Most Tor Keys May Be Vulnerable To NSA Cracking
Ars Technica reports that security researcher Rob Graham of Errata Security, after analyzing nearly 23,000 Tor connections through an exit node that Graham controls, believes that the encryption used by a majority of Tor users could be vulnerable to NSA decryption: "About 76 percent of the 22,920 connections he polled used some form of 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman key," rather than stronger elliptic curve encryption. More from the article: "'Everyone seems to agree that if anything, the NSA can break 1024 RSA/DH keys,' Graham wrote in a blog post published Friday. 'Assuming no "breakthroughs," the NSA can spend $1 billion on custom chips that can break such a key in a few hours. We know the NSA builds custom chips, they've got fairly public deals with IBM foundries to build chips.' He went on to cite official Tor statistics to observe that only 10 percent of Tor servers are using version 2.4 of the software. That's the only Tor release that implements elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman crypto, which cryptographers believe is much harder to break. The remaining versions use keys that are presumed to be weaker."
Just use bigger DH, with better cipher. AES-256? Maybe. Twofish? OK.
Bruce Schneier himself advises avoiding elliptic-curve, as being intellectually tainted by the spooks.
"Flyin' in just a sweet place,
Never been known to fail..."
I recommend a "zero time pad" : if you want it secret, don't put it on a computer.
Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
The more I read of Slashdot (and to an extend Ars Technica), the less I want to continue reading. All it is these days is NSA, NSA, NSA. It's too damn depressing and what's worse, it's one of those situations where it's
(a) an intangable threat (you will probably never suffer directly because of what they're doing, but it still feels wrong)
(b) related to (a), it's something that the wider public doesn't know about and would be hard-pressed to convince is a threat without sounding like a looney
(c) cannot be overcome (moving to Linux for example doesn't change much if the network can still be tapped, and evidently TOR is now comrpomised), short of abandoning technology and reverting to primitive technology for, again, a hypothetical threat that will probably not ever affect us DIRECTLY, but still something we know shouldn't be happening.
I just want to read about science and technology, interesting shit. Seems impossible to do that anymore since clearly NSA stuff rates rather highly.
TL:DR - what's the point of knowing how evil things are if tangible, WIDESPREAD changes aren't going to happen due to our lack of power? You just become miserable, while everyone else is (relatively) happy because they don't know. There's a reason ignorance is bliss is a saying.
"Holy crap! A weapon just floating in space!"
If that speculation is right, that a billion dollars will buy hardware that takes a few hours to break one key, great. That would mean nobody is going to break MY key, and that al Qaeda's keys were broken soon after they started using them. Works for me.
Mmmm laws that granted NSA permissions to do this have been approved during Bush presidency. Is this meaning Republicans and Democrats are the same? Maybe it's time to wake up US citizens and stop voting for those two partys over and over... But as a Canadian, I probably should not comment on US politics. Anyway our Prime is not a reference...
Depending on the encryption method, doing it twice might make it easier to crack...
**This message has been encrypted twice with the ROT13 method**
Wrong Guardian Schneier link. :-)
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance
From Item 5:
"Prefer symmetric cryptography over public-key cryptography. Prefer conventional discrete-log-based systems over elliptic-curve systems; the latter have constants that the NSA influences when they can."
"Flyin' in just a sweet place,
Never been known to fail..."
According to consolidated financial statements and reports of the Tor Project for the year ending December 2012, US Federal agencies are responsible for nearly sixty percent of funds received by the project. Tor has taken a defensive stand against this, but who knows?
A two party system with a third one being the official opposition right now... Yeah Right (Slow Clap).
What's this "have to hide" bullshit? What if you want to hide? A large percentage of the population are introverts, and a significant proportion of both those (among others) don't have any desire to share anything personal with anyone, at least aside from those they choose to. Some people like privacy, like anonymity, like not being seen by others. Hell - I get a serious case of anxiety if someone is merely standing behind me, no matter how innocuous my activities.
Please, don't start with this "if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to worry about" utter crap. The next step to that is "if you have anything to hide, you're probably a pedophile" which you're already alluding to. No, we just don't like oxygen-wasting cretins sticking their nose into our lives. Considering such a vast number of people value their privacy in exactly the same way, this behavior is *natural*.
I make very little effort to hide my presence online. But if I did choose to, then by no means does anyone have any justification to suggest that there's something wrong with wanting to hide. It's part of the human condition - some people like being seen, being known, being pored over - some people prefer the exact opposite.
You might suggest this is an over-reaction, that you're merely pointing out that the internet isn't for people who want to hide. But the point is, it should be. You should be directing your energies to fixing the problem - not just throwing your hands up and saying 'don't bother trying to hide even if you want to'.
"The true measure of a person is how they act when they know they won't get caught." - DSRilk
1. Us government creates Tor.
2. Us government can audit Tor traffic.
Who exactly is surprised by this??
-Lod
Just use bigger DH, with better cipher. AES-256? Maybe. Twofish? OK.
Bruce Schneier himself advises avoiding elliptic-curve, as being intellectually tainted by the spooks.
that's what they want you to think.
Some drink at the fountain of knowledge. Others just gargle.
Exactly. Some activities need to stay hidden. For example:
* I don't want someone's Christmas gift to be spoiled for them.
* My neighbors don't need to know how much my electric bill was, or what tier of service I have hooked up to that wireless router.
* I have a very dedicated stalker, whose information is limited because that person can't dig into my email or other accounts to find out what I'm up to.
* If I post on a forum for people who own a particular product, I don't need people to be able to find my house so they can steal it.
* A friend who's hurting after a disastrous breakup might email me something in confidence. That should stay confidential.
* Employment and tax documents, with pay grade information and SSNs and all kinds of other PII.
* Online banking, anyone?
* I may compose some music that isn't ready for release yet, and that needs to stay private until it's been polished.
* Medical records about who has what rash on their what now?
There's just some information that doesn't need to be free. No nefarious intent, just things that shouldn't be public.
Sorry guys, Tor is designed to be used in all the ways we've spent years trying to fix broken internet protocols from doing, you really need to stop drooling over it. Its not actually a good solution. It is in fact an absolutely shitty solution to the problem, as its really a way to create a bunch of new ones.
If you have to hide, the Internet isn't for you.
It's a really good solution! It protects privacy, it's supported/maintained by really smart people who want to protect privacy, and (when using the most current version) gives the user strong privacy.
I just made a whole lot of unsubstantiated claims with no explanation, no supporting evidence, and with no background... just like you did. (I didn't call people names, though.)
Sheesh, gimme some Deep Woods Off! - The number of astroturfers on Slashdot is astounding.
Who cares who else uses Tor? Who cares whether it creates protocol problems? Who cares whether pedophiles or botnets use the system?
The important bit, the one that has value to *me*, is that it can hide my identity. It can hide the identity of people who are afraid of oppression, it can hide the identity of whistle blowers, it can hide the identity of people asking for help.
Stop astroturfing - you're not particularly good at it.
"If you have to hide, the Internet isn't for you."
"pedophiles and botnets"
Are you cutting yourself with that edginess?
You know what, I've yet to see anything worth reading coming from your keyboard and this is your crowning glory - associating people who want some privacy with pedophiles.
Your opinions are worth less than the photons they have been written with.
Ciao. Meet your new status.
--
BMO
Not necessarily. In many cases, double encrypting it will not make it at all harder to crack, it will just effectively encrypt it with a composite key no more complex than either of the keys you used.
The original blog post by Rob Graham that Arstechnica reports on has created some confusion about Tor versions. The current recommended stable version of Tor is 0.2.3.25-12. The current alpha release is Tor 0.2.4.17-rc, and people running relays are being encouraged to use this version on the mailing lists. So the repositories, by recommending Tor 0.2.3.x, aren't out of date. However, the Tor website does advise against using the Ubuntu repositories because they aren't "reliably updated" (https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian#ubuntu), which I don't think is the fault of Tor developers. Also, the most up to date version of Tor can be found at the following repository: deb http://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/ tor-nightly-0.2.4.x-wheezy main.
> Your anxiety issues can be treated, the Internet is not proper treatment,
Firstly, who said my anxiety was anything to do with the internet? I never even mentioned a computer. Stop making up shit.
> You use the Internet as a crutch. Man up and fucking go see a damn doctor and stop being such a coward.
I said I don't make effort to hide my online activities. I'm not talking about myself. I'm respecting those who do want to maintain their privacy.
> You were NEVER anonymous on the Internet, you have ALWAYS been logged, you just aren't smart enough to realize it.
Huh? Of course I realize that. I've been building networks since before the net existed. I just posted yesterday in fact about the futility of trying to hide your information on the net - http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=4173525&cid=44773011
You're completely mis-understanding me. We're probably on the same page in a lot of respects. My issue isn't that you're suggesting that the internet isn't secure. My issue is that you make no distinction between people who "have to hide" and people who "want to hide".
> I made no mention of that retarded 'nothing to hide nothing to fear' crap, you did.
You did - as soon as you failed to make the above distinction, you treated people who want to hide but have nothing to fear as being in the same group as people who NEED to hide. For example, you said TOR is only really used by "uber nerds, pedophiles and bot nets".. So - anyone who uses TOR because they want to hide, who isn't an uber nerd or a bot is.. a pedophile?
I'm simply pointing out that your argument basically strips down the internet population into - precisely - those who have nothing to hide and those who need to hide. Not only are the two not mutually exclusive, but it completely ignores the category that the majority of people fall into who want to keep their privacy - those who have nothing to hide but want to hide anyway.
Your line of thinking is very near to treating anyone who uses encryption, or encrypted channels, or any means of trying to secure the communications, pre-emptively criminal. It's a line of thinking that needs to be stamped out whenever it's seen.
"The true measure of a person is how they act when they know they won't get caught." - DSRilk
Yeah, actually if someone is bad enough to make the NSA's top 10 list, it'd probably be good for someone to be reading their email. I have a BIG problem with the fact that the NSA is tracking everyone's emails and phone calls. I've contacted my congressman about that more than once, calling them out very publicly.
The top NSA agents know who the really bad guys are, the guys who will probably be involved in the next 9/11. Maybe they can't publicize the intelligence that proves it, maybe they are missing a few details, but we knew who bin Laden was. I'm fine with invading their privacy.
But but but if they invade anyone's privacy, they'll invade everyone's privacy. If we let them, yes. Ideally what we want is systems, including budgets and oversight, which only allow them to spy on a few people, so they have to pick which ten people they really do need to spy on.
That's my point. They won't spend any money tracking me. Well, not more than about $10-$50, since I'm pretty sure I'm on a list or two. They WILL spend money tracking whoever appears to be the next bin Ladin. Cool. I'd like them to be able to track bin Laden, while it's not anywhere near worth it to track me.
If I were using "1 bit encryption" they WOULD break it. They proof of that is that they DO track people who use 0 bit (plain email, phone). That's bad. I prefer that everyone use encryption enough so NSA finds it worthwhile to track 0-100 people.
Ps - I said I'm probably on a list. I've worked in security for many years, so my footprints can be found looking at information about exploits, etc. I run a system where we teach cybersecurity to state and local government employees, so I frequent sites that a bad guy might find interesting. On top of that, I use words like "freedom" and "Constitution" and we now know the Obama administration considers those words to be red flags.
He hasn't reversed himself from that link you cited - he was just pointing out an NSA recommendation, and was against it then, as well. See his comment to a poster further down:
Bruce Schneier September 30, 2005 11:39 AM
"'Elliptic Curve Cryptography provides greater security and more efficient performance than the first generation public key techniques'
"But ECC was less researched than the others algorithms!"
I agree with you, not the NSA.
Allow me to rest my hand in the sand and then complain like a bitch when I am run over by a lorry. Because someone else should have been saving the world while I looked the other way.
MMO Quests are like orgasms:
You may solo them, I prefer them in a group.
Not only this, but applying different cryptography methods on top of each other may expose weaknesses in the system. IIRC Sony choosing to use "all the crypto" was one of the mistakes that allowed the PSN to be cracked,
Just assist and support the people in the US who are trying to curtail the out-of-control US government whenever and however you can with whatever can help.
The US government has been steadily growing and hardening itself against control by the citizenry and expanding its' scope & power beyond constitutional limits for ~100 years. It won't be overcome by a change simply between (D) & (R). The pendulum must swing back toward constitutional first-principles and a government that is small enough, and local enough, to be controllable by the citizens.
The American people, on the whole, have a long history of being basically good, relatively peaceful, and generous people. The US government, on the other hand, has grown far too large & powerful and has long ago lost any legitimate claim to actually represent the will or the character, spirit, or beliefs of it's citizens.
From a friendly/neutral foreign perspective, it would be far more beneficial internationally for the smaller-government crowd in the US to prevail, as a smaller, less-powerful US Federal government that is more open and accountable to its' citizens and has more effective oversight would sharply curtail the international bullying and "dirty games & tricks" the US government has been playing, and increasingly plays, against even those the US government call "allies" and their peoples & interests.
Strat
Progressivism (aka US 'Liberalism'): Ideas so good they need a police/surveillance-state to enforce.
We certainly need more research, but it looks like an RC4 complete break (that would be the big, recent breakthrough - would love to see the details, now we know about it) and 1024-bit RSA keys are the meat and potatoes of BULLRUN. And since PCI Compliance for a while advised everyone to use RC4 as a workaround to the BEAST attack... yeah. NSA. Bastards.
They set the constants for all of the NIST curves, however. And if they have a SHA-1 preimage (and it's their algorithm they no longer even recommend, so they might) then they could set them any way they wanted. Or just try repeated phrases until they got bit patterns they were after. prime256v1/secp256r1 and all that jazz? We can't trust them anymore. They're NSA-derived - and the way it turns out they've been behaving, we therefore assume that they ARE backdoored, even if they use them themselves.
The curve Tor uses is curve25519. That is not NIST-derived, NSA didn't pick parameters out of a hat for that one: DJB made it independently. It's been designed, and the reasons for the choices thoroughly explained. It's extremely fast due to its structure, it's good even through the twist, the implementation is so careful that it's constant-time to avoid timing attacks, and we have a rough idea how strong it probably is (around 2^110-ish). Ed25519 is also similarly good and makes a great signature scheme (and you could do DH with it better as well), although you probably don't want to use SHA-512 with it anymore, because NSA - Skein-512-512 is probably the way to go. I don't trust NIST's choices anymore. They are ALL NSA, and thus ALL potentially-tainted.
Unless elliptic curves in general are crackable, which would be quite a wheeze, and of course a possibility. Certicom (NSA) have been doing those for a long time: but the 25519 curves are the product entirely of civilian mathematical research, at least. For now, Schneier is spooked and notes RSA still works fine, if slowly, and maybe bigger keys... 3072-bit? 4096-bit? Against an adversary like this - and it's clear that they consider EVERYONE an adversary - we need the margin.
I note DSA and ECDSA really need strong random numbers for every signature (see fail0verflow's Sony crack for a practical exploit), and GCM fails quicker than it should with non-random keys. Reasonable conclusion: subtle RNG backdoors. We should keep a special look-out for those. Other choices exist which aren't similarly affected (particularly, Ed25519 does not need random numbers per-signature, neither does RSA, although RSA blinding does).
What next? AES-128-CCM use in TLS, perhaps, or OCB-AES-128? (Note I'm specifically NOT recommending AES-256/192 because of the meet-in-the-middle attack - I'd rather move to TWOFISH-256.) Ed25519 DH in TLS? All commercial CAs are toast, the model has been so thoroughly subverted that it can't possibly continue to work. What about DNSSEC? Could do the job. But we can't trust the US to manage the internet anymore. We're meeting in November to see what we have to do: maybe if we remake it used good RSA or Ed25519 keys and take the hands of the root out of ICANN, because ICANN is the US and the US has spectacularly demonstrated it cannot be trusted to manage anything, probably no country can... which means, perhaps, it's time to dig the root KSK revocation key out of mothballs: if there's no trust, there's no point. We're going to need a treaty, a .INT. This isn't a quick-fix.
Bruce Schneier http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/09/black-budget-what-exactly-are-the-nsas-cryptanalytic-capabilities/ stated that "Breakthroughs in factoring have occurred regularly over the past several decades, allowing us to break ever-larger public keys. Much of the public-key cryptography we use today involves elliptic curves, something that is even more ripe for mathematical breakthroughs. It is not unreasonable to assume that the NSA has some techniques in this area that we in the academic world do not. Certainly the fact that the NSA is pushing elliptic-curve cryptography is some indication that it can break them more easily."
I'd not rush from DH to ECC but would strongly recommend a move to 2048-bit or above keys
And have just realised that I haven't posted to Slashdot for many years...And yet somehow my .sig is still relevant. NSA may have dropped their plans for mandatory Escrow 15 years ago after the quote was made...but they didn't change the fundamental goal: to read everything.
"Mary had a crypto key, she kept it in escrow, and everything that Mary said, the Feds were sure to know."
that's what they want you to think.
That's what they want you to think.
systemd is Roko's Basilisk.
I thought this meant the encryption is applied 5000 times:
People choose crappy passwords like ABCDE so rather than using "ABCDE" as the encryption key (which wouldn't look very random at all and therefore be very bad) for encrypting the content, the password is hashed to something that hopefully looks random, then that hash is used as the key for encryption.
The purpose of repeating that hashing process is to slow down brute force guessing against your password itself, not to protect the contents from cryptanalysis or against brute forcing all the possible hashes directly. If I want to see if your password is AAAAA, I have to repeat the algorithm 5000 times to see if the resulting hash can be used to decrypt the contents. If I don't care what your password is, I could just guess hashes starting with 0x1 to 0xFFF.... The reason attackers put up with the 5000 rounds of hashing is that even if it takes a second to calculate each password's hash, they'd still guess "ABCDE" before they guess which of the 2^x possible keys it produced.
If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
He said exactly that some ECC curves have suspicious origins, and one shouldn't trust them. What he didn't say is that all of ECC is suspicious, or that he knows anything with certainty.
Anyway, it's easier to use RSA with a larger key than to investigate each ECC curve you are thinking about using. But that's just my opinion.
Rethinking email
I recommend a "zero time pad" : if you want it secret, don't put it on a computer.
That's equally vulnerable to the $5 wrench decryption method.