?
Remember, Slashdot does not have a -1 disagree moderation, and no, troll, flamebait, and overrated are not substitutes.
Why not just equip the crew capsule with retro rockets?
...Oh, right, the exploding part. Is there any powerful form of lift that doesn't require exothermic reactions and isn't privy to melting/boiling/exploding?
I read TFA and all I got was this lousy cookie
It's amazing that after the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo successes we can't seem to figure out how to make heavy lift rockets. This is nearly 40 years after Apollo was canceled. The Saturn rockets were real workhorses yet with all the advances we can't match them. I have to wonder if it's more beaurocracy than technology.
folks it was built by the LOW BIDDER - what on earth would you expect - the design has been an abortion since day 1 and has had problems with virtually every single subsystem.....
After all, it's a replacement for Space Shuttle, isn't it? *ducks* (But seriously, Russians really got this right. You just *don't* put people on top of a big solid propellant booster if you want them to survive.)
Ezekiel 23:20
How much risk is acceptable? Is the Air Force suggesting that space exloration should be 0% risk, or less?
If so, then we should probably ground all aircraft, scrap all automobiles - you get the idea.
Let's face it. Sitting on top of tons of explosive, and lighting them off, is going to be risky. Minimize the risk, yeah, but there will always BE RISK. It doesn't matter what kind of engine you are using, or what kind of fuel it is using. A crash within the first minute of flight is often quite deadly in aviation simply because the pilot has so few options for ditching or bailing out. The same will always be true of spaceflight.
If we want 0% risk, we had better get started on that space elevator. Of course, there may be some hidden risk at some point in that ascent - but at least we won't be blowing it up to use it.
"Windows is like the faint smell of piss in a subway: it's there, and there's nothing you can do about it." - Charlie Br
Here's the straight-talk version:
"Welcome to NASA. We're going to send you into space, but this involves sitting you atop something that's basically a big stick of explosives. We're aiming for a controlled burn, and most of the time we get that part right, but as you're probably aware, every now and then something does blow the heck up.
Now, as you might imagine, if you are sitting atop a big stick of explosives, and it blows the heck up, you probably go with it. We're going to try to give you some kind of an out so that the explosives can blow up without you doing the same, but we want you to know it's not really going to make your odds all that much better."
I mean, seriously, folks. People don't sign up to be astronauts without grasping that there's a very real risk of death at pretty much every point in the mission.
Village idiot in some extremely smart villages.
I sure would like to see the numbers which show how the solid fuel debris velocity compares with the velocity imparted to the capsule by the launch abort system.
it would be in the Orion coffin, not an Ares.
I prefer the "u" in honour as it seems to be missing these days.
Ares is simply a disaster and rehashing old designs to shoddily heavy lift payloads into space is plain wrong if you expect to try and get into space on a regular basis. Don't get me started on how stupid solid rocket boosters are. You need something that you can control. It's yet another disaster waiting to happen after the Shuttle. There is no way in this day and age after fifty years that getting in space should involve a completely irreversible, one way process of lighting a solid rocket booster.
I believe others have pointed to the lack of scientific talent and and lack of merit within NASA these days and we're seeing the results.
From TFA:
.5% of reality and I will consider apologizing to Mr. Hanley.
/ATK, I'm looking at you.
"But Jeff Hanley, who manages NASA's Constellation program that includes the Ares I, questioned the validity of the Air Force study because it relied on only one example. He said NASA had done its own study, using supercomputers to replicate the behavior of Ares I, that predicted a safe outcome."
Allow me to translate this:
"[...] He said NASA had done its own study, *USING NO EXAMPLES AT ALL WHATSOEVER*, that predicted the results that NASA required for further funding."
Show me that 'the supercomputers' model the Air Force's one example to within
I am incredibly passionate about space flight. The incompetence and political gaming which has produced the fiasco that is the Ares has not caused me any surprise. From the moment NASA decided on solids for a manned vehicle I knew that, without question, the advancement of the state of the art was not going to come from NASA. Ares isn't about space travel. It's about government subsidies to existing aerospace contractors. Thiokol
oh...wait
Table-ized A.I.
"NASA management has stated that their computer models predict a safe outcome."
-In retrospect, NASA also predicted the safe outcome of the last Challenger launch.
"It's time they you take off your Engineering hats and start putting on your Management hats."
- Famous last words. Unfortunately, with the current disagreement brewing, I think someone at NASA must have uttered those very same words, not knowing what trouble they can cause.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think NASA has all the elements for the Perfect Storm:
1. Underfunded,
2. Overzealous and overbearing management,
3. Overconfidence,
4. Massively complex, high-risk mechanical systems,
5. Career managers making critical decisions, instead of career engineers,
6. Over-valued managers,
7. Under-valued engineers.
Ever notice how when something goes wrong at NASA, it almost always results in a massive, explosive failure, along with several deaths?
Oh well. This conflict will give the networks something to scruitinze instead of endless "specials" on the life and death of some freaky-deeky nutjob pop singer.
Knowing Google's lust for data collection, the Soviet Union is still alive and well inside the psyche of Sergey Brin....
Really? This was modded troll? I've never really cared enough to ask about my moderations but this one bugs me. What is my motivation to post if it might get randomly modded troll and never see the light of day?
Sorry I'm just tired after a long day.
-b
No offense, but I've stopped responding to AC's.
Retro-Rockets. Those are the rockets with the orange shag carpet, right?
They are so last century.
Not that I know a thing about rocket science (or the science of destroying them in spectacular fashion) but --IF-- this prediction were true,
could Nasa not come up with an alternative way of slowing the capsule down, such as gliding in some way? Maybe even use shape charges
to blow debree/bits-o-exploding-rocket away from the capsule? -- A bit like fighting (uncontrolled) fire with (controlled) fire..
Again, I don't claim to know anything about anything.. Just typing random thoughts..
This is only the latest in a long line of technical problems with Ares I, to say nothing of all the delays, cost overruns and other management issues.
First, they discovered an oscillation issue from the SRB that could cause damage to the upper stage and the orion capsule. Last year, they found out that with a slight wind gust, the vehicle might collide with its launch tower.
Incidentally, both of these problems and the current one are all related to the SRB. President Obama needs to do the right thing here and kill Ares I before it has the chance to kill anyone.
for Mythbusters. I can hardly wait for the YouTube video.
Sorry, but gray text on gray background is making my eyes bleed.
I've been pointing out this for quite a while. Despite the advantages of sitting on top of the stack, there still are, and will probably always be, certain flight phases where an abort is less than 100% survivable. A full minute is significantly longer than I expected for early boost. But there are probably significant times later in flight where aerodynamic forces make the reversal following an abort maneuver problematic.
Support SETI@home
A liquid-fueled, multi-stage rocket and their dragon capsule uses an ablative shielding?
While Ares I is years off, spacex has already successfully tested the first stage of the Falcon 9 and are on schedule for a Falcon 9 launch later this year,
and a Falcon 9-heavy which will be able to do most anything Ares I can do cheaper and safer will be launched in 2010.
Its one company, and one guy running the company with his own money for a hell of a lot less than the Ares I.
http://www.spacex.com/falcon9_heavy.php
Unlike NASA they learn from their mistakes, and dont put politics before safety and reliability.
Also because its liquid fueled you can shut off the damn rocket at T-0:00
Yes they have already launched Falcon 1 rockets and used those rockets as the basis for updating the designs
of Falcon 9 and Falcon 9-heavy
100% chance? That's almost a 99% chance! Quick place your bets!
(be gentle mods, I thought this was funny)
Help fight spam
That said a small leak in the solid rocket motor O-ring seals wasn't anything to be alarmed about. The same NASA that said we've seen foam strikes on the shuttle for years without any problems, so don't worry about it. NASA has a problem, too many politicians control nasa instead of "missile men".
If it's any consolation, a lot of the engineers that are actually working on the project think it's a mess as well. A friend of mine works on the team designing the launch tower, and they're pulling their hair out over these problems.
Please stand clear of the doors, por favor mantenganse alejado de las puertas
This AC is unambiguously WRONG about DoD policy regarding affirmative action and equal opportunity.
I normally ignore these racist rants from ACs but since it has been modded up as informative by unsuspecting mods, I will respond in brief.
ALL branches of the military have policy and guidelines in place for recruiting, retainment and training of disadvantaged minorities. This is unequivocal FACT.
These policies and guidelines are open and fully available to the general public:
Army: http://www.aschq.army.mil/supportingdocs/p600_26.pdf
Navy: http://neds.nebt.daps.mil/Directives/5354d3.pdf
Air Force: http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/36/afpd36-D2/afpd36-D2.pdf
Marine Corps: http://www.29palms.usmc.mil/base/safety/eo/pdf/EO%20Terms%20and%20Definitions.pdf
Some of these are not the official policy/plans but are official documents that do refer to them. I'm not going to burn up the rest of my Saturday night looking wasting time responding to this AC but hope this is enough for those who might believe there is even a shred of truth to this AC's post.
The fact that so many who have served are not aware of the existence of these policies is a testament to the policies' effectiveness. This is one of the few policy level implementations that the military has done right. By the time promotion boards roll around, it is either transparent or nearly transparent to the board members.
I will remind those that care that the "Military" amicus brief filed by military leaders in 2003 during the Grutter vs. Bollinger (University of Michigan) was cited by the Supreme Court as being one of the strongest arguments in favor of affirmative action in higher education.
I would hate to be under a 3 mile cloud of shit burning and hitting the ground.
There may be simple solutions to this. First, fire the escape mechanism, then order the rocket to self destruct AFTER the astronauts are clear. It appears that the Air force example didn't do that (since there were no astronauts to protect). The most common reason to order the destruct would be a guidance failure, that is, it's deviating from it's programmed trajectory. At that moment, fire the escape system. Rocket continues rising (in the wrong direction, but generally up). Then blow the rocket up.
Another option would be nice, but might require significant re-design. The abort procedure is to ignite the second stage and arc away from the booster. If necessary, the lower segments of the booster might be separable as well to reduce it's thrust so the second stage can get away.Then destroy the booster. Since the second stage cannot make it to orbit, NOW fire the escape rockets and then destroy the second stage once the astronauts are clear. This will not work for the Ix since it's second stage is a dummy.
The Air Force's study is based on a real world example, a Titan IV with strap-on SRBs, one of which failed spectacularly. Based on my reading of the "report", in reality a short slide set, I believe the analysts neglected the Orion LAS, and assumed the crew capsule follows the same ballistic arc as the burning fuel debris.
The launch abort system (ideally) imparts an added 5 seconds of forward velocity to the capsule, which I'd hope/think would be enough to pull the crew beyond the ballistic path of the shell of debris.
Luke, help me take this mask off
Do you have a reference for his statement? Not doubting you, in fact I believe that he probably did say it. I just want to see the quote and any additional information. Hanley was also quoted as saying the likelihood of an Ares failure was about 1 in 3000 (see Orlando Sentinel or Florida Today) which is complete nonsense.
Our founding fathers removed the guys in charge. Be American. Vote incumbents out.
Ignore what I said about the reference. I saw the comment in the article.
Our founding fathers removed the guys in charge. Be American. Vote incumbents out.
Speaking as someone who was once in the industry, you don't have to blow up the solid rocket booster. All you have to do is 'vent' it. The way range safety works (or at least how it worked in my day) is that there is a predetermined area that the rocket must stay in during its flight so that if all propulsion is shut off it won't land anywhere where there are people. If the propulsion is still applying thrust, then all bets are off--it could land anywhere including in a crowded city. Thus the destruct system only has to shut off the propulsion, under command when it is noticed that the rocket is heading out of the range safety area. It is burning and thrusting out one end, so blow a hole in the other end or along the side and it no longer has any directional thrust. Solid rocket boosters get a bad rap. They did not explode during the Shuttle disaster. I repeat, they did not explode. Look at the old videos. Because of the O-ring issue, they sprung a leak of flame, which ignited the liquid fuel, which exploded. After the explosion, the now free solid rockets flew off in random directions, after which, I assume, the distruct command was initiated to vent them so that there would be no net thrust, as I explained above. They -never- exploded, even after the liquid fuel exploded right next to them--they kept right on working. Solid rocket boosters are much, much safer than liquid fuel. The only issue is that you can't shut them off. But you can vent them in an emergency which has the same affect.
Do you have a reference for his statement? Not doubting you, in fact I believe that he probably did say it. I just want to see the quote and any additional information.
Here's an earlier similar quote, from June 7:
http://m.floridatoday.com/news.jsp?key=218238
But NASA says new supercomputer analyses will prove the Ares I launch abort system would do its job, propelling the Orion crew module and astronauts safely away from a dangerous maelstrom of fire and debris during an emergency.
"We feel we have a very, very, very safe first stage. Very reliable," said Jeff Hanley, manager of NASA's Project Constellation, which is developing Ares rockets and Orion spacecraft in an effort to replace retiring shuttles and to ultimately carry astronauts to the moon by 2020. "We think we have a very robust design for the abort environment."
Of course, most of these comments are made pseudonymously and should be therefore be taken with a grain of salt, but they're still quite interesting:
http://www.nasawatch.com/archives/2009/07/ares_doubts_con.html
Sources report that Steve Cook and his team were preoccupied on Friday with the ramifications of this report going public. Several meetings were held on Friday and another was planned for Saturday morning. Lots of finger pointing and asking questions along the lines of "who knew what and when did they know it?" and "how do we respond?" was reported to have happened on Friday. A briefing is being prepared for NASA Administrator Bolden for presentation as early as Monday.
http://www.nasawatch.com/archives/2009/07/usaf_orion_crew.html
When people at MSFC tried to discuss this in 2007/2008 "Niki the aborts manager" shut them down and made sure two most vocal left the group.
Space flight needs to get to the stage where it is not dangerous. It should be routine and boring and reliable.
Stick Men
Solid rocket motors, however, tend to "go to hell all of a sudden" in a rather spectacular way. "Sucks to be you" is really their only failure mode.
The challenger SRBs worked perfectly with a leaky O ring. Solid motors can't explode because their fuel only burns at the surface. Liquid fuel can turn into explosive if it becomes an aerosol. Solid rocket motors are about the simplest motor you can make. They are very reliable.
http://michaelsmith.id.au
Those silly rockets haven't changed one bit!
"I got it all together but I forgot where I put it."
I am thinking that it may be a good time to start buying stock in Space-X.
Liquid 1st stage is always a better option as you can throttle the danged thing a lot better than the solid pocked which is pretty much start and hope to god it works all right.
I think that a liquid 1st stage built from space-X would be a whole heck of a lot safer and less vibration for the crew and in the case of abort the engines can be stopped letting the escape rocket system pull the capsule ahead of what burning debris of the liquid rocket is left...
A Delta IV or Atlas whatever may work if they really want to keep their solid booster rockets as those are used today wuith pretty good success, not man-rated though, but probably safer than the roman candle that is the Ares-I.
So are there any plans for a fall back?
Tsukasa: All I really want, is to be left alone...
One of the NASA designs from long ago had a "parachute" made of stainless steel cloth that slowed the capsule during reentry...
I see a simple solution: get NASA management to climb into an Ares themselves and demonstrate, if they're really that confident.
GCHQ Quantum Insert installed. If only our tongues were made of glass, how much more careful we would be when we speak
Someone has probably mentioned this but I can't be arsed to look at everyone else's comments:
What do you bet NASA didn't do their conversion to metric right in their computational modeling?
one two three four five ?!! That's the combination on my luggage!
Rugged.
Long shelf life.
Tend to explode on impact.
What more could you ask for
more cowbell
Without understanding the manner in which the policies and guidelines that I am talking about are applied, I cannot take you seriously.
The trouble here is that you are having a knee jerk reaction to what you think is an inherently flawed system, without having put any thought into how such system can be applied without "evaluating individuals based on skin color and race."
The question that needs to be asked, evidently one which you have not asked yourself, is "in what way can disadvantaged groups be assisted without lower standards of evaluation?" If your first and only reaction is not "Impossible! That's racist!" then you will find ways in which this IS possible.
I suggest you read, familiarize and otherwise educate yourself about the issues to which I am speaking before trying to lecture me about what I do and don't know.
Early abort for a liquid fueled rocket is pretty spectacular as well, but it's hard to beat this fireworks show with a failure in a USAF solid booster (17 foot crack in the booster let go all at once) (another cut of the same incident).
"100% liquid fuel was always the right way to do. Loose the solids..."
When someone says "solid rocket" most people think of Challenger. The problem there was that the rocket was operated in conditions outside of design specifications. Liquid fuel rockets tend to fail when pushed beyond their limits, too. I've certainly seen plenty of footage of both types exploding.
I asked about this question to an actual rocket scientist not long ago. My take was that liquid fuel seems safer because you can control it off after ignition. His response, in part: "Offhand I know of at least several cases of a liquid fuel engine going 'BOOM!' and everyone being surprised." Apparently many of the failure modes don't allow for any warning; it just explodes before you can do anything. Further, reportedly, simply "turning off" a rocket engine in flight is not as simple as it sounds; the dynamic loads are complex, and doing it wrong can cause the vehicle to break-up. He said that solid rockets are typically more reliable than liquids, because of their simple design. Liquid fuel motors are very complex, and thus cost more to make, and to make reliable.
He also described an aspect of flight dynamics: Rockets launched vertically go through two phases. The first is overcoming the force of gravity to get it airborne; the second accelerates it downrange and into orbit. Solids lend themselves towards the first phase, because they have a high trust-to-mass ratio. In the second phase, propellant efficiency matters more, and then liquid engines are a win.
He did say that the choice of a solid rocket for the first stage of Area was driven entirely by time and cost constraints. There's no way NASA could have designed and tested a liquid-fuel rocket motor of sufficient thrust and reliability within the time and money allotted.
Now, this is just one guy's take, so I'm not accepting it as ultimate truth. But he knows more than I do.
I, too, have a rather romantic vision of the Saturn V, but given that it was only launched about a dozen times, I'm not sure how realistic that vision is.
dragonhawk@iname.microsoft.com
I do not like Microsoft. Remove them from my email address.
Interesting that. I believe the Air Force study compared both Titan and the Challenger, then used the Titan for the purposes of the presentation. So, there were TWO real world examples used. The only question in my mind is what is the LAS profile and how well did the Air Force model it -- they did claim to use their ejection seat code for the analysis and that is known to be a good model of reality.
Let us not forget the up-mass issue. The claim is that the booster has plenty of up-mass; but, they've been cutting systems and putting constraints on the weight of the Orion in order to stay within those margins. During the Augustine Commission presentation I believe they said they currently had a 14% margin for up-mass (that's from memory; so, don't flame me). That's with a crew of 4. The claim is that the LAS is the limitation; but, what they're not saying is that they can't increase the capability of the LAS without increasing it's mass and cutting into the current margin. They designed the LAS knowing what the capabilities of the booster are, and what limitations that would put on the capsule. It's a circular argument that conveniently hides the issues at hand... The point is, the vehicle appears to not have the capability to do what it was commissioned to do: Reliably and safely lift a crew of 7 into LEO.
The Range Safety Officer can't let it just crash back to the ground. The stark reality is that in the event of a guidance failure the RSO's job is to activate the destruct system. Although the lives of the astronauts might be lost, the lives of hundreds of people on the ground take precedence. And no, there isn't really going to be time to determine which way the rocket is going. In the time it would take to figure that out, Cocoa Beach could be a flaming inferno.
It appears the RSO has more latitude in the performance of their duties than posts here would suggest. On STS-51-L (the Challenger's last flight), the RSO saw the evidence of explosion and initially thought to recommend no action. It was only once the SRBs appeared to re-stabilize in flight that destruct was recommended. You can read the RSO's statement here:
http://books.google.com/books?id=A3REsJuW2yEC&lpg=RA3-PA185&ots=G8HM7ELnVo&pg=RA3-PA185
dragonhawk@iname.microsoft.com
I do not like Microsoft. Remove them from my email address.
The report does not say that an abort will be fatal any time within the first minute. It says that an abort will be fatal any time between 30 and 60 seconds. Aborts before 30 seconds are survivable -- although it says that aborts between 20 and 75 seconds are still in the danger area. The variable in question is dynamic pressure. Between 20 and 75 seconds dynamic pressure is over 3 psi. Between 30 and 60 seconds dynamic pressure is over 5 psi.
I'm unhappy at this blind spot in the abort cycle. But it's my understanding that had this happened on the Saturn V it didn't look good for survivability. Certainly if it happened on the shuttle it would probably not be survivable and NO ONE wanted to test the Gemini abort option (ejection seats). Wally Schirra declined to abort on Gemini 6 when it shut down, Manned space flight is DANGEROUS and the ONLY time the program had fatalities is when they allowed themselves to forget it.
Stacy Brian Bartley
I understand that you are referring to an atomic bomb....but in reality the nuclear rocket can easily be stopped, restarted, throttled, and is self moderating (To the End of the Solar System: The Story of the Nuclear Rocket). It is very unlikely that the nuclear rocket would face this failure mode.
As an aside the specific impulse of the nuclear rockets designed and tested in the 50's and 60's achieved well over 800 s. This is nearly twice that of the ~450 s that is the theoretical maximum of the H2 and O2 solid rocket designs.
In fairness the reliability of the reactor core of the nuclear rocket achieved in the 50s and 60s was not outstanding, but they made incredible progress. Also the nuclear rocket was typically only considered for missions that started in Low Earth Orbit is. As a shuttle from LEO to the moon and mars and such.
Why not a space plane, doesnt have to be big, but a flightdeck/sleeping area, cargo bay, and a emergency module that can pop out of a dock in the hull, takes off like a plane, lands like a plane, has rockets for egress of the atmosphere and moon shot, and return home, reenter and land like a plane!!!
I have no idea why we continue to use a launch pad that is at sea level! This is such a stupid idea. They could launch in Denver and be literally 1 mile higher and save all that fuel. It is actually quite substantial. Just an idea guys!
Summary of Apollo I investigation: The thorough investigation by the Apollo 204 Review Board of the Apollo accident determined that the test conditions at the time of the accident were "extremely hazardous." However, the test was not recognized as being hazardous by either NASA or the contractor prior to the accident. Consequently, adequate safety precautions were neither established nor observed for this test. The amount and location of combustibles in the command module were not closely restricted and controlled, and there was no way for the crew to egress rapidly from the command module during this type of emergency nor had procedures been established for ground support personnel outside the spacecraft to assist the crew. Proper emergency equipment was not located in the "white room" surrounding the Apollo command module nor were emergency fire and medical rescue teams in attendance. There appears to be no adequate explanation for the failure to recognize the test being conducted at the time of the accident as hazardous. The only explanation offered the committee is that NASA officials believed they had eliminated all sources of ignition and since to have a fire requires an ignition source, combustible material, and oxygen, NASA believed that necessary and sufficient action had been taken to prevent a fire. Of course, all ignition sources had not been eliminated. The Apollo 204 Review Board reported that it took approximately 5 minutes to open all hatches and remove the two outer hatches after the fire was reported; that the first firemen arrived about 8 to 9 minutes after the fire was reported and that the first medical doctors did not arrive until about 12 minutes or more after the fire was reported. Thus there was not expert medical opinion available on opening the hatch to determine the condition of the three astronauts although medical opinion based on autopsy reports concluded that chances for resuscitation decresed rapidly once consciousness was lost and that resuscitation was impossible by the time the hatch was opened. It is clear from the Board's report and the testimony before the committee that this kind of accident was completely unexpected; that both NASA and the contractor were completely unprepared for it despite the amount of documentation of fire hazards in pure oxygen environments. The committee can only conclude that NASA's long history of successes in testing and launching space vehicles with pure oxygen environments at 16.7 p.s.i. and lower pressures led to overconfidence and complacency. The Apollo 204 accident was a tragic event in the nation's space program. Because of it there has been a thorough analysi and review of all aspects of the Apollo program. Consequently many changes have been made in the Apollo system design, operations, management, and procedures and NASA expects this will result in an improved spacecraft and booster system. The committee's review of the accident found nothing which would make the committee question this expectation. It is the committee's hope that the remainder of the program will be carried out with greater understanding and dedication than if there had been no accident. The total impact of the Apollo 204 accident on the Apollo program is not yet known. In continuing its close surveillance over the Apollo program, your committee will be especially mindful of the impact of the accident on program schedules and cost, and on the effectiveness of the changes in management and operations made by NASA during the past several months.
After projects Mercury and Gemini capsule size increased to seat 3 pilots for the Apollo project's moon mission. The first Apollo disaster was significant because it was a crew of 3. Three pilots were on board all Apollo missions: Commander, Command Module Pilot, and Lunar Lander Pilot. Most of these pilots were from test pilot programs. Media was there for both the significance of the first manned mission to the moon as well as the height of the cold war and the internal political and external diplomatic ramifications of a successful moon shot. Later space programs launched the first civilian scientists and engineers.
There's still a slim chance, even if it is 1:10^12... that was good enough for the Millennium Falcon.
Spaceflight has never been a safe operation... never! It was never easy either, but back when it was new, people paid attention.
Ever since the years when a Shuttle was launching every few months, people just don't think of it as "new" or even say "wow" anymore. It just "what NASA's doing".
What's most appalling about this predicament is the thinking going into it; it's like 1972 all over again. We're so busy lighting-off explosives that we're discounting the (best and brightest) people that are on top of that sophisticated powder-keg. Maybe that's why we were so attentive and fascinated in 1972... life was on the line should any little thing go wrong. Those guys were truly national heroes.
It pains me to say it, but I'm doubtful that NASA's thinking will not change until we have another Challenger disaster.
This post © Copyrite Duggeek, all rights reversed.
...best solution would be to fly crew in safer manner (perhaps using SpaceOne?)
and dock the GIANT DEATH TRAP later.
I find this all absurd. It's likely that it will take us more than 50 years to get back to the moon, we should be ready to be on mars by now! And it's likely that Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin will have passed away before we get back! All this money they spent on just reusing the shuttles engines is insane. They should have designed a rocket that doesn't need a solid booster, and one that has fool proof protection for the astronauts. Here's my idea 1. Place the parachutes near the tail of the rocket so expensive liquid rocket nozzles are not damaged. 2. 1-2" thick steel plate to protect the crew capsule, make it an inverse cone so it will help throw the capsule away from any explosions. 3. Your not climate police your rocket engineers, stop wasting your money on satellites that you can't even get safely into orbit.
"In fact the SRB's on the shuttle have exactly this feature, and were used in the Challenger disaster when the SRB's appeared to be heading towards land."
You're thinking of the range safety destruction ordinance. That's something completely different.
The range safety charges are strategically-placed explosives, designed to cause the vehicle to break-up into (relatively) safe fragments, upon remote command. On the shuttle SRBs, they're basically a long strip along the entire length of the rocket, and peal it open like splitting a soup can along the seam. They were indeed used on STS-51-L.
http://books.google.com/books?id=A3REsJuW2yEC&lpg=RA3-PA185&ots=G8HM7ELnVo&pg=RA3-PA185
Thrust venting is more like a shutdown. If the shuttle SRBs have thrust venting, it would involve blowing a hole open in the top of the SRB stack, so that the propellant thrust escapes equally from top and bottom.
Thrust venting doesn't inherently destroy the vehicle. Of course, if used in flight, loss of propulsion means gravity takes over, which usually doesn't end well for a rocket. But it can (in theory) also be used before liftoff, to cancel the effect of premature ignition.
Pretty much every rocket launched by NASA or US DOD has range safety charges. I'm not sure if it's "law", but it's certainly mandated at a lower level if not. I'm sure Ares has such, too.
dragonhawk@iname.microsoft.com
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Ah. Interesting. Thanks for the info.
dragonhawk@iname.microsoft.com
I do not like Microsoft. Remove them from my email address.