Airline Pilots Rely Too Much On Automation, Says Safety Panel
Hugh Pickens DOT Com writes "Nearly all people connected to the aviation industry agree that automation has helped to dramatically improve airline safety over the past 30 years but Tom Costello reports at NBC News that according to a new Federal Aviation Administration report commercial airline pilots rely too much on automation in the cockpit and are losing basic flying skills. Relying too heavily on computer-driven flight decks now poses the biggest threats to airliner safety world-wide, the study concluded. The results can range from degraded manual-flying skills to poor decision-making to possible erosion of confidence among some aviators when automation abruptly malfunctions or disconnects during an emergency. 'Pilots sometimes rely too much on automated systems,' says the report adding that some pilots 'lack sufficient or in-depth knowledge and skills' to properly control their plane's trajectory. Basic piloting errors are thought to have contributed to the crash of an Air France Airbus A330 plane over the Atlantic in 2009, which killed all 228 aboard, as well as a commuter plane crash in Buffalo, NY, that same year. Tom Casey, a retired airline pilot who flew the giant Boeing 777, said he once kept track of how rarely he had to touch the controls on an auto-pilot flight from New York to London. From takeoff to landing, he said he only had to touch the controls seven times. 'There were seven moments when I actually touched the airplane — and the plane flew beautifully,' he said. 'Now that is being in command of a system, of wonderful computers that do a great job — but that isn't flying.' Real flying is exemplified by Capt. Chesley Sullenberger, says Casey, who famously landed his US Airways plane without engines on the Hudson River and saved all the passengers in what came to be known as the 'Miracle on the Hudson.' The new report calls for more manual flying by pilots — in the cockpit and in simulations. The FAA says the agency and industry representatives will work on next steps to make training programs stronger in the interest of safety."
The obvious solution is self-flying planes! Then there won't be a pilot to rely too much on automation.
Wait, what? Why in the world would someone use the auto pilot in a simulator? Isn't the whole point of the simulator to let the pilot get more stick time without the fuel cost?
-jcr
The only title of honor that a tyrant can grant is "Enemy of the State."
As soon as I'm on the STAR, I go _mostly_ manual. I fly the entire approach pattern manually, with the exception of speed control (since that is critical to maintain spacing, I have to make sure I'm not going faster or slower than the ATC suggestion, at risk of being spun).
I also fly my own bird every weekend at least a couple of hours.
I agree there is too much automation in the cockpit, and that it is relied upon too heavily, especially during departure and approach.
If you read the summary, you'll notice one of the big problems is when that automation fails. It's great when it removes human error, but if automation fails, you still want human error as minimal as possible... and that means teaching pilots to rely less on automation (which is a very different thing from using less automation).
Start them off flying something like DC-3's and 4's like Buffalo Airlines, and you won't have these problems.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroflot_Flight_593
"Despite the struggles of both pilots to save the aircraft, it was later concluded that if they had just let go of the control column, the autopilot would have automatically taken action to prevent stalling, thus avoiding the accident"
And reading this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pulkovo_Aviation_Enterprise_Flight_612
I'd rather have a computer flying the airplane I am sitting in, than a hairless ape.
"It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
Automation fails from time to time, and when it does, pilots are the failsafe. But to be able to do that, they need to stay in practice, and that's the problem being highlighted here: they're getting so little time in control that they're getting out of shape.
Well yes, but pilots help make sure they can go back up again.
Pilots either need more control or we should admit that they're just safety technicians in case something goes wrong and train them accordingly - an air marshall for the plane itself who doesn't do anything under normal circumstances.
It takes a man to suffer ignorance and smile
Be yourself no matter what they say
In a crash the fact that is an airbus has to be mentioned. When an airbus behaves under dramatic conditions it becomes a "US Airways plane"!
There are a couple of parts of the flight where the pilot is required to use the automation. The biggest is during cruise in what's known as RVSM airspace, where the vertical separation minimums are reduced from what was standard before RVSM was implemented. There, if your autopilot quits, ATC will send you down below the RVSM floor. RVSM is in use above some altitude in the 48 states and on transAtlantic routes. (I don't recall the exact altitude.)
The other is in flying an instrument approach to very low altitudes, known as a category III approach. IIRC, those must be flown on autopilot in order to continue below category III minimums.
Disinfect the GNU General Public Virus!
The majority of plane crashes are caused by pilot error, either in isolation or in response to equipment failure and/or adverse environmental/weather conditions. Flight systems were automated to help avoid or minimize those errors by reducing the mental workload required to manage the plane in those scenarios. Great pilots utilize that automation to improve the overall safety of their flight operations. Bad and lazy pilots use automation as a crutch for their poor airmanship. In the absence of automation bad pilots would still be bad pilots but the number of adverse incidents caused by pilot error would be higher. The solution is better employment screening, skills monitoring, and training, and not cutting back or removing the automation.
Especially when you park your DreamLifter at the wrong airport
When Capt Sullenberger landed on the Hudson, the aircraft software worked to prevent his stall. But his flying skill is what safely landed the plane. His knowledge of what the aircraft can and cannot do was critical. He even realized he needed the APU for the computers to continue operating, and turned it on early in the emergency. His actions showed that he understood his plane and how to fly it. Some pilots are forgetting the "fly it" part.
Automation isn't so much to remove possibility for human error, as to stop people getting exhausted from performing a monotonous task. Which may reduce errors, but may actually also cause worse ones if it means you can relax more than usual. Think about using cruise control in your car. It makes highway driving much more pleasant, but it adds a little extra to your response time, since you've removed your feet from the pedals, etc..
Some cars these days have adaptive cruise control that can detect that of course.. and some cars can drive themselves entirely.. and while that of course reduces "human error", it also potentially removes the "human common sense" element..
which is totally what she said
Likewise, the automation is not designed to handle extreme failures of the aircraft. For example, the situation many years ago in Iowa where the hydraulics failed and the pilot had to steer the plane using only the engine throttles is an example of something that no computer system is designed to do. Yet a veteran pilot managed to pull it off.
My son is 13 years old and has been training to be a pilot since he was 11. He has taken off and landed a small airplane (with the PIC in the airplane with him, of course) quite a few times. It just goes to show that landing an airplane isn't as difficult as some people think it is ... it just requires focus and passion. Both of which my son has in spades when he's flying an airplane.
This news story struck me as wonderful news. My son has wanted to be a pilot since he was three years old. If you are one of the lucky few (I am not) who knew what he wanted to be for his whole life, then I envy you as much as I envy my son for having a singular great dream. The notion of drones and computerized pilots scares me because it threatens that dream. Stories in which autopilots and drones are slandered make me happy.
I don't make the rules. I just make fun of them.
The autopilot functions similar to password fill-in on your web browser. It makes it much more convenient for you to login to all of your sites without having to remember all those passwords.
The autopilot failing is like when your computer crashes, and now neither your browser, nor you, remember your passwords.
If you are not allowed to question your government then the government has answered your question.
I'm a manager at a world leading flight training company targeting major airlines all around the world, we train cadets from scratch on small aircraft and flight simulators in order to develop these basic skills and beyond (eg: ATPL and HPAT, type specific training etc.). I assist with developing syllabi and ensuring their compliance with numerous safety authorities all over the world. We looked into the Air France disaster to see how we can improve out syllabi to give students the skills to handle these atypical situations. To make a long story, the growing trend for airlines to want to cut costs on training and even remove what they call "unnecessary" training from syllabi is what is leading to this problem. The MPL is the prime example of this, this is my solution:
- Stop treating us like a factory, each student is different and can they can take longer to learn certain concepts. Fixed length integrated courses don't work if they don't have good margins for this.
- English is the language of aviation. If you bring us cadets who can't speak it, we have to teach them english within your timetable which degrades outcomes.
- Redo the MPL and bring back spinning, hand and feet skills etc.
- Whilst the MPL has a heavy focus on simulators, it needs to be a much bigger part of their renewals and professional development in order to re-enforce what they learnt during early stages of their career and training when they start working.
- Some airlines have poor quality control in their recruitment phases, is susceptible to corruption or have too many "token" cadets. Some people just aren't cut out to be pilots, identify this early not late.
- Airline and safety authority audits are a joke, Standards/QA Manager(s) should be mandatory, I've seen our competitors teach students very bad techniques because of a bad instructor or two and it poisons entire batches of students. Auditing needs to be proactive, integrated into systems and workflows and not just a visit a few times a year. to look through paper records or merely reactive in the case of a safety incident.
Remember, the training doesn't stop when the student is finished their course. Operators and manufacturer (Airbus, I'm looking at you) need to stop treating pilots like bus drivers and focusing only on fuel optimisation.
- This is minor but still important. Shock material. We aren't allowed to show students the imagery of air disasters any more. They can be and usually are gruesome by statistically effective, safety incidents in classes that were shown this material were halved compared to classes that weren't.
This opinion is my own and doesn't reflect that of my employer, doing it anonymously because our media policy prohibits these types of comments. I'd love to hear people's feedback on how training could be furthered improved, it's what gets me up in the morning, trying to fight the system.
What doesn't make sense? Automation fails and human intervention is needed, but some of the humans he are needed to intervene don't have the skills to do so.
Just require the pilot to demonstrate glider Silver badge proficiency once a year.
http://www.ssa.org/BadgesAndRecords#Silver
Thanks for summarizing the summary.
CLI paste? paste.pr0.tips!
For example, the situation many years ago in Iowa where the hydraulics failed and the pilot had to steer the plane using only the engine throttles is an example of something that no computer system is designed to do. Yet a veteran pilot managed to pull it off.
That veteran pilot was a passenger that just happened to be on the plane. 99% of pilots would not have been able to pull it off. So what should we do about that?
Option 1: Train 100,000 pilots on a difficult technique that they will likely never use.
Option 2: Have one programmer sit down with that veteran pilot and code up the technique, test it on a simulator, test it on a real plane, and then use a USB thumb drive to update all flight control software on every plane.
automation is not designed to handle extreme failures of the aircraft.
It should be. One of the lessons of TMI was that automating routine stuff only leads to disaster because operators lose the skills they need to handle emergencies. The "extreme failures" are the first thing that should be automated, because those are the events that pilots are least capable of handling properly. ABS in cars is a good example of this. Nobody needs ABS to slow down for a routine traffic light. But ABSes have saved many lives when drivers slammed on the brakes to avoid a collision, or started slipping on ice.
exact
As exact as float, or more exact, like double?
CLI paste? paste.pr0.tips!
More automation already means that the pilots gain less experience, including in unforeseen circumstances. That was exactly what the AF447 crew ran into. The juniors didn't catch on and when the old man finally got back, he didn't gain oversight in time either. A veteran pilot would've been able to pull the thing out of its deathly course, provided he'd known what was going on. Worse, the automation will mean there will be less pilots of such veteran ability around.
So this is a bit of a turning point. More automation, and then better work hard on making it able to handle as many situations as possible, not just the common ones. Then give it full authority. Or more emphasis on pilot training, and having them fly often so they keep current. The middle way would be both, which is probably harder to do well.
The summary states that the report calls for more manual flying in the air, though. Which means using less automation. This seems like the wrong way to go about it since it gives more chances for human error. It seems to me that the better solution would be more mandatory yearly simulation time with simulations focusing on how to properly handle auto pilot failures. That way, you keep the pilots in practice without making the passengers any less safe.
The best thing about UDP jokes is I don't care if you get them or not
That veteran pilot was a passenger that just happened to be on the plane. 99% of pilots would not have been able to pull it off. So what should we do about that?
That's not exactly the full crux of what happened. The DC10 had two pilots and one engineer. There was another pilot who happened to be a flight instructor that happened to be a passenger and he went up to the cockpit to assist when the plane lost hydraulics. From my understanding the instructor provided assistance by controlling the throttle but didn't take over. Could the crew have handled themselves? Who knows.
Dennis E. Fitch, an off-duty United Airlines DC-10 flight instructor, was seated in the first class section and, noticing the crew were having trouble controlling the airplane, offered his assistance to the flight attendants. Upon being informed that there was a DC-10 instructor on board, Haynes immediately invited him to the cockpit, hoping his instructional knowledge of the aircraft would help them regain control. Upon entering the cockpit and looking at the hydraulic gauges, Fitch determined that the situation was beyond anything he had ever faced. . . Haynes, still trying to fly the airplane with his control column while simultaneously working the throttles, asked Fitch to work the throttles instead.
Well, there's spam egg sausage and spam, that's not got much spam in it.
If you read the summary, you'll notice one of the big problems is when that automation fails. It's great when it removes human error, but if automation fails, you still want human error as minimal as possible...
When automation fails the humans are supposed to get in radio contact with the ground and reach for the book of checklists. The "Top Gun" style of piloting where they switch off the autopilot and start heaving at the controls really, really doesn't apply outside of the cinema.
Even in the Hudson River incident the passengers might have been better off if the pilot had made it a bit further down the checklist and hit the "ditch switch" to close valves and air vents underneath the aircraft. They're designed to keep it floating a bit longer. The "water landing" checklist was designed for descent from higher altitudes with more time available, he never completed it.
No sig today...
Can you believe the idiot newscasters actually read that list on the air?
Everyone in that newsroom should have been fired for extreme stupidity.
If you think I voted for Trump because of this post, you're wrong. I voted for Dr. Jill Stein of the Green Party. Again.
... automation was behind this? http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-25032380
I read the /. piece, then I came across this news item. Even with automation, how do you land at the wrong airport?
Proverbs 21:19
There's a somewhat lengthy and hard to find (too lazy to look now) article on the Internet where some magazine did essentially a minute by minute recap of what the black box told about the infamous Air France crash. That happened basically because (inexplicably) the captain put the most junior of his 2 co-pilots in charge when flying through some very bad weather. After the crash it was determined that the co-pilot was not properly trained for the conditions he encountered and Air France has made changes to pilot training in simulators as a result. It was a jaw dropping series of events where a quick decision had to be made and in every case, the wrong decision was made. Had just one such decision been different (ie. the captain took a later break, the more senior of the 2 co-pilots was put in charge, the plane avoided the storm it flew into, etc.) we wouldn't be talking about this as a crash. The plane would have safely reached its destination. So I'm not sure that mentioning this particular flight is a good example. It was an amazing perfect storm of bad decisions all of which had to be wrong for the plane to crash and unfortunately they were all wrong. Another good thing that came out of it (besides training changes) was that it was quickly realized before the black box was found that likely the infamous defective air speed tubes were to blame (indeed, they started the sequence of events that led to the crash) and those began to be replaced. I believe that all Airbus planes have had those tubes replaced with better models from another company. The co-pilot basically panicked and misunderstood (due to inadequate training) the situation he was in and he put the plane into a stall, causing it to crash. Neither the other co-pilot nor the captain (he re-entered the cockpit about 1-2 minutes before it crashed) realized the plane was in a stall until it was too late to correct it.
It's not about staying in practice. The problem is much more immediate. In order to interact with any system when you're to be part of the control loop, your brain needs to be preset for control. That means you need to know and feel exactly in what state is the system you're going to take control over. It's very hard to maintain this awareness if you're not actually controlling the process. You need to be ahead of the plane, so to speak.
This very same problem is present in all of man-machine interaction when control tasks are involved. This is the reason, for example, that "taking over" a self-driving car while it is underway is pointless: you need to be pretty much driving the car without actually driving it - so you might as well be the driver without the self-driving brouhaha. Otherwise by the time you figure what's going on, you'll be dead. You can only take over a self-driving car when it's stopped. Even then you'll be quite likely to get lost or to execute a wrong turn/maneouver since you're unlikely to know where you are - unless you're on a road you frequent.
What it really boils down to is something else entirely: people use "common sense" to judge things that they have zero experience with. If you ask "common sense", it would be "cool" to have self-flying planes, self-driving cars, etc. But common sense is precisely the wrong one to make judgment about such things. Reality is quite far from common sense, until you had a chance to experience it just so. The common-sense widely-spread non-specialist thinking about self-controlling systems is usually wildly off-base. Reality is under no obligation to make sense to anyone, so to speak. Thus some things that should be "common-sense-easy" are very far from being so. Self-controlling systems often bring with them a whole lot of extra issues that nobody had any idea of until they've faced them. Aviation industry has only recently went out of automation-related self-denial. 20 years after it was all understood. That's the risk of relying on common sense over facts.
A successful API design takes a mixture of software design and pedagogy.
What about all those times when a 'veteran pilot' farked up badly and crashed the 'plane?
No sig today...
It also doesn't help that in some cases the change is rather jarring and the problem has gotten even worse now that the systems are fly by wire.
We are at that line where machines become autonomous in an useful way and the rest of us finally realize how incompetent humans are at flying and driving.
One day people will look back and wonder what it was like when a human actually controlled the vehicle.
"If any question why we died, Tell them because our fathers lied."
Actually, I have several friends that are Airbus 330 and 321 captains that actually would like to have more control over the plane and less automation. To some degree, they are hamstrung by the company, Airbus Industrie, that is relegating to pilots to "flight management" duties instead of actually "stick and rudder" flying. Most pilots I know lean towards type A and would much rather have control over their plane then hand it over to avionics and flight management systems.
If it were so easy to just automate extreme failures, websites like Google, Facebook, and Amazon would go down a lot less often. Unfortunately despite thousands of employees with extreme technical skill, there are still mistakes that bring them down from time-to-time. If we didn't have human SREs or System Administrators, things would be a lot worse. A computer doesn't have the analytics skill of a pilot and never will unless we end up with a singularity.
We don't have strong AI yet and pilots will never just "sit down with a programmer". Automation has to be tested thousands of times across thousands of scenarios in different aircraft and conditions for decades. Even then, there's always the chance that some snippet of code is waiting to kill a plane full of people because it got the wrong set of sensor inputs.
I'd like to actually see some commercial cargo planes go fully UAV.
As to human pilots in passenger planes. You could make it so that every third flight they had to go fully manual. Pick an interval.
I've decided to stop wasting my time responding to AC trolls/sockpuppets... so if you want a response from me... login.
Automation fails from time to time, and when it does, pilots are the failsafe. But to be able to do that, they need to stay in practice, and that's the problem being highlighted here: they're getting so little time in control that they're getting out of shape.
Right, build or contract a small fleet of trainers (perhaps twin turboprops or two seaters trainers like PC.7s or Tucanos or even set aside an old 737 or something in that class) and make these people fly their ass off once in a while. I'm sure simulators are great learning tools but there is no substitute for taking a plane up and actually practicing things like: engine restarts, flying on one engine, simulating an emergency descent after a rapid decompression or just boning up on basic aerobatics (the value of practical experience is one of a number of reasons the military hasn't replaced exercises like Maple Flag with simulater-only LAN partys). That should take care of any 'bureaucratification' problems your pilots are suffering from.
Only to idiots, are orders laws.
-- Henning von Tresckow
Likewise, the automation is not designed to handle extreme failures of the aircraft. For example, the situation many years ago in Iowa where the hydraulics failed and the pilot had to steer the plane using only the engine throttles is an example of something that no computer system is designed to do. Yet a veteran pilot managed to pull it off.
This scenario has happen several times and the pilots have not always been successful at control via engine throttle only. But an autopilot program has been developed now that can do a much better job than the human pilots. See Propulsion Controlled Aircraft.
"Real flying is exemplified by Capt. Chesley Sullenberger, says Casey, who famously landed his US Airways plane without engines on the Hudson River and saved all the passengers in what came to be known as the 'Miracle on the Hudson.' "
Yeah, and how many times a year is that needed? JFC.
It doesn't mean much now, it's built for the future.
Drones have a horrible safety record, and are exactly what you are claiming is the fix. In the case of drones since humans rarely get hurt you don't hear about all of the crashes. At least two within the last week have caused damage to people so we heard about those.
The problem is really that people sitting outside expect or demand perfection where it can't really exist, given our current "air lift" flying technology.
Well trained humans combined with computers has gotten us to an extremely good record with safety. Wi To Lo or whoever the pilot in training was from Asiana was not trained and the one guy that was trained on the plane didn't do their job. Computers that should have caught the problem didn't for what ever reason.
Claiming computer guided is the only way is fine until an anomaly wipes out electrical systems. While it would be difficult for a human to land a large passenger plane without electricity at least there is a chance.
-The wise argue that there are few absolutes, the fool argues that there are no probabilities.
He kinda pulled it off. Loads of people died in a fireball cartwheeling down a runway and through some corn fields. Some pilots flying over Iraq, on the other hand, did the same in a far more modern plane (a cargo jet), and landed safely.
NASA has actually conducted tests with special flight control software that can fly the aircraft using only differential engine power, even in some cases with an engine inoperative. It performed beautifully, much better than a human pilot could. But this is just one of the many unexpected things that can happen to an airplane (and extremely rare at that). You can't program everything into the systems, you still need basic on the spot common sense surprisingly often. As an airline pilot, I can't tell you how many times I've had to keep the plane's automation from doing something completely stupid because of some malfunction in the software.
People often cite the statistic saying that most accidents are caused by pilot error, but those don't include the huge number of malfunctions of automation that were corrected by the pilots and therefore did NOT end up in the statistics.
Automation and manual control. Sure, the autopilot drops out for various reasons, most of which have to do with the sensor suite for airspeed and things of that nature. Pitot tubes are notorious for freezing up, etc. rending auto-pilot relatively useless.
Solve that problem and you can automate the entire flight. I never understood why they don't just GPS the entire flight.
First sorry for my English.
Automation work very well in fully tested conditions and bring many advantage in term of safety, cost and comfort. The problem is that the real life is not always contained into the fully tested conditions, and that even with an massive and continuous development effort, this assertion will never be proved false.
The current state of the aircraft operation is that basically the human endorse the full responsibility to engage the automation, monitor his work, disable it in case it is not appropriate, and manually operate the aircraft. This is manly because the today automation level don't include the capabilities to replace the human for those meta-tasks. But there is technically no reason to not includes them, and I believe that the future automation will take this direction. The consequence is that the human will have even less opportunities to operate an aircraft in sustainables conditions and that the remaining out of tested condition case will be so unmanageables situations that only a few exceptional pilots will eventually be able to survive. Until this extreme level of automation is in operation, we will inevitably see pilot error due to untrained operation like in the AF443, like in Kazan a few day ago, like many others accidents...
What is important to understand here is that the concept of "untrained operation" (or not enough) for an human is not so different from the concept of "untested condition" for an automatic system. From the aircraft essential operations like aerodynamic and motors, this make no difference if the action (or inaction) in from a human or from a computer. The point is to how to know what is the good action to do at each time in the operation. The only solution here it to have a very very depth knowledge in a lot of specific fields, a massive quantity of information to choose from, and a very quick reaction time to analyse all of them. Human brain can archive fantastic things from the eyes of others humans, but have still several hug limitations. He is specifically unable to focus on a task for a long time, sensible to external stress, limited in his precision and repeatability, and usually slow and error prone in untrained operation. An automation yield better result for most of those metrics, but is completely unable to handle untrained operations (out of tested conditions).
Did you get the idea ? Having a slow and error prone human trying to resolve untrained operation is better than having only an automation that will do nothing relevant at all. This is what we commonly call intelligence: trying to solve something new. Just a note: while our human body have evolved to integrate some basic survival action generator in case of emergency situation, there are really not effective for an today aircraft operation; don't mix them with the required intelligence. At this stage you maybe feel the problem: Out of the automation tested conditions, automation is for nothing, and human is a mediocre performer, but we have no other choice yet. Having the pilot trained to replace the automation working into tested conditions is not the solution, because the real problem don't lie into the tested conditions, but outside of them.
Now a level higher. Training a pilot on a unexpected situation is a long process. From a very general point of view, you can decompose this process into some basic parts: 1) recognize the situation; 2) select the appropriate action; 3) do the selected action. In practice this is implemented into a written procedure and the pilot train this procedure. What is important to understand here is that this way of training the pilot is to make an unexpected situation managed more by his experience than by his intelligence, because experience is fast, while intelligence is slow. We essentially try to extend the "tested condition" manageable by his brain, much like we can extend the tested condition of an automate. I predict that in the future, the computers will be less limited than the human brain in the extension of the teste
As a commercial pilot, I know a great many other commercial pilots. While the focus on systems is paramount due to ever-increasing aircraft complexity, I can't say that I know of a single pilot who does NOT have exceptional pilotage skills, and with whom I would be perfectly happy having fly an airplane in distress on which I was a passenger.
The vast majority of pilots LOVE to fly, and spend some of their off-time flying small aircraft for FUN, and to keep their pilotage skills sharp.
Read the third paragraph of this article. It looks like it's been managed in at least a limited case. The article doesn't mention whether it's gone farther than a limited test case, though.
That should be "the third paragraph of the section of the article. . ."
You may want to watch this very on-topic keynote.
cpghost at Cordula's Web.
Sometimes there are failures that aren't on the checklist. The Gimli glider comes to mind where they ran out of gas at 35000 ft. When the all engines out alarm went off, they reached for the checklist and discovered there was no entry as it wasn't supposed to happen. With all engines out they lost all electrical and hydraulic pressure and were informed that a 777 can't glide. Luckily the captain was an accomplished glider pilot and the co-pilot knew of an abandoned airfield and with luck they landed without killing any passengers or people picnicking on the runway (it was being used for car racing) and through luck they picked the least occupied runway and the nose gear failing stopped them quicker then the brakes could.
Imagine being on the ground when suddenly a silent airliner lands.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gimli_glider
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverted_totalitarianism
Likewise, the automation is not designed to handle extreme failures of the aircraft.
I beg to differ. Even though i'm unable to find it on the net i distinctly remember that after the crash of UA232 (total hydraulics failure) a system was developed (but not installed, as it was deemed too costly) that could land a DC-10 in those extreme circumstances.
If it were so easy to just automate extreme failures, websites like Google, Facebook, and Amazon would go down a lot less often. Unfortunately despite thousands of employees with extreme technical skill, there are still mistakes that bring them down from time-to-time. If we didn't have human SREs or System Administrators, things would be a lot worse. A computer doesn't have the analytics skill of a pilot and never will unless we end up with a singularity.
We don't have strong AI yet and pilots will never just "sit down with a programmer". Automation has to be tested thousands of times across thousands of scenarios in different aircraft and conditions for decades. Even then, there's always the chance that some snippet of code is waiting to kill a plane full of people because it got the wrong set of sensor inputs.
Which is why I will never get on a plane unless there is a pilot to switch off the AI if it goes haywire and fly the aircraft old-school. Furthermore I will never trust my well being to an AI driven car. With a plane at least there are a couple of minutes to react if the AI goes ape-shit before you run out of sky, with a AI driven car it's perhaps 10 seconds if you are lucky before you get T-boned by a truck and become a slimy red coating on the inside of a car wreck. I am still on the fence about AI driven trains.
Only to idiots, are orders laws.
-- Henning von Tresckow
Actually, it is, and this is the reason that the FAA has requirements for pilots to remain current. They're required to execute a minimum number of take-offs and landings. And any training program worth a shit gives them simulator time, and practice with emergency procedures. I haven't sat in the controls in 20+ years, but maybe these guys aren't getting enough practice now.
Your example with a car is irrelevant. Cars are not planes, and you don't have to stop the plane to take over from an auto-pilot. Frequently, in an aircraft, you'll have more time to figure things out than in an automobile. You don't have to deal with trees, pedestrians, or other solid objects until you get close to the ground.
Just another day in Paradise
The reason for spending huge effort chasing tiny loss rates is that people are afraid to fly but not afraid of things likely to kill them.
Automated flight ops are doing so well that involving meatbags more in operations may cost more lives than it's intended to save.
"This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
air france 447.
The guy who said the election was rigged won the presidency with the second-most votes.
What I meant by "it's not about staying in practice" was that the issue with automation has to do with things that happen on a much smaller time scale. It didn't mean that staying in practice is irrelevant. Is is relevant, but you need more than that. Practice demonstrably isn't sufficient in itself.
The only difference between a plane and a car is that the time scales may happen to be two or three orders of magnitude different, if you're lucky. Autopilot disconnect-related CFIT is a classical example of what I'm talking about. By the time the pilot figures out that his idea of what's going on (we're in a safe, controlled flight on autopilot) differs from reality (CFIT-in-progress), it's too late, or there's sufficient panic that has set in that the control responses are not what you've been trained for either (stall recovery, spin recovery, etc.).
It doesn't matter that the pilot has more time to figure it out. They are unaware of their own mental model's divergence from reality. In spite of having been given all that time, they still CFIT because they think they're on autopilot. You'd think this would be pretty obvious, but there's one insidious thing. If you're unaware of it, it will eventually kill you. Your brain's sampling of the state of the environment is highly dependent on how confident one is in their own model's accuracy. If things "feel" like everything is the way you imagine it should be, you'll be tricked by your own brain into "seeing" made-up instrument readings, your sensitivity to increased wind noise will be diminished, etc. I'm dead serious. It takes awareness of this pitfall to be able to force oneself to see how it really is, to make your brain not trick you. When you don't, and you're a pilot, usually a couple hundred people perish with you. This is happening over and over, it's sickening. The reason why it happens with such regularity is that we're dealing with a basic property of our brain's visual interaction with the environment. It's not widely appreciated in nonspecialist circles, unfortunately. We're almost all "broken" like that.
A successful API design takes a mixture of software design and pedagogy.
Sully may have been able to ditch successfully without it; but, William Langewiesche makes a strong case that the Airbus A320's fly-by-wire software was an important factor in the favorable outcome of the procedure. See http://www.vanityfair.com/style/features/2009/06/us_airways200906 and the expanded account in Langewiesche's excellent book, 'Fly by Wire: The Geese, the Glide, the Miracle on the Hudson.' I'm an instrument-rated private pilot who is in awe of both Captain Sullenberger and the Airbus engineering team.
Meanwhile annual death rates continue to fall every year.
We still have about a month to go but it looks like 2013 will see the lowest number of air traffic casualities since
the beginning of world war 2:
Casualties since 2010
I wonder if that is because of more and more automation or despite of it?
You may not mention Captain Sullenberger in your bemoaining the loss of skill in favor of automation for pilots because Captain Sullenberger EXACTLY landed a powerless plane because his Airbus craft had an autopilot able to feather the controls much more delicately than he or any other human could. The computer is what saved those lives, not the human.
Cranky educator.
Yes, typo on my part. Thanks
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverted_totalitarianism
Its going to be the same say. Introduce a little bit of automation and drivers get complacent. The only way out is zero or 100% automation.
http://michaelsmith.id.au
"ABSes have saved many lives when drivers slammed on the brakes to avoid a collision, or started slipping on ice." [citation needed]
If anything, the evidence is somewhat to the contrary. Studies on taxis with and without ABS (the cabs are otherwise very similar vehicles), showed that ABS equipped cars did not have lower accident rates overall. Indeed, certain types of accidents, e.g. in snow, where significantly higher for ABS equipped cars. Cite:
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=rI4c24VTriEC&pg=PA219&lpg=PA219&dq=Aschenbrenner+and+Biehl+ABS&source=bl&ots=RgRKvw7Qnx&sig=1hNW1rAyzlSw5hpcGjgFnpn4Qpc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=3xmPUrDcOYX40gXHm4DYDw&ved=0CDMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage
I use Friend/Foe + mod-point modifiers as a karma/reputation system.
Bear in mind, the captain was responsible for some of the mistakes that led to them running out of fuel in mid-air in the first place.
I use Friend/Foe + mod-point modifiers as a karma/reputation system.