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Protecting a Laptop From Sophisticated Attacks

mike_cardwell sends in a detailed writeup of how he went about protecting a Ubuntu laptop from attacks of varying levels of sophistication, covering disk encryption, defense against cold boot attacks, and even simple smash-and-grabs. (He also acknowledges that no defense is perfect, and the xkcd password extraction tool would still work.) Quoting: "An attacker with access to the online machine could simply hard reboot the machine from a USB stick or CD containing msramdmp to grab a copy of the RAM. You could password protect the BIOS and disable booting from anything other than the hard drive, but that still doesn't protect you. An attacker could cool the RAM, remove it from the running machine, place it in a second machine and boot from that instead. The first defense I used against this attack is procedure based. I shut down the machine when it's not in use. My old Macbook was hardly ever shut down, and lived in suspend to RAM mode when not in use. The second defense I used is far more interesting. I use something called TRESOR. TRESOR is an implementation of AES as a cipher kernel module which stores the keys in the CPU debug registers, and which handles all of the crypto operations directly on the CPU, in a way which prevents the key from ever entering RAM. The laptop I purchased works perfectly with TRESOR as it contains a Core i5 processor which has the AES-NI instruction set."

169 comments

  1. And all of this effort will not protect you from by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Funny

    The real enemy, which is the alien space zebra vampires that are out to suck your blood.

    Seriously, this much effort is excessive considering the value of what anybody in a normal situation should have on their laptop. If you have a genuine need for this, you should be on the level of the person carrying the Football, and as such, you would be better investing in the Secret Service equivalent.

  2. Re:This just reminds me of... by stillnotelf · · Score: 2

    I must be new here, I thought it was traditional to at least RTFS, if not RTFA.

  3. Or for even better security... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Power it down, encase it in concrete, and toss it overboard into the Mariana trench.

    1. Re:Or for even better security... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Funny

      Doesn't protect you from Murlocs or Aquaman.

      Aquaman is out to get you, that's why he has been using his aquatic telepathy to convince you to throw your laptop overboard.

      The concrete is to protect it from the pressure.

      He's very cunning. You have to be with such a lame power.

    2. Re:Or for even better security... by Anaerin · · Score: 1

      You know, for a minute there, I was wondering how a hole filled with tomato sauce would help. Guess I better lern 2 reed betta.

    3. Re:Or for even better security... by Abstrackt · · Score: 1

      Ah yes, the Marinara trench, located not far from the Leaning Tower of Pizza in Italy. ;)

      --
      They say a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, but it's not one half so bad as a lot of ignorance. - Terry Pratchett
  4. Re:This just reminds me of... by barlevg · · Score: 1, Funny

    Oh, ha! No, I'm just a really bad skimmer today...

  5. Re:This just reminds me of... by netsharc · · Score: 2

    Gee, I wonder how that link got planted into your mind...

    INCEPTION

    --
    What time is it/will be over there? Check with my iPhone app!
  6. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by CadentOrange · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I agree that it's just too much hassle to go through to secure a standard laptop. It's still an interesting experiment and it neatly lays out the attack vectors and potential counters.

  7. Re:This just reminds me of... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'm so sick of that comic, with deniable encryption implementations like those found in TrueCrypt you can be quite effective against such an attacker.

  8. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by idontgno · · Score: 1

    Yes.

    TFA's a fine intellectual exercise, but as explicitly pointed out, the willingness to commit kidnapping and inflict torture rather pathetically trumps all of that.

    Interesting. Not completely practical, but interesting.

    --
    Welcome to the Panopticon. Used to be a prison, now it's your home.
  9. Re:This just reminds me of... by barlevg · · Score: 1, Funny

    Did you not notice the reply right above yours?

  10. wow by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

    you must value your pron a whole lot more than i do.

  11. Really? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    An attacker could cool the RAM, remove it from the running machine, place it in a second machine and boot from that instead.

    Is this the whole "freeze electrons in place" nonsense? I'd love to see a real world example of this actually working.

    Sounds like the whole "well if you dont wipe your drive with zeros a hundred times a guy with a tunneling electron microscope could count the off spin of the variant quarks.. blah blah " ie; theoretically possible with infinite funding, but not feasible in real life and only happens on movies.

    1. Re:Really? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Slashdot ran an article on that a while ago, it does work. Not flawlessly, but the concept was simple enough: an inverted can of compressed air was used so that the super cold junk at the bottom was deposited on the chips, which cooled them down considerably (note: this is why the cans warn you about getting frostbite if your skin touches it).

      Then the DIMMs were removed from the target machine to another computer that was nearby and read out. I guess that implies a hot-swap (err, "live insertion").

      I agree with you however, it just isn't practical to be a useful attack in real life. It's cool, but not something you'd actually use.

    2. Re:Really? by Baloroth · · Score: 2

      I was surprised to read that too, but apparently freezing RAM in liquid nitrogen can retain the data stored in it for up to a week. All RAM modules have some data remanence, apparently , and data can last for a few seconds or even minutes in RAM after power loss at room temperature (which is why the hard reset attack works at all) and longer if the modules are cooled (even without liquid nitrogen). I imagine a can of compressed air held upside down would do the trick in a pinch. I was surprised too, but it makes sense. Data isn't held in some magical electrical suspension, it reflects an actual physical state of matter, even in RAM, and while that state may degrade quickly without power, it won't vanish instantly. Higher temperature increases entropy, so cooling it slows that down.

      And while these attacks seem unlikely, it is yet another possible attack vector to get at sensitive information. Attacks on PLCs seemed unlikely too, until Stuxnet came around.

      --
      "None can love freedom heartily, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but license." --John Milton
    3. Re:Really? by Riceballsan · · Score: 1

      Nonsense in movies data recovery is usually understated while things like breaking encryption are overstated. Oh my god he's using Adk1221 Encryption, that's CIA grade encryption, but I'm a super genious *tap tap tap* 5 seconds later, Got it!. While data recovery is seemingly imposible, a room of people looking at images on a server, OMG he hacked and deleted the images *images instantly disapear from the open file on the screen.

    4. Re:Really? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      RAM works by storing charge in capacitors to represent the data. The discharge rate of capacitor is a function of the electromagnetic permittivity of the dialetric, which is a function of temperature. In other words the colder it gets, the longer the capacitors hold their charge and the longer the data stays in them.

      The more you know.

    5. Re:Really? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hows about turning on the RAM test in your POST settings... Sure it takes longer to boot, but it also obliterates the RAM as far as the warm-boot attack is concerned. It would be a good idea for servers with confidential data along with making the burgler alarm trip a reset.. Someone breaks in and doesn't deactivate the alarm in time ... boom, keys are gone.

    6. Re:Really? by ksd1337 · · Score: 1

      So, couldn't they just design some system that wipes the RAM if a live removal is detected?

    7. Re:Really? by queazocotal · · Score: 1

      Umm - no.
      Permittivity of the dielectric is pretty much constant with temperature.
      Leakage current through that dielectric is strongly influenced by temperature.

  12. Who needs registers by bstrobl · · Score: 2

    You and your fancy registers, I use a specially trained hamster to push buttons depending on the bits it sees on an LED board. And the hamster only taps the buttons in the correct way if fed the correct combination of grains!

    Although I am having my suspicions that the little bugger is selling information to the north korean hamsters...

  13. I'm tempted to mod that funny by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Just because of the utter fail.

    1. Re:I'm tempted to mod that funny by LocalH · · Score: 1

      Go for it, not like it'll affect his karma.

      --
      FC Closer
  14. Re:This just reminds me of... by TheSpoom · · Score: 1

    Unless they know what they want and don't find it in your primary encrypted drive, in which case they'll continue to beat you. What, you don't think they also know about plausibly deniable encryption?

    --
    It's better to vote for what you want and not get it than to vote for what you don't want and get it.
    - E. Debs
  15. Hmm.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Tinfoil hat anyone???

  16. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by kylemonger · · Score: 1

    Willingless to kidnap and commit torture is not trumped if you're dealing with law enforcement. If they gotten to the point where their only remaining option is beating the information out of you, then you've won, assuming our legal system has any remaining value. Evidence that flows from that beating isn't going to be admissible in court. And why would an ordinary citizen want to hide information from law enforcement? Malum prohibitum .

  17. Paranoid much? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The frozen RAM trick is a neat concept and all but, let's get real for a moment. How real is the risk? Have you got anything that anyone wants that badly? If you do, is it really worth that much to you to prevent such a desperado from gaining access?

    I've go highly sensitive bank(I work there) data on my laptop. It's very important that I prevent the leakage of that data. So much so that I spent an extra $100 to use a hardware encrypted disk(FDE). The baddies would have to grab it while it's running and unlocked or they've got to freeze the memory etcetera. But those are highly unlikely scenarios and they are simply not worth defending against.

    Laptops go missing everyday, even in my own company. But, it's usually lost or stolen at an airport or train station, powered off, in its bag and unusable(at least the existing data is) to the person who finds it because of hardware encrypted FDE disks.

    All further paranoia is futile. And, for those that say; 'well, I don't have a hardware encrypted disk.' If you're so worried about this stuff and your data isn't worth $100 to protect it with a hardware encrypted disk, then STFU.

    1. Re:Paranoid much? by MightyMartian · · Score: 2

      The only people who I could reasonably see being at risk for this would be people like national leaders, diplomats and other REALLY IMPORTANT PEOPLE. I can't imagine such an attack being used against average people, and beyond that even in the case of REALLY IMPORTANT PEOPLE, it's going to have to be done pretty bloody quickly, and I still question how much data you're going to get out of it in real world conditions.

      I'm putting this under "paranoid schizophrenic".

      --
      The world's burning. Moped Jesus spotted on I50. Details at 11.
    2. Re:Paranoid Much? by Sancho · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Think of it like a hobby. It may not be really practical, but it's interesting to some people.

    3. Re:Paranoid much? by Qzukk · · Score: 1

      When it comes to security, the question is not "are you paranoid?", it's "are you paranoid enough?". Sure, for most people, the answer is "yes", but this is a useful resource nonetheless.

      If I ever end up having to move a file of social security numbers or medical records on a portable device, I'll definitely be referring to this and choosing an appropriate level of paranoia.

      --
      If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
    4. Re:Paranoid Much? by TheCarp · · Score: 1

      There is also just being interested and wondering if you can do it. There is also the possibility of doing it because someone large like a major national government's thugs (china, US, etc) want your data, or the data of the people you are developing the procedures to help.

      of course, if thats the case, then.... this is perhaps not over the horizon at all, they are, in fact, inadequate protections.

      Course, nothing will protect you from the "$5 wrench" scenario (not that any government would ever pay that little for a wrench).

      --
      "I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
    5. Re:Paranoid much? by MightyMartian · · Score: 1

      The more sensible thing at that point would be not to store it on any kind of portable computer at all, but rather on an encrypted drive of some kind.

      --
      The world's burning. Moped Jesus spotted on I50. Details at 11.
    6. Re:Paranoid Much? by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Those people arent using Ubuntu, though, thats the really absurd thing.

    7. Re:Paranoid Much? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      People keep picking on this guy because most of these things aren't practical security measures for most people, but since he's obviously just doing this stuff out of intellectual curiosity, I think that's missing the point. Remember when people would play with technology for fun? No?

      Anyway, you can think of this as the other side of all those stories of impractical, wack-a-doo intrusion techniques that we often see on Slashdot. Why *not* post a story with a bunch of equally impractical safeguards? The writer has the time and resources to do this research, which is good for him, and it's an interesting enough read.

    8. Re:Paranoid Much? by jovius · · Score: 1

      Unless he's talking abut color codes and security clearances I don't think he's being overly paranoid. Although tampering with a computer is highly suspicious.

  18. Re:This just reminds me of... by Applekid · · Score: 2

    Unless they know what they want and don't find it in your primary encrypted drive, in which case they'll continue to beat you. What, you don't think they also know about plausibly deniable encryption?

    With pretty much every nation either already being a police state or quickly becoming one, I don't see any scenario in which they would actually avoid the sadistic pleasure of beating on a suspect, whether or not they really think they could get what they want.

    --
    More Twoson than Cupertino
  19. Re:This just reminds me of... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    That's just a problem of data rather then the mechanism, the whole point of deniable encryption is they can't prove it exists, from that point you have to use that to your advantage. Also, in most scenarios involving an attacker like that it's more likely going to be law enforcement using court orders to compel you to hand over keys, in a scenario against law enforcement deniable encryption definitely starts to have real world practicality. These days, I think it's more likely that someone is going to be attacked with a criminal or civil court order rather then a wrench when it comes to seizing data.

  20. Re:This just reminds me of... by Riceballsan · · Score: 1

    I would imagine that would take a combination of your bluffing skills, and the stregnth of your hoax. Say you have a laptop with 500,000 SSN's on them, you mirror the fake to be exactly like the real, except then you have it randomize all of the SSNs. Now of course you then need to get the heck out of town as soon as they can confirm that you have tricked them.

  21. Why Windows 7 as honeypot? by Czubaka · · Score: 0

    I'd imagine a better honeypot. Just install MoviX with preinstalled Cursed Tape from The Ring. Now, if they steal your laptop, Samara gets them in exactly SEVEN DAYS

  22. Re: the real enemy? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Bears.

  23. Bullshit! by ThurstonMoore · · Score: 0

    An attacker could cool the RAM, remove it from
    the running machine, place it in a second machine
    and boot from that instead.

    This is the biggest bunch of bullshit I've ever read. This guy needs slapped.

    1. Re:Bullshit! by Osgeld · · Score: 1

      apparently you can, but honestly at that point why bother, if a portable machine is sitting there running with shit in ram just take the thing

    2. Re:Bullshit! by TheCarp · · Score: 3, Informative

      It is a theoretical possibility and has been shown to be possible.

      Lets be honest though.... it is just not that likely of an attack. Lets not forget you can't encrypt your initrd... Unless you store your boot partition on a USB key and carry it with you, then it can be modified by an attacker. All he has to do it reboot the machine, install a key logger in the initrd, and get the passphrase the next time you type it in.

      That or install one between the keyboard and machine. Hell, can probably do everything he needs from the USB bus. Did they ever fix that USB bus problem where a USB device could get full DMA without any OS help required? Hell the USB device could even be installed inside the laptop so its active and invisible while you use it.

      Thats before we even talk about things like, installing a pinhole camera to record your keystrokes....oh or using audio, as its been demonstrated that you can reliably recover typed information from recordings of the typing.

      Without physical security there is no security. You can't prevent your hardware from being booby trapped... and there are people out there with entire labs devoted to producing this sort of clandestine equipment. Hell, the FBI is known in some instances to have put a tarp in front of a whole house at night, with a print of the original house on it...just so they could work undetected.

      Its all a matter of who wants your data and what they are willing to get it.

      -Steve

      --
      "I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
    3. Re:Bullshit! by nospam007 · · Score: 1

      Not to mention that protecting laptops from sophisticated attacks is not the problem right now.
      Protecting servers from unsophisticated attacks is what we apparently need.

    4. Re:Bullshit! by kaiser423 · · Score: 2

      ?

      Care to elaborate? It's really not very hard at all to put the RAM in another machine, and boot that machine with a little bootloader/program that just dumps to contents of RAM to a file.

      The dude even linked to the tool and the technical explanation: http://www.mcgrewsecurity.com/tools/msramdmp/

    5. Re:Bullshit! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Cold boot attacks - not too complicated.
      http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/

      Move the live computer to somewhere where you can work on it, without shutting it down first:
      http://www.wiebetech.com/products/HotPlug.php

      Crack it open, spray the ram with compressed air, keep it very cold, read the RAM out.

      This would work great.

    6. Re:Bullshit! by Sancho · · Score: 2

      Lets not forget you can't encrypt your initrd...

      You can compute its hash, though, and fail to boot if the hash has changed. See TrustedGrub.

    7. Re:Bullshit! by ksd1337 · · Score: 1

      This guy needs slapped.

      Sorry, we're all out! Though, we've got a nice discount on kicked!

    8. Re:Bullshit! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      http://citp.princeton.edu/pub/coldboot.pdf

    9. Re:Bullshit! by tlhIngan · · Score: 1

      An attacker could cool the RAM, remove it from
      the running machine, place it in a second machine
      and boot from that instead.

      This is the biggest bunch of bullshit I've ever read. This guy needs slapped.

      Obviously you don't know modern RAM. DRAM needs to be refreshed a lot, but it is surprisingly stable. The longer data is held static in DRAM, the more likely it'll last between boot sessions.

      I've done it to debug an OS - the OS logged to RAM, and when it crashed, I merely powercycled the board and could access the memory buffer in the bootloader. It was plain text, but it wasn't until I powered it off for 10-20 seconds did I start noticing corruption. Cooling the RAM preserves the contents longer, and if you're all prepared, it should only take a few seconds to remove all power, pop the memory out, and pop it into another computer.

      It's actually a bit of a problem if you have a RAM disk as sometimes the superblocks would be valid, but the data was corrupted enough that things hung and crashed because they assumed that since the RAM disk mounted, the files are still OK. We had to wipe the RAM to fix it - it happened so damn much.

    10. Re:Bullshit! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Also need to not store confidential data on laptops when not nescesary

    11. Re:Bullshit! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's not bullshit. I've been doing it for decades - I remember actually doing cold boot attacks as a mere hacking child, pulling cartridges and cold booting into RAM dump tools in bootsectors when something pesky was living on the reset vector - and a few years ago it's been publicly demonstrated that some of the old tricks do still work.

      It's true that modern DRAM fades much faster than the old stuff (especially SRAM, which really can take hours), but some things don't change. Freezer spray on the RAM - it doesn't take liquid nitrogen - massively increases the remanance. You have minutes, instead of seconds, and you're probably coldbooting to something that is imaging the RAM. Bits fade to 1 quicker than to 0. Individual RAM chip models and runs have specific - pretty consistent - fade properties over time (you can even use these to identify them forensically, to some extent). Even if you don't get every bit, if you're looking for a key, you can probably get some of the bits with a much greater probability than 50%, which can massively accelerate a search.

      If you want to be secure, you probably want to be actually writing random data and erasure patterns over whatever RAM you can access on powerdown (ultracapacitors are your friend), reboot, or the case being opened. And just because you're being careful with the key doesn't mean you get a free pass on being equally careful with the plaintext.

      While you could theoretically do it on the CPU cache and debug registers as well, that presents some practical challenges: you'd have to use JTAG to get it out without destroying it (which involves you already being inside the case), and with it being RAM that naturally runs very hot and short-lived on an extremely fast cycle time, remanance would be comparatively lightning fast.

      You could also have even more fun with audio "squeak" (capacitor) or "keystroke" attacks, potential optical "LED bus modulation" attacks (in a few scenarios), power analysis attacks and any number of other physical side-channel attacks. It's an interesting field, really.

      [1] Lest we Remember: Cold boot attacks on encryption keys http://citp.princeton.edu.nyud.net/pub/coldboot.pdf

    12. Re:Bullshit! by MacTO · · Score: 1

      Here's a deep and dark secret about digital electronics: it really analog and subject to the same laws of physics as everything else. The only reason why we call it digital is because of how we treat those analog signals. Voltages between 0 V and 0.8 V may be considered as a 'zero', voltages between 2.8 V and 3.5 V may be considered as 'one'. And, of course you don't have a clean transition between those two states either. The transition is defined by the properties of the materials. The properties of the materials are defined by environmental conditions (e.g. temperature). Cooling the electronics down will change how long the contents of RAM will be preserved. Is it enough of a difference? I don't know. What I will say is that I've seen noticeable differences in the amount of noise in CCD detectors from cooling them down.

    13. Re:Bullshit! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It isn't a "theoretical possibility". It isn't bullshit. Fuck you all. It's been done. I first heard of this in community around 2006 or so. It was referenced after that in papers. A part of me suspects a few elite organizations probably used this as early as 2002.

      http://citp.princeton.edu/pub/coldboot.pdf
      http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-536.html

      There's an early paper--cold boot recovering AES keys from RAM. There's off the shelf software that will do this with windows bitlocker.

      Now please, stop talking about things you don't understand children.

    14. Re:Bullshit! by Reservoir+Penguin · · Score: 1

      I must be really behind times, but would not informational in RAM disappear without refresh?

      --
      US-UK-Israel: The real Axis of Evil
    15. Re:Bullshit! by Bucky24 · · Score: 1

      I think (and I haven't read TFA so I may be wrong) the whole point of cooling the ram is to get access to the password hashes so that one can login to the machine. Though honestly if you can get the ram why not just take out the hard drive and get the data from that?

      --
      All the world's a CPU, and all the men and women merely AI agents
    16. Re:Bullshit! by rollingcalf · · Score: 1

      The hard drive is encrypted, with a password entered in the boot process to decrypt the disk. So removing the hard drive without knowing the encryption key is useless.

      --
      ---------
      There is inferior bacteria on the interior of your posterior.
    17. Re:Bullshit! by seekret · · Score: 1

      Because if the hard drive is encrypted you can't access the data without the password.

    18. Re:Bullshit! by LordLimecat · · Score: 2

      It is a theoretical possibility and has been shown to be possible.

      If he is referring to "putting the RAM into another PC" and "booting from the ram", hes full of crap and isnt qualified to defend against these attacks. Every theoretical attack I have heard of relies on specialized hardware to read the RAM without altering it.

    19. Re:Bullshit! by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Question: Wouldnt sticking the RAM into another computer be a MASSIVE risk, given the POST ram checks etc, and the fact that you really dont know what parts of RAM the boot CD will overwrite?

    20. Re:Bullshit! by gsnedders · · Score: 1

      Many middle- and almost all high-end servers have hot-swappable RAM. When you're dealing with large numbers of RAM modules, and downtime is expensive, you want to be able to swap as much as possible at run-time.

    21. Re:Bullshit! by BitZtream · · Score: 1

      Awesome ... except I can also update the hash when I hax0r your initd args.

      Hell, I could just throw a custom hypervisor in the boot process and you'd never even know.

      --
      Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
    22. Re:Bullshit! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Talking out of your arse: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDaicPIgn9U

    23. Re:Bullshit! by Sancho · · Score: 1

      No, actually, you can't. Read up on TrustedGrub if you want to comment intelligently.

    24. Re:Bullshit! by cerberusss · · Score: 1

      Its all a matter of who wants your data and what they are willing to get it.

      It's my wife. To get my data, she's willing to do anything except have sex with me

      *cries*

      --
      8 of 13 people found this answer helpful. Did you?
  24. Paranoid Much? by paulmac84 · · Score: 1

    There's caring about the safety and security of your data, then there's being obsessed about the safety and security of your data, and way over the horizon is this guy.

    --
    One of the universal rules of happiness is always be wary of any helpful item that weighs less than its operating manual
  25. Harmless fun by petes_PoV · · Score: 1

    this much effort is excessive

    Oh let the guy fantasize that he's Johnny Mnemonic or whatever. It's preferable to playing with guns and pretending he's The Terminator

    --
    politicians are like babies' nappies: they should both be changed regularly and for the same reasons
    1. Re:Harmless fun by Qzukk · · Score: 1

      It's preferable to playing with guns and pretending he's The Terminator

      As long as he only blows out their kneecaps, they'll live.

      --
      If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
    2. Re:Harmless fun by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      As long as he only blows out their kneecaps, they'll live.

      I know you're joking but please don't perpetuate that myth.

  26. Laptops by Osgeld · · Score: 1

    its like putting your life savings in your wallet.

    1. Re:Laptops by gknoy · · Score: 1

      Especially if you use Bitcoin.;)

    2. Re:Laptops by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What is this "life savings" thing you mention?

  27. Re:This just reminds me of... by chill · · Score: 1, Informative

    Fairly easy to detect, if you have access to the target machine multiple times.

    Take bit-level snapshot of hard drive on first visit.

    On subsequent visits, take bit-level snapshots and compare them. If the "random" data changes between snapshots, then something is touching it and your plausibility goes out the window.

    --
    Learning HOW to think is more important than learning WHAT to think.
  28. Re:This just reminds me of... by INT_QRK · · Score: 1

    Axiom 1: The cost of security must never exceed the value of the asset. Just saying.

  29. Re: the real enemy? by chill · · Score: 1

    Only if you're a Packers or Lions fan.

    --
    Learning HOW to think is more important than learning WHAT to think.
  30. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by Tetsujin · · Score: 2

    Yes.

    TFA's a fine intellectual exercise, but as explicitly pointed out, the willingness to commit kidnapping and inflict torture rather pathetically trumps all of that.

    Interesting. Not completely practical, but interesting.

    Well, it depends on how you define practical - and what kind of situation you're in.

    I mean, if it were my laptop? Sure, probably not worth this kind of security. Someone could get credit card numbers, site passwords perhaps, and possibly enough personal information to do some identity theft scheme... Damaging stuff, potentially, but probably not worth their while to extract the data, or worth my while to protect it.
    But let's say it contained some sensitive, valuable information from my job - so that stealing my laptop could be a worthwhile target for corporate espionage. Then it might be worth protecting it a little more carefully...

    Another thing to consider is that, while the XKCD password cracking algorithm does trump most forms of security, that's only true if someone is actually willing to use it. I could see kidnapping and torture as a real possibility if you were dealing with organized crime or an intelligence agency... Otherwise, the escalation of the crime (from simple theft of a moderately expensive piece of hardware to various forms of felony) would deter most people from attempting it.

    If someone has reason to believe it's worth stealing my laptop for the information on it, simply stealing a laptop would be pretty easy. Nick it when I'm at a hotel or something - talk their way past the cleaning staff to get into the room, game over. If a laptop is stolen, police aren't going to care. The machine is simply gone. As long as the initial theft goes off without a hitch, it's a pretty safe crime, especially if they don't try to sell the machine after stealing it.

    There's bound to be some level at which information is worth enough to be worth stealing a laptop, but not worth kidnapping and torturing someone for a password... So locking down the machine from those kinds of attacks isn't totally impractical. It just depends on what's on the machine.

    --
    Bow-ties are cool.
  31. Re: the real enemy? by INT_QRK · · Score: 1

    No, robots. They steal old people's medicine.

  32. A lot of work for little gain by BitZtream · · Score: 2

    TRESOR is an implementation of AES as a cipher kernel module which stores the keys in the CPU debug registers, and which handles all of the crypto operations directly on the CPU, in a way which prevents the key from ever entering RAM.

    Awesome, its stores the keys in the cpu debug registers when in use. The data to recreate them still has to flow into the CPU from ram, so all you're taking out is the path between ram and the CPU for an intermediate step. So all you get is a speed boost, no security gain since the attacker already knows the algorithm your using and all the data you provided to the CPU. The speed boost is nice if its being used all over the place (like for an encrypted FS) but otherwise its not that big of a deal and its certainly not new.

    As for the rest, cryptfs or bitlocker with your screensaver/lock setup to throw out your keys when the screen blanks/suspends/whatever.

    So basically Win7 with BitLocker enabled or whatever alternative setup results in the same thing on Linux. Its not even a little hard, and you've already got well past the point where they'll just beat the password out of you.

    If you did it to learn, good for you. If you did it for some sort of practical value, then this really is one place where epic fail applies.

    --
    Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
    1. Re:A lot of work for little gain by Sancho · · Score: 1

      I believe the idea is to load the keys into the debug registers, and then erase the keys from memory. Then cold-boot attacks won't work.

      Yes, the keys do go into RAM, but you significantly reduce the amount of time that they are there. Normally, keys are in RAM as long as there is a mounted cryptfs.

    2. Re:A lot of work for little gain by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      As for the rest, cryptfs or bitlocker with your screensaver/lock setup to throw out your keys when the screen blanks/suspends/whatever.

      eCryptfs (deployed on Ubuntu Linux and RHEL) will not throw out your keys on suspend and hibernate, but BitLocker will. BitLocker will not throw out your keys when your screen locks. Think about it; there are still running processes that need to access the disk while the screen is locked.

      That said, if you care about usable and secure full disk encryption, your best bet today is to run Windows 7 Ultimate and enable BitLocker with a TPM+PIN protector.

    3. Re:A lot of work for little gain by linuxrocks123 · · Score: 2

      The security gain comes from the fact that it is feasible to perform a side-channel attack on RAM but infeasible to perform a side-channel attack on CPU registers. The data to recreate the keys is scrubbed from RAM; the keys never leave RAM. I have done work on a similar project to TRESOR, called Loop-Amnesia, which uses MSRs instead of the debug registers to perform the same task and does not require AES-NI support.

      ---linuxrocks123

      --
      vi ~/.emacs # I'm probably going to Hell for this.
    4. Re:A lot of work for little gain by linuxrocks123 · · Score: 1

      Sorry, the keys never leave the debug registers -- the keys are not computable from anything in RAM.

      --
      vi ~/.emacs # I'm probably going to Hell for this.
    5. Re:A lot of work for little gain by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      The massive, gigantic problem with all of this is that "weakest link" applies here. Theyre not going to wait for you to turn off your compter and walk away so they can do a RAM dump, theyre simply going to modify your bios or bootloader or insert a keylogger inbetween the keyboard and motherboard, and find out your passphrase.

      So at the end of the day TRESOR and all the rest is wonderful, but it doesnt prevent the hardware from being tampered with except in the most theoretical and irrelevant manner.

    6. Re:A lot of work for little gain by swillden · · Score: 2

      theyre simply going to modify your bios or bootloader or insert a keylogger inbetween the keyboard and motherboard, and find out your passphrase.

      That's a significantly different threat model. It presumes that the attacker can gain access to your hardware, modify it, then return it to you without you noticing it was gone or that it was modified, and then take your machine again.

      Not that this is impossible, but it raises the stakes and the difficulty significantly.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    7. Re:A lot of work for little gain by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      If youre worried about encrypting the contents of RAM, youre trying to protect against an attack which needs far more physical access than booting off of a CD and loading a malicious MBR onto the drive.

    8. Re:A lot of work for little gain by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Something the XKCD comic method misses is many times you either don't have access to the person with the keys (you got the laptop but the owner is dead or missing) or you have the files but need to decrypt it without the owner knowing you have this info (they tend to get suspicious when you beat them). There are lots of ways to get an encrypted file without the owner knowing you have it, but being able to do anything with it is a whole different matter.

    9. Re:A lot of work for little gain by swillden · · Score: 1

      If youre worried about encrypting the contents of RAM, youre trying to protect against an attack which needs far more physical access than booting off of a CD and loading a malicious MBR onto the drive.

      Right, you have to take the laptop. So? In many contexts this is significantly easier than getting control of it twice, with the owner none the wiser in between.

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    10. Re:A lot of work for little gain by Jonner · · Score: 1

      TRESOR is an implementation of AES as a cipher kernel module which stores the keys in the CPU debug registers, and which handles all of the crypto operations directly on the CPU, in a way which prevents the key from ever entering RAM.

      Awesome, its stores the keys in the cpu debug registers when in use. The data to recreate them still has to flow into the CPU from ram, so all you're taking out is the path between ram and the CPU for an intermediate step. So all you get is a speed boost, no security gain since the attacker already knows the algorithm your using and all the data you provided to the CPU. The speed boost is nice if its being used all over the place (like for an encrypted FS) but otherwise its not that big of a deal and its certainly not new.

      As for the rest, cryptfs or bitlocker with your screensaver/lock setup to throw out your keys when the screen blanks/suspends/whatever.

      So basically Win7 with BitLocker enabled or whatever alternative setup results in the same thing on Linux. Its not even a little hard, and you've already got well past the point where they'll just beat the password out of you.

      If you did it to learn, good for you. If you did it for some sort of practical value, then this really is one place where epic fail applies.

      You clearly didn't read much of TFA and only demonstrate your own ignorance. The speed benefit for AES encryption comes from the AES-NI instructions in recent Intel CPUs regardless of where the key is stored. There is not a speed benefit from using TRESOR (which does use AES-NI when available), but it does make cold boot attacks on systems with encrypted disks much more difficult. This is because the key used to decrypt the disk contents only needs to exist in RAM long enough to copy it to CPU registers. After that, the key does not exist in system RAM anywhere. There are tools which make it easy to recover RAM contents after rebooting many machines, but not CPU registers.

  33. I have seen RAM retention in real life by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    I once worked with an embedded device that demonstrates that nicely. This device didn't clear its display frame buffer on boot. You could power it down, then turn it back on and even several days later and the initial image on the display was recognizable (there was obvious corruption, but you could certainly tell what had been there before).

    1. Re:I have seen RAM retention in real life by CityZen · · Score: 1

      I also learned this back in undergrad (ages ago for me). Our project was to interface a DRAM chip to a simple 8-bit CPU system. The hardware side was just hooking up the right connections. The software side was to write an interrupt-driven refresh routine to make sure all the contents were read every few milliseconds. I was pleased to see my DRAM chip working just fine, and then quite surprised once I realized the refresh routine wasn't running! Some locations would get corrupted right away, but others would hold their contents for a few minutes (maybe longer, but I didn't keep testing).

      Oh, and that reminds me of DRAM testing. One type of test that's hard to do is to verify that refresh is working properly. Since reading DRAM refreshes it, you've got to write the test pattern, wait some questionable length of time, then go back and verify it later. Doing this for many test patterns takes a long time! And you can't be sure of the results, since maybe if you had waited just a bit longer, it might have failed. In theory, though, once you've waited past the required refresh period, it should have been read already by the refresh function.

    2. Re:I have seen RAM retention in real life by Tacvek · · Score: 2

      as an undergrad, I interfaced a DRAM chip (with internal refresh logic) to an FPGA connected to an ADC and DAC with microphone and speaker. The FPGA was configured to contain a soft processor of my own design, which ran a hard coded program that simply read from the ADC and wrote to sequential ram positions when one button was pressed, and read from ram and wrote to DAC when the other was pressed. The DRAM thus contained uncompressed PCM data.

      If I recorded myself saying something, and then pulled the plug and then plugged it back in within 3 minutes, and pushed the play button, you could still make out what I said. It takes a shockingly long time before the ram decays completely to white noise. This is without any cooling of the RAM at all.

      --
      Stylish sheet to fix many problems in Slashdot's D3: https://gist.github.com/801524
    3. Re:I have seen RAM retention in real life by _133MHz · · Score: 1

      Long ago I had a Macintosh PowerBook 145 which did something similar. If I suddenly powered off the machine and powered it back on a while later, the monochrome LCD would show the contents of the display buffer prior to the shutdown for a split second after the startup chime but before the usual checkerboard pattern, with varying degrees of corruption depending on how long the machine stayed off. It held a recognizable image for a surprisingly long time. I remember reading that this particular laptop uses pseudo-static RAM so I attributed such behavior to that.

      I also remember that a friend's beige G3 showed some remnants of old video memory contents as well. It took several seconds to generate a valid video signal from a cold boot, in those intermediate states it would sometimes display "pieces" of whatever was left in VRAM from the previous session. That one had SGRAM for its video chipset if I remember correctly.

    4. Re:I have seen RAM retention in real life by Brianwa · · Score: 1

      X11 used to do the exact same thing, it would normally show a black screen for several seconds when you stared it but it was actually showing whatever was sitting in the display buffer. I could turn off my computer for up to several seconds and still make out my background image when X restarted. That was an ancient computer too, with a power switch that actually cut all power.

  34. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by BitZtream · · Score: 1

    In general, when law enforcement has an instance where someone won't give up a password, they just put you in jail anyway, effectively that is just as good as finding you guilty, either way, you end up in jail. You lose.

    --
    Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
  35. non removable memory by magarity · · Score: 1

    An attacker could cool the RAM, remove it from the running machine, place it in a second machine and boot from that instead
     
    Half of my netbook's memory isn't removable and if the author is actually worried about this kind of thing he can get a similar model and bite the bullet on performance by operating it with only the internal ram. I doubt the residual charge would last through unsoldering the chips and attaching them to a board to be put in another machine.

    1. Re:non removable memory by sp0tter · · Score: 2

      or one could superglue the DIMMS in place

      --
      you don't eat crackers in the bed of your future--or else you'll get all scratchy
    2. Re:non removable memory by johnthorensen · · Score: 1

      You could still connect an FPGA to the RAM (tricky soldering, but doable). Then, cool the RAM, shutdown the machine and use the FPGA to read out the RAM contents.

    3. Re:non removable memory by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You could still connect an FPGA to the RAM (tricky soldering, but doable). Then, cool the RAM, shutdown the machine and use the FPGA to read out the RAM contents.

      Yes that will work - but only in the same circumstances where a $5 wrench would do the same job.

      Far fetched scenario - imagine someone does work for an international company that sells advertising and sorts data, for various reasons they don't trust the tubes and when work needs doing in China the rules say the system and staffing review policies gets escorted, not all the system can be in transit at any one time, and it moves on a tight itinerary. Any deviation from the timetable means the couriered data is made redundant without exception (Enigma 101). The article doesn't cover bugging - but in my imaginary scenario we weigh mobile phones and laptops on departure a secure location and arrival at a secure location *and they never leave our sight* (yes, you shower and sleep with them) in between.

      The purpose of encryption is provide enough delay change the systems so that the unencrypted data has minimal value. The mistake is to put too much trust on the encryption alone. The more effort the enemy puts into trying to obtain that information, the less resources they have to defend their own data.

    4. Re:non removable memory by CSMoran · · Score: 1

      You could still connect an FPGA to the RAM (tricky soldering, but doable). Then, cool the RAM, shutdown the machine and use the FPGA to read out the RAM contents.

      Yes that will work - but only in the same circumstances where a $5 wrench would do the same job.

      Not really. If you get Bad Terrorist's laptop but not the Bad Terrorist, you can play the RAM trick on the laptop, but a $5 wrench is pretty useless.

      --
      Every end has half a stick.
  36. Sounds like a TPM chilp could help you by fx242 · · Score: 1

    ... as the root keys never leave the chip. But hey, trusted computing is eevil right?

    1. Re:Sounds like a TPM chilp could help you by Reelin · · Score: 1

      No, trusted computing is useful. What corporations are trying to do with it is eevil...

    2. Re:Sounds like a TPM chilp could help you by marcosdumay · · Score: 1

      Trusted Computing requires that you don't have the master key for your computer. That's evil.

      Protected boot sequence (it has another name, I won't bother to search it, sorry) is not inherently evil. It is only evil if used with Trusted Computing.

    3. Re:Sounds like a TPM chilp could help you by fx242 · · Score: 1

      I have no problem not owning that key, if nobody else owns it too. Yes it could be abused, mas all technology could be abused for evil.

  37. Re:This just reminds me of... by EXrider · · Score: 0

    Let me put my tinfoil hat on for a moment... Beatings aren't necessary, the US gov't can simply use the NSAKEY to decrypt anything encrypted using Microsoft libraries, this was revealed back in NT4 and again when Win2k SP2 source code was leaked. This is to make their encryption methods export compliant. This is the only legit news article I could dig up on it right now, but if you look around, I'm sure you'll find more. Pretty sure I read somewhere that there's another "unknown" key out there that they think is for the UK gov't to use as well; actually that might be what was revealed in the SP2 source code leak.

    --
    grep -iw skynet /etc/services
  38. You are an idiot. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If the AES keys never touch the RAM, then whatever is on the RAM is useless to anyone who does not have the keys.

    1. Re:You are an idiot. by pclminion · · Score: 1

      How do you propose to load a value into a register from anywhere OTHER than RAM?

  39. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    In general, when law enforcement has an instance where someone won't give up a password, they just put you in jail anyway, effectively that is just as good as finding you guilty, either way, you end up in jail. You lose.

    If they're set on it, there's nothing you can say that will change an officer's mind about putting you in jail once they've decided they're going to. Give them all the passwords you want. Refuse them. It doesn't really matter.

    Incidentally, whenever you ask a lawyer if they've ever had a case helped by the client opening his mouth to police investigators, they just start laughing. Opening your mouth, even about a password, even if you're TRYING to help, cannot possibly help you.

  40. this begs the question by pak9rabid · · Score: 1, Insightful

    What does he have on his laptop that's so gd important that he has to go through this much hassle to secure it....kiddie porn?

    1. Re:this begs the question by MacTO · · Score: 2

      Worse. Photos of kittens playing with balls of yarn! Something that he can't let his colleagues see lest he be shamed for the rest of his life.

    2. Re:this begs the question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I agree, anybody who attempts to secure their computer beyond setting a root password is almost certainly a paedophile.

    3. Re:this begs the question by rocket+rancher · · Score: 1

      What does he have on his laptop that's so gd important that he has to go through this much hassle to secure it....kiddie porn?

      Security does not imply criminality. Go fuck up some other thread, you asswipe troll.

    4. Re:this begs the question by Bucky24 · · Score: 1

      I honestly can't see the difference between the two, aside from one is more polite than the other.

      --
      All the world's a CPU, and all the men and women merely AI agents
    5. Re:this begs the question by Bucky24 · · Score: 1

      You don't live in the US do you?

      --
      All the world's a CPU, and all the men and women merely AI agents
    6. Re:this begs the question by QuantumRiff · · Score: 1

      He has very important secrets.. Things so important, that he trusts a single USB drive to continue to work so that he can access it (since that is where he stores his FDE key. Oh, and a smartcard for his PGP) So two things to lose (or someone that wants to prevent him from pubiishing or whatever, just has to destroy..

      --

      What are we going to do tonight Brain?
    7. Re:this begs the question by pak9rabid · · Score: 1

      Normally I'd agree with you, but he's going to pain-staking efforts to secure whatever it is he's lugging around on there. At first I thought he was just this for the fun of it, until I read this comment from him:

      If it leaves my side, I will consider it tainted, and do a reinstall. I really am willing to be that anal ;)

      Sure does seem like a lot of hassle to go through for not hiding something.

  41. Solving the wrong problem by cloudmaster · · Score: 1

    If your laptop is valuable enough that someone would go through the effort of chilling the RAM and booting the machine, you should probably not be laying your laptop out on the table at Starbucks. In fact, if your laptop is that valuable, you've done something incredibly stupid in your systems design.

    Encrypt the data (either individual files, your homedir, or the whole drive), and don't use a really stupid password. If that's not good enough for your data, then your data belongs on a system which is not portable and which has actual physical security applied.

    1. Re:Solving the wrong problem by cloudmaster · · Score: 1

      Err, booting it in a different machine. Though I suppose one can imagine a criminal saying "Aww man, it's turned off. Well, off to find an easier target!". :)

    2. Re:Solving the wrong problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      OK, Often I need to upload the config file to a router in a bank branch that is out of cell phone range... How would you suggest I do that without having the data on my laptop? The router is down, so uploading it to the bank branch sever is not an option. There is no wifi in range, nor cellphone/3g coverage. The bank uses VoIP phones which also depend on the router.

    3. Re:Solving the wrong problem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You store the data on a microSD card, hide that in your belly button, then use a laptop with nothing valuable on it to upload the file.

    4. Re:Solving the wrong problem by Em+Adespoton · · Score: 1

      With that much depending on it, it sounds like the branch needs a hot swap. Really.

    5. Re:Solving the wrong problem by Bucky24 · · Score: 1

      Then you would use this: http://fingerprint-usb-review.toptenreviews.com/kanguru-bio-aes-review.html

      or rather one that worked on more systems than windows. I know there's one out there but I can't find it anymore.

      --
      All the world's a CPU, and all the men and women merely AI agents
  42. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by RKBA · · Score: 1

    What has happened in the past (and was reported on in the news a few weeks ago), is that a judge orders you to divulge the password(s) and if you refuse he sentences you to contempt of court and keeps you in jail/prison until you do reveal the passwords.

  43. Re:This just reminds me of... by toastar · · Score: 2

    I must be new here, I thought it was traditional to at least RTFS, if not RTFA.

    Your not the new one.... someone needs to tell Soulskill the obligatory XKCD belongs in the comments not the summary.

    Jeez, taco's gone for one day and posters start slacking.

  44. Re:This just reminds me of... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You're assuming the data changes often if at all.

  45. USB devices don't "get DMA" by Burz · · Score: 2

    You are thinking of firewire.

    1. Re:USB devices don't "get DMA" by drinkypoo · · Score: 1

      Doesn't USB3 have a DMA mode? ISTR reading something that made me think that USB3 was coming to the same wide world. Of course, if your platform has a working IOMMU it's potentially not a problem anyway.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    2. Re:USB devices don't "get DMA" by Agripa · · Score: 1

      All flavors of USB have DMA but they require the CPU to setup the transfer while with Firewire it can be initiated from the device.

  46. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by kylemonger · · Score: 1

    To jail you they will have to charge you with something, typically contempt of court or obstruction. Neither of these is a felony where I live and the prison terms are modest. Meaning that once released you'd still be young, able to vote, carry a firearm and get a job. Plus by standing up for your privacy you might help change the society we live in.

  47. Re:This just reminds me of... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    weird... i'm watching Inception right now, while reading this post.

    ...at least that's what i _think_ is going on....

  48. Re:This just reminds me of... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Offtopic

    Did you not notice the reply right above yours?

    No, I didn't. Because as of when I loaded the story, it did not exist. Notice that there is only a 2 minute difference between their post and mine.

  49. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by Imrik · · Score: 1

    In the US at least, contempt of court has a prison term of 'until you comply with the court order.'

  50. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by networkBoy · · Score: 1

    Still untested for all practical purposes, but...
    The fifth amendment here in the US *should* protect you from being compelled to give up passwords that are not written down, including punishment via contempt of court.
    -nB

    --
    whois gawk date unzip strip find touch finger mount join nice man top fsck grep eject more yes exit umount sleep dump
  51. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by networkBoy · · Score: 1

    Really?
    Where was this?

    --
    whois gawk date unzip strip find touch finger mount join nice man top fsck grep eject more yes exit umount sleep dump
  52. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by kylemonger · · Score: 1

    Federal judges can jail you forever. Terms vary in state courts.

  53. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by Squiddie · · Score: 1

    That's still being debated. It depends on the circumstances. It's a new thing for the courts to deal with, and we can all see where this is going.

  54. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by Reelin · · Score: 1

    What has happened in the past (and was reported on in the news a few weeks ago), is that a judge orders you to divulge the password(s) and if you refuse he sentences you to contempt of court and keeps you in jail/prison until you do reveal the passwords.

    ...

    [citation needed]

  55. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by networkBoy · · Score: 1

    Failing that you take the Screwed less test:
    Will disclosing the key screw me more or less than keeping it secret?
    If the answer is less, well, give up the key.
    If it is more give up the key with a typo or two.
    (Ollie North style)
    "I'm sorry sir I don't recall"

    --
    whois gawk date unzip strip find touch finger mount join nice man top fsck grep eject more yes exit umount sleep dump
  56. You're so fucking special. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ---Anonymous Coward

  57. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by he-sk · · Score: 1

    Impossible in my jurisdiction.

    --
    Free Manning, jail Obama.
  58. Re:This just reminds me of... by stderr_dk · · Score: 3, Informative

    Let me put my tinfoil hat on for a moment... Beatings aren't necessary, the US gov't can simply use the NSAKEY to decrypt anything encrypted using Microsoft libraries...

    This story is about an Ubuntu laptop. I doubt any Microsoft libraries were used.

    --
    alias sudo="echo make it yourself #" ; # https://pipedot.org/~stderr & http://soylentnews.org/~stderr
  59. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by EdIII · · Score: 1

    It is a neat experiment.

    Unfortunately, some people need to have a laptop and move around in the field. I am not talking about executives either. So this is hardly worthless.

    Regardless of what he said, I am reminded about the security principle of "Once the equipment is out of your possession, there is no security".

    To make sure we have always been secure, we don't store sensitive data on the laptops themselves, but remote in and do work on different machines. Windows Server 2008 remote desktop sessions are nice when you need that platform and then have consistent tools and versions for multiple people.

    If we ever lose a laptop, which has happened, there is somebody available 24/7 to change the security credentials to prevent access. Add some low level BIOS services to render the machine useless, report its position, take a picture, and destroy the OS is also nice to have.

    We have never been under the impression though that you can truly secure hardware when it is out of your possession, which is why they are primarily used as thin clients to do work elsewhere.

    For some people that might not work, and need to work locally, but for what we do work ain't happening without an Internet connection anyways.

  60. Re:This just reminds me of... by seekret · · Score: 1

    Isn't there that feature in TrueCrypt which will overwrite the encrypted data unless you tell it not to by checking the box and entering the password? In this case I guess it's a matter of how much you want to keep the data compared to how much you want to keep it secret.

  61. Re:This just reminds me of... by theLOUDroom · · Score: 1

    Unless there's a plausible reason for the data to change. For example, if I keep taking shots of a lava lamp every 1 second and hide the data in the images, it is perfectly reasonable to expect the data from my lava lamp pictures to be different the next time they look at it.

    --
    Life is too short to proofread.
  62. Re:This just reminds me of... by Runaway1956 · · Score: 1

    Oh, wait now - let's not take our tinfoil hats off to quickly! You don't think that Canonical took a bribe from the US government to use Microsoft libraries on their machine do you? Hey, they might be disguised with a new name or something!

    Thanks for your post though - when I read GP post, I was sort of scratching my head. "Didn't I read Ubuntu in the summary?" My brain works slow when I wake up, but it does work, LOL

    --
    "Windows is like the faint smell of piss in a subway: it's there, and there's nothing you can do about it." - Charlie Br
  63. Re:This just reminds me of... by Runaway1956 · · Score: 1

    "how much you want to keep the data compared to how much you want to keep it secret."

    Exactly. When the data becomes a liability, then you wipe it.

    --
    "Windows is like the faint smell of piss in a subway: it's there, and there's nothing you can do about it." - Charlie Br
  64. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by CastrTroy · · Score: 1

    Isn't there a truecrypt feature that allows you to have 2 passwords, each one showing a different partition. This allows you plausible deniability. Just hand over the dummy password and they can see the stuff you want them to see.

    --

    Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
  65. The crowd at /. is losing edge by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    (I know I'll get flamed for targeting all the Comment owners) But here's what I think. You guys are sad for all saying the same thing almost (This is insane, this isn't needed, he's playing with guns..etc)...

    Well, what you guys are saying is exactly in the lines of "640K ought to be enough for everybody". There was no RSA before RSA came... There was no Captcha (and then the bots made you have Captcha)... and so on.

    Making your laptop more secure is good. It's advisable. However much you can make it secure, the better. Because, sooner than later, you'll realize the "freaky" attacks that he'd described will be common-place script-kiddie stuff and then, you'll be scavenging for his post so you can apply the rules!!!

    He's done an excellent job in explaining how to do things (I loved the part on running your firefox as a different user and one of the comments on the main article, points out a flaw and gives a better way... I'm going to implement it soon)

    Look at the sophisticated attacks by Anonymous and Lul(whatever)... Those "sophisticated" attacks will be common place in a year or 2... And qubes is a great alternative as well... Security by Isolation is a good example.
    Anyway, why I say the crowd at /. is losing edge is because you all have failed to SEE THE AWESOME NERDINESS of the post! Where's your .. love for nerd-shit!

    I mean, since when have all of you become so oh "practical" and "live real bro".. I bet all of you were checking your facebook without http while posting your silly comments!

    We need an overhaul of real geek nerd crowd here to talk real stuff!!! And I hope most of you were through a Linux / BSD Distribution while commenting and not... cheekily using the pre-installed Windows 7 and just posting Love for Linux when you don't know how to run 3 commands through it.

    Step up. Just because Rob quit don't mean the good guys go away! (I don't have a /. id, so if you want to personally flame me... omar dot technologies at gmail dot com

  66. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by bill_mcgonigle · · Score: 1

    Isn't there a truecrypt feature that allows you to have 2 passwords, each one showing a different partition. This allows you plausible deniability. Just hand over the dummy password and they can see the stuff you want them to see.

    And if you don't have a second one, they're assume you do anyway, and torture you until you give up the 'other' password.

    --
    My God, it's Full of Source!
    OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
  67. BitLocker comparison by Cato · · Score: 1

    Since I recently set up BitLocker on a Windows 7 laptop (requires Ultimate or Enterprise which are not cheap) - if you have a TPM chip it's convenient to use in the default setup with keys held in the TPM, but if the laptop is stolen it doesn't stop anyone booting it and trying passwords, though it does stop them booting from CD/USB drive to read the disk, or putting the disk in another PC.

    TrueCrypt and commercial Windows tools such as PointSec which require a separate disk decryption password every time you boot, which I think is more secure.

    1. Re:BitLocker comparison by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Bitlocker can use TPM + Flash Drive and/or TPM + PIN

  68. boot partition on usb disk by Errtu76 · · Score: 1

    "Man, i can't boot anymore, that sucks!"

    "How come?"

    "A fish ate my USB disk"

  69. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by F.Ultra · · Score: 1

    Another thing to consider is that, while the XKCD password cracking algorithm does trump most forms of security, that's only true if someone is actually willing to use it. I could see kidnapping and torture as a real possibility if you were dealing with organized crime or an intelligence agency... Otherwise, the escalation of the crime (from simple theft of a moderately expensive piece of hardware to various forms of felony) would deter most people from attempting it.

    Not only that, but one also has to consider that most attempts to steal information from say a laptop probably has as an requirement that it is done in stealth which means that they cannot go the XKCD route. Much information gathered would be worthless if the victim knew that it had been stolen.

  70. Interesting and overkill at the same time... by Mysticalfruit · · Score: 1

    Okay, I learned about TRESOR, that's cool. Also, running firefox as a different user is an old trick I've been using for a long time.

    However, I live by a basic rule that's served me well. Laptops are fundamentally weak places to keep data.

    --
    Yes Francis, the world has gone crazy.
  71. Easy to break by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Just write some dumbass crypto program that does something no other crypto program is doing. Put some backdoors in the source code but obfuscate them properly. Mike Cardwell will try out the program....mission accomplished.

  72. Ob. xkcd reference by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Hey, wait, this is not fair! Now WE don't have anything to post anymore.

  73. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by TheLink · · Score: 1

    That's why fixing this bug will help more for plausible deniability than Truecrypt's "feature": https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+bug/148440

    When "everyone" has an encrypted partition/file whether they use it or not, it's much easier to deny using it.

    --
  74. Re:This just reminds me of... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This is the case in the US. It isn't hard for a lot charges to be piled on someone, and with the job of judges hinging on the campaign contributions from private prisons, they have to give the max sentences, or they will be replaced by judges who will.

    Telling someone that they, or one of their family members (hint: it is damn easy for marijuana to wind up in the strangest of places, or that a death threat "mysteriously" will appear) will be facing life in the joint, and almost anyone will spill the beans.

  75. Here's a protip: by pasv · · Score: 1

    Don't get yourself in the situation where you have to defend yourself from people that want your info that badly. Disk encryption is fine, sure it drains battery. But i'd say 99% of people that get your laptop from there will give up. If you have to worry about the other 1% your life is pretty whacked. Or you are in the military and they have standards you should be following.

  76. CIS Tool (multiplatform security test) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Has a profile in its tests for "SSLF Laptop", which really might be of assist here to others in that capacity - it has other test profiles, but the "SSLF" ones ARE the MAIN ONES to use (they push the security settings to the max/limit is why: Why else do securing a system unless you do that after all... imo, @ least!)

    This test not only extends to Windows, but also Linux (and many other OS platforms as well), & is VERY comprehensive - based on "best practices" from the security realm! It was also highly acclaimed in COMPUTERWORLD here:

    http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9018362/CIS_tool_aims_to_help_federal_agencies_check_Windows_security_settings

    * For those of you interested in acquiring a test license/evaluation (good for 33 days iirc)? Go here:

    http://benchmarks.cisecurity.org/en-us/?route=default

    (It's "The GOOD STUFF"...)

    APK

    P.S.=> In fact? Well - I just finished up doing it on my home system (91% score of 100, & would be 98% IF I didn't disagree with a couple settings they espouse, whereas I do not (I will be discussing it w/ they via email shortly/soon this week in fact)), since the folks @ CIS know I've been "championing it" since late 2007, here:

    http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy&hl=en&site=&source=hp&q=%22HOW+TO+SECURE+Windows+2000%2FXP%22&pbx=1&oq=%22HOW+TO+SECURE+Windows+2000%2FXP%22&aq=f&aqi=&aql=1&gs_sm=e&gs_upl=3242l10817l0l11038l35l28l1l0l0l0l373l5510l0.6.15.3l24l0&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.&fp=87cd2c56f2a7d925&biw=983&bih=646

    And gave me a license recently (very cool of they, imo!)

    I did it for my home system, a Windows 7 64-bit based one, using the SSLF Desktop profile (been using this tool for YEARS now, since 2007 or so, because it makes securing a system @ the software/OS level almost "fun-to-do" - like running a performance benchmark test program, albeit for SECURITY PURPOSES!)...

    ... apk

  77. a user for firefox by allo · · Score: 1

    isn't this, what we have apparmor for?

  78. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by Jonner · · Score: 1

    The real enemy, which is the alien space zebra vampires that are out to suck your blood.

    Seriously, this much effort is excessive considering the value of what anybody in a normal situation should have on their laptop. If you have a genuine need for this, you should be on the level of the person carrying the Football, and as such, you would be better investing in the Secret Service equivalent.

    I think the education of the author and indirectly those who read the post goes far beyond the value of protecting that particular laptop. I don't have the patience to spend as much time as he did researching and experimenting, but now I can benefit for his work by implementing some of the same protections. The logical extension of this project would be to produce an install disk making it possible for anyone to have the same level of security on her laptop with only slightly more effort than a standard Ubuntu install. The benefit of that would easily outweigh the time spent on the prototype. Such a Ubuntu (or other distribution) installer could be created by the author, since he's already done some work in that direction, or anyone else who reads the post.

  79. Re:And all of this effort will not protect you fro by wwphx · · Score: 1

    One thing that I really like about his technique is the practical application of the honeypot. It would be great for crossing the border back into the U.S.

    Customs Agent: Please open and log on to your laptop.
    Honeypot Owner: Yessir! (logs on to functional Win 7 partition while his private stuff is nicely hidden away)

    The problem for me is that an 8 gig partition is not viable.

    --
    When you sympathize with stupidity, you start thinking like an idiot.
  80. Partial solution by Urkki · · Score: 1

    USB and Firewire Ports, meet Mister Hot Glue Gun. Mister Hot, the heat is on, do your thing, get some holes lubed up, do the old in-out, fill 'em up good with the creamy goodness.