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Ask Slashdot: Can Commercial Hardware Routers Be Trusted?

First time accepted submitter monkaru writes "Given reports that various vendors and encryption algorithms have been compromised. Is it still possible to trust any commercial hardware routers or is 'roll your own' the only reasonable path going forward?" What do you do nowadays, if anything, to maintain your online privacy upstream of your own computer?

213 comments

  1. No. by deconfliction · · Score: 5, Interesting

    'nuff said.

    1. Re:No. by deconfliction · · Score: 5, Interesting

      actually the obvious answer is that trust is not a binary thing. Evaluate your threat models. If you want to be safe from the NSA, and you are protecting information they want to know, then yes, I would say that eschewing any technology from corporations that are easily coerced by the NSA would be a good idea. Of course, that is practically impossible. But you do what you can. And wanting a device with all source available, in a form that is easy to (perhaps modify and) compile to a verifiable equivalent of the stock firmware and operating system would be the first obvious step.

    2. Re:No. by sabri · · Score: 5, Insightful

      actually the obvious answer is that trust is not a binary thing.

      Actually, the obvious answer is that you don't have a choice. No matter how much effort you put into it, you will always be depending on third party hard- or software that simply have to trust. So, you want to solder your own PCB? Sure, go ahead, but your Ralink SoC is still manufactured somewhere in China. Don't trust Cisco's IOS? Sure, write your own, and let me know how you designed and manufactured your own ASICs. And then we're not even discussing the fact that as soon as the packet leaves your router, it will enter one that you don't even own. Yes, there is a lot that you can do and I think the closest real answer to the poster's question is to just get an OpenWRT capable router and compile from scratch, but to not trust anyone is simply not an option.

      --
      I'm not a complete idiot... Some parts are missing.
    3. Re:No. by erroneus · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I was going to say that.

      RSA compromised with money. Cisco compromised already documented. Juniper? I don't know but I wouldn't doubt it.

      NSA, you've turned the world against the US and all its businesses. Happy yet?

    4. Re:No. by D-Fly · · Score: 4, Informative

      Public key cryptography using open source tools that have been tested and retested by lots of other coders still works pretty well. The RSA backdoor you are referring to is certainly discouraging news. But on the other hand, the fact that RSA had backdoored itself was sort of understood by the community at large as far back as 2006, shortly after they issued the compromised tool. This week's news is merely confirmation. That's why PGP and its ilk, open source and made by activists, might be a better option than commercial tools by companies with a strict profit motive.

      If you are really concerned about security, you might very well want to roll your own machine, and certainly should run a fresh, clean linux install off a CD every time you start up, to reduce the chances your machine is compromised.

      --
      \
    5. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The NSA is executing policy of the current and past administrations. You know who to blame, you're just afraid to point the finger at the President who is directly responsible.

    6. Re:No. by deconfliction · · Score: 3, Interesting

      es, there is a lot that you can do and I think the closest real answer to the poster's question is to just get an OpenWRT capable router and compile from scratch, but to not trust anyone is simply not an option.

      I agree with you, though would optimistically add to your thoughts- "to not trust anyone is simply not an option... yet". Maybe there will come a day when a truly open source and hardware replicator will become possible. Before dismissing me completely, I imagine there would be some years where it looks like an Apple-II 3d printing another Apple-II, but it's seeming more and more possible. And then it's a bootstrapping issue from there to catch back up to modern specs. But I'd have a lot of fun with an Apple-II that I had a lot more trust in of not being infiltrated by the NSA (regardless of whether the original already was)

    7. Re:No. by mellon · · Score: 1

      To expand, your router is plugged into the Internet. Your packets traverse many unfriendly wires. They might even trombone through Belarus. So if you want real privacy, find a Tor router you know you can trust. Good luck!

    8. Re:No. by couchslug · · Score: 4, Interesting

      "certainly should run a fresh, clean linux install off a CD every time you start up, to reduce the chances your machine is compromised."

      You can also boot an .iso image from a USB or other flash as well as CD and load it entirely to RAM with no persistent home.

      Knoppix (nicely polished distro) has had the "toram" option for many years as do other distros it inspired.

      http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Knowing_Knoppix/Advanced_startup_options#Transferring_to_RAM

      --
      "This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
    9. Re:No. by toejam13 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      If you are really concerned about security, you might very well want to roll your own machine, and certainly should run a fresh, clean linux install off a CD every time you start up, to reduce the chances your machine is compromised.

      The next question is, what motherboard and network card firmwares can you trust? Running trusted code at the OS level and higher does reduce your risks, but until you can audit the code running your hardware, there is still a threat.

      Obviously, one can ask if most companies are a big enough fish to worry about this. Firmware hacks are fairly sophisticated, which makes me believe that they'd mostly be used to spearfish data from specific companies. So unless there is hidden backdoor in every network card manufactured by Popular Company X, should we be worried?

    10. Re:No. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 5, Informative

      " But on the other hand, the fact that RSA had backdoored itself was sort of understood by the community at large as far back as 2006, shortly after they issued the compromised tool."

      "Backdoored itself" is a singularly apt way to put it. But apparently they were engaged in trying to "backdoor" other people, too, which is not a victimless crime.

      Personally, after their "SecureID" debacle and now this, I'm not inclined to "trust" RSA at all. Fool me once, and all that.

      And the same can be said about DropBox. They promised end-to-end encryption, but instead they were "de-duping" files to save storage, which means that entirely contrary to what they told their customers, they actually had direct access to your raw files. Sure, they fixed that (so they say), and said "Sorry, we won't do it again." But how much can you trust them, considering that they blatantly lied to you before?

    11. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      Firmware attacks can be sophisticated indeed: http://spritesmods.com/?art=hddhack&page=1

    12. Re:No. by msauve · · Score: 1

      It doesn't matter. Either there's an airgap, where nothing can get out regardless, so it doesn't matter, or their's a hop along the path you don't control so the security of your device doesn't matter.

      --
      "National Security is the chief cause of national insecurity." - Celine's First Law
    13. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Warning: Awesome Link!
      Lost many minutes after clicking!

    14. Re:No. by erroneus · · Score: 4, Insightful

      It has been demonstrated that the intelligence agencies (plural) in the US government is the tail that wags the dog. This is historically true and more than likely true today as well. When you've got the dirt on many people, how tempting would it be to leverage that into getting your way? It's a temptation many could not avoid exploiting.

    15. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      With upcoming 14nm transistors, it may be a while before we can use 3d-printers to create opensource CPUs

    16. Re:No. by icebike · · Score: 1

      And the same can be said about DropBox. They promised end-to-end encryption, but instead they were "de-duping" files to save storage, which means that entirely contrary to what they told their customers, they actually had direct access to your raw files. Sure, they fixed that (so they say), and said "Sorry, we won't do it again." But how much can you trust them, considering that they blatantly lied to you before?

      Deduping should never actually work if the files were store with unique encryption keys. On personal stuff, multiple files that are bit-for-bit identical (such as THIS GUY's Experiment you can see where it might be possible, but perfectly innocent. After all he sent the exact same file with just a different name.

      But de-duping encrypted files seems unlikely to have much of a payout.

      --
      Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
    17. Re:No. by tibman · · Score: 4, Interesting

      You could always just build a cpu from scratch? http://www.homebrewcpu.com/

      --
      http://soylentnews.org/~tibman
    18. Re:No. by hackus · · Score: 2

      and our enemies don't trust them either:

      http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/11/cisco-attributes-part-of-lowered-earnings-to-chinas-anger-towards-nsa/

      Do yourself a favor and get yourself a PC white box and start routing with a LINUX source code stack.

      At least then you can pick the hardware you want to trust and you can have a choice as to how far you want your security to go into the software stack audit.

      But all of this is pointless.

      As I pointed out before, it is IMPOSSIBLE to build a secure system anywhere NATO or its allies are operating.

      Any claim of data protection by any company in this domain is FALSE.

      We now know if you refuse to turn over any encryption information or fail to give your customers or your private data to the NSA you will get butt f*cked in prison.

      So it is pointless to even consider TRYING to build a secure system, it cannot be done as a goal or even as a business benefit towards your customers.

      My personal opinion as I have watched my friends and other companies literally go to jail or go under due to NSA activities is this: It has nothing to do with security, it has everything to do with funding NSA mischief.

      That means industrial and financial espionage operations to insure information is known ahead of the game in the financial markets.

      So the entire issue is that we are dealing with just common criminals and thungs.

      The NSA is not even particularly smart, but they ar elike a large gang of wolves cornering the beast we call freedom and liberty and they are going to take it down.

      -Hack

      --
      Got Geometrodynamics? Awe, too hard to figure out? Too bad.
    19. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You are absolutely right. Snowden did not cause this disaster. It was made in Washington DC.

    20. Re:No. by currently_awake · · Score: 1

      Given the resources the NSA has, I think you can assume that any crypto they allow to exist must be back-door'd.

    21. Re:No. by Goody · · Score: 1

      I think to be really secure, you have to mine the silicon yourself and etch all integrated circuit silicon wafers in your own underground lab. Using any code that is on the Internet is foolhardy. You must develop all your operating systems from scratch, in assembly language.

      --
      Tired of being "punished" by the Slashdot $rtbl since 2002. I'm now over at http://soylentnews.org/ .
    22. Re:No. by currently_awake · · Score: 1

      The amount of work required to install a back-door in the chip sets for all commodity network gear is low enough in comparison to the payoff that you can assume it has already been done. Why go to the trouble of hacking every OS in existence when your "modified" network card can just access the memory and HDD and send you the data?

    23. Re:No. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      "Deduping should never actually work if the files were store with unique encryption keys."

      Yes, this is correct.

      "On personal stuff, multiple files that are bit-for-bit identical (such as THIS GUY's Experiment you can see where it might be possible, but perfectly innocent."

      And this is correct, as well. But what they were actually doing was the former, not the latter. Their "end to end encryption" promise was simply and blatantly false.

    24. Re:No. by currently_awake · · Score: 1

      Given how extensively the NSA has been working to see everything, we should assume that TOR has been compromised. If you want real privacy, roll your own (hardware and software).

    25. Re:No. by viperidaenz · · Score: 1

      There will never be a commercial chip printing machine. Stop living in Terra Nova.

    26. Re: No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You couldn't use flash for this because it could be written to. CDR or DVDR would be the two best options. -MT

    27. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Who is letting Dropbox have access to anything other than Truecyrpt container files? Duh. It works almost as efficiently since it's upload algorithm is block-based.

    28. Re:No. by AmiMoJo · · Score: 3, Interesting

      If you use commodity hardware you could have two CPUs from different manufacturers and compare outputs. Back in the 80s that sort of thing was popular in critical systems. Buy a 68000 CPU from two different sources, preferably from different continents and with each being a unique design. Run the same code on both, and if their outputs don't match for some reason one is faulty. This of course assumes that both don't have identical back-doors.

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    29. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This assumes the hardware isn't compromised.

    30. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Back in the 80s that sort of thing was popular in critical systems.

      Whereas today they use whatever CPU the marketing manager of the design company managed to bring at the workplace in a smartphone? ;) It sure seems like that when reading about recent commercial air vehicles.

    31. Re:No. by npetrov · · Score: 1

      This is an amazing link.

    32. Re:No. by Thor+Ablestar · · Score: 2

      You are right. But there IS a FPGA strong enough to program it to be a processor. And there are FPGA configs to make some popular architectures out of it, including Sun Sparc. It's quite enough for 90 per cent of jobs you make on your Intel or AMD desktop. I don't believe that it's possible to create a bugged VHDL compiler or bugged FPGA. It' too low-specialized for such task, and any mismatch between FPGA and the VHDL's idea of it will just cause a total failure.

    33. Re:No. by Ihlosi · · Score: 1
      If you are really concerned about security, you might very well want to roll your own machine,

      That'll help against cybercriminals. Maybe. If you're lucky.

      If you really have TLAs going after you, expect attacks that are hardware-based or at least have a hardware component.

    34. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I think to be really secure, you have to mine the silicon yourself and etch all integrated circuit silicon wafers in your own underground lab. Using any code that is on the Internet is foolhardy. You must develop all your operating systems from scratch, in assembly language.

      You poor, deluded fool.
      The backdoor is in the ASM.
      You've got to program the microcode by hand, and build your own compiler in machine language.

    35. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Couldn't deduping of files work if they add a cryptographic hash of the file? That way they could dedupe files without actually knowing the file's contents, based on the hash alone.

      Of course if a file is known, it could still be used to prove that you had that file, so depending on your needs it may still not be safe enough (for examplle, if you are in a dissident group, in case the computer of someone else in the group is compromised and a group-specific document gets known, such a hash could be used to find any other members of the group who are careless enough to store that file in a dropbox folder.

      However if all you want is that no one can read the contents of the file, it would be good enough.

    36. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Firmware attacks can be sophisticated indeed

      You said it. https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-us-12/bh-us-12-archives.html#Brossard

    37. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The NSA is executing policy of the current and past administrations.

      How can you know? After all, if they lie to congress, why shouldn't they also lie to the president?

    38. Re: No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Build your router from FPGAs. No ASICs allowed. Run Open Source. Avoid binary firmware blobs.

      Not that hard?

    39. Re:No. by crazytrain86 · · Score: 2

      I always chuckle when people claim that being able to compile from source is helpful in securing their stuff. How many people have actually bothered to review open source anyway? It has taken until now to actually get a review of TrueCrypt, a program that almost everyone uses for encryption and open source. Along those lines, we should all switch to Gentoo and never get compromised again! *rolls eyes*

    40. Re:No. by Sqr(twg) · · Score: 2

      That's why PGP and its ilk, open source and made by activists, might be a better option than commercial tools by companies with a strict profit motive.

      If you were an unpaid maintainer of an open-source cryptography tool, and someone offered you $3 million (tax free) to use a specific random-number generator (with no known weaknesses) in your software, would you do it?

    41. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I am wondering why is this article still online - I mean itis clearly a sign of terrorist activity or? Another thing - what is this third core for that author has found on his hd.

      Parent comment is one of the few that I have seen on /. that had woken up technical interest in me. indeed amazing.

    42. Re:No. by Moskit · · Score: 1

      > Cisco compromised already documented.

      Documented where?

    43. Re:No. by furbyhater · · Score: 3, Insightful

      We aren't forced to use a 14nm process just because the industry giants are doing it.

    44. Re:No. by Sique · · Score: 1
      With "mining silicon yourself" you surely mean "fill a bucket with sand", right? Sand is, after all, mainly silicondioxide. Then you have to mix the sand with coal and iron ore in an oven to create ferrosilicon. Blow hydrogen chloride on it to get Trichlorsilan. Distill it and then let it condense at pure silicon bars to grow them. Put the resulting large silicon bars into a zone melting oven to purify them.

      The problem with silicon is not mining the ore. Its purifying the silicon.

      --
      .sig: Sique *sigh*
    45. Re: No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Obviously false you mean. If you don't trust your device 100%, you don't trust your device. If some of its security might be compromised all of it might be compromised. Security very much depends on its weakest link.

    46. Re:No. by hot+soldering+iron · · Score: 1

      This is exactly one of the attack vectors used by China when they went after Google. They slipped some backdoors into the firmware code at the manufacturers facility in Korea. Even if the Google office was running SELinux, all it took was a port knocking to have full access to the machine, totally bypassing the high level security.

      --
      When you want something built, come see me. If you want correct grammar and spelling, get a F*ing liberal arts student.
    47. Re: No. by couchslug · · Score: 1

      Technically true, but unless someone is targeting your specific machine it's doubtful that would happen.

      You could also boot off CF card in an adapter after modding the adapter to disable writes. Any changes to the CF could be done using a different adapter.

      These CF cards are available with a write-protection switch:

      http://www.ritekusa.com/BusinessSolutions/IndustrialCFCards/CF300XSLCWriteProtectionSwitch.aspx

      --
      "This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
    48. Re:No. by multi+io · · Score: 1

      If you use commodity hardware you could have two CPUs from different manufacturers and compare outputs. Back in the 80s that sort of thing was popular in critical systems. Buy a 68000 CPU from two different sources, preferably from different continents and with each being a unique design. Run the same code on both, and if their outputs don't match for some reason one is faulty. This of course assumes that both don't have identical back-doors.

      That sounds more like a method for finding normal (unintentional) CPU bugs, not backdoors, because the latter would be designed to not alter the regular behavior of the processor.

    49. Re: No. by couchslug · · Score: 1

      You can remove the USB key after booting to RAM, as it's no longer needed.

      --
      "This post is an artistic work of fiction and falsehood. Only a fool would take anything posted here as fact."
    50. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They slipped some backdoors into the firmware code at the manufacturers facility in Korea.

      Citation needed.

    51. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So ehmm, isn't this related to the age-old CS problem of the halting problem? Do 2 programs on their respective - possibly different - platforms have the same output? Sure you can compare side-effects like standard output and IO in general, but what happens inside between these side-effects of the program? That's pretty hard to make hard guarantees, you'd actually have to tap every circuit line in the CPU and compare signals instead of only outputs i.e. blackbox testing is not satisfying.

    52. Re:No. by erroneus · · Score: 1

      http://www.networkworld.com/news/2013/101713-cisco-nsa-backdoor-274965.html

      I love that they say possible but not exploited. Like suuuuure. They would just save that one for later right? They will never leave any option or opportunity open. they collect more data than they will ever ever ever need. It's like the NSA is run by obsessive hoarders.

    53. Re:No. by MikeBabcock · · Score: 1

      We design all our own router equipment from small server class machines with multiple PCIe gigabit NICs running Linux. I'm frequently tempted to make the jump to OpenBSD but what we have makes us happy at the moment.

      Are we always more secure than a hardware router with closed software? Maybe, maybe not. But I know what to do if we need to fix a security vulnerability on a Linux machine, and I can.

      --
      - Michael T. Babcock (Yes, I blog)
    54. Re:No. by Miamicanes · · Score: 2

      The problem with using a FPGA is that THEN you're buying a chip that costs more than Intel's second- or third-most expensive i7, and getting a CPU with the approximate performance of a 500MHz Pentium III.

      More importantly, even if you DO build your own CPU using a FPGA, at least 95% of your VHDL is going to come from somebody else if you want to have it meaningfully working, with Ethernet and USB, before you die someday. If somebody is so paranoid about security that he doesn't think he can trust a COTS CPU from someone like Intel, what makes him think that ${government-espionage-agency} doesn't have the resources to plant exploits in the VHDL components he'd download and add?

      And before someone brings up China... frankly, if my hardware is going to be pwn3d by ANY government espionage agency, I'd PREFER to have it be pwn3d by China's instead of the NSA (or some other American agency, or the agency of some obedient American vassal state). At least China doesn't have the legal authority to deprive me of my life and liberty based upon data mining for technical violations of some obscure law.

    55. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Oh this is pretty hilarious(not really), I go from using an old desktop packed with ethernet cards & a wifi AP using it as a (linux)router to a nice new nifty, no so cheap router(linux ironically enough)...

        OTOH it is fully compatible w/dd-wrt/etc. (got lucky, as I needed it in a hurry and preliminary investigation made it a top contender plus it was widely available in retail, surprisingly enough)...

    56. Re:No. by Moskit · · Score: 1

      Thanks for the link, did not find it before.

      Article does not exactly say Cisco is compromised.

      It says that Cisco, just like a wild variety of other vendors( including Juniper, Apple, VMware, Brocade, Intel and IBM) used BSAFE encryption library in some of their products. If you read further, you will find that their implementation chose to not use DRBG algorithm but much more popular AES.

      Whether one believes it or not, you have to hand one thing to Cisco - they are pretty open about those things. Including publishing security advisories and all other kinds of information out there. It's as much as you can get from a vendor.

      Agreed about NSA's "obsessive hoarding" though, it's almost as if they employed people who are heroes of that TLC "Obsessive Compulsive Hoarders" series ;-)

    57. Re:No. by deconfliction · · Score: 1

      Your jadedness is all well and good. But I think you are even admitting that the last year with the Snowden revelations did change the computer security landscape in a fundamental way. Gentoo's lack of popularity, TrueCrypt's lack of review are but a pair of good examples of eye rolling insanity. The thing is, before this year, the people who saw how much misplaced trust was put in these various things were written off as paranoid, or pushed Zersetzung-style to insanity. This is a new age. Being able to compile from source isn't the final security solution, *it is the first necessary step*. One which in this new age, people might just be wise enough to start putting forth the effort of taking.

    58. Re:No. by Jane+Q.+Public · · Score: 1

      "Couldn't deduping of files work if they add a cryptographic hash of the file?"

      Just off the top of my head, that would seem to work fine.

      But (apparently) that isn't what they were doing. If they were, I would not think they'd have any reason to apologize to their customers and "change their practices".

      On second thought, even de-duping via cryptographic hash could be problematic. You could see who has the same files, and when. This could reveal an awful lot of information about people.

    59. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Like this, http://www.spi.dod.mil/lipose.htm.

    60. Re:No. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Reagan? They quote his executive order directly at their website. Nobody should be particularly afraid of pointing out dead people. Different issue is why executive orders are cumulative and can't apparently be changed over time. That will eventually expose the US justice system and society to a phenomenon called Austrian Shitstorm.

    61. Re:No. by deconfliction · · Score: 1

      If somebody is so paranoid about security that he doesn't think he can trust a COTS CPU from someone like Intel, what makes him think that ${government-espionage-agency} doesn't have the resources to plant exploits in the VHDL components he'd download and add?

      open source, many eyes. Same equation as democracy of course. I.e. be critical all you want, but do put forth an alternate foundation (for providing real security in the sw/hw case, or real liberty in the democracy case)

  2. X-Files by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Trust No One!

    1. Re:X-Files by davidwr · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Trust No One!

      And I should believe you why?

      --
      Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    2. Re:X-Files by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Trust No One!

      And I should believe you why?

      Because the truth is out there.

    3. Re: X-Files by jd2112 · · Score: 1

      You want the truth? You can't handle the truth!

      --
      Any insufficiently advanced magic is indistinguishable from technology.
    4. Re:X-Files by currently_awake · · Score: 2

      I don't recognize your sig quote, but the math is wrong. 6x9=54.

    5. Re:X-Files by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I can't see his sig quote, but from your answer I guess it says 6*9=42.

      In which case please hand in your geek card. And consult the Guide for the answer.

    6. Re:X-Files by DamonHD · · Score: 1

      THHGTTG

      --
      http://m.earth.org.uk/
    7. Re: X-Files by ganjadude · · Score: 1

      of course not, because its like, out there

      --
      have you seen my sig? there are many others like it but none that are the same
  3. Still have to rely on the NICs by ModernGeek · · Score: 4, Insightful

    You still have to rely on the trustworthiness of the NICs. Anything contacted to the Internet can not be trusted.

    --
    Sig: I stole this sig.
    1. Re:Still have to rely on the NICs by the_B0fh · · Score: 1

      Like that Intel NIC that was reliably going offline when receiving a "corrupted" packet?

    2. Re:Still have to rely on the NICs by ewieling · · Score: 1

      I still have nightmares from that. We call it Intel NIC Debacle of 2013 (or sometimes just The Dark Times). Lost business and had many very angry customers because of that NIC. Kristian Kielhofner should be named some sort of geek Saint or something for finding the root of the problem.

      --
      I really shouldn't have used someone else's email address for this account.
    3. Re:Still have to rely on the NICs by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

      [Posting Anon to preserve mods already made...]

      I still have nightmares from that. We call it Intel NIC Debacle of 2013 (or sometimes just The Dark Times). Lost business and had many very angry customers because of that NIC. Kristian Kielhofner should be named some sort of geek Saint or something for finding the root of the problem.

      Jesus Ad Hominem Christ! You got this close and didn't even think about naming him Saint NIC?!?

      Prepare to be visited by the Ghost of Slashdot Past....

    4. Re:Still have to rely on the NICs by ModernGeek · · Score: 1

      Like that Intel NIC that was reliably going offline when receiving a "corrupted" packet?

      Suffice to say that this is one of the times that, "It's not a bug, it's a feature" wouldn't apply.

      --
      Sig: I stole this sig.
  4. For VPNs, or for routing? by dgatwood · · Score: 5, Informative

    The answer depends on what you mean. As far as I'm concerned, a hardware router can probably be trusted to be a basic firewall/router. It's pretty unlikely that anyone will come up with a useful attack on a device that's just doing port blocking, NAT, and basic routing. At worst, somebody might DOS it or turn it into a well-connected zombie to aid in DDOSing somebody's server, but neither of those is compromising your data.

    Now if you're passing unencrypted data across that router, you might have a problem, but then again, passing unencrypted data across any router outside your own intranet is a bad idea, so nothing new there. And if you're expecting the commercial router to provide a VPN, then the answer to whether it is trustworthy becomes "no", because its crypto implementation cannot readily be audited and verified to be trustworthy.

    --

    Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    1. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by LWATCDR · · Score: 1

      That pretty much sums it all up. Frankly unless you are some high profile location I would not worry much about a government based backdoor in your router. If they want your data bad enough they will find a way. You are going to do Tempest? Are you hardened for social attacks? What about all your PCs?
      If you are worried, something like OpenBSD or Linux as a router should work. I am pretty sure if they are interested enough they will get the data one way or another.

      --
      See my blog http://ilovecookes.blogspot.com/ for light hearted technical information.
    2. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by FlyHelicopters · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I am pretty sure if they are interested enough they will get the data one way or another.

      This...

      Or has no one ever heard of rubber-hose cryptography?

      If all else fails, they can break in at night and steal the information locally, or simply put a gun to your head.

      When it comes to computer nerds, that last option probably has a 99.99% success rate.

    3. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Funny thing is, I quit trusting commercial routers with VPNs years and years ago because the only thing I could trust is that they'd sell me 5 vpn licenses for $500 and if I want 10, well, we have this fabulous line of VPN concentrators for only $50,000 plus per-vpn license fees.

    4. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by RR · · Score: 3, Insightful

      As far as I'm concerned, a hardware router...

      There is no such thing. A device that moves data from one location to another, using some policies to examine and transform it, is not just a "hardware" device. It's also software. And if it interfaces with software, then it can be compromised. Or haven't you noticed the news about D-Link routers? A lot of these routers have 2MB or less of flash, which makes it difficult to find a useful exploit, but "difficult" doesn't mean "impossible."

      It's pretty unlikely that anyone will come up with a useful attack on a device that's just doing port blocking, NAT, and basic routing. At worst, somebody might DOS it or turn it into a well-connected zombie to aid in DDOSing somebody's server, but neither of those is compromising your data.

      With just a little paranoia, I can imagine someone finding a way to get those routers to copy your traffic, or at least the headers, to some hostile entity. It doesn't take full knowledge of your traffic to destroy your privacy.

      A router is a type of computer. It's subject to all the same concerns about trustworthiness as any debate about proprietary and free software.

      --
      Have a nice time.
    5. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by jhol13 · · Score: 1

      I would be surprised if every single american made router can NOT be attacked by NSA to gain management console. Which means thay can inspect and re-route your data at will. And they can get the access inside your intranet. Same with british made (is there any?), probably israeli and maybe some chinese. IMHO best bet would be german or perhaps scandinavian ones. Same with VPN, german VPN is very likely without intentional holes.

    6. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by dgatwood · · Score: 2

      There is no such thing. A device that moves data from one location to another, using some policies to examine and transform it, is not just a "hardware" device.

      That's completely immaterial. A hardware router is distinguished from a software router by whether it is or is not a general-purpose computer. Hardware routers range from that little D-Link all the way up to Cisco boxes. In the most extreme designs, the hardware provides a dedicated I/O processor that performs the actual routing functions, allowing it to route data considerably faster than a general-purpose computer can.

      With just a little paranoia, I can imagine someone finding a way to get those routers to copy your traffic, or at least the headers, to some hostile entity. It doesn't take full knowledge of your traffic to destroy your privacy.

      I think you missed my point, which was that yes, you could do exactly what you're suggesting, but it would be just as easy to do that at any router along your data's path to its destination. As soon as the data leaves your intranet, it's like sending a postcard. You should assume that it can and will be monitored by everyone and his mother. Therefore, there is no security concern because the data in question was never secure to begin with.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    7. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      I would be surprised if every single american made router can NOT be attacked by NSA to gain management console.

      Well, then, I have some good news for you: No company has manufactured a router in the U.S. since the Clinton administration! :-D

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    8. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by drinkypoo · · Score: 1

      It's pretty unlikely that anyone will come up with a useful attack on a device that's just doing port blocking, NAT, and basic routing.

      Nonsense! Also, even many cheap routers do packet inspection and sometimes even packet mangling now. Virtually all of them have some means to get a prompt. Many of them are running Linux and you can load binaries into their memory via tftp and host attacks from them directly. Further, there have already been many useful attacks on these consumer-level firewall products; some of them have been as pathetic as exploiting default passwords on maintenance interfaces left open to the internet by default, others not.

      Now if you're passing unencrypted data across that router, you might have a problem

      It can be used to capture traffic from the local network, too, if you're crafty.

      --
      "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
    9. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by RR · · Score: 1

      I think you missed my point, which was that yes, you could do exactly what you're suggesting, but it would be just as easy to do that at any router along your data's path to its destination. As soon as the data leaves your intranet, it's like sending a postcard.

      But your router is an integral part of your intranet. With a little more paranoia, I can imagine a router doing vulnerability scans, or proxying a device with more memory that can do the vulnerability scans, and giving some third-party access to your computing devices. Systems are often set up to share a lot on the local network, for convenience and because the intranet is considered to be "safe." If you don't want to be in a position to trust your router, then you really should consider your security boundary to be your computer, and distrust anything that leaves or enters your NIC.

      Which really is not that bad of an idea. "Hard and crunchy on the outside; soft and chewy on the inside" is how some people describe networks where they trust the firewall. Now that sort of attitude is especially useful for an environment with BYOD and APT; most recently, Google is famously structuring their network so they don't have to trust their intranets.

      Just because there are many threats, doesn't mean you should bring untrustworthy devices onto your own premises. You should do defense in depth.

      --
      Have a nice time.
    10. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by RR · · Score: 1

      As far as I'm concerned, a hardware router...

      There is no such thing. A device that moves data from one location to another, using some policies to examine and transform it, is not just a "hardware" device.

      That's completely immaterial. A hardware router is distinguished from a software router by whether it is or is not a general-purpose computer. Hardware routers range from that little D-Link all the way up to Cisco boxes. In the most extreme designs, the hardware provides a dedicated I/O processor that performs the actual routing functions, allowing it to route data considerably faster than a general-purpose computer can.

      A hardware router is distinguished from a software router by the fact that a software router is capable of executing general-purpose instructions. In theory, you can make a hardware router that is only ever able to execute routing functions, and I think many routers do have portions of TCP/IP hard-wired into the silicon, but I'm not aware of routers where that's the only thing they do. In practice, the highest-level hardware routing that I know is the MAC caching in unmanaged switches.

      Home routers are especially bad. Only a few of them use hardware for the routing, and all of them have general-purpose processor cores. The 802.11n router that I got for $50 this year has 128MB of RAM, 32MB of storage, and a 680MHz MIPS 24K processor. Except for the storage and floating point, that's far more computing power than I had in my desktop 15 years ago. I could install X Window libraries and run graphical programs from my router. If I wanted to, I could even attach USB storage and display adapter, and use it as my desktop.

      --
      Have a nice time.
    11. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      But your router is an integral part of your intranet. With a little more paranoia, I can imagine a router doing vulnerability scans, or proxying a device with more memory that can do the vulnerability scans, and giving some third-party access to your computing devices. Systems are often set up to share a lot on the local network, for convenience and because the intranet is considered to be "safe." If you don't want to be in a position to trust your router, then you really should consider your security boundary to be your computer, and distrust anything that leaves or enters your NIC.

      Depending on your level of trust/paranoia, you should consider the security boundary to be your app and the libraries statically linked into it. By the time it gets anywhere close to the NIC, it is out of your control.

      And yes, if your intranet is likely to contain actual secrets, you should encrypt everything as though it were a public network, and maybe also consider placing an additional firewall outside your router to do DPI looking for possible information leakage, unusual activity, etc.

      With that said, your home intranet isn't likely to contain much (if any) data that isn't going to the public Internet, and assuming your switches are working properly, it should not be possible for your router to see non-broadcast traffic directed towards a different device anyway. Obviously, that reasoning fails if your switch is a managed device that can be potentially reprogrammed to change the switching behavior, but that's atypical for home networks, which I thought was the main point of discussion in this thread.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    12. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      A hardware router is distinguished from a software router by the fact that a software router is capable of executing general-purpose instructions.

      We have different definitions, and thus will come to very different conclusions based on those definitions. To me, a software router means a router in which you install the software, and thus are in some sort of control over it, as opposed to a prepackaged all-in-one solution, where you (typically) aren't in control of anything other than its configuration. If you don't configure the software yourself, the router is essentially a black box, and whether it is using hardware-assisted routing or purely software routing doesn't significantly change the level of trust.

      The reason the trust level doesn't change is that it is not really feasible to have a router that is incapable of running general-purpose instructions. Such a device cannot be configured usefully, except perhaps by swapping out a configuration ROM (which would be highly impractical in most real-world environments). I've seen lots of two-tier setups, where special-purpose hardware does the actual packet routing and a general-purpose CPU runs some sort of web or SNMP interface for configuring the device, but you still have a general-purpose CPU that can be attacked, and can then be told to reprogram those special-purpose devices to route or modify packets in a different way, up to and including diverting some portion of the traffic to a port on the general-purpose computer for deep packet inspection.

      Therefore, black-box hardware-assisted routing is no more secure than black-box pure-software routing. From a security perspective, the only things that matter are the extent to which the software is under your control and the extent to which you trust the software vendor.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    13. Re:For VPNs, or for routing? by RR · · Score: 1

      Depending on your level of trust/paranoia, you should consider the security boundary to be your app and the libraries statically linked into it. By the time it gets anywhere close to the NIC, it is out of your control.

      Not necessarily. If you can't trust your computer, then as soon as you touch it, your information is out of your control.

      Your home intranet isn't likely to contain much (if any) data that isn't going to the public Internet, and assuming your switches are working properly, it should not be possible for your router to see non-broadcast traffic directed towards a different device anyway. Obviously, that reasoning fails if your switch is a managed device that can be potentially reprogrammed to change the switching behavior, but that's atypical for home networks, which I thought was the main point of discussion in this thread.

      Well, my home intranet has plenty of data that aren't going on the Internet.

      But back to the original problem. My $50 home router does indeed have a built-in managed switch, and can be reprogramming to do port mirroring. My home router can be reprogrammed to do a lot. But that doesn't even matter. You can tell a lot from a network by using broadcast packets, such as Microsoft NetBIOS and Apple Bonjour.

      The point is that a router is not just a hardware device. They're general-purpose computers. I'm in control of my router, like I'm in control of my computer. Most people aren't. The OP asked, Can Commercial Hardware Routers Be Trusted? The answer is No, and it was naive to assume otherwise.

      --
      Have a nice time.
  5. How are you going to roll your own? by kasperd · · Score: 2, Interesting
    If you replace a hardware router with a PC, you have to trust
    • CPU
    • Motherboard
    • BIOS
    • Storage device
    • Storage controller
    • Network interface
    • Operating system

    If any of the above is compromised, you are no better off than with a hardware based router.

    If you by hardware router mean a device that truly forwards packets in hardware without involving any sort of CPU, then your best guarantee is the economical one. It is cheaper for the vendor to manufacture hardware without snooping capabilities than with.

    --

    Do you care about the security of your wireless mouse?
    1. Re:How are you going to roll your own? by dcollins117 · · Score: 1

      I was going to suggest OpenBSd plus pfsense, but you kind of took the wind out of my sails.

    2. Re:How are you going to roll your own? by wonkey_monkey · · Score: 0, Offtopic

      Some guys just made a car out of Lego.

      --
      systemd is Roko's Basilisk.
    3. Re:How are you going to roll your own? by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      Be your generations http://www.gnewsense.org/Projects/Lemote you don't have to 'trust' just understand and test.
      Take your cash, skills and efforts away from the tame junk "compromised" brands and build with more interesting products, projects.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    4. Re:How are you going to roll your own? by RabidReindeer · · Score: 1

      If you replace a hardware router with a PC, you have to trust

      • CPU
      • Motherboard
      • BIOS
      • Storage device
      • Storage controller
      • Network interface
      • Operating system

      If any of the above is compromised, you are no better off than with a hardware based router.

      If you by hardware router mean a device that truly forwards packets in hardware without involving any sort of CPU, then your best guarantee is the economical one. It is cheaper for the vendor to manufacture hardware without snooping capabilities than with.

      The flip side of that is that if you are a powerful agency - one powerful enough to control what's going on in overseas fabrication plants and suppress any signals coming out of them, you have to be able to set up a scheme that's subtle enough to go undetected without it either being subverted by or corrupting the:

      • CPU
      • Motherboard
      • BIOS
      • Storage device
      • Storage controller
      • Network interface
      • Operating system

      Because Chthulhu knows, it's hard enough to get that stack operating reliably even without a secret agenda. If just one component in there doesn't operate precisely like its Secret Masters expect it to - whether due to local customization or even simple software upgrades, it's likely to explode very messily.

  6. It can be a good thing too by jones_supa · · Score: 0, Troll

    Commercial. You keep using that word. Remember that "commercial" can sometimes also be a guarantee that you do not get fucked: screw with your customers and that kind of company will soon be out of business.

    1. Re:It can be a good thing too by SB9876 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Like RSA or Microsoft?

    2. Re:It can be a good thing too by PopeRatzo · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Remember that "commercial" can sometimes also be a guarantee that you do not get fucked: screw with your customers and that kind of company will soon be out of business.

      See, that's the theory, but it can not work in practice the way things are today..

      Today, you will notice that an increasing number of business models reject the notion of "I'm the seller and you're the buyer". Most of the corporations with whom you do business don't really see you as the customer any more. For example. If you use Google, are you the customer or are the advertisers? If your data is compromised, that doesn't change anything about the relationship between the seller and the buyer. Same goes for banks, and for Microsoft, Apple, and most of the big tech corporations. While they may sell products to you, they have significant income streams that are deals with the government. In the next six years, Apple computers could have almost a trillion dollars in cash-on-hand. Are they a tech company or a bank? The money they make from their intellectual property doesn't come from you. The money they make from their "strategic partnerships" doesn't come from you.

      You're going to buy their products regardless, so it's a lot more important to Apple that they have a good relationship with the government than with you. Because their beneficial sweetheart tax deals could bring in as much as the profit from selling consumer electronics.

      Same goes for the telecommunications industry. When you've got telecoms involved in creating content, you're no longer the customer. You're not the consumer, you are the consumable.

      This new relationship circumvents every aspect of the notion of "free market", at least any "free market" that involves you. And make no mistake: this new relationship where there is a third party that inserts itself between you and the company from whom you purchase an item is the model of the future. Video gaming, food, intellectual property (of course), transportation, right on down the line. You are being cut out of the equation. There is more profit in making the government happy than there is in making you happy.

      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    3. Re:It can be a good thing too by Miletos · · Score: 2

      NSA: Plz backdoor because terrorists. K thx bai.
      Company: No! We can't lull our customers into a false sense of security. It's unethical and the stockholders will destroy us if they find out.
      NSA: But, but...$10 million contract?
      Company: ...I'll call you back monday.

    4. Re:It can be a good thing too by PopeRatzo · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Bottom line is this: there is no longer a division between the corporate world and government. They are one in the same. They rely on each other and have no reason to take you into consideration.

      This makes dealing with the problem as citizens ten times harder. Because if you attack one of the heads of this snake, the head at the other end comes around to bite you. And the current setup is sweet for both corporations and government so they've got no reason to want to change it.

      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
    5. Re:It can be a good thing too by wvmarle · · Score: 1

      When it comes to trustworthy, it seems nowadays made-in-China is the way to go. At least no NSA involvement there.

    6. Re:It can be a good thing too by ImaLamer · · Score: 1
    7. Re:It can be a good thing too by currently_awake · · Score: 1

      most modern IC's are designed in the USA. Either it's an American chip or a china copy of one.

    8. Re:It can be a good thing too by Pav · · Score: 1

      If I must (for example) give someone a webcam into my life I'd prefer them to live far away and have as little interest in my life as possible. Across the largest ocean on earth is good.

  7. How about open-source firmware? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    I'm definitely in the "no" camp on this one, but how about after-market, open-source firmware? I run DD-WRT on my good ol' WRT54G, which I trust a heck of a lot more than the OEM code. How far does replacing the stock firmware go towards securing my home network?

    1. Re:How about open-source firmware? by RabidReindeer · · Score: 1

      I'm definitely in the "no" camp on this one, but how about after-market, open-source firmware? I run DD-WRT on my good ol' WRT54G, which I trust a heck of a lot more than the OEM code. How far does replacing the stock firmware go towards securing my home network?

      It goes as far as you can trust your replacement code.

      It won't protect you from hardware-based exploits except to the degree that you use the hardware in unexploitable ways. It won't protect you from fifth-column code in your OS if you use that code without inspecting it. But at least you should have a reasonably degree of trust in your own code.

      And yes, I know the theory behind malware-injecting compilers, linkers and debuggers. But as long as you're not operating in a monocultural environment, there are simply too many ways that fifth-column software tools can fail, and fail in ways that make it obvious that there's something seriously wrong.

  8. The Wrong Question by agwadude · · Score: 4, Insightful

    You shouldn't have to trust your upstream routers. Instead you should assume they're compromised and use end-to-end encryption. HTTPS and SSH, for example, specifically protect against active attackers such as malicious routers.

    1. Re:The Wrong Question by storkus · · Score: 2

      This! Mod parent way up! The question isn't whether your [insert endpoint here] is safe, but if the intermediate points are. Even if your own router is safe, what about the one upstream? I've assumed for a long time (way before Snowden) that all electronic communications are monitored, and when you realize that, and the insane difficulty of getting around that monitoring, you kind of give up. You have to decide what is important enough to secure from a worthy (non script-kiddie) adversary and versus letting them see what kind of pr0n you like. IMHO this has been the reality for years (probably before 9/11 thanks to CALEA and friends), but it took Snowden to wake most people up to the fact.

      Now securing your own machine, that's whole other level: again, how secure to do need it to be? I'm *HOPING* that keeping the browser cache clean/disabled, using Linux and FF and shutting down the browser when accessing bank account info and such is enough to keep the CC guys from getting my info; OTOH, if you're doing something that the intelligence agencies (regardless of country) is interested in, your only real hope is to use the the 100% open software/firmware like the FSF advocated, and (of course) even then there's no guarantee the hardware doesn't have a compromise or some CIA/FBI/whatever spy doesn't physically attack your machine when you're not looking (which is normal if you're actually under investigation).

      As others have pointed out, its you versus agencies with BILLIONS of US$ (or equivalent) funding: you can resist, but if they really want you, you have no chance of winning: think the end of Half Life when Freeman refuses--that's what you face, proverbially.

      tl;dr YOU ARE SCREWED, and your barely computer-literate family and friends have probably already been pwned and not even know it.

    2. Re:The Wrong Question by VortexCortex · · Score: 1

      You shouldn't have to trust your upstream routers

      No, instead you should be able to verify all of your hardware and software are valid. One way to do this is demand the VHDL and compiled chipset designs for all your hardware. This way one can benchmark things such as power draw or timing characteristics in reality and simulation, allowing some degree of verification that pattern matching code isn't running across your bits.

      Unfortunately people are confused by the infinitely reproducible nature of information. This is the first generation of the online Information Age wherein information is infinitely reproducible, not scarce, i.e., we now live in a post information-scarcity world, but the laws and economic concepts are still having growing pains. E.g: If something is in infinite supply, what price does it have? ECON101 says Zero. What's scarce is the ability to create new configurations of bits and make new discoveries, not the ideas or information itself. Instead of agreeing to pay scientists, inventors, and creators well up front for their efforts of creation, their efforts are devalued because corporations would rather cherry pick and pay only that which becomes popular; It takes the same work to create either way. The fallacy is that the mechanic should charge you each time you benefit from his efforts later -- They don't. They do work once and get paid for it once; It's a sane business model since there's an unbounded times one can benefit from the labor to fix the car down the road.

      This simple bid, agree on price, do work once, get paid once, and work more to make more money concept is accepted everywhere but the illogical and economically untenable market of research, ideas, and information... So, your in ability to apply basic economic principals to technology is to blame for your current inability to trust your hardware. It's quite poetic, eh? That deception as to the fundamental process of creation breeds a world full of distrust.

      Here's an idea for you: Consider that if you connect via HTTPS to, say, Anywhere.com, it could have been compromised and serves you an exploit or backdoor instructions for your router, browser, OS combination.

      What good will encryption do you, Mr. Anderson, if you can't trust your system security?

      Pick a subset of the system to test for integrity. Now, replace all non consequential input and make it white noise or a no-op on the processing thereof. For a browser you'll process connections and scripts and rendering of HTML but images, text, video, audio, etc. remain unprocessed. If your 'input sanitized' virtualized system state does not match the non 'input sanitized' system state then there is an exploit (information has breeched its containment boundary). If the system states are the same however on the sanitized or not systems then the input is safe to feed to your hardware implementation, so long as the virtual hardware systems are accurate representations of reality, and all their other subsets check out.

      The reason why The Unix Way of doing one thing and doing it well is the right way is because one can verify security thus. The complexity of the system sky rockets if scripts can trigger on image data contents, etc. Indeed you wind up with unintended consequences such as cache cookies being able to track you by serving you a unique image, etc. This is also why modern design of information systems is such a train wreck: Your race still treats breeches as features instead of vulnerabilities. The information leaks across your porous "boundaries" like through sieves, and you entertain the ridiculous notion such can be secured. I'm surprised you don't build banks out of tissue paper.

      There are more efficient means by which to eliminate any distrust and verify cybernetic integrity, however you humans do not currently possess the technology or even the cognitive language to express them properly yet. You still sell ideas and data as if they're scarce; Like physical things. You're still

    3. Re:The Wrong Question by FlyHelicopters · · Score: 1

      OTOH, if you're doing something that the intelligence agencies (regardless of country) is interested in, your only real hope is to use the the 100% open software/firmware like the FSF advocated

      The question is, are you trying to stay off the radar, or trying to avoid having the NSA hack your computer once you're on the radar?

      If the former, the challenge is that they can miss and miss and miss, and only have to hit once. You have to hit every time. The odds of that over any period of time are nearly zero. A single mistake and all your efforts are for nothing.

      If the latter, no amount of electronic protection is going to do you any good. If they really can't hack their way in, they'll just wait until you leave for lunch and physically break in and copy your hard drives.

      And if that fails and you're really on their radar, they'll just use rubber-hose cryptography. Very, very few computer people would stand up very long to a real honest-to-god gun put against their head.

      And if that really does fail, there is always your family.

      I might resist (at first) if they just threaten me, but I have 3 kids, put a gun to their heads and I'll do whatever I'm told. 99.9% of everyone will.

    4. Re:The Wrong Question by deconfliction · · Score: 2

      where is my "+1:alien" moderation button...

    5. Re:The Wrong Question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Right now, I am baffled by my ISP's upstream router. It's a NAT, so some suckage is to be expected. However, I've noticed they tend to reset my rsync streams. Disable the delta-xfer algorithm - it works. Enable rsync smarts - it fails. Connections forcibly closed with a bunch of RST. My guess is that the NAT does something beyond its expected duties, like decompressing the streams for inspection? When rsync elides some parts, it must see a lot of stream errors.

      Can anyone offer a better explanation, or confirm my paranoia?

  9. How to maintain privacy upstream... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Don't connect

  10. Personally, I took the consequences. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    I have switched my entire network to a massive 20 parallel lines using RFC 1149. All packets are compared. Compromised packets are noticed and filtered immediately. Through special in-built markers, exchanging lines out or manipulating them is not possible. All packets are constantly tracked. Bit pricey but worth the money.

    100% NSA proof.

    1. Re:Personally, I took the consequences. by mbone · · Score: 1

      How do you know that those are not genetically modified birds, subjecting you to a roost in the middle attack ?

    2. Re:Personally, I took the consequences. by rubycodez · · Score: 2

      I'm afraid my cat decreased your throughput by 5%

    3. Re:Personally, I took the consequences. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's a lot of work to protect your lolcats photo collection.

  11. Buy what NSA is buying by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Would you trust that they did their homework ?

  12. routerpwn by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative
    1. Re:routerpwn by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      mod parent up! there's some hard core pwnage going on there.

  13. I wouldn't by digitaltraveller · · Score: 1

    I wouldn't.

    Our team of scientists and Linux netwokring experts has an open, next generation router project up on IndieGogo right now, but we aren't getting much traction. I guess we missed product-market fit. To the point that we are have modified the campaign to ask people not to buy the router or if they do - risk us not shipping some of the more advanced features that we are working on in this product. We had hoped to release it all as open source but I just don't think that' going to be possible now, unless we somehow magically start getting a ton of orders.

    1. Re:I wouldn't by BitZtream · · Score: 1

      ...
      Why choose Linux for a 'next generation router' when there are at least 3 OSes with FAR faster IP stacks?

      IF you're picking Linux for your router, you've already shown you're not qualified to be making such a router.

      The OS you were looking for was FreeBSD, which is what gets used in high end routers (or at least is the base in which those OSes are derived from). Juniper, F5, all the high end gear is FBSD, not Linux.

      --
      Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
    2. Re:I wouldn't by vadim_t · · Score: 1

      Who cares? A consumer router is going to run well enough with either, and won't have a 10 page long list of firewall rules to slow things down.

      I have a router running Linux and it deals with a 100 Mbps fiber line just fine. Running BSD on it isn't going to make any difference except for me having to learn how to do things in FreeBSD.

    3. Re:I wouldn't by vadim_t · · Score: 2

      Some comments:

      "Upliink"? Took me a while to notice there are two "i"s there for some bizarre reason. As a result, googling for it failed. If you're going to make up words, at least don't make them confusingly similar to normal ones.

      Half a million is an awful lot of money. $430 is a lot for a router.

      It's not clear at all what it does. IPv6 internet? What is that?

      Sharing the connection with nearby people? Why would I want to?

      Mesh networking. How is this going to scale? What performance and latency do you expect? How likely is it that two users will find one another? You need a huge amount of deployed devices for this to work, especially for ones in fixed locations.

      There's some nonsense in the video about the number of people in the world without internet access. A $430 device sold in first world countries won't do anything to address that.

      It's an enormous mish-mash of things. Android, mesh networking, some nebulous IPv6 internet, a web browser, an API for I don't know what... seriously, I'm well versed in tech, but I have no clue what is all this about. And that is a bad sign.

      TL;DR: it's unclear what it does, why would I want to participate, and it's very expensive. Why aren't you developing alternative firmware for cheap wifi routers, for instance?

    4. Re:I wouldn't by digitaltraveller · · Score: 1

      Thanks for your feedback. Something I've learned is that marketing and complexity don't mix, so I agree our communication strategy is not optimal. We are trying to talk to too many audiences and doing a bad job with all of them. We'll try harder.

      Half a million is an awful lot of money. $430 is a lot for a router.

      It's a server/router hybrid. We need to be clearer about that. The specs are competitive with what you'd find in the market for regular computers, but we thought it would be distracting to break them down because some of them are subject to change.

      It's not clear at all what it does. IPv6 internet? What is that?

      Sharing the connection with nearby people? Why would I want to?

      Because at scale, the idea turns your internet acquisition cost into a one time cost. It's true that it's better for municipalities to adopt this kind of technology than individuals. Sharing your connection: For better performance and your privacy. We probably could probably selll the privacy aspect more, as I think our architecture is the best I know out there for turning the internet back into the bastion of liberty it once was, rather than the surveillance state it has become. Our solution to this by the way was to create a commodity market for anonymous distributed computation, but more work needs to be done.

      Mesh networking. How is this going to scale? What performance and latency do you expect? How likely is it that two users will find one another? You need a huge amount of deployed devices for this to work, especially for ones in fixed locations.

      I admit there are critical mass issues, and this is a very legitimate criticism of the project. Our strategy to bootstrap this network is to run our network over the regular internet until such time that it spreads to someone near you in physical proximity.

      There's some nonsense in the video about the number of people in the world without internet access. A $430 device sold in first world countries won't do anything to address that.

      I don't think it's nonsense. We are trying to turn internet acquisition into a one time cost. It's a high price, why we were asking people to get in touch with internet.org for us and ask them to talk to us. We've now made contact with them, and hope something comes of it.

      It's an enormous mish-mash of things. Android, mesh networking, some nebulous IPv6 internet, a web browser, an API for I don't know what... seriously, I'm well versed in tech, but I have no clue what is all this about. And that is a bad sign.

      TL;DR: it's unclear what it does, why would I want to participate, and it's very expensive. Why aren't you developing alternative firmware for cheap wifi routers, for instance?

      Mish-mash: That's true, but I think the strength of our approach will come out as we roll out more of our stuff. If you are serious about solving this problem you have to look at it from a lot of different angles. Also most WIFI hardware sold out there has closed source drivers, even on Linux. That's a nonstarter for a project like ours. Controlling the hardware makes things much easier.

      Anyhow, thanks for this feedback. Overall, it's some of the best we've got. We'll review it and act accordingly to improve our message.

    5. Re:I wouldn't by digitaltraveller · · Score: 1

      I really like the BSDs, especially Tinfoil. There will always be standalone servers. But we think that the future is partially about router/server hybrids with eg. big LRU caches. A great example of this. A busy router can easily download the same image file, 100K times a day. That's waste. In a perfect world we'd have a completely finished software system, that works everywhere, without hacks, and doesn't have to leverage the convenience of an OS that seems to have most of the market share out there. If it's any consolation anything we do should be trivially portable to the BSDs. But at the moment it doesn't seem like there is a big market for what we are doing.

      tl;dr Premature optimization is the root of all evil.

    6. Re:I wouldn't by wvmarle · · Score: 1

      You always talk about Internet to be a one-time cost.

      That's only true if there is no (high speed) uplink to the rest of the world to be paid for, for example. Those don't come for free. And if you're really sticking to your own mesh network, it's going to be unusably slow. And people wouldn't be able to access staples like Slashdot, or Google.

    7. Re:I wouldn't by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Not to mention using pf vs. whatever the current Linux firewall flavor-of-the-month is

    8. Re:I wouldn't by fostware · · Score: 1

      Seconded...

      We've worked on minimal hardware routers and iptables can't keep up with pF on the same hardware.
      pF also allows more flexibility, and can do funkier layer 2 than iptables.
      The ALiX boards in the Yawarras (http://www.yawarra.com.au/) are small, flexible, and FreeBSD supported.
      We don't use them so much anymore since we run more VM host-based firewalls, and we've moved on from hosting various physical machines requiring firewalling between them (since a possibly compromised machine's firewall can't be trusted...)

      --
      "We know what happens to people who stay in the middle of the road. They get run over." - Aneurin Bevan
    9. Re:I wouldn't by vadim_t · · Score: 1

      Ok, since you liked it, I decided I'll think on this some more and give some more feedback. So:

      Something I've learned is that marketing and complexity don't mix, so I agree our communication strategy is not optimal. We are trying to talk to too many audiences and doing a bad job with all of them. We'll try harder.

      You need a good reason for why I would want this right off the start. And right now it's not there. Look at FON, who did part of what you are, much more successfully. The immediate question for something like this is "Why would I want to share my connection?", and FON answered "You'll earn money!". There, that's nice and sensible.

      They also gave out their hardware at a ridiculously cheap price. They were selling those at a Linux convention and though the pretty much unanimous opinion was that the idea was silly, a lot of people still got one, because it was so cheap.

      It's a server/router hybrid. We need to be clearer about that. The specs are competitive with what you'd find in the market for regular computers, but we thought it would be distracting to break them down because some of them are subject to change.

      Does every single person need a server? I don't think most people do. There's also questions like how does this work, exactly? If I bought this thing and hooked it up, who is it serving to? Myself and perhaps whoever finds an open AP and connects to it? Seems like a waste of money. I don't really have anything to serve to random passers-by.

      Why have a powerful router? Why not something with the power of a Raspberry Pi, that you stick a SD card or flash drive into, if you want? The few people needing a serious server capable of more than serving cat photos can buy it separately.

      Because at scale, the idea turns your internet acquisition cost into a one time cost.

      Only if there are tens of millions of these things around. Otherwise you pay for this and you pay your usual ISP.

      Sharing your connection: For better performance and your privacy.

      Many ISPs have rules against this. How does sharing your connection and allowing random people to torrent things improve performance? It maybe improves privacy in the sense of confusing what you're accessing and what other people do, but these days that means that one day the police will break in, grab all your hardware and try to figure out whether it was you or not who downloaded child porn. There's a good reason why few people run tor exit nodes.

      Oh yeah, this thing apparently runs tor. If it runs an exit node, you're not going to have better performance at all, as well as making it risky for the owner. If it doesn't, and this is successful, you're going to overload the tor network.

      I admit there are critical mass issues, and this is a very legitimate criticism of the project. Our strategy to bootstrap this network is to run our network over the regular internet until such time that it spreads to someone near you in physical proximity.

      Is it really going to work in a city? I live in one. My wifi signal is junk at the most distant room and I finally had to give up and just run some cable. Pretty much every single house with internet access in a city has a wifi router, because that's what an ISP gives you. Which means every possible channel is already clogged. I don't see this reaching any useful distance.

      It's also a very niche, geeky, and expensive thing. I'm sure that in my building I'm the only person who has the slightest chance of being interested in such a thing, and given the wifi quality around here it can't possibly reach any nearby ones.

      I don't think it's nonsense. We are trying to turn internet acquisition into a one time cost. It's a high price, why we were asking people to get in touch with internet.org for us and ask them to talk to us. We've now made con

  14. Trust nothing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I encrypt everything end-to-end using a Caesar-13 algorithm. The NSA had nothing to do with the development of that cipher, unlike DES, AES, SHA hashes, etc.

  15. There are easy ways to solve this by pcsutt0n · · Score: 1

    If you want to roll your own, there's a great OpenBSD router tutorial. If you're not comfortable with commandline configuration, pfSense is a really great option for old PCs with a few NICs.

    1. Re:There are easy ways to solve this by VortexCortex · · Score: 1

      "roll your own", ah but you didn't, and by suggesting that you did only make Ken Thompson sad.

  16. Would that the IETF knew by mbone · · Score: 3, Interesting

    This is a big (and, I personally fear, unfixable) problem for the IETF and associated Internet bodies. Of course, router security is only a tiny piece of it. Given that RSA has been revealed as taking money from the NSA to weaken security protocols, who knows how deep the rot goes.

    One big fight right now is in over the removal of NSA employed Chair of the Crypto Forum Research Group. There will be more.

  17. Trust for what purpose? by vadim_t · · Score: 3, Interesting

    For ensuring the safety of your outgoing traffic, it doesn't matter at all whether you can trust your router or not. It's just one step away from a router at your ISP, which you can't trust, and which can be assumed to be malicious.

    It's a bit different for ensuring the safety of your internal network, though. If you think there might be any reason why the NSA, government or whoever might want to reach inside your personal network, then you certainly should avoid any closed solutions and keep it under as much control as possible. That router might well hiddenly allow people that know how to access your network without permission.

    Router manufacturers also have been caught rewriting pages to insert ads. Here is one example of such a thing.

  18. Not trusting vendors = you give up a lot by davidwr · · Score: 3, Interesting

    One solution is to simply not communicate outside of a domain you trust. Go offline. I the extreme, use pen and paper to store information you don't want others to see, and if you need to share that information with others, memorize it and tell it to them in person. As a compromise, use a trusted courier. But even that requires trusting someone.

    Basically, adopt the same "off the communications grid" techniques that Osama bin Laden was thought to use.

    As I said, you give up a lot, and for 99+% of us, that's not going to be the best option out there. But for a few, it is.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:Not trusting vendors = you give up a lot by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      I think the answer is "no" which is why McAfee wants to build something to try to remedy that with Tor built in. The problem (as others have noted) is that unless you are building everything from the ground up at some point you have to trust someone else.

    2. Re:Not trusting vendors = you give up a lot by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Basically, adopt the same "off the communications grid" techniques that Osama bin Laden was thought to use.

      And how did that work out for him? Oh yes, he's fish food.

    3. Re:Not trusting vendors = you give up a lot by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Funny

      He died non-violently in December 2001 of kidney failure.

    4. Re:Not trusting vendors = you give up a lot by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      ..."adopt the same "off the communications grid" techniques that Osama bin Laden was thought to use"... and never again walk outside of your own house.

  19. You mean... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Bush? Clinton? Bush? Reagan? Carter? Ford? Nixon?

    Maybe Lincoln or Hoover?

    Hell if you really want to blame anyone, how about George Washington and his leading of thousands of men strong against a few hundred rioting moonshiners out West (Who by the way had already dispersed before they ever got there)?

    There's a lot of blame to go around, so stop trying to pin it on a specific president just because you don't like his policies.

    If you really want to place blame, place it on we the people for not holding our elected officials responsible before, or even, now.

  20. Why bother? by VonSkippy · · Score: 0

    So what exactly do you have to hide?

    Just kidding (more or less) but really, what difference does it make. If NSA (or any other powers that be) wants to "get you", does it matter if they have "real data" they sniffed from one of your digital systems or not? If they truly want to arrest/harass/make you disappear whether they have real data or fudged data is rather moot.

    So why worry? Either you're below their radar, and they can collect or not your precious data, or you're a target, in which case no matter what you do/hide/avoid won't help you in the long run.

    Privacy went out the door along with all those AOL CD's - what's amazing is that people are just starting to notice (or care).

    1. Re:Why bother? by dbIII · · Score: 1

      It matters is you are for instance Airbus and Boeing want your passenger aircraft designs and ask the government for help - but that was a few years ago and I'm not sure the NSA was the perpetrator. You can write that off as sticking it to the cheese eating surrender monkies and mindlessly wave the flag, but that's ignoring that it could go the same way between two US companies depending on who has the political influence.

  21. Ceasar-13? by davidwr · · Score: 1

    I bet that's more interesting with a 23-letter alphabet than the ROT-13 algorithm I sometimes use in my 26-letter alphabet.

    --
    Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
    1. Re:Ceasar-13? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I often wonder that if you layered the encryption would it decrease or increase in security. For example, encrypt with some good algorithm X but then apply 2 of your own on top of it (or maybe before it). Like blindly adding 1 to every byte in the stream and then doing a simple xor swap across all the bytes.

      If you do it before you encrypt, the people will hack through X but still be left with gibberish making them think something is wrong.

      If you do it after you encrypt, the people will try to hack through X (if they can guess that's what you used) but their efforts would fail.

  22. true, except failed arithmetic re taxes by raymorris · · Score: 1

    True, for some business models the user is the product. The advertiser is the paying customer. Broadcast TV and radio are examples.

    You forgot how to multiply when you made this statement, though:
    > Because their beneficial sweetheart tax deals could bring in
    > as much as the profit from selling consumer electronics.

    Assume a 100% tax break, the company pays 0% taxes.
    That's zero percent of their profit. Profit = sales - expenses.
    If they have no sales, they make no money, and paying 0% tax doesn't help them. Sales is always more important.

    Let's compare two sales figures, both with a 10% tax reduction. If the company does $10 million in sales, that 10% tax cut is worth $1 million. If the company does $100 in sales, a 10% tax reduction is worth $10 million. So we see that to maximize the value of tax breaks, a company needs to have more happy customers, generating more profit subject to the tax break.

    1. Re:true, except failed arithmetic re taxes by PopeRatzo · · Score: 1

      Of course. I was typing faster than I was thinking.

      I wanted to say that the strategic partnerships and intellectual property and (in Apple's case) the investment of their "war chest" can bring in as much profit than selling their products.

      Off-topic, but if Apple wants to keep hundreds of billions in cash, they ought to become a bank.

      --
      You are welcome on my lawn.
  23. You're doing it wrong. by BitZtream · · Score: 3, Insightful

    If you're worried about a router and if you can trust it, you've already done it wrong.

    Your data should have been encrypted before it let the original application if its something you care about.

    It shouldn't MATTER if you can trust the router, if it does, you've already failed.

    --
    Persistent Volume manager for Kubernetes - https://github.com/dwimsey/openshift-pvmanager
  24. It's situation specific by doubledown00 · · Score: 1

    Start by evaluating what you have and whom you wish to keep it away from. If you have classified data that a national security apparatus wants, do what a poster up-thread suggested and keep it offline (also, stay the hell away from me). If your data is less sensitive, then evaluate your security posture using a multi-tiered approach. Assume all routers can be compromised and treat them as the first line of defense. Evaluate where you data sits (cloud based versus local) and how it is transferred (encrypted versus non). Evaluate your own work flows in determining how the data is potentially vulnerable.

    You can build your own fortress unto yourself if you want to, but at the end of the day even if you're sharing with other fortress entities you will still end up having to send data across untrusted lines. Some of those lines are run by people who don't have your privacy interests at heart. So knowledge and common sense are still your best defenses.

    1. Re:It's situation specific by dbIII · · Score: 1

      If you have classified data that a national security apparatus wants

      As Boeing vs Airbus showed well over a decade back the national security apparatus is for hire, so commercial stuff (like the Airbus passenger aircraft designs) is also potentially stuff they want.

    2. Re:It's situation specific by ihtoit · · Score: 1

      If you have classified data that a national security apparatus wants

      ...and they know about it, they will not stop at pulling fingernails to get it.

      Shortened it for you.

      --
      Political debates have me rolling my eyes so much I think I got optical whiplash. I should sue. - Foamy The Squirrel
  25. Good question! by mikeg22 · · Score: 1, Insightful

    I have no answer. I wanted to comment that this is the most pertinent "Ask Slashdot" that I've seen in the last five years. I would guess any router who's firmware was open-sourced.

  26. Who keeps the keys to your kingdom? by BoRegardless · · Score: 1

    If you are doing things that affect large powerful organizations in potentially negative way, you already know you are a target. Deal with it with hardened software, but don't forget that most secret information is lifted with social engineering (inside jobs of dozens of types.) Someone gives the combo to the safe away!

    If you are not stepping on government, NSA or mega-corp toes, standard encryption techniques are probably just fine, but that is just one of the lines of defense.

  27. Amish by smittyoneeach · · Score: 2

    Actually, the obvious answer is that you don't have a choice.

    There is always subsistence farming.

    --
    Get thee glass eyes, and, like a scurvy politician, seem to see things thou dost not.--King Lear
  28. Commercial ANYTHING cannot be trusted by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    Come on, you sheeple- how many explicit revelations about how the monsters rule over you do you have to read before you get it? You are less than s**t in the eyes of those types of Humans that seek to rise to the top of any business enterprise. In Soviet nations back in the day they had a phrase- "SCUM RISES TO THE TOP".

    Amoral and immoral psychologies are universal amongst corporate controllers. "Never give a sucker an even break" is their motto. Then, worse, these worthless individuals hob-nob with people of the same 'class'- powerful religious, government, media, military, 'charity' leaders and the like. They call themselves 'the elite' and define themselves essentially as NOT YOU.

    People like Tony Blair have spent the last two decades+ getting 'the elite' to sing from the same page in the same hymn book. A large chunk of Blair's project is the rolling, expanding programs of "TOTAL SURVEILLANCE". Blair instructs his disciples that the better you monitor the sheeple, the better you control them, and the greater chance you will keep their passive support that actually empowers the elite.

    All major commercial software is compromised. All major computer hardware, where possible and useful, is compromised. Intel's x86 CPUs have had hardware back-doors for years now (activated by encrypted keys). Intel's hardware 'random' number generators have been designed by the NSA, and can be controlled at will by the chips hardware back-doors, where given sequences of op-codes allow the behaviour of the generator to be altered.

    All network equipment is fully back-doored and compromised in multiple ways. Many of these NSA methods are so horrible, form an engineering POV, that the normal functionality of the equipment is horribly degraded even when no intelligence agency hacking is involved.

    The biggest open-source projects are also fully compromised. The NSA uses teams of psychologists to exploit the 'autistic' nature of many developers, so that flaming and aggressive behaviour in developers' forums can act as cover for slipping into builds modules of NSA designed code.

    But open-source is ONLY vulnerable if the project is so unwieldy, testing the validity of key modules becomes impractical. Small, tight focused code projects like Truecrypt can never be viable targets, so the NSA focuses on psychological propaganda scaring users away from such options, or the simple distribution of NSA hacked binaries from sites under the control of NSA allies (if your favourite tech site "supports the troops", it most certainly supports the NSA and will willingly supply NSA-hacked versions of your favourite utilities).

    The US intelligence agencies have a budget running into HUNDREDS of BILLIONS of dollars every year, and rising. Only the tiniest fraction of this spending is given any public coverage. In reality, the NSA has far more money than it know what do do with, and all 'blue sky' ideas to improve full surveillance programs against every single citizen are given real consideration. NSA data centres are hundreds of times larger than you imagine, and are well beyond the capacity required to store FOREVER every single available electronic communication.

    The NSA has a desperate need for new, comprehensive data sources- hence Bill Gates' inBloom and Kinect 2 projects. Gates promises to provide, within a decade, everything you can possibly learn about every child, across their entire childhood, in the USA. With the Xbox One, Gates promises to groom the entire population of the USA to accept government cameras and microphones in their own homes.

    Of course you MUST accept cameras in your house. You MIGHT be raping your daughter. You MIGHT be beating your wife. You MIGHT be saying the "N-word". You MIGHT be planning resistance against Obama and Gates. You MIGHT be a 'moosleem' terrorist. What right do you have to hide from US justice, you depraved anti-American criminal terrorist scumbag? Don't you read what the owners of Slashdot have their vile shills rant here over and over, with a score of 5?

    1. Re:Commercial ANYTHING cannot be trusted by ihtoit · · Score: 0

      yeah I stopped reading at "sheeple". Fail.

      --
      Political debates have me rolling my eyes so much I think I got optical whiplash. I should sue. - Foamy The Squirrel
  29. What airgap? by Skewray · · Score: 2

    It doesn't matter. Either there's an airgap, where nothing can get out regardless, so it doesn't matter, or their's a hop along the path you don't control so the security of your device doesn't matter.

    If you have an Intel processor, then there is already a radio backdoor built in. See http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/enterprise-security/what-is-vpro-technology-video.html

    1. Re:What airgap? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Radio? Where do you get that?

      And it's the VPro processors only, at the moment.

    2. Re: What airgap? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yeah it is a radio backdoor with 3G support. And its all in hardware, the NIC intercepts packets going to the AMT remote interface. Can't even firewall it.

      The vPro is in the newer processors. The BIOS option supposedly turns it off, or maybe not, how will you ever know.

    3. Re:What airgap? by msauve · · Score: 1

      Huh? What routers use an Intel laptop processor? What routers use an Intel processor at all - they're mostly MIPS/ARM, RISC is simply better and cheaper for the bit-banging required. In modern routers, very little traffic ever even touchs the CPU, it's switched in hardware. And what wireless can keep up with the traffic which flows through even a single Gb port? Any wireless isn't going far without an antenna external to the metal case they're are built in. No, those plastic Linksys/Dlink/Netgear/Belkin toys aren't routers to anyone serious enough to need airgap security. Nor is a PC running software.

      --
      "National Security is the chief cause of national insecurity." - Celine's First Law
    4. Re:What airgap? by unixisc · · Score: 1

      The ones that pFsense or m0n0wall use are typically Intel based boards - if you see their supported arch, it's mainly Intel. But you are right - the bulk of routers would be based on MIPS or other RISCs

  30. Does it matter when the telcos are 0wned? by dbIII · · Score: 1

    Where I am the telco that is a bottleneck to the rest of the world has admitted letting the NSA watch everything available. If you are in such a situation if your router is phoning home that's just redundancy.

  31. It's not just the hardware, it's the algorithms by Mr.+Protocol · · Score: 2

    All the crypto software I've looked into depends on big internal arrays of special numbers to do its work. If those numbers are compromised (which is what NSA contracted RSA to do, basically), then the whole end-to-end crypto channel is compromised.

    And that's the problem. You can build an open-source hardware router with open-source software, to keep the possibility of hardware backdoors to a minimum, but if the basic crypto algorithm you use has been compromised from the get-go, none of it matters. I think that's going to be the next really difficult intellectual load to lift: vetting ALL of the current crypto algorithms in use today to make sure the algorithms don't have built-in compromises. Since that vetting has to be done by crypto experts, not just software engineers, that pushes the trust back up one step: which crypto experts do you trust?

    1. Re:It's not just the hardware, it's the algorithms by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It shouldn't be a matter of trusting experts alone, they are experts because they are able to demonstrate knowledge alone.

      What really needs to happen is that anyone "signing off" on anything needs their paycheck tied to that assumption/position/vocalization.

    2. Re:It's not just the hardware, it's the algorithms by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      To minimise accusations that these magic numbers have been chosen for nefarious purposes, most cryptographic algorithms either give a full and complete justification for why they have been used instead of other magic numbers (this is the case for Rijndael/AES's s-boxes), or that they are completely innocuous because they're just the binary fixed point representation of some well-known constant such as Pi, E, or the Golden Ratio (e.g. Blowfish uses the binary representation of pi to initialise its key schedule). The latter case is called a "nothing up my sleeve number", and is supposed to alleviate suspicion because there is nothing special about such numbers and they cannot be adjusted to alter the properties of the algorithm. In the former case, it is up to the research community to determine whether their justification for their choices is valid. Some algorithms do neither of these things, such as the infamous Dual_EC_DRBG CPRNG that the NSA foisted off on NIST, and paid RSA $10 million to use by default in their libraries. Indeed it seems to contain an NSA back door.

    3. Re:It's not just the hardware, it's the algorithms by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Three experts you can trust, one reporting to USA, one reporting to Osama, et al, ore reporting to China. If the answers differ, you have a breach.

  32. And they ARE compromised. by Ungrounded+Lightning · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Modern laptops and desktops come with remote administration tools built into the chips on the board. (The vendors tout this as a feature, simplifying administration of a large company's workstations. It's easier and cheaper to build it into everything than to be selective, so it's in the machines sold to individuals, too.)

    One example: Intel Active Management Technology (AMT) and its standard Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI), the latter standardized in 1998 and supported by "over 200 hardware vendors". This is built into the northbridge (or, in early models, the Ethernet) chip).

    Just TRY to get a "modern laptop" (or desktop), using an Intel chipset, without this feature. (I suspect the old Thinkpad is how far back they had to go to avoid it.)

    You can't disable it: Dumping the credentials or reverting to factory settings just makes it think it hasn't been configured yet and accept the first connection (ethernet or WiFi, whether powered up or down) claiming to be the new owner's sysadmins.

    If the NSA doesn't know how to use this to spy on, or take over, a target computer, they aren't doing their jobs.

    Some of the things this can do (from the Wikipedia articles - see them for the footnotes):

    Hardware-based AMT features include:

    Encrypted, remote communication channel for network traffic between the IT console and Intel AMT.
    Ability for a wired PC (physically connected to the network) outside the company's firewall on an open LAN to establish a secure communication tunnel (via AMT) back to the IT console. Examples of an open LAN include a wired laptop at home or at an SMB site that does not have a proxy server.
    Remote power up / power down / power cycle through encrypted WOL.
    Remote boot, via integrated device electronics redirect (IDE-R).
    Console redirection, via serial over LAN (SOL).
    Keyboard, video, mouse (KVM) over network.
    Hardware-based filters for monitoring packet headers in inbound and outbound network traffic for known threats (based on programmable timers), and for monitoring known / unknown threats based on time-based heuristics. Laptops and desktop PCs have filters to monitor packet headers. Desktop PCs have packet-header filters and time-based filters.
    Isolation circuitry (previously and unofficially called "circuit breaker" by Intel) to port-block, rate-limit, or fully isolate a PC that might be compromised or infected.
    Agent presence checking, via hardware-based, policy-based programmable timers. A "miss" generates an event; you can specify that the event generate an alert.
    OOB alerting.
    Persistent event log, stored in protected memory (not on the hard drive).
    Access (preboot) the PC's universal unique identifier (UUID).
    Access (preboot) hardware asset information, such as a component's manufacturer and model, which is updated every time the system goes through power-on self-test (POST).
    Access (preboot) to third-party data store (TPDS), a protected memory area that software vendors can use, in which to version information, .DAT files, and other information

    --
    Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
    1. Re:And they ARE compromised. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > (ethernet or WiFi, whether powered up or down)

      Some of what you say may be true, but a normal laptop generally doesn't have its WiFi active when it's switched off.

    2. Re:And they ARE compromised. by cr0nj0b · · Score: 1

      IPMI is primarily used on sever hardware. Power On/Off, Serial over Lan, basic management stuff.

      AMT/VPro is a useful tool in an enterprise environment.
      As another person said, a laptop does not keep its wifi powered up while it is off.

    3. Re:And they ARE compromised. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It sounds awesome. Always has. But, I've never been able to get it to work well enough to be remotely usable and that was inside the firewall.

      Remotely outside the firewall? LOL.

    4. Re:And they ARE compromised. by Ungrounded+Lightning · · Score: 1

      Some of what you say may be true, but a normal laptop generally doesn't have its WiFi active when it's switched off.

      And you know this how?

      (By "switched off" do you mean laptop power or the WiFi/Bluetooth switch?)

      Suppose it's listening passively, possibly also intermittently, and not transmitting unless it observes a properly authenticated request from the "remote administrator" or a specialized beacon (since most WiFi networks won't know how to send it traffic if it's not responding). How could you tell the difference? There'd be no external sign - no light, no radio emission - unless it was actively being probed RIGHT THEN, and even then there'd only be the acknowledgements and other handshaking, with no need to light the lamp.

      Yes there are issues with trying to establish a link through the ordinary WiFi network when you're being passive, and the documentation claims WiFi configuration doesn't work in power-down mode (but the wired connection does). Nevertheless, who knows what that firmware is up to, besides Intel and the NSA?

      --
      Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
    5. Re:And they ARE compromised. by Ungrounded+Lightning · · Score: 1

      But we know it keeps its wired link active.

      In fact, on an older laptop I have had (a Toshiba Tecra M5) you can see it:
        - Power it down.
        - Plug it into a live ethernet switch.
        - Green light comes on, yellow light flickers with traffic.

      Of course there's no need for those lights to blink, either. So I wouldn't take the ABSENSE of activity, especially in a newer model that might be trying to be stealthy, to indicate it's NOT talking and listening. (Look at the switch, instead, which I'd consider more likely to show such activity since it doesn't have any easy way to know that the device was trying to be stealthy.)

      --
      Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
    6. Re:And they ARE compromised. by Ungrounded+Lightning · · Score: 1

      I've never been able to get it to work well enough to be remotely usable and that was inside the firewall.

      Remotely outside the firewall? LOL.

      They ADVERTISE that it can be configured to "phone home" when out of the office but hooked up to the net.

      --
      Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
    7. Re:And they ARE compromised. by Nethead · · Score: 1

      And Micky D's advertise their food as tasty.

      --
      -- I have a private email server in my basement.
  33. Alternatives to being spied on? by unixisc · · Score: 4, Interesting

    If you wish to skirt the NSA, get your router from Huawei, and let the Chinese spy on you instead. If you don't want the Chinese to spy, get something from the usual NSA contributors. Or see if there's anything made in Russia or any country that's totally independent of the US.

    How easy is it to get a standard router from Cisco or Juniper, and replace IOS or JunOS w/ something like pFsense, m0n0wall or OpenWRT?

    While at it, switch to IPv6, and within a group of people, share a /64 subnet so that even if the NSA spies, they'll find it impossible to source the original source/destination, particularly if dynamic IPs are used.

    1. Re:Alternatives to being spied on? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Use routers from all parties. That way, you at least give no relative advantage to any of them. ;-)

    2. Re:Alternatives to being spied on? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      "switch to IPv6, and within a group of people, share a /64 subnet"

      Please elaborate. I think the most natural IPv6 scheme would involve a number of subnets between you and your friends. That's no problem, of course, since you would get a /48 from your ISP so you can entertain thousands of friends with separate subnets. The most natural scheme would also embed the MAC address in every IPv6 packet, but even that can be obfuscated.

      However, two problems:

        1. Since you own the /48, the authorities will confiscate your computers if they found one of your coconspirators uploading copyrighted content. They would be demanding appropriate logs if you wanted to shift the blame to your friends.

        2. Your friends would have to trust you not to capture their traffic. They might mind your snooping more disturbing than that of the NSA. Your friends would have to trust you not to frame them with forged logs.

    3. Re:Alternatives to being spied on? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Juniper and Cisco sell software -- throw out their OS, and you might as well just buy a low-end 1U server with an SSD.

    4. Re:Alternatives to being spied on? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Juniper and Cisco sell software -- throw out their OS, and you might as well just buy a low-end 1U server with an SSD.

      They still sell hardware but it's becoming more of a software game. The person who came up with this thread is an idiot. The NSA and major infrastructure use these same routers. Network folks aren't idiots and exploits/bugs are normally found pretty quickly and exposed/corrected.

    5. Re:Alternatives to being spied on? by unixisc · · Score: 1

      I wasn't thinking of a /48. I was thinking of a x64 only, but shared b/w several people on the same subnet. Like in an apartment complex, or classroom, or some such area - maybe even tethered to one of the nodes. If you maintained no logs, just put the onus on them to demonstrate in court that whoever is accused of doing something criminal is actually the one doing something criminal.

      This of course assumes that one wants to defy the authorities, and contest the constitutionality of what they are doing in court. Otherwise, they could just buy the compromised routers and not bother

    6. Re:Alternatives to being spied on? by unixisc · · Score: 1

      So if you are buying a Layer 3 switch - say a router w/ 24 ports, how is it any similar to a rackmount server? Which PC vendor would make a PC which one can repurpose for such a router? In other words, a PC w/ 24 Ethernet ports on the back? It's the hardware that one buys, and if one can replace the OS w/ an FOSS router OS such as pFsense or OpenWRT, one should be good to go. Or else, what am I missing here?

    7. Re:Alternatives to being spied on? by unixisc · · Score: 1

      But if there are backdoors that the NSA want and got the likes of Cisco or Juniper to put in there, can they be legally removed? I'm imagine no, and that by keeping the OS closed sourced, Cisco & Juniper avoid getting into that minefield of what happens if a customer discovers & removes it. Whereas swap the OS w/ an FOSS management tool, and it's out of the control of Cisco, Juniper, and the Feds.

  34. Want to be 100% safe? Then forget the Internet. by kheldan · · Score: 2

    The only way to obtain 100% safety from being hacked by a government agency, as well as anyone else, is to place an air gap between your system(s) and the public Internet. Think of it like trying to protect your house from burglars breaking in: The best you can do is slow them down. Given enough time, skill, and resources, any burglar can defeat any security arrangement in any house. Same goes for your computers. Therefore there is an implied level of risk involved if you wish to continue using the internet, and if you cannot accept that risk, even after taking reasonable precautions against your system(s) being compromised by whoever might wish to, then you must re-evaluate whether or not it's worth it to you to continue using the internet at all. Now, some people are going to flame me for saying this, because they're convinced that life cannot continue without internet access, but that's simply not true, just ask anyone who was an adult about 25 years ago how they managed to get along without the World Wide Web (hint: they got along just fine without it).

    --
    Are YOU using the TOOL, or is the TOOL using YOU? Think about it!
  35. No trust by manu0601 · · Score: 1

    I do not trust commercial routers, not because of NSA-weakened crypto, but because of plain old security holes like unclosed developper backdoors or web administrative interface full of CRSF vulnerabilities

    I use a Soerkis box with a PCI DSL board, and I run NetBSD on it

  36. Do you trust the code? by tbshmkr · · Score: 1

    The question is can you trust the algorithms/OS used in the routers. If you build your own router/firewall, will you be sure there is no backdoor built into the code?

  37. Open Source Routers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    There are any number of Open Source router projects to replace proprietary router software with a Linux or BSD system on your own router hardware. OpenWRT and others. For home or small business it may well be a fair idea if you are upset by the RSA fiasco or don't trust venders. Of course its more work, and not for those scared of such projects. I lnow little about them except some projects seem to have been around a decade or more.

  38. If you can't get the builders to give you a back d by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    then change the list of people who are building it into a list of people who will back door it for you. Simple as that. Not everyone can be bought for a price, but there is enough people who can be bought for a price to buy it for a price.

  39. Nothing by tpstigers · · Score: 1

    There is no privacy on the Internet. Never has been.

  40. DDWRT by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I installed above on a router a few months ago - never looked back. Not that I sought it out, but my local thrift store has TONS of WRT whatever purple and green routers that run DDWRT no questions, and my crappy Cisco router was crappy. No signal outside the house, constant reboots required, UPnP that was subpar. The new router is good because I could look at the firmware source if I wanted to, but I can trust the community too. With the net gear BS I couldn't look at either.

  41. Timothy and Ask Slashdot by Fnord666 · · Score: 1

    Timothy, Timothy, Timothy. When will you ever learn? "Ask Slashdot" posts belong in the "Ask Slashdot" section so that those of us who choose to filter out those stories can do so. It doesn't work though if you keep posting "Ask Slashdot" stories in other sections.

    --
    'The tyrant will always find pretext for his tyranny.' - Aesop's Fables
  42. "Trust no one." by antdude · · Score: 1

    According to Fox Mulder from The X-Files. ;)

    --
    Ant(Dude) @ Quality Foraged Links (AQFL.net) & The Ant Farm (antfarm.ma.cx / antfarm.home.dhs.org).
  43. No by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Tighten your tinfoil hats.

  44. Now now ... by golodh · · Score: 1
    Don't be uncharitable towards the NSA! They're as unhappy as you are this all got out.

    They took every precaution to prevent the world from learning about this sort of thing. If they'd had their way, nobody would know or suspect and everything would be fine.

    If you want to blame anyone for having all this come out, blame that tattletale contractor guy with the big usb sticks.

  45. only one answer to this by ihtoit · · Score: 1

    end-to-end encryption with a key pair. Doesn't matter what the carrier looks like at this point. It could be a fucking pigeon.

    That is all.

    --
    Political debates have me rolling my eyes so much I think I got optical whiplash. I should sue. - Foamy The Squirrel
  46. you mean... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    you mean those usually beta/alpha firmwares who often can barely run without incurring in problems, and that don't get security update for well over 6-12 months on certain platforms becaus... whell, they're beta?

  47. Parent Link is Awesome by jlb.think · · Score: 1

    That is by far the most interesting bit of information I've read in a long time. Awesome sir.

  48. No, don't go offline ! by Taco+Cowboy · · Score: 2

    Go offline.

    If you do that they win !

    Internet is a threat to them. Internet is the one thing that can expose their evil deeds.

    If there was no Internet, Edward Snowden's revelation will never get known to many of us.

    The obvious answer is FPGA routers, made with fully open-sourced VHDL files.

    --
    Muchas Gracias, Señor Edward Snowden !
    1. Re:No, don't go offline ! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And I thought an obvious answer was some cheap, low power system to act as your NAS and router. But this requires know-how.

      The revelations you speak of, were brought to me by the press, not the internet. The internet is responsible for things like infowars.com, yet no one listens to them. When they were warning over a decade ago that backscatter xray scanners were being tested in US prisons and that they will be deployed onto airports and all public spaces under some pretext, no one listened, and look what happened.

  49. depends on what you're protecting by a2wflc · · Score: 1

    The front door on my house works great for me. A bank wouldn't want to use it to protect their vault.

    My router does fine for me. I'd like my politicians, and boss, and many other people who's decisions & actions affect me to be better protected than I am, but I can't build a custom router for them.

  50. But if... by leuk_he · · Score: 1

    I you can roll your own machine from scratch that is fine.

    If however you hire some specailiast to make the machine, and he uses of the shelf components then you have added 2 modes of attack.

    example: Snowden was hired by the NSA to increase the internal security of the NSA.

  51. It's one thing or another... by wjcofkc · · Score: 1

    If it's not fear of NSA snooping, it's the occasional revelation that an enterprise class router has a simple root level access username and password hard coded into it, or it's a near perfect knock-off from China with who knows what going on. The question is: were we ever able to trust commercial routers? The answer is no.

    --
    Brought to you by Carl's Junior.
  52. Router issues by Miamicanes · · Score: 1

    Going off slightly onto a diagonal tangent, but relevant due to Christmas shopping and the annual agony of trying to pick a new router before giving up in disgust... is there actually such a thing as a high-end router that DOESN'T seem to have page after page of 4- and 5-star reviews, sprinkled with 5-10% of 1-star reviews, and a pattern something like...

    ***** Awesome! Kicks ass! The greatest router I've ever had! Problem free, works flawlessly, and perfect in every way. {technical details}.

    * Total garbage. Pure shit. 5GHz connections dropped after a day, and the router had to be rebooted to fix it.

    ***** (another overwhelmingly-positive review)

    * Worked like a champ for {3-9 months}, then crapped out and left me in misery until I finally gave up and bought a new one.

    ***** (another positive review claiming it's a gift from ${deity})

    * Junk. 2.5GHz works for 3 hours, then the router forgets how to route traffic between wireless and wired. 5GHz doesn't work reliably with Apple devices, and works reliably with Android devices only if you remove the network, reboot the phone, then add it as a new network.

    * Terrible range and speed. I connected to this AP with my laptop from 5 feet away, and got barely 1mbps on an unused 5GHz channel. I disconnected it, reconnected my old $49 access point, and benchmarked 36mbps. WTF?!? ... and so on. Case in point: just about every dual-band 3-antenna router from ASUS, Netgear, Linksys, and Buffalo router that costs more than $150.

    As far as I can tell, it basically comes down to:

    * None of them have adequate heat-removal, especially if they're in a closet or cabinet of any kind. The electrolytic capacitor plague continues unabated 15 years later.

    * Poor antenna impedance-matching, so RF gets reflected back into the radio module and progressively damages it.

    * RF modules have real limits that nobody ever talks about, and certain permutations of features that just can't work, but because nobody from the manufacturer will ever come out and identify what those precise constraints are, end users are left to randomly flail about and wonder why certain things just don't work.

    * Crap component quality pushed to the absolute limit of its design capabilities, then pushed 5% further, and guaranteed to fail eventually.

    * Zero quality control besides "could we power it up enough to flash it"?

  53. Safe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    No one is going to break into an air gap computer in a Faraday cage.

  54. Douglas Adams by gd2shoe · · Score: 1
    --
    I won't join Slashcott. OTOH, If Beta goes live, I just won't be back until it's fixed. Sorry Dice.
  55. Nein by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    http://scherbius2014.de/EDVstattIT.html

  56. You were saying? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/Silicon_scan_draft.pdf

  57. ROTFL by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Yes, seriously - I am rolling on the floor laughing at this!

  58. Screw the VHDL... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    What makes you think the silicon isn't backdoored? http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/05/29/silicon_backdoor/

  59. Binar by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Are you sure? I assume that, given the case that a gun is involved, the probability that one of the concerned persons will not survive is much greather than 0.01% and so no information transfer will take place.

  60. Which requires... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Which requires a trusted third party toolchain to generate the various bits of magic needed by the FPGA. And you have to trust your FPGA manufacturer didn't embed a small SoC that has hooks into the dedicated ethernet MACs embedded in there.

  61. Homebrew router = up-to-date by phorm · · Score: 1

    With homebrew, at least you can make sure it's as up-to-date as possible. Some of the ISP gear is *OLD* and there's no guarantee that your ISP is pushing out any sort of regular security updates (or that they're even provided by the manufacturer).

  62. No, you don't have to trust the NIC by Burz · · Score: 1

    See http://qubes-os.org/trac/wiki/QubesArchitecture

    Computers can be operated such that all networking components starting at the NIC and ending at the (entire) remote system are untrusted. In an OS like Qubes, the NIC and IP stack are operated in their own untrusted VM running from a read-only template.

    It works great!

    Then, of course, there are the tools you can use to enhance privacy and trust: Tor and I2P use onion routing and use addresses that are verified with crypto. Where I2P improves over Tor is in the former's abilities as a general purpose transport, and its P2P spin (lack of centralization) on onion routing.

    When the privacy tools are not application-specific, there is better potential for consistent utilization and for thwarting attacks.