How The NSA Targets Tor
The Guardian has released new documents from Edward Snowden showing how the U.S. National Security Agency targets internet anonymity tool Tor to gather intelligence. One of the documents, a presentation titled "Tor Stinks," bluntly acknowledges how effective the tool is: "We will never be able to de-anonymize all Tor users all the time. With manual analysis we can de-anonymize a very small fraction of Tor users, however, no success de-anonymizing a user in response to a TOPI request/on demand." (Other documents: presentation 1, presentation 2.) The NSA is able to extract information sometimes, though, and Bruce Schneier details what we know of that process in an article of his own. "The NSA creates 'fingerprints' that detect http requests from the Tor network to particular servers. These fingerprints are loaded into NSA database systems like XKeyscore, a bespoke collection and analysis tool which NSA boasts allows its analysts to see "almost everything" a target does on the internet. ... After identifying an individual Tor user on the internet, the NSA uses its network of secret internet servers to redirect those users to another set of secret internet servers, with the codename FoxAcid, to infect the user's computer. FoxAcid is an NSA system designed to act as a matchmaker between potential targets and attacks developed by the NSA, giving the agency opportunity to launch prepared attacks against their systems." Schneier explains in a related article why it's important that we figure out exactly what the NSA is doing. "Given how inept the NSA was at protecting its own secrets, it's extremely unlikely that Edward Snowden was the first sysadmin contractor to walk out the door with a boatload of them. And the previous leakers could have easily been working for a foreign government."
And this is exactly why you use TAILS. No fingerprints. Heck I have an exclusive machine for TAILS.
until it can monitor EVERYTHING. The end result of that will be CONTROL. Smart TVs? Built in cameras. How long until they start REQUIRING being monitored?
People often claim that the NSA is watching exit nodes, and can tie Tor traffic back to the users. This apparently claims the opposite.
So do we know for sure if this a real leak, or was this "leaked"?
John
To make a long story short, Tor warns about this in the site, if not with the exact words, anyone capable of watching outgoing traffic from a machine and incoming traffic to the destination server may be able to match both. Thinking that most internet traffic goes through the US, it not really a surprise they are able to do so. Saying they will *never* be able to de-anonymize all Tor users to me sounds like a trap, an attempt to make users feel safe, but instead might just be a computational power issue.
A few days ago a well known Tor developer was getting angry on Twitter because he thought the Guardian was holding back a story on Tor due to redacting requests and pressure from governments.
The presentations cited date from 2007. That's 6 years ago and tells us diddly squat about their current capabilities. All it tells us, really, is that in 2007 they had developed some working techniques in the lab, and were talking about the same kinds of attacks that were being discussed in public. It also tells us they use custom malware - but that was already revealed previously.
The Snowden files contain a complete copy of GCHQ's internal wiki. It seems highly unlikely that there is no further information on Tor after 2007. Rather, it feels like the British and American governments treat their capabilities against Tor as one of their most valuable secrets and applied significant pressure, the resulting compromise being "you can make a story about Tor, as long as it's based on old information that is no longer relevant".
For Tor browsing you should use a different browser and OS, in a VM, than the one you normally use.
For example, the silk road guy who legally changed his name to his handle ("frosty") and then used said name in his encryption key.
"Have you ever thought about just turning off the TV, sitting down with your kids, and hitting them?"
I've been running Tor on my home FIOS connection for about six months in non-exit relay mode. Last month I received a registered letter from Verizon notifying me that I was using excessive bandwidth and that my connection would be terminated in ten days if I did not cease and desist. From what I read there were less than 100 FIOS customers that received this letter, and it was sent to folks who used upwards of 10tb per month. The paranoid conspiracy theorist in me says that the NSA encourages ISP's to crack down on Tor relays, while the annoyed consumer in me looks on it as a ploy by Verizon to sell me a commercial fiber service. Either way, I don't have the inclination or money to fight this battle, and so I shut down my Tor relay for now. Interesting to note that we were blocked from accessing Hulu Plus from our home as they had identified my IP as a Tor relay. Now that the relay has been off for a few weeks I should try connecting to Hulu again to see how long they blacklist IP's for.
"We make our world significant by the courage of our questions and by the depth of our answers." Carl Sagan
This is not about monitoring anymore, probably never was
...giving the agency opportunity to launch prepared attacks against their systems
They are actively attacking Tor nodes and clients, be or not outside US, being used for criminal activities or just someone worried about his own privacy.
This is not about defending against terrorists, they are attacking the US citizens that dares to try to have some privacy. Along with foreing citizens worried about the same.
And they are not just forcing everyone to be unsafe, they are too, so others (foreing countries, private companies wanting to get rid of competitors, hacking groups, old-style criminal organizations, even terrorist groups) can use the same tools/backdoors/exploits as them, being either provided by leaks (not just Snowdens unknown predecessors, there are a lot of private companies with high security clearance with access to all of that that could have their own agenda (Snowden worked for one of them), or just plain hacking (like yesterday's Adobe one that could had leaked where Acrobat or Flash have NSA backdoors).
My understanding is whenever quantum computing reaches its whatever level of computations, FS won't work when at least one of the private keys is known. Many are running on the assumption that many encrypted sessions are being archived for later decryption.
What the NSA is doing is unacceptable whether or not a foreign government access any of the data. Unless the US government obtains a warrant, based on probable cause, that specifically describes the places to be searched and things to be siezed, this activity is illegal.
Give me Classic Slashdot or give me death!
He means: will the NSA try to root you for running a tor node?
Do you even lift?
These aren't the 'roids you're looking for.
so will this result in a theocratic christian government run by the bible belt?
I'm god, but it's a bit of a drag really...
Interesting. If I worked for NSA, I would try to. It would give some more information. Though on the other hand, they may just as well run their own nodes to get that information (oh yes, they do this already), and hacking 'normal' people just for the lulz always increases the chance of information about your operations getting out.
In short: It would be stupid to hack you just because you're running a node, unless you're their target in some other way.
c++;
Tor, originally sponsored by the United States Navy.
Any questions?
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
Not according to this latest leak (who knows about future leaks).
As I read this leak, TOR isn't broken (I the sense that the NSA isn't recording all unencrypted TOR traffic, the way some had feared). The NSA doesn't root all nodes. If they're interested in some specific person, they break their anonymity by rooting them specifically. But I still need to go read Bruce's analysis.
I find it interesting/amusing that when Freedom Hosting was busted, and the FBI left behind a rootkit on the hosted servers to infect users wholesale, that wasn't an NSA payload - it was a 0-day they bought on Silk Road. For all that this spying pisses me off on principle, I love that bit: someone at the FBI has a sense of humor, or at least irony.
Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
He means: will the NSA try to root you for running a tor node?
One of the presentations says "probably not" and cites legal and technical challenges. We all know "legal" isn't really much of a roadblock, probably written in there for plausible deniability while the presenter mentioned with a wink and a sneer while dictating against the powerpoint, but sounds like if you run an exit node and keep it patched up, it might not be worth the squeeze for a full attack.
Keep in mind that if they decide your node IS worthy of being attacked, you won't have the resources to defend against every known and currently-unknown exploit, so you should assume you've already been compromised and mitigate accordingly.
Reading through Bruce Schneier's Guardian article, I could be wrong here. It's unclear whether they root all TOR nodes. I don't see this one on his blog, where he occasionally responds to comments, so it's hard to ask.
Either way, it's (so far) a good sign for TOR users trying to avoid government scrutiny by not-the-US-or-it's-allies, that the NSA has to root nodes in order to break anonymity. The system described is pretty elaborate, and seems unnecessary if they could get the same result from total network traffic analysis.
It does make a comedy of the TOR groups presentations to the FBI in recent years, though, about why TOR should remain legal.
Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
The powerpoint specifically states that they have considered it but regard it a questionable action both for policy reasons as well as technical ones.
Because he knew that if there was an indiscriminate data dump, governments would use that to distract from the real meat. By getting professional journalists to digest the data into understandable stories, he ensured that would not happen. Also he feels details about specific operations or sites or whatever isn't really important to the debate, which is what he cares about the most.
Now that said, we'll have to see if he is happy with the current level of disclosures. My impression so far is that he has been very happy with how things worked out. But this is a guy who had EFF and Tor stickers on his laptop. If he knows Tor is broken and the Guardian do stories implying that it's not, it'll be interesting to see if he has any reaction to that. Right now he's lying low because he wanted to fade away so the stories focus on the material - and that's something he has done amazingly well.
There's a subtle but profound point there. Most warrantless searching of internet stuff has been done under the banner of "no reasonable expectation of privacy". But a TOR user has taken active steps to ensure his privacy - this traffic is as much "not public" as we have the technology to make it. If you don't (legally) have a reasonable expectation of privacy when you go that far, It gives lie to the excuse in the first place.
Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
It does make a comedy of the TOR groups presentations to the FBI in recent years, though, about why TOR should remain legal.
What, what? Forgive my probable naivete, but shouldn't that be the other way around? It should remain legal unless the FBI has some compelling arguments otherwise. First and Fourth amendments, and all that.
Second to last slide mentions that too - paraphrased "could be worse - people might find alternatives to tor or improve it if they knew what we could do".
Keep in mind that if they decide your node IS worthy of being attacked, you won't have the resources to defend against every known and currently-unknown exploit, so you should assume you've already been compromised and mitigate accordingly.
If they think your node is worthy of attack, even a moderate defense will simply cause them to take it down or busy it up, such that users of interest move to another node.
Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
You're a fucking nutbag.
HELP MY ACCOUNT HAS BEEN HACKED BY AN ILLIBERAL ART STUDENT SET TO DESTROY THE INTERWEBZ!
Manning didn't release everything at once. That was a Guardian journalist. Manning gave the lot to Wikileaks, who worked with the newspapers to release little bits at a time. Then some idiot at the Guardian told everyone the key to the encrypted load, and it all got out. But don't blame it on Manning, who did exactly what Snowden did later (i.e. give the stuff to pros, who then went through it and published a little at a time).
HELP MY ACCOUNT HAS BEEN HACKED BY AN ILLIBERAL ART STUDENT SET TO DESTROY THE INTERWEBZ!
"Our goal was to analyse Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze..." http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/nsa-research-report-on-the-tor-encryption-program/501/
Belief is the currency of delusion.
"It is a Windows 2003 computer configured with custom software and a series of Perl scripts. These servers are run by the NSA's tailored access operations, or TAO, group."
If they are using Windows Server 2003 for their MITM attacks, you would think someone could come up with a way to identify and infect them.
There is a lot of overlap between anonymity and privacy but neither is a subset of the other.
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/09/security_matters_0920
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/01/privacy-vs-security-vs-anonymity.html