Fukushima Nuclear Worker Accidentally Toggles Off Cooling Pumps

Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:13 · Score: 5, Insightful

since a backup system kicked in to prevent any critical consequences.

Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:18 · Score: 1

the button to shut off the backup is on a wall right at butt level
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:47 · Score: 5, Insightful

I think the point is not that no disaster occurred, it is that a failure of the primary system happened for whatever reason. Remember that the backup generators failed during the tsunami. On a different day, this inadvertent power off might have been worse.
Ideally you have no unexpected failures, and at least one redundant backup.
The sad thing about all this is that at least one of the Fukushima reactors began to fail before the tsunami even hit the buildings (due to the original quake). Would a simple quake now bring the rest of the system to failure state? Japan is an earthquake haven.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:15 · Score: 4, Insightful

While I AM of the opinion that Fukushima remains a challenge and threat to entire humankind, these kinds of articles are not helpful. The backup system in this case is kind of irrelevant, but more so than that, now over 3 years since the reactor core was offloaded into the cooling pool, all calculations and evidence (from intentional, several days long cooling outages) points to that the pools could remain without cooling for weeks with no "critical consequences". Moreover, in such a case that something is amiss would be detected long before critical consequences allowing the situation to be rectified.
General consensus is that even in case of sudden loss of water in the pool, 3 years old irradiated fuel bundles could easily be cooled by air convection from their own heat alone, although for somewhat obvious reasons that hasn't been tested out. In addition radiation would then make working on the site even harder than now. The critical failure mode for this particular setup is loss of coolant with air convection blocked (such as by rubble from the initial explosion, or the temporary cover they had installed in the early months) or structural failure of the building in case of another earthquake in particular, or simply from the prior damage and ground subsidence due to groundwater changes etc. Or prompt criticality incident due to unfavorable geometry of the nuclear material from damage or attempts to remove the fuel bundles.
The occurrence of human error is, "human", but extremely worrisome in that they have zero margin of error once the removal of the fuel bundles from the pool starts in the coming months. Due to the sheer number of the bundles in the pool (1535 give or take), any chance of mistake would spell almost certain disaster. Even if they somehow press the chance of serious human error to 0,01 percent (one percent of one percent) per bundle the chance of everything running smoothly is 0,9999 to the power or 1535 or 85,8%, leaving a 14.2% chance of disaster for the whole operation. A worker allegedly failing in this basic task under less stressful circumstances isn't necessarily relevant, but it's tempting to consider it not boding well for the future prospects.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by tlhIngan · 2013-10-07 07:17 · Score: 2

since a backup system kicked in to prevent any critical consequences.
Question is, how long do you want to rely on backups to save your ass when the primary problem is accidentally hitting a button? The backup's there as a just-in-case, but it's not something you really want to rely on happening just in case it happens to fail the one time.
Remember, there were a few emergency gensets set to supply power to the reactor cooling systems as well, but it seems a tsunami wiped out them out, and the ones it didn't kill, it killed the switchboards that selected the power source.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:31 · Score: 2, Insightful

Go hit the red button in your data center to see how vulnerable it is. it has a backup system I assume so it can't be that vulnerable.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by i+kan+reed · 2013-10-07 07:32 · Score: 0

You want backups to save you when you do something really stupid you should never do, and that ought to be rare. Critical backups also have tertiaries, in case that blows at the same time. Even with nuclear reactors, there is no such thing as "completely safe" and people like you would sacrifice the safe in the name of the perfect.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by kelemvor4 · 2013-10-07 07:37 · Score: 1

the button to shut off the backup is on a wall right at butt level
Come here, I want to ass you some questions about the button locations.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by durrr · 2013-10-07 07:43 · Score: 1

It's a spent fuel pool, not a reactor core, and even so the backup kicked in with short notice and even if it hadn't, other sensors would've likely flagged down the problem or tripped alarms if it had been left unattended for a very long time.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by IndustrialComplex · 2013-10-07 07:48 · Score: 3, Insightful

I think the point is not that no disaster occurred, it is that a failure of the primary system happened for whatever reason. Remember that the backup generators failed during the tsunami. On a different day, this inadvertent power off might have been worse.
Ideally you have no unexpected failures, and at least one redundant backup.
I think the bigger point here is that even though someone pressed the wrong button, the system didn't go into a catastrophic failure mode. You can't expect that every failure possiblity be prevented, only that no single failure leads to a catastrophic failure.

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Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:54 · Score: 0

See? 2-ply is all the safety we NEED for 12,000 spent fuel rods 100 feet in the air at already melted-down facilities...
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:56 · Score: 1

Do you realize that apples and oranges actually have more in common than the two things you just compared?
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:58 · Score: 2, Informative

[Useful comment needed]
This isn't wikipedia, where people can trot out two simple words and feel justifiably smug, you know.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by timeOday · 2013-10-07 07:59 · Score: 1

The problem is not so much nuclear reactors in general, the problem is that post-disaster Fukushima is, by necessity, flying by the seat of their pants. At some point, duct tape and baling wire will fail to provide the level of surety we expect from highly studied and regulated normal activities.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by ottothecow · 2013-10-07 08:05 · Score: 4, Interesting

One thing worth noting though is that often these systems use ancient control schemes.
Can't speak directly about the japanese systems since they have some more modern stuff, but in the US they are *old*. We haven't started building a new plant since 1974 or a new reactor since 1977 (though they did start some new reactors at existing plants earlier this year).
The control rooms at these places are filled with tons of manual buttons and switches. Many of them look like this. I have no doubt that they are reliable and have failsafes, but a physical switch doesn't have a "are you sure" dialog or stop to ask for an admin password. Sure, switches might have those little covers you have to lift up to press a button, and the most important switches could be controlled with a key, but if somebody wants to push a button, it is getting pushed.
We hear a lot about how much reactor design has come along in the 35 years it has been since we last built one (just think about how long ago that was)...but don't forget that along with efficiency and physical safety, there have been a LOT of improvements in monitoring and control (only a fraction of which have been able to be integrated into the old plants).

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Bottles.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by ShanghaiBill · 2013-10-07 08:08 · Score: 2, Insightful

Ideally you have no unexpected failures, and at least one redundant backup.
In this case, they did have redundant backups. The first backup plan was the one that automatically kicked in. The second backup plan, is that sometime over the next few minutes, hours, or days, but long before it was actually a problem, someone would have noticed that no water was being pumped, and would have turned the pumps back on. It would have only been a problem if left long enough for the cooling water to boil off, and that would have taken awhile. TEPCO has made a lot of big mistakes, but this isn't one of them. This is being blown out of proportion ... and I say that as a tree-hugging environmentalist who thinks that nukes are a bad idea.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by ocdscouter · 2013-10-07 08:09 · Score: 2

[Useful comment needed]
This isn't wikipedia, where people can trot out two simple words and feel justifiably smug, you know.
Exactly! This is where your trot out xkcd and feel smug!
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by ocdscouter · 2013-10-07 08:10 · Score: 2

[Useful comment needed]
This isn't wikipedia, where people can trot out two simple words and feel justifiably smug, you know.
Exactly! This is where your trot out xkcd and feel smug!
This is also where you pray that maybe the New Slashdot will feature an edit button.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by JeffAtl · 2013-10-07 08:23 · Score: 1

One thing worth noting though is that often these systems use ancient control schemes.
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That's not inherently a bad thing though - especially in this type of environment.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 08:29 · Score: 1

You should do that at least yearly. If you're not, you're lying to yourself. You should also restore something from tape monthly, to production,
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by SuricouRaven · 2013-10-07 08:47 · Score: 1

The little cover is called a 'Molly guard.'
Molly was the daughter of the inventor. The name is quite literal: They were invented to guard switches from Molly.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by jandrese · 2013-10-07 08:49 · Score: 1

The Fukushima plant is from the 70s, no doubt its control systems are ancient. In fact it was one of the oldest nuclear power plants still operating when the wave hit.

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Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by dgatwood · 2013-10-07 09:14 · Score: 1

Actually, it is. Electronic gauges don't typically stick. Don't get me wrong, a mechanical backup should be mandatory so that an electronics failure doesn't result in being unable to get readings at a critical moment, but using them as the primary readout mechanism is a recipe for disaster.

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Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 09:25 · Score: 0

While I AM of the opinion that Fukushima remains a challenge and threat to entire humankind
You can safely re-evaluate your opinion. Fukushima is at most a threat to a region of Japan.
Even if you remove all backups systems and let it fail massively no-one on a different continent will be harmed by it.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by IonOtter · 2013-10-07 10:12 · Score: 2

I think the point they were trying to make, is that an electronic switch is a lot more fragile than a hardware switch. Electronics are particularly susceptible to damage from radiation, which is why you can't just send in robots to do all the cleanup work in a reactor accident. Chips get fried just like we do, sometimes even faster.
So technically, once you drag the irradiated corpses out of an analog control room, you'll be able to use the same switches that are already there. With electronic switches, they'll all need to be replaced.

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[End Of Line]
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 11:48 · Score: 2, Interesting

You're wrong. If they fuck up while removing the rods from the spent fuel pool they run the risk of having a criticality incident that could release more Caesium into the environment than all of the above ground nuclear tests ever put together. If that happens, all bets are off.
http://rt.com/news/fukushima-fuel-cleanup-operation-522/
Folks with decades of real world experience are concerned. Perhaps you should re-evaluate your opinion.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 12:45 · Score: 0

the button to shut off the backup is on a wall right at butt level
You're not far wrong.
Trusting corporate interests with managing, maintaining and recovering nuclear power stations from disaster is the social equivalent of a butt-level button.
Even this discussion is an example of the nuclear power industry's salamitaktik approach to defusing outrage. In a week where Tepco and the Japanese government have admitted they do not have the resources to decontaminate Fukushima, we're being fed reassuring pap about "the backup system kicked in to prevent any critical consequences".
Meanwhile, they're continuously leaking bio-accumulating beta emitters into the ocean, with varying excuses. Last week they were saying "workers overfilled a storage tank without a proper gauge", this week it's a worker "carelessly pressed a button shutting off cooling pumps".
Of course, Slashdot does not consider this to be news, because it's not being paid to.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by girlintraining · 2013-10-07 13:24 · Score: 4, Interesting

One thing worth noting though is that often these systems use ancient control schemes.
The control systems were state of the art when it was built: In the early 80s. These reactors have a life expectancy of 50 years. They generally don't get a refit until halfway through that service life, when many of its non-structural components like pipes, tubing, turbines, and pumps, have degraded to the point that the ongoing maintenance cost exceeds the replacement cost.

I have no doubt that they are reliable and have failsafes, but a physical switch doesn't have a "are you sure" dialog or stop to ask for an admin password.

No, it has about a year's worth of training, and time in a simulator ensuring that every plant operator has a full and complete understanding of the machine they'll be working with. It also has multiple people checking each others' work. It also has ongoing training and random inspections by an independent government body, as well as regular inspections by management, to ensure operational safety and compliance with the protocols they were trained in.
You're right that a switch doesn't have a dialog box that pops up when you push it... but these buttons aren't being pushed by Joe Average just following a three ring binder. There has been only a handful of cases in which this training failed, and it took numerous failures at all levels to allow it to happen; And the systems these events happened at were immediately pulled from active service or retrofitted so that it couldn't happen again.
The nuclear industry's safety record is unmatched in the larger industry of energy production. Every year we tolerate a major oil spill. Every year we hear about gas stations experiencing catastrophic failure of safety systems leading to massive neighborhood-sized fireballs. We only hear about nuclear accidents about once every decade or so, and the majority of them result in a big mess and lots of costs for the plant operators, but do not endanger public safety or harm the environment.
All that said... Fukishima has been mismanaged from day one, and a lot of the failure is down to Japanese culture; An inability to be transparent and admit when there's a problem. This retiscence to work the problem is what led to the disaster, and what has since amplified the failure enormously.
The international community in the hours and days following the disaster repeatedly offered assistance, including the US Army Corp of Engineers, who were dispatched to an aircraft carrier who was sitting about 200 miles off the coast in international waters with a full team prepped and on standby, ready to assist in evacuation and containment efforts. These were some of the most highly trained people on the planet; They had each spent years training for it. They were a phone call and 30 minutes away by helicopter from being on the scene and ready to assist.
The phone never rang.
To this very day, the plant managers continue to underfund the cleanup and containment efforts. They continue to keep insufficient equipment and personnel onsite. They have no published plan on how they plan on cleaning up the affected area. Even the Russians, after Chernobyl, put their entire military into containment and isolation of the area... and while many people died, and they were not adequately trained, or equipped, they sent people in by the busload to try and stop it from getting worse. Now I'm not saying Japan should have done that... thrown away thousands of lives to a radiological inferno, like the Russians did... especially not when state of the art equipment and well-trained personnel were ready to assist and knew how to minimize the risk to life.
But I am saying this disaster has been made needlessly worse, much worse, because the Japanese government, their culture, and the corporate culture within TEPCO, are functionally incompetent. And there's no equipment on the planet that can fix what is essentially a problem between the ears of TEPCO management and Japanese government leaders.

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Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Lazarian · 2013-10-07 15:05 · Score: 1

What is Bill Murray doing in that control room?
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by sjames · 2013-10-07 15:36 · Score: 1

This was nothing like critical emergency. Had the backups not kicked in, the water temperature would have slowly risen untill someon thought to themselves, "the water seems pretty hot, why is it so hot?" and then turned the pumps back on.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by sjames · 2013-10-07 15:38 · Score: 1

Except that the red button is specifically designed to shut everything down, including the backups. If you press it and nothing happens, THEN there's a problem.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by sjames · 2013-10-07 15:39 · Score: 1

No, that's the control to turn the pumps on. That's why it's not called a buttoff.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 17:49 · Score: 0

I'd take physical buttons any day over some software on some computer, especially in an environment that is trying to be secure in more than one way. The thing you need is training, and education for the workers. Yes, it's expensive, yes, you have to actually pay the workers to get smart ones, that won't push buttons randomly. Yes, even the cleaners. You do not subcontract them from somewhere. The "are you sure" dialog is the small cap on the button, the key to unlock some specific button is the admin password, the access control to the control room is the password. The cleaner is your trainee system administrator. Treat them as such.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by rrittenhouse · 2013-10-07 17:51 · Score: 1

Except Unit 4 was shut down and the fuel in the "spent fuel" pool is not spent.

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-- I may be paranoid, but I'm still alive
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by LienRag · 2013-10-08 05:28 · Score: 1

From what I understand (I don't have the link, but François Leclerc has an interesting survey of Fukushima in Paul Jorion's blog), the pool where the rods are is at risk of fracturation from an earthquake, which would then makes the rods uncoolable and self-burning (no chain reaction, but creation of a cloud of radioactive particles) in two weeks - that's why the USA advised all americans to evacuate the Tokyo area at first, before they could check how the rods were behaving.
Re:Evidently not that vulnerable by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-11 09:30 · Score: 0

Building nuclear reactors in one of the most earthquake prone zones in the world does not show a lot of intelligence and no wonder those same people are now clueless now about how to avoid open-air fission. Japan does NOT know how to fix the spent nuclear rod pools without running water into the ocean and filling up tanks.
- Nalliah Thayabharan

Homer! by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:13 · Score: 4, Funny

It was homer simpson who did it.

Re:Homer! by Valentinial · 2013-10-07 06:16 · Score: 2

Came here to post similar. When they derive a solution that prevents this type of mishap, I hope they call it the 'Homer Principle" or something near that.

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@Valentinial
Re:Homer! by jones_supa · 2013-10-07 06:17 · Score: 2

It's funny how the power plant in The Simpsons almost starts to look more reliable, as it has become the practice of every week to hear about some little accident at Fukushima.
Re:Homer! by sociocapitalist · 2013-10-07 06:18 · Score: 2

DOH!!

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blindly antisocialist = antisocial
Re:Homer! by Peter+Simpson · 2013-10-07 06:22 · Score: 2, Informative

And the "rat" that tripped the braker in the previous incident is a 6 ft tall, glowing green rat with three eyes and a forked tail...

[3-eyed fish knowingly blinks its eyes (sequentially)]
Re:Homer! by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:03 · Score: 0

No, it was DeeDee
Re:Homer! by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:08 · Score: 0

Yum!!!
Re:Homer! by SailorSpork · 2013-10-07 07:11 · Score: 1

If this was a Kinja-powered news site, the comments section here would be full of Homer Simpson images, animated gifs, and memes generated just for this news story.

Thank goodness this isn't powered by Kinja.
Re:Homer! by tokiko · 2013-10-07 07:20 · Score: 1

> Vent radioactive gas?
(typing) N-O
> Venting prevents explosion.
Okay, then, vent the stupid gas. (typing) Y-E-S
> Decalcify calcium ducts?
(typing) Y-E-S
> Vent radioactive gas?
Well, give me a Y, give me a... Hey! All I have to type is Y. I just tripled my productivity!
Re:Homer! by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 14:13 · Score: 0

Mr. Sparkle!

Wow ... by gstoddart · 2013-10-07 06:15 · Score: 4, Insightful

Am I imagining things, or does it sound like a nuclear plant is being operated by a company without the barest idea of how to do that?

Accidentally flipping off the cooling pumps in a nuclear plant sounds like something which shouldn't even be physically possible.

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Lost at C:>. Found at C.

Re:Wow ... by SirGarlon · 2013-10-07 06:16 · Score: 2, Insightful

It sounds like the company has a pretty good idea of how and where to use backup systems, actually.

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[Sir Garlon] is the marvellest knight that is now living, for he destroyeth many good knights, for he goeth invisible.
Re:Wow ... by TheResilientFarter · 2013-10-07 06:34 · Score: 3, Insightful

This is my thinking, but it's the employees, thus management, that are the problem, not the equipment. I worked in the Naval Nuclear Power Program, where everything was essentially manual. One single operator could cause a meltdown, yet the U.S. Navy is one of the largest and one of the oldest operators of nuclear power plants (by hours critical) and has a spotless safety record. Keep in mind that the average age of the 'employees' is around 22 or 23, with a very low percentage of them over age 26.
Re:Wow ... by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:48 · Score: 0

Things might have gotten slightly out of standard/improvised after the rather big explosion that tore a lot of the plant to shreds...
Still, some kind of locks/covers over important shit would be nice.
Re:Wow ... by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:53 · Score: 0

I can't help but picture Homer Simpson lounged back at his station here.
Re:Wow ... by Somebody+Is+Using+My · 2013-10-07 06:54 · Score: 5, Informative

the U.S. Navy is one of the largest and one of the oldest operators of nuclear power plants (by hours critical) and has a spotless safety record
If you don't count there loss of the nuclear submarines USS Thresher and the USS Scorpion, the radioactive contamination of the USS Guardfish, or both the USS Puffer and the USS Proteus discharging radioactive water into the oceans.
Not to mention I am sure there are a number of other incidents that haven't been declassified yet.
I don't know how well the US Navy ranks amongst other operators of nuclear power plants, but "spotless" is not an accurate description. They may do very well comparatively and the overall harm may be minimal, but they have made their share of mistakes.
Re:Wow ... by bobbied · 2013-10-07 07:04 · Score: 5, Insightful

Keep in mind too, that the Navy is not interested in making a profit. It's goal is to keep it's resources available (afloat, underway and mission capable) under the most difficult circumstances. They can afford to have many times the number of people operating a power plant and they utilize their people to keep their plants operating sans automation. The Navy is not interested in being efficient either. They routinely power cycle their plants and burn though more fuel than they other wise would. They also are not risk adverse. In time of war, they would have no problem pushing their reactors beyond the design limits if the mission demanded it.
Electric power generation is about efficiency and safety. It's more efficient to automate and not pay operators, so they automate their plants, and operate within very narrow operating parameters. They are risk adverse and would rather scram a reactor and go off line than risk operating outside of their design limits.
The navy does have an enviable safety record. But what you really are saying is that the safety of nuclear power is really something to be trumpeted. Except for some research accidents, the worst US event in history was Three Mile Island and that was pretty much nothing. When you put Japan into the mix, things get more interesting, but who can really complain about that? The earthquake was well beyond design limits and even then the damage, while significant, is going to be manageable. It's just going to take a few decades for things to radioactively cool.

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Re:Wow ... by NatasRevol · 2013-10-07 07:05 · Score: 3, Insightful

Because they didn't know how to protect primary systems.

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Re:Wow ... by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:28 · Score: 0

[...] everything was essentially manual. One single operator could cause a meltdown [...]. Keep in mind that the average age of the 'employees' is around 22 or 23, with a very low percentage of them over age 26.
The Navy—a terrorist's wet dream [wiping my mighty beard clean].
Re:Wow ... by TheResilientFarter · 2013-10-07 07:44 · Score: 4, Informative

In training we covered the incidents of the Thresher and the Scorpion, and neither will discharge anything of genuine concern around them. Even immediately following the shutdown of the reactors and assuming reactor coolant pumps and natural circulation failures, the decay heat would easily be absorbed by the sea water that would have filled the reactor compartment, thus it can safely be assumed that the core remained intact. The other areas that contain high amounts of contamination are the primary shield water tank, the ion exchanger, and the charcoal filters. These systems are closed systems designed to operate at incredibly high pressures and are made of very corrosion resistant materials. Although eventually leaks will form from corrosion, but the leakage would be very slow as there is not significant difference in densities, temperatures, pressures, etc, to cause rapid loss, and the leaks themselves would be quite small.
The other 'incidents' are more public embarrassment than actual environmental concerns. The 'radioactive' water that is discharged comes from the water that circulates through the reactor. Technically, there are radioactive contaminants that emit a small amount of gamma radiation. These contaminants are actually particles that will typically settle in the seabed, IIRC, and are typically borderline measurable in most plants as the water is continually circulated through an ion exchanger (resin bed) and an activated charcoal filter. However, the Navy is so anal it treats anything remotely contaminated as radioactive material. The 'father of Nuclear Power', Admiral Hyman Rickover, famously drank a glass of this water at a Congressional hearing to demonstrate how benign the water really is. I think it is also important to note that the Proteus is not a nuclear powered ship, but a sub tender.
Prior to some year, I forget which (1970, maybe?), the Navy would discharge all kinds of crap at sea, which is actually quite typical of many industries and nations even today. However, the Navy stopped discharge of highly radioactive materials, such as ion exchanger resin, and has set a fleet-wide goal to only discharge so much total annually, I think it's something like 50 Ci, and while I was in would regularly come in under that number.
'Radiation' can come from many other sources than nuclear power plants. I don't know if the limits have changed, but it used to be that coal plants would discharge far more radioactive materials than nuclear power plants, but this would never get mentioned anywhere except nuclear power propaganda. When we were going through our radiological controls training, we learned that porcelain dentures are among the highest sources that people are exposed to. One of the Navy's training facilities has a containment vessel built completely around a nuclear power plant, which is unusual, as containment usually only goes around the reactor compartment. This vessel was made of a material that contained a high amount of alpha radiation, and the subsequent painting with lead-based paint made the vessel itself a far higher in-practice contamination risk than the nuclear plant it contained! Keep in mind this is a product of the private contractor that build the vessel, not the Navy, and the vessel was quite old and built in a time when most people and organizations had less concern for such things.
Re:Wow ... by lgw · 2013-10-07 08:03 · Score: 2

Accidentally flipping off the cooling pumps in a nuclear plant sounds like something which shouldn't even be physically possible.
The coolant pumps are not an internet service - they're heavy machinery operating in or near something dangerous. When heavy machinery goes wrong, it often does so energetically. That's why it's possible to shut them off.

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Re:Wow ... by TheResilientFarter · 2013-10-07 08:07 · Score: 2

Totally agree with most of that. I think incredibly few captains would bother operating beyond a reactor's stated limits even in wartime. The reason is that you are really only going to get a few more RPM from your screws for an enormous percent increase in reactor power, and at those speeds, this results in only a marginal increase in actual speed of the ship. It just doesn't pay off, while the risks to the equipment are very real. It wouldn't do any good to have an important electrical component fail because of high temperature and cause the reactor to be shut down. For example, a failure in a control rod drive mechanism would cause the rod to be released and the spring would shove the rod into the core, precluding criticality. Another issue is something that can occur based on core age and reactor power. If a core is old enough, it may not be able to be restarted in the event of an emergency shutdown for some period of time. This preclusion isn't a procedure, it's physics: the core has too many poisons exposed relative to available fuel, and the poisons will require a minimum amount of time to decay before the core may be restarted. However, in the event that a captain did order the plant to be operated beyond normal capacity, this would essentially be put into a calculation to determine how the plant is to be operated for the remainder of its life. In other words, the plants were designed with allowances to be operated beyond capacity.
I'm not aware of any power cycling that was not necessary, unless your stating that the procedures are set up that way, but I really can't see that. The only thing that really bothered me was that we always had to have one of the plants operating while in foreign port (surface ships have 2 plants, except the USS Enterprise, which had 8. The claim was that most ports cannot provide enough power for a naval ship, which is loaded with all kinds of pumps and such that do use a very high amount of power compared with most commercial ships, particularly when compared with a nuclear powered ship. Since I've never had any reference for comparison, I just had to hit the I believe button on that one.
Re:Wow ... by bareman · 2013-10-07 08:26 · Score: 1

It's sounds more like they're being operated by a Coal / Oil company that wants to see nuclear energy banned everywhere.
Re:Wow ... by bobbied · 2013-10-07 08:46 · Score: 1

My "Cycle the power" is just a theory based on things I can surmise. Electrical producers like to run their nuke plants at constant outputs for days, weeks, or months, a luxury I'm assuming is not necessarily one the Navy has. Power producers can run deep into their fuel cycles and by slowly lowering the power output can keep the xenon poisoning at bay, For the Navy would be an unacceptably risky portion of the fuel cycle, due to the "non mission capable" should a reactor be shutdown too quickly. You just don't want to tow some ship home, because they can't restart their reactor.
The power generator will manage their fuel to get as much usable energy out of every ounce of fuel for two reasons. 1. It's cheaper to burn less fuel, 2. Refueling is an expensive operation. Ship reactors are a different story. The Navy is more interested in keeping the system operating without much regard to cost or efficiency. They want mission capable as much as possible so they are likely to refuel much sooner than a power plant.

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"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
Re:Wow ... by TheResilientFarter · 2013-10-07 10:13 · Score: 1

If that is the case, then it's somehow in the design of the fuel meat. The first ship I was on was at the end of its life. Deactivation is based more on fiscal schedules than anything, so we deactivated in October, but had to shutdown for the last time a couple of months before that to get the core at a low enough temperature that it could be pulled on schedule. Even so, there were only a few more inches of available pull on the lowest rods, though none were at max, IIRC, and we were operating xenon-precluded during the last underway.
The Naval reactors can be run for quite a long time. There are enough redundancies built into the system that most of the components can be taken offline temporarily when maintenance is required without necessitating a reactor shutdown, though there were shutdowns for casualty simulations/training. The primary reason the plants get shutdown is to reduce manning requirements when pulling into port, but that definitely makes for more power cycling than a commercial plant, but it also means a lot more down-time, during which there is no fuel consumption. As I understand it, a commercial plant can replace fuel rods while at power, which blows my mind. Commercial plants also operate boiling water reactors, which are much more efficient than the Navy's pressurized water reactors.
Re:Wow ... by bobbied · 2013-10-07 11:37 · Score: 1

The reactor designs I've seen for commercial power did not include the ability to refuel while running. I've only seen two up close with my own two eyes. Both where under construction and neither had fuel in them. I was no expert then and it's been three decades since. I can imagine ways to make refueling happen while operating, so I guess they have mastered that.

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"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101
Re:Wow ... by Xyrus · 2013-10-07 15:07 · Score: 1

They outsourced their nuclear engineering to Chernobyl.

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~X~
Re:Wow ... by oursland · 2013-10-07 15:23 · Score: 1

You mean like the backup generators that failed during the tsunami, and subsequent meltdown that was caused by the failure?
Re:Wow ... by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 16:22 · Score: 0

If I remember correctly, in the book Atomic America, the author tells this story staring Admiral Rickover. Background: Rickover headed the project to make nuclear submarines. After the first US nuclear sub was lanched, it made a couple of public relations stops in some East Coast cities. I think NY was one.
Then, Rickover put out a edict that lasted for decades, into the 1990's or ?
The edict was that no nuclear submarine was to visit any US Harbor or Port of any US city of any size. Rickover assessed the benefit vs. the risk.
Re:Wow ... by AmiMoJo · 2013-10-07 20:02 · Score: 2

In training we covered the incidents of the Thresher and the Scorpion, and neither will discharge anything of genuine concern around them.
I'm amazed you would take the Navy's word for that. Do you think they would really say "oh yeah, those two were ecological/radiological disasters, oops"?

Although eventually leaks will form from corrosion, but the leakage would be very slow as there is not significant difference in densities, temperatures, pressures, etc, to cause rapid loss, and the leaks themselves would be quite small.
And because it's far away under the sea that means a small leak is okay, right?

--
const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
Re:Wow ... by AmiMoJo · 2013-10-07 20:10 · Score: 2

When you put Japan into the mix, things get more interesting, but who can really complain about that?
How about the people who were told "we designed this reactor to be safe in a country where there are frequent, large earthquakes and tsunami", but now find themselves forced out of their homes and communities? Seems like they have a genuine grievance.
Then there are the 120m other Japanese who are paying for the clean up. I'm sure they would rather not, and the promise of nuclear power bringing cheap energy is now completely impossible to achieve.

--
const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
Re:Wow ... by TheResilientFarter · 2013-10-08 00:28 · Score: 1

Yes, I believe them. They never lied to me one single time in the Naval Nuclear Power Program. I worked on the plants. I know how the plants work. Kind of hard to tell me lies about things I'm going to work on and maintain. The amount of radiation leaking out is insignificant, and everything I've ever read states that the radiation actually measured is the same as background radiation, however, I'm skeptical of how they measure radiation at such depths. When we checked for contamination, we used handheld detectors to check every surface, which isn't possible at those depths, so I imagine the best they can do is measure radioactivity of the vicinity, which would make sense that they wouldn't find the minute traces of radioactive particles leaking and then dispersing.
Re:Wow ... by lennier · 2013-10-09 09:41 · Score: 1

Am I imagining things, or does it sound like a nuclear plant is being operated by a company without the barest idea of how to do that?
Well, yes and no. This isn't actually a nuclear plant anymore; it's a nuclear disaster site, full of jury-rigged temporary equipment. Of course they're making things up as they go along, and of course it's all awkward and unsafe, because nobody in the entire nuclear industry has been here before. There really is no long-term plan, but that's not entirely TEPCO's fault because the industry as a whole doesn't have any long-term plan for dealing with nuclear disasters other than to say "they will never happen because we have failsafes, so we don't need to waste any time thinking about that".
Fortunately all that saved time and effort not coming up with worst-case disaster scenarios because they were too far-fetched to imagine is now paying off! If we all just close our eyes, clap our hands and chant "THORIUM PEBBLE-BED LIQUID SODIUM BREEDERS!" this will all magically go away.

--
You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC

Just another sign of TEPCO's incompetence... by Elledan · 2013-10-07 06:16 · Score: 4, Interesting

This isn't another example of how precarious the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi plant is, but one of how massive the incompetence of TEPCO is that they keep having 'incident' after 'incident'. Even long before Fukushima Daiichi TEPCO's safety record was beyond frightening.

That the Japanese government a) allows TEPCO to 'clean up' Fukushima and b) refuses any foreign help shows that the problem with Fukushima is and always has been a political one.

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Re:Just another sign of TEPCO's incompetence... by icebike · 2013-10-07 06:36 · Score: 3, Insightful

That the Japanese government a) allows TEPCO to 'clean up' Fukushima and b) refuses any foreign help shows that the problem with Fukushima is and always has been a political one.
If the Japanese government is anything like our government, (or most governments), suddenly tossing them into a critical situation in a plant they are not familiar with (which is already fundamentally compromised), is just BEGGING for a far worse Chinese fire-drill than is currently going on.
If it is in fact a political problem as you suggest, then implying that the government should do anything differently is pointless, because governments are, by definition, political.

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Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
Re:Just another sign of TEPCO's incompetence... by CrimsonAvenger · 2013-10-07 08:17 · Score: 1

This isn't another example of how precarious the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi plant is, but one of how massive the incompetence of TEPCO is that they keep having 'incident' after 'incident'.
No, this is an example of how you hear about this sort of trivia BECAUSE it's Fukushima.
Let's see. This particular incident reduces down to "minor operator error, safeguards worked as designed"....

--

"I do not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it"
Re:Just another sign of TEPCO's incompetence... by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 18:10 · Score: 0

Just so you know, i didn't mean they should be nuked, but it's their own damn fault (nuking them selfs) if they don't get their shit together
Re:Just another sign of TEPCO's incompetence... by lennier · 2013-10-09 09:54 · Score: 1

This isn't another example of how precarious the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi plant is, but one of how massive the incompetence of TEPCO is that they keep having 'incident' after 'incident'.

... after multiple explosions and meltdowns.
You seem to be under the assumption that this is a nuclear plant. It's not. It's a nuclear meltdown site, and the thing about meltdowns is they don't have an off switch. You don't fix them - fixing the problem will require several hundred years for the corium to decay. You don't decommission them - decommissioning is what you do to an unexploded reactor that reaches the end of its natural life gracefully. You sure as heck don't operate them like they're functioning online plants. The best you can do is try to manage them and minimise the releases. And since the only management they can do is pour water onto naked radioactive corium and pump radioactive groundwater out, then try to store it in leaky tanks - all in a mess of jury-rigged pipes, cables and generators with temporary staff recruited by the Mafia who are rapidly burning out their dosimeters - it's not exactly likely to all go according to the textbook, is it?

--
You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC

Weird by asmkm22 · 2013-10-07 06:17 · Score: 2

That seems like the sort of function that should be designed with a multi-step process to execute, to eliminate precisely that kind of error. How in the world did that get implemented?

Re:Weird by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:30 · Score: 0

Emergency kill-switch?
Re:Weird by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:37 · Score: 0

How in the world did that get implemented?
A huge explosion.
Reactor 4 is immediately next to reactor 3, a reactor that blew up in a violent hydrogen explosion. All the usual, carefully engineered multi-step processes you're thinking of were inartfully eradicated by this explosion. The reactor 4 spent fuel pool, its pipes and pumps and wires et. al. were immediately adjacent to reactor 3.
This is another Fukushima non-story, like the 100 gallons of spilled low level water last week. Fuel pools heat slowly enough to be noticed when the cooling flow stops and the backup system they've put in since caught this in any case.
But hey, publishing weekly Fukushima scare story is grist for the media's mill these days.
Re:Weird by AmiMoJo · 2013-10-07 06:42 · Score: 2

It's like the trigger on a gun. The idea is that it's easy to operate when you need it, and the safety aspect is covered by responsible use. The problem is that in a crisis or the aftermath of one the systems and discipline break down.

--
const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
Re:Weird by icebike · 2013-10-07 06:50 · Score: 4, Funny

That seems like the sort of function that should be designed with a multi-step process to execute, to eliminate precisely that kind of error. How in the world did that get implemented?
I suggest one more step in the process might be effective.
They need a slight reconfiguration of the Cooling Pump Switch. It would be relatively cheap, and pretty much idiot proof.

--
Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
Re:Weird by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:56 · Score: 2, Funny

Clippy: Hello! It looks like you are trying to shutdown the cooling pumps. Would you like me to:
- Shutdown the cooling pumps
- Turn out all the lights
- Turn off everything (default)
Re:Weird by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:00 · Score: 1

Yeah, but who needs the idea to switch off the friggin' cooling pumps easily in the first place? I mean, unless one lives happily in hell the main risk of "spent" fuel rods is not that they do freeze over...
Re:Weird by Sarten-X · 2013-10-07 07:08 · Score: 2

Anybody who notices that they've started leaking badly, or throwing parts around, or otherwise misbehaving.
These are big machines operating in the real world. I, for one, am glad that they can be shut off quickly, though they shouldn't need to be.

--
You do not have a moral or legal right to do absolutely anything you want.
Re:Weird by omglolbah · 2013-10-07 07:33 · Score: 1

The simplicity of shutting down the pumps would have no safety-issue in a properly design system.
Many process control systems designers do levels of protection:
Level 3: Process Control
This level handles the normal operation of the plan. Regulates coolant flow to the pools and announces alarms if you get into a "high temp" state.
Most of the time Offshore in the oil business this level does not take any actions other than notifying the operator.
Level 2: Process Shutdown (PSD)
This level WILL take action on a "high high" event by starting redundant coolant pumps or other actions to cool down the material. This is automatic but usually take into account the speed of which the system could be normalized after a shutdown. This is primarily to protect equipment and not really the process.
Level 1: Emergency Shutdown (ESD)
Offshore this usually means a blow-down of pressurized systems and closing off wellheads. This is a hugely expensive thing... To be avoided!
This level ignores completely the cost of operation a trip will cause and is entirely about securing the systems and avoiding damage to people, environment and plant.
Thing is... Most people would refer to both PSD and ESD levels as 'backup systems' when in fact they are integral parts of the system design. PSD is something that happens routinely in most plants due to anything from equipment failure to network outages. It is what is supposed to happen when the normal operation is not stable. NOT NEWS....
ESD on the other hand usually makes the news over here due to the ramifications of a rig shutting down in an emergency.
So the fact that you can push a button and shut down a pump isnt really the issue. It should cause audible alarms of course, but you WANT to be able to kill off a pump rapidly if something unexpected happens.
Re:Weird by IndustrialComplex · 2013-10-07 07:58 · Score: 1

Yeah, but who needs the idea to switch off the friggin' cooling pumps easily in the first place? I mean, unless one lives happily in hell the main risk of "spent" fuel rods is not that they do freeze over...
Well, do you want to be able to shut them down quickly when something goes wrong and instead of refilling the coolant they are pumping the radioactive water out of the cooling towers? Think of a swimming pool and its pump. A hose on the outside breaks, and instead of recirculating out and back into the pool, you just have something pumping water OUT of the pool.
Or what happens when your sensors pick up noise in the pumps. Do you want to shut them down quickly so that damaged bearing can be replaced and get the pump back to full functionality in a day or so? Or do you want to take a few extra minutes while the pump grinds itself into a fuzed hunk of steel due to a fractured bearing? Now you have to replace the entire pump (these are not tiny sump pumps), and you will be operating on your backup pumps for a long time while the old primary pump is replaced, and a huge inspection needs to take place.
Basically, sometimes there are very good reasons for wanting a system to shut down quickly.

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Re:Weird by firex726 · 2013-10-07 08:03 · Score: 1

Depends how much of an emergency is needed.
I would think adding a couple other buttons or switches and requiring them to be toggled in sequence would add a much greater level of safety from accidental shut off while not requiring much more effort by an operate to execute when shit hits the fan.
Re:Weird by DerekLyons · 2013-10-07 08:20 · Score: 1

That kind of thing sounds good to the armchair engineer... who never thinks that there might be situations where the pumps might need to be shut off in a hurry. Or of the facts that adding complexity failure modes - making the system less safe, not more.
Re:Weird by SuricouRaven · 2013-10-07 08:52 · Score: 1

It's a cooling system. If it leaks, it starts spraying radioactive high-pressure water around. I imagine the off switch is a big red button on the wall.
Re:Weird by avandesande · 2013-10-07 09:25 · Score: 1

I was envisioning a small guillotine but what was in your link would do...

--
love is just extroverted narcissism
Re:Weird by turbidostato · 2013-10-07 11:38 · Score: 1

"but who needs the idea to switch off the friggin' cooling pumps easily in the first place? "
These pumps (as basically all of them) can present a catastrophic failure scenario, while having the pump stopped for hours or even days is not a major problem and can't go unnoticed till it's too late to react so, can you imagine what's the operation you want easy and unencumbered?
Re:Weird by lennier · 2013-10-09 10:08 · Score: 1

That seems like the sort of function that should be designed with a multi-step process to execute, to eliminate precisely that kind of error. How in the world did that get implemented?
Well, I imagine the process flowchart was rigorously overseen and went something like this:
1. Have an earthquake of magitude 6 local equivalent (earthquakes? in Japan? unthinkably unlikely! we can build cheaper if we ignore this contingency)
2. Have a tsunami overtop our seawall (tsunamis? in Japan? on the coast? see above)
3. Lose local, grid and backup generator power (utterly impossible, see above. and obviously flood isn't a risk so we'll put our generators in the basement)
4. Have a meltdown and explosion (this will NEVER happen because it just can't. So it won't. Ever. Full technical refutation: nananana CAN'T HEAR YOU).
5. Run around screaming with our hands in the air (precise details to be left to onsite implementors)
6. Burn out all our trained staff because of contamination
7. Quickly bodge something together to stop the leaking
8. Oh god it keeps leaking aaaaarrrrgh make it stop it won't stop why won't it stop
9. Quick hire some untrained staff and fake their dosimeters why is it still leaking
10. Toss something to the press about billion dollar frozen ice walls. Don't mention the leak. Try to smile. Randomly punch buttons. Is it hot in here?

--
You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC
Re:Weird by lennier · 2013-10-09 11:16 · Score: 1

Yeah, but who needs the idea to switch off the friggin' cooling pumps easily in the first place?
I'm guessing, but since main power to the reactors has been out since the tsunami, they're probably routing power to the cooling pumps via emergency generators / power cables. And it's probably one of those temporary/emergency junction boxes that lost power rather than the main control panel.
Heck, I don't even know if they have physical access to the original control rooms and wiring for much of anything anymore. This isn't a functioning nuclear plant; it's a wet, rusty junkjard full of random places that can kill you if you stand too close.

--
You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC
Re:Weird by lennier · 2013-10-09 11:19 · Score: 1

The simplicity of shutting down the pumps would have no safety-issue in a properly design system that hasn't exploded

People here seem to keep assuming that this is a functioning plant and that the original design specifications hold. It isn't and they don't. It's a debris field with lots of temporary jury-rigged power sources running everything.

--
You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC

Huh? by Antipater · 2013-10-07 06:17 · Score: 4, Insightful

'The latest incident is another reminder of the precarious state of the Fukushima plant...'

So something unexpected occurred, but automatic backups stepped in and prevented any negative consequences. While the plant may or may not be in a precarious state, this is hardly the example to be using for a FUD article. Hell, change the spin around and it could be used in a TEPCO press release showing how far they've come in stabilizing the situation.

--
Everything is better with chainsaws.

Re:Huh? by girlintraining · 2013-10-07 06:32 · Score: 3, Funny

The question remains just how vulnerable to simple mistakes (such as a single button push) are these spent fuel pools,

Did you also notice that this is pretty much how the Linux command line and programming is? One single button push can ruin your whole week. Yet, everyone here calls that a feature and blanches at Windows when it says "Are you sure you want to do this?"
I bet the engineer who pushed the button was a slashdotter... "ARE YOU SURE YOU WANT TO CAUSE A MAJOR NUCLEAR EVENT? y/N? _" ... oh fuck you, NukeOS, I know what I'm doing!

--
#fuckbeta #iamslashdot #dicemustdie
Re:Huh? by AmiMoJo · 2013-10-07 07:03 · Score: 4, Insightful

They failed to train the employees properly and allowed a critical function to be operated by someone who clearly didn't understand it. In this instance the backup saved them, but relying on backups is not a good policy. To put it another way, they can't ignore this incident and simply rely on the backups in future, they have to take steps to correct it.

--
const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
Re:Huh? by h4rr4r · 2013-10-07 07:16 · Score: 1

When someone fubars a server it tends not to release nuclear waste. On top of which they get fired, unlike TEPCO.
Re:Huh? by omglolbah · 2013-10-07 07:37 · Score: 1

Pretty much every control system in the world relies on 'backups' for safety.
Building a system where the regular "process control" wont fail if equipment breaks is prohibitively expensive and is rarely done.
You build a system that works unless something breaks, then you add a second "Process Shutdown" or "Emergency Shutdown" system on top of that to handle all the safety functions.
For instance, at most oil rigs you have emergency shutdown solenoids on valves to the flare boom. If an emergency shutdown is triggered these solenoids open the valves and normalize the pressurized systems. This ESD system logic is usually completely separate in function from the process control system.
In essence it is what you could call a "backup" system.
Re:Huh? by girlintraining · 2013-10-07 07:53 · Score: 1

When someone fubars a server it tends not to release nuclear waste. On top of which they get fired, unlike TEPCO.
No, but the underlying psychology is the same; We want computers and equipment that do what we say without questioning it. Asking for confirmation insults our intelligence, whether you're a system administrator, or a nuclear engineer. This isn't about getting people fired, or slamming your religion of choice; This is about human nature, and where we draw the line between computers doing what we say and computers doing what's safe.

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#fuckbeta #iamslashdot #dicemustdie
Re:Huh? by mdielmann · 2013-10-07 10:31 · Score: 1

Pretty much every control system in the world relies on 'backups' for safety. Building a system where the regular "process control" wont fail if equipment breaks is prohibitively expensive and is rarely done.
You build a system that works unless something breaks, then you add a second "Process Shutdown" or "Emergency Shutdown" system on top of that to handle all the safety functions.
For instance, at most oil rigs you have emergency shutdown solenoids on valves to the flare boom. If an emergency shutdown is triggered these solenoids open the valves and normalize the pressurized systems. This ESD system logic is usually completely separate in function from the process control system. In essence it is what you could call a "backup" system.
Yes, backups are placed for safety purposes. No, that doesn't mean an incident hasn't occurred just because the backup system saved your ass. Relying on the backup system to cover for your incompetence just means that one day there will be a failure of the backup system and your incompetence will manifest at the same time. Then you will go from a near miss to possibly a catastrophe.
Here's a story from a while back in my career. I had a client with a RDBMS for running their service management. It was hosted on its own server, had redundant power supplies, backup system, and the RDBMS had concurrent logging. One day the network admin decided to test the redundant power supplies. He made a number of poor choices: he didn't perform a backup prior to testing; he did the test during the day, while the RDBMS was running; he did it while users were on the system. When he pulled the primary power supply plug, everything was fine. He plugged it back in. When he pulled the secondary power supply plug, he discovered that the primary power supply was already dead. This necessitated a phone call to support (me), and a full test on the system. Fortunately, the concurrent logging worked fine and they lost less than 15 minutes of data entry. Due to his poor timing, they lost over two hours of access to the system (and a bill for those two hours). Had that last failsafe not worked (or the hard drive gotten corrupted), he could have lost data to the last backup. Hours, or perhaps a day of data.
The moral of the story: backups are there in case something goes wrong, not so that you can be lax with your procedures.

--
Sure I'm paranoid, but am I paranoid enough?
Re:Huh? by turbidostato · 2013-10-07 11:47 · Score: 1

"No, but the underlying psychology is the same; We want computers and equipment that do what we say without questioning it. Asking for confirmation insults our intelligence"
Asking for confirmation makes scripting it harder while at the same time getting nothing on interactive use. When was the last time you did NOT unconciously pressed the "yes" button after an "are you sure?" message?
The problem is "security theatre" not something about egos: it is something cumbersome and doesn't really work.
Re:Huh? by danlip · 2013-10-07 12:09 · Score: 1

You look like you're causing a meltdown. Would you like help?

Where's the problem? by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:18 · Score: 4, Insightful

A human made a mistake which was caught and corrected by an engineered system. Seems like a non-story.

Re:Where's the problem? by asmkm22 · 2013-10-07 07:37 · Score: 1

I think it's a story in that it apparently only takes a single mistake to toggle off the cooling pumps. Even standard rack servers have bezels that keep you from accidentally powering them down unless you really mean to get to that part of the server.
Re:Where's the problem? by IndustrialComplex · 2013-10-07 08:06 · Score: 1

I think it's a story in that it apparently only takes a single mistake to toggle off the cooling pumps. Even standard rack servers have bezels that keep you from accidentally powering them down unless you really mean to get to that part of the server.
It very likely did. What happened is that the worker was intentionally shutting down the power to some systems, but accidentally turned off the pumps. He could have been trying to turn off Pump Room #2 and accidentally flipped the switch for Pump Room #3. If he got the switches confused, a faceplate or bezel isn't going to stop it.

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Re:Where's the problem? by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 08:07 · Score: 0

It would be a non-story if it was at any other nuclear power plant. Since this happened at the Fukushima site, which is being watched like a hawk, and since Tepco is universally considered incompetent and shouldn't be allowed to run a kitchen blender, this is front page news.
After actually reading the article, it sounds like unexpected systems shut off in response to normal maintenance, which goes back to personell knowing the plants engineering design, and improper maintenance procedure. For a nuclear site that had a major catastrophe happen to it, they should be batting 99.9%, and they aren't.
Re:Where's the problem? by excelsior_gr · 2013-10-07 09:12 · Score: 1

On the surface, yes, it does seem like a non-story. But there are some news to be had from it, both good and bad:
The good news is, as you pointed out, that the engineers that designed the system knew what they were doing. The bad news, however, is that the engineers that run the system, don't know what they are doing. Alas, stupidity always finds its way and it may be just a matter of time before a human mistake does not get caught by the engineered system. This story is a sign that something is wrong, and some people should think long and hard about this.
Re:Where's the problem? by mdielmann · 2013-10-07 10:43 · Score: 2

I've been hearing bad things about Japan's nuclear industry for over a decade now. I personally think the best "minor" event was when a technician witnessed a criticality event outside of a reactor, while carrying the nuclear material in a metal bucket. He wasn't even aware of what the blue flash signified. I wasn't either, until that story, but I don't work with nuclear materials. The news stories surrounding this incident mentioned a number of minor to moderate handling violations. Ah, here's a link to the event. September, 1999. Okay, not so minor. Second biggest, after Fukushima.

--
Sure I'm paranoid, but am I paranoid enough?

Buh. by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:19 · Score: 1

How are critical systems only protected by a single button?

Shouldn't it be a mechanically complex task, or be password/switch position controlled action?

Re:Buh. by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:46 · Score: 0

How are critical systems only protected by a single button?
Shouldn't it be a mechanically complex task, or be password/switch position controlled action?
The obvious answer is these systems probably have failure modes that require immediate shut down to minimize the damage done, and the error here is that the employee used that emergency shut down when it was not warranted.
Since these are cooling pumps for a nuclear reactor I'll go out on a limb and guess that it's possible for the pumps to leak contaminated water and that the ability to kill the pumps quickly addresses the "spewing pressurized radioactive waste" fault mode.
Re:Buh. by IndustrialComplex · 2013-10-07 08:11 · Score: 1

How are critical systems only protected by a single button?
Shouldn't it be a mechanically complex task, or be password/switch position controlled action?
It wasn't protected by a single button. It was also protected by a backup system of pumps (and likely more). It might have been a mechanically complex task, or controlled as well.
Lots of things can have complex steps and safety checks, but they matter for little if the person going through the checks doesn't realize he is flipping the wrong switch.
It could have been a failure way up the communication chain as well.
Mgr: Go turn off Pump Room #4
Worker: OK. *Goes off and gets the keys to the power box, unlocks the box, goes through his checklist to verify that he is turning off Pump Room #4*
Worker: OK boss, Pump Room #4 is turned off like you asked.
Mgr: ... wait, didn't I tell you Pump Room #3?

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Re:Buh. by bobbied · 2013-10-07 08:17 · Score: 1

Um... Except perhaps when such controls need to be operated quickly in the case of an emergency, like the next earthquake.
You have 10 seconds before the end of the world if you don't enter the 24 char password with upper case, lower case, numbers and special characters...

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"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101

Disaster only strikes ONCE by ElitistWhiner · 2013-10-07 06:21 · Score: 2

Fukusima will never end.

Re:Disaster only strikes ONCE by bobbied · 2013-10-07 08:23 · Score: 1

Not during our lives. It's going to take a long time before things cool off enough to allow approaching the facility close enough to decommission it.
Hopefully we won't be seeing weekly updates on /. though..

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"File to fit, pound to insert, paint to match" - Aircraft Maintenance 101

Like King-Size Homer? by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:21 · Score: 0

Release deadly gas (Y/N)? http://i.stack.imgur.com/M6Ua8.png

Simpsons did it. by jtownatpunk.net · 2013-10-07 06:21 · Score: 1

Darn that lousy Tibor!

The Boss by Joe_Dragon · 2013-10-07 06:22 · Score: 1

Who is this Homer Simpson??

Re: The Boss by jd2112 · 2013-10-07 06:42 · Score: 5, Funny

Didn't he write The Iliad?

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Any insufficiently advanced magic is indistinguishable from technology.
Re: The Boss by Roman+Coder · 2013-10-07 07:02 · Score: 1

/applaud

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"The future can only affect the present if there is room to write its influence off as a mistake." - Yakir Aharonov
Re: The Boss by K.+S.+Kyosuke · 2013-10-07 07:47 · Score: 1

Didn't he write The Iliad?
I thought he wrote 2001: A Space Odyssey?

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Ezekiel 23:20
Re: The Boss by turbidostato · 2013-10-07 11:26 · Score: 1

No, The Illiad writes UserFriendly.

Working as intended by DerekLyons · 2013-10-07 06:25 · Score: 1, Insightful

"A Tepco employee carelessly pressed a button shutting off cooling pumps that serve the spent fuel pool in reactor #4 - thankfully a backup kicked in before any critical consequences resulted."

Um - that's what backups are for. Seriously, this is just another ignorant journalist generating controversy from thin air to get the site he works for some page views.

Re:Working as intended by iggymanz · 2013-10-07 06:27 · Score: 2

normally, that would be a proper reaction. but we're talking about a place that put their "main backups", the most critical safety system outside of containment, underground. asking to be flooded. I'd be very suspect about any of their backup systems
Re:Working as intended by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:40 · Score: 0

""A Tepco employee carelessly pressed a button shutting off cooling pumps that serve the spent fuel pool in reactor #4 - thankfully a backup kicked in before any critical consequences resulted."
Um - that's what backups are for."
So that careless people can work there?
Was the button labelled: "Do not press this button, ever!!!" ?
Was there a seal on it, that you have to disrupt before being able to press it?
Is there a counter to check how many times it was pressed and when?
Why isn't the button locked with a key so that it cannot be pressed 'carelessly' by somebody putting his lunch on it?
Or was it just a careless button for careless monkeys who have no idea what they are doing?
Re:Working as intended by phorm · 2013-10-07 07:20 · Score: 1

No, backups are to kick in when the primaries fail, not because some idiot accidentally poked the "off" button.
Failsafes (double-person authentication, or at the very least a molly-guard a big freaking DON'T TOUCH UNLESS YOU KNOW WHAT YOU'RE DOING sign) are what is needed to prevent issues like this.
Re:Working as intended by omglolbah · 2013-10-07 07:24 · Score: 1

The terminology here is confusing to say the least. I highly doubt it was a "backup system" that did this. More likely process safety functions took over for process control functions...
Re:Working as intended by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 08:13 · Score: 0

Sure, you get right on turning on a failsafe to every single switch in the plant. I'm sure that will be feasible.
How far up and down the chain do you require two person authentication? Primary pumps with backup systems? What other systems require such authentication?
Re:Working as intended by DerekLyons · 2013-10-07 08:40 · Score: 1

No, backups are to kick in when the primaries fail, not because some idiot accidentally poked the "off" button.
A backup system doesn't know if the failure (lack of water flow, or change of level or temp, or whatever triggered them in this case) is caused by accident or actual failure - and that's proper design, because you want to rely on the backups activating regardless of the cause. A failure is a failure regardless of the cause.

Failsafes (double-person authentication, or at the very least a molly-guard a big freaking DON'T TOUCH UNLESS YOU KNOW WHAT YOU'RE DOING sign) are what is needed to prevent issues like this.
Um, 'fail safe' is exactly what this system did - despite human error, no accident ensued. (Or, to put it another way, you shouldn't use big words you're clueless as to the meaning of. It make's you look like a fool.) As to the others, no matter what you do you cannot eliminate human error. Period. Designing your backups to protect against erroneous operations is simply good engineering. Relying solely on signs and switchguards is foolish and an invitation to accidents.
Re:Working as intended by turbidostato · 2013-10-07 12:23 · Score: 1

"Was the button labelled: "Do not press this button, ever!!!" ?"
Why you'd want the button, then?
"Was there a seal on it, that you have to disrupt before being able to press it?"
This button was meant to be used as part of business as usual operations, now why you should seal it as if it were a non-for-usual-operations device?
"Is there a counter to check how many times it was pressed and when?"
What for? And how that would prevent the button being pressed out of requirements?
"Why isn't the button locked with a key so that it cannot be pressed 'carelessly' by somebody putting his lunch on it?"
Because the key is in the door before the system that reads "Authorized personnel only"
"Or was it just a careless button for careless monkeys who have no idea what they are doing?"
Or was it an anonymous coward just spitting every nonsense that crosses his mind without ever read the article?
A better question would be, as per the article's contents: was it that the inspector was running a mistaken procedure or was it that the pump switch was not properly labelled?
Re:Working as intended by phorm · 2013-10-08 03:38 · Score: 1

Yes, it's good that the backup system works, that's not the issue.
The issue is that it shouldn't be the main mitigating/limiting factor for simple human failure. There should be lots of other stuff that prevents stupid human mistakes from taking down the primary.
Just like in the rest of the computing world. It's great if you've got complete backups, but not so good if the reason you needed them is because somebody corrupted the DB by leaning on the exposed "emergency power off" button in the datacenter.
Nowhere did I say that you should rely solely on signs and switchguards, that would be dumb. Not having such things in combination with a backup is also dumb. No, you can't eliminate human error, but you can take reasonable steps to reduce it which seem to be lacking in this case.
You're correct in that failsafe wouldn't be the correct word in this case. I hardly think that makes me a fool, and at least I'm not foolish enough to think that the word "makes" somehow requires an apostrophe.

if it was a operating plant, there would be alarms by swschrad · 2013-10-07 06:25 · Score: 2

but that didn't help the Three Mile Island operators any, now, did it?

you have to be at the top of your game to keep the dragons at bay in a nuke plant.

there is so much fouled up at Fukushima Daiichi that the training manuals and game plans are straight out the window and into the fire. this means you can't follow the manuals any more. and THAT means that a one-man job needs to be cross-checked at every step by somebody who is in position to monitor the stage being worked on.

and THAT... means the same old team can easily be outclassed by the breeding dragons in the lairs. we have already seen TEPCO stumbling around so many times like it takes two members of the shore patrol to drag them back to the ship for Captain's Mast.

TEPCO is, has not been for a long time, and will never be in a position to manage the catastrophe they set forth. this is no place for yes-men who are slaves to 40-year-old process.

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if this is supposed to be a new economy, how come they still want my old fashioned money?

Re:if it was a operating plant, there would be ala by intermodal · 2013-10-07 06:33 · Score: 1

Hate to break it to you, but as incompetent as TEPCO may be, they did not cause the tsunami. They may have failed along the way, but to claim they "set forth" a catastrophe here is nonsense.

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Gen I vs. Gen III by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:35 · Score: 1

Just like ot point out, this is a Gen 1 reactor. We're currently in Gen 3-3+, and the learning from older models like Fukishima has already been incorporated into the new designs. Newer plants have fewer issues than this and have increased safety by many orders of magnitude.

Sadly, we're all human. by Dzimas · 2013-10-07 06:38 · Score: 4, Interesting

We've instilled a belief in the general public that scientists and engineers can pull of miracles, and that we know more than them. Science in movies is often almost magical, and people expect our encyclopedic knowledge of esoteric technical systems to translate into quick and easy solutions to difficult problems. About a decade ago, I found myself giving a presentation to a group of nuclear scientists. It was a nerve-wracking experience for a young computer geek, and I presented the team with two alternatives for warehousing environmental data at their facility. There was a brief debate before the most senior member of the group spoke up and said, "You're the expert. What do you recommend?" It didn't matter that there were ten people in the room with PhDs and decades of experience; everyone naturally wants someone else to provide them with an easy path to the best answer. At that point, they were all primed to accept a recommendation from the young whippersnapper who could think quickly on his feet (and was armed with a laser pointer, I might add) I gave them the best recommendations I could, and many were eventually accepted. But deep down I realized that I could quite easily have led them astray at that point. I'm acutely aware that there must be dozens of people like me who have been working at Fukushima for over a year now; the so-called "experts" on the ground who are trying to make the best choices possible. Their job is unenviable because they're facing contamination on a huge scale and many decisions were made in haste in an attempt to limit the scope of the catastrophe. That will make everything harder for those involved in the containment and remediation in the coming decades.

Re:Sadly, we're all human. by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 08:18 · Score: 1

They're nuclear scientists, not IT specialists. None of them had the expertise to verify your claims. Just because someone has a doctor, it doesn't mean he's knowledgeable about anything besides his field. That's what consultants are for.
If the consultants are ignored, or are fake, it doesn't work, of course.
Re:Sadly, we're all human. by Dzimas · 2013-10-07 10:29 · Score: 1

It was a process decision, one of those challenging situations where the content experts can provide a very technical answer that appears simple on the surface but is anything but in reality. Those are tricky moments, because no single person in the room has the big picture -- the business analysts hold part of the puzzle, as do the scientists and the IT staff tasked with modeling and building the system.
Re:Sadly, we're all human. by geekoid · 2013-10-07 11:21 · Score: 1

""You're the expert. What do you recommend?" It didn't matter that there were ten people in the room with PhDs and decades of experience;"
dear lord, get your stupidity out of the industry, go.... mop floor or something.
You are the expert. They are not. The primary difference seems to be they are educated enough to realize that it makes them an expert in their fields, not all fields. where as you seem to thing PhD = 'Knows everything'
" who could think quickly on his feet"
whoa whoa whoa. You didn't have the best solution based on you information before the presentation?
You, and people like you, are exactly why this industry isn't maturing into an actual engineering field.
Just becasue you are standing up there presenting as if you are an expert, when by you own admission you are not and expert, doesn't mean others lack the professionalism you do and go around pretend to be an expert but really foisting there expert advice on to others like you do.
This, this is why Software and IT needs a professional engineer exam. So we can weed out non experts like you from critical decsions.

--
The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
Re:Sadly, we're all human. by ebno-10db · 2013-10-07 13:39 · Score: 1

I respect the senior guy for saying "I don't know", unlike some idiots who think they're showing weakness if they admit they don't know something.

Addendum. by SeNtM · 2013-10-07 06:43 · Score: 1

Due to increased radiation levels, rats grow up to 3 feet long and have opposable thumbs.

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"There ought to be limits to freedom." -George W. Bush

wjy not use the waste heat? by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 06:54 · Score: 0

If they generate so much heat that cooling them is critical, why dont they keep making power with it? Like pebble bed reactors or some type of thermal electric gen..?

Re:wjy not use the waste heat? by bob.lansdorp · 2013-10-07 07:14 · Score: 1

If they generate so much heat that cooling them is critical, why dont they keep making power with it? Like pebble bed reactors or some type of thermal electric gen..?
Because it is much more difficult to extract useful work from low temperature waste heat than from high temperature waste heat. See the second law of thermodynamics for details (eg Carnot efficiency).

WOW. Sensationalism at work by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:02 · Score: 1

So someone pressed a wrong button and a pump tripped off. Here's some reality:

1. Rats are going to bite things. That's why we have safeguards and alarms in place to make sure no "dire consequences" occur.
2. Anyone know how long it takes a standard cooling pool "filled to capacity" to get hot enough to boil? Hint: more than a few hours. In some cases days. And no doubt there will be plenty of gauges, computer data points, alarms, and human log taking that will notice these kinds of things LONG before its a big deal. The pool was deliberately overdesigned so that you have that extra time in case lots of things all go wrong at the same time.
3. Human error happens. That's why we have automatic systems that start a pump and/or give an alarm so you KNOW something is wrong. You engineer the system so that human error doesn't cause unrecoverable issues. Operators here are trained that if something happens that they aren't expecting STOP, and don't touch anything. Just look and see what is going on. Automatic systems should normally take care of any emergent problem. And even if they fail, the systems are designed to provide enough time for the operator to take their own action. Some of them are engineering to allow for hours to take action. Human error is a part of life. We try to engineer out of it. Sometimes we fail(see TMI). But those operators actually started trying to control the automated systems, and thats where you should stop and start asking the big questions like "Are we really sure this is the right choice to take?" and "Let's get a 2nd/3rd/4th opinion before we do this".

But since its a nuclear power plant(and a damaged one) we clearly must panic, right?

This article makes it look like the cooling pumps for the spent fuel pools were seconds from going critical and boiling out all of the water in the pool. That's far from the truth.

Big fail article.

Yes, I work in nuclear power. Posting anonymously for a reason...

Safe, clean, and too cheap to meter! by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:07 · Score: 0, Flamebait

Evidently not that vulnerable
since a backup system kicked in to prevent any critical consequences.

Exactly! We need to keep in mind that nothing can possibly go wrong - why, it'd probably take an earthquake to interfere with a nuke plant, and eathquakes and tsunamis are purely mythical.

It's perfectly OK for TEPCO's operators to make mistakes - since nothing can go wrong, and backup systems always work, as proven conclusively by this incident.

Re:Safe, clean, and too cheap to meter! by IndustrialComplex · 2013-10-07 08:19 · Score: 2

One of their safety guys forgot to eat breakfast that morning. He relied on his backup reserve of stored fat to get him through until lunchtime, but that's not good enough, he could have kept forgetting to eat and what then? He runs out of stored reserves and starves to death, right there in the middle of conducting a safety examination.
Why if enough of the safety guys forgot to eat, every single one of them could die, and then there would be NONE left. No way in hell am I relying on a backup system that was designed by trial and error evolution.

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Another Big Red Button by NeroTransmitter · 2013-10-07 07:08 · Score: 0

Rightly put in the wrong place. Or is it wrongly put in the right place?, either way.

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^ Probably Sarcasm...

Dance Dance Radiation! by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:08 · Score: 0

Nuclear Mix!

Re:if it was a operating plant, there would be ala by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:10 · Score: 0

So they didn't build it in a tsunami prone area, right?

Spent fuel pool cooling... by Bugler412 · 2013-10-07 07:19 · Score: 2

Means you have days to respond, not minutes. And a backup kicked in quickly, accompanied (I presume) with a lot of alarms and a very strong reprimand from management for "testing an interlock" Why is this news?

Can we just *PLEASE* start using passive cooling? by mark-t · 2013-10-07 07:22 · Score: 0

Because then bonehead manoeuvres like this just won't be an issue.

Oh right... passive cooling reactors don't produce weapons-grade material as a waste by-product.

We wouldn't want to switch to energy systems that might actually have wholly peaceful implications, would we?

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File under 'M' for 'Manic ranting'

News Flash by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:23 · Score: 0

Guy makes mistake. Leads to nothing newsworthy. Press catches wind and destroys a reputation.

Sorry... by Chemisor · 2013-10-07 07:23 · Score: 1

Sorry about that. I left the coolant report on the console while I was programming the repair bot to install the Hydroelectric Magnetosphere Regulator and Hank picked it up. Before I knew it, he's shambling into the reactore core. It took a few Rad-X, but I finally caught up with him right as he was shutting off the coolant pump. Close call, but hey, those ghouls are not the brightest tools in the shed. But don't worry, I talked to Harold and he said he'll retire Hank to guard duty instead.

Re:Sorry... by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 09:08 · Score: 0

Sorry about that. I left the coolant report on the console while I was programming the repair bot to install the Hydroelectric Magnetosphere Regulator and Hank picked it up. Before I knew it, he's shambling into the reactore core. It took a few Rad-X, but I finally caught up with him right as he was shutting off the coolant pump. Close call, but hey, those ghouls are not the brightest tools in the shed. But don't worry, I talked to Harold and he said he'll retire Hank to guard duty instead.
Great Fallout 2 reference.

and most of the Gen 1 plants are still running by swschrad · 2013-10-07 07:26 · Score: 1

it took a massive fubar in designing and rebuilding transfer units at Diablo Canyon to get that plant shut down, and they're built on top of an active fault zone.

we might not get any Gen 3 plants running, frankly, the cost/benefit ratios have cancelled all but two being built now. and one of them keeps getting delayed.

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if this is supposed to be a new economy, how come they still want my old fashioned money?

IT's time. by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:40 · Score: 0

The time has come for the world to take this problem on. The Japanese have failed at this so far, and it is far to important to allow foolish pride, and irresponsibility to get in the way. We need our international best and brightest on this now.

Re:Can we just *PLEASE* start using passive coolin by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 07:40 · Score: 0

I think I got dumber just reading your post.

There are issues with passive cooling; most of it has only been proven in mathematical models to work, and Westinghouse's AP-1000 (the most prominent passive cooling system out there) had to go through massive redesigns due to some partially valid complaints.

However, the issue is not switching between active and passive cooling. Most of the reactors in operation are older models that used active cooling. You can't upgrade them to passive because the cooling is the key design feature; you might as well just tear it down and build a new one.

So rather the issue to switching to passive cooling has absolutely nothing to do with producing weapons grade material, it has to do with the financials of building a new nuclear power plant and shutting down older models, which is not insubstantial ($5-$10B up front for 2-3 years with no revenue during construction during a global financial recession is a huge hurdle to overcome).

Emergengy Shutoff button? by Kaenneth · 2013-10-07 07:41 · Score: 1

Without more details, I would guess that the button is actually a Big Red Button, that is, a safety feature of the pump system; in case something/someone clogs the intakes for example.

Re:if it was a operating plant, there would be ala by jeffmflanagan · 2013-10-07 07:41 · Score: 2

Blaming nature for the foreseeable consequences of building a nuclear reactor with inadequate safety precautions in a tsunami zone is nonsense. TEPCO is 100% responsible for the ongoing disaster, not nature.

Reactor 4 has *unspent* fuel rods by fche · 2013-10-07 07:42 · Score: 1

Remember, those were removed from reactor 4 for maintenance, sometime before the tsunami. That's a full reactor worth of live & hot fuel rods, in an open pool. Pretty crazy.

Re:Reactor 4 has *unspent* fuel rods by the+eric+conspiracy · 2013-10-07 09:43 · Score: 1

If they weren't in an open pool there would be a nice pressure buildup.
You don't want that.
Re:Reactor 4 has *unspent* fuel rods by fche · 2013-10-07 10:42 · Score: 1

Not that I know anything, but there exist valves and such to relieve excess pressure from enclosed spaces. Just the fact that a reactorful of fuel is sitting almost in the open - and has been there for two years - boggles this little mind here. No wonder they're reinforcing the concrete structure -now-, but what were the original GE engineers thinking?
Re:Reactor 4 has *unspent* fuel rods by geekoid · 2013-10-07 11:14 · Score: 1

So a valve constantly releasing pressure is better than an open pool...how?

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Re:Reactor 4 has *unspent* fuel rods by fche · 2013-10-07 11:30 · Score: 1

Perchance such a valve could be plumbed to a facility more radiation-tolerant than the general atmosphere.
Re:Reactor 4 has *unspent* fuel rods by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 13:48 · Score: 0

Note, the reason they are in the pool in the first place is that water is one of the best materials for blocking radiation. Spent fuel has a lot of short-term radioactive fission byproducts that are more radioactive than the fissionable Uranium due to the shorter half-lives. Storing unspent fuel shouldn't be a problem in this case, as the main fuel (U-235) is also the main radioactive component, with a fairly long half-life compared to the fission byproducts which we use the spent fuel pools for.

Power Plant! by interval1066 · 2013-10-07 07:54 · Score: 1

Johnny unplugs the the main panel... "Just kidding"

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Re:Can we just *PLEASE* start using passive coolin by mark-t · 2013-10-07 08:02 · Score: 1

I never suggested upgrading existing reactors... I realize that's impossible...

It's just damn annoying reading stories like this because passive cooling reactor technologies have existed for decades, and yet hardly anybody ever used them. We have an opportunity to change how we do things in the future, but given the past resistance to adopting such methods, I remain pessimistic that they'll actually start using far safer systems, in favor of what will give them the most money right away.

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File under 'M' for 'Manic ranting'

Vista by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 08:05 · Score: 0

The question remains just how vulnerable to simple mistakes (such as a single button push) are these spent fuel pools, filled nearly to capacity as they are with over 12,000 spent fuel rods?

You are attempting to shut down a cooling pump. Cancel or allow?

Do we need a UAC for nuclear power plants as well? Do we want it to be as annoying as Vista?

Re:if it was a operating plant, there would be ala by intermodal · 2013-10-07 08:19 · Score: 1

Considering 40 years between construction and the incident, I'd say that is a correct analysis. They did not build it in a particularly tsunami-prone area. Especially when you consider what actually happened, compared with what a lot of people seem to think happened.

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Re:if it was a operating plant, there would be ala by intermodal · 2013-10-07 08:21 · Score: 1

I disagree. I'll give them up to a maximum of 40%, no more.

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Sure, we believe you... by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 08:31 · Score: 0

"after a rat tripped an electrical wire."

Sure. Obviously. What a crock of shit.

Skewed statements by Imagix · 2013-10-07 08:36 · Score: 1

Wow, skewed much. "... thankfully a backup kicked in...". That same phrase could have just as easily been phrased "The robust backup systems performed perfectly as designed to ensure the safety of the stored materials." But I guess reports of systems working as designed don't sell many views.

Re:if it was a operating plant, there would be ala by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 09:23 · Score: 0

They did not build it in a particularly tsunami-prone area.

The entirety of Japan's east coast is a particularly tsunami-prone area, as the historical record amply shows. Are you aware that the ground level was lowered by 20 meters before construction of Fukushima Dai-ichi started? This has saved some money on pumps, while creating the conditions for a tsunami to drown the plant. Penny wise, pound foolish, I call that.

No help for human nature by sabt-pestnu · 2013-10-07 10:12 · Score: 1

Every now and then, someone WILL lean against the wall and stumble back against the server room's Emergency Power Disconnect switch.

And the very next day, someone will fit a flip-up cover for it.

Re:No help for human nature by geekoid · 2013-10-07 11:25 · Score: 1

IN some scenarios a flip cover is WORSE then accidentally activating a back up.

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O RLY? by Gravis+Zero · 2013-10-07 11:04 · Score: 1

Sadly, we're all human.

speak for yourself, fleshbag!

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Anons need not reply. Questions end with a question mark.

SImple by geekoid · 2013-10-07 11:12 · Score: 1

start developing nuclear power plant that i=use the spend material as fuels. AS a bonus, the the waste will be less, and return to background radiation levels in less than 500 years. As little as 200 years in some cases.

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Re:if it was a operating plant, there would be ala by geekoid · 2013-10-07 11:23 · Score: 1

They did in that they refused to take proper care of the waste in order to save money.

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Re:if it was a operating plant, there would be ala by geekoid · 2013-10-07 11:24 · Score: 1

Keep in mind when ti was built, plate tectonics was barley a recognized thing.

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Clippy by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 14:45 · Score: 0

It looks like you are trying to shut down the cooling pumps... Do you want to adjust the control rods?

the evidence is there by slashmydots · 2013-10-07 17:44 · Score: 1

I'm starting to think that only complete idiots are employed there.

Just a rat? by FilatovEV · 2013-10-07 19:44 · Score: 1

May be, there were four turtles nearby, too?

Oh no!!! by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-07 21:18 · Score: 0

The sky is falling the sky is Falling!!! We need to stop all nuclear right now!!!!!! The FUD told me so!!!

Re:if it was a operating plant, there would be ala by intermodal · 2013-10-08 01:26 · Score: 1

I can agree on that particular point.

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Re:if it was a operating plant, there would be ala by intermodal · 2013-10-08 01:31 · Score: 1

Certainly not understood the way we understand it today. Really, the biggest failure (of many) on TEPCO's part was in its backup generator system placement and design. Ironically, this system was much newer than the rest of the facility, but set forth the chain of failures that led to the multiple meltdowns.

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Re:WOW. Sensationalism at work by LabratSR · 2013-10-08 03:03 · Score: 1

Good post. Fact is that the spent fuel has been in the pools for 3 years and is almost ready for dry cask storage, which starts at unit 4 next month.

Cesium Found In Children’s Urine by Anonymous Coward · 2013-10-08 03:28 · Score: 0

Cesium Found In Children’s Urine Shows Ongoing Widespread Problem In Japan
October 7th, 2013 SimplyInfo
The acceptable amount of radioactive cesium in human urine is zero. The substances (cesium 134 and 137) does not exist in nature and cause damage to the human body.
Also in 2013 a group in metropolitan Tokyo continued to find cesium in children’s urine. While they tested fewer children the amounts and instance percentage appears to be about the same as they found in 2011 and 2012. The Tokyo metro findings for 2013 were between .04 bq/kg to .43 bq/kg

Is this a joke? by doccus · 2013-10-08 07:24 · Score: 1

"an anonymous contributer writes.. there was an incident at Fukushima but nothing happened" .... end of submission. Look I know the quality of submissions everywhere seems to have fallen, but , seriously.. Come on, guys..

Dear Tepco employee, by terrywirth5 · 2013-10-08 09:59 · Score: 1

The honorable thing to do is disembowel yourself. This is commonly known as hara kari.

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