Backdoor Discovered Into Seagate NAS Drives

Mark Wilson writes: If you have not recently updated the firmware for your Seagate wireless NAS drives, now is the time to do so. Researchers at Tangible Security have discovered a series of vulnerabilities in a number of devices produced by Seagate that could allow unauthorized access to files and settings. An undocumented Telnet feature could be used to gain control of the device by using the username 'root' and the hardcoded default password. There are also other vulnerabilities that allow for unauthorized browsing and downloading of files, as well as permitting malicious files to be uploaded. Tangible Security says that Seagate Wireless Plus Mobile Storage, Seagate Wireless Mobile Storage, and LaCie FUEL drives are affected, but there may also be others. The security issues are confirmed to exist with firmware versions 2.2.0.005 to 2.3.0.014.

Comments

Backdoor Discovered Into Seagate NAS Drives

[nickweller]

Who wrote the code. What explanation do they have for inserting such features in a supposedly secure storage device. Is there a more sinister explanation for this?

Re:Backdoor Discovered Into Seagate NAS Drives

[AmiMoJo]

As much as I love a good NSA/GCHQ conspiracy theory, I think this one is most likely just incompetence. Their NAS boxes run Linux, and telnet is really useful for debugging headless machines during development. Someone either forgot to turn it off before shipping or just assumed that because they changed the default port no-one would find it.

Let me guess

[Anonymous Coward]

Closed-source firmware?

My gosh

[execthis]

My gosh, you would think in this day and age that firmware developers would know better than this. Hard-coded telnet passwords? Seriously?

Telnet?!

[maugle]

Seriously, who uses telnet instead of ssh in this day and age? I think we're at the point where including telnet - even optionally - in any Internet-facing device should be classified as a malicious act.

Re: Telnet?!

[cbiltcliffe]

SSH has many advantages besides encryption. Passwordless login, tunnelling, etc.

Re: Telnet?!

[rahvin112]

One of the most important aspects of securing your systems is to layer the security, so that if a zero day is used and the black hat gets access to something they don't automatically get access to everything else. This is simple things like not using the same password on every computer, and even simpler things like not using insecure protocols on your network, even on the internal side.

There is simply no reason whatsoever to use telnet even internally. SSH does everything telnet does, it doesn't cost more, it isn't harder to use, it's not more difficult to deploy and above all it adds an extra layer to the security.

Using telnet, even internally is just bad practice and frankly means you aren't very smart. I agree with the parent poster, using telnet in this day and age should be considered a deliberate malicious act by a manufacturer and an indication of stupidity on the part of any admin.

Wrong response

[Anonymous Coward]

When a company's firmware is backdoored, you don't just download the patch and hope they won't do it again. You buy from somewhere else.

Re:Wrong response

[AmiMoJo]

Consumer laws need to catch up. This kind of vulnerability should be considered a fatal design defect and result in a recall of the affected products, with a full cash refund.

Mix-match vendors and layer your security

[rtkluttz]

Its pretty much come down to the fact that all corporations are working against the consumers. The best we can hope for is to mix and match vendors and layer our security and don't use cloud based shit. Use open source firewalls and control your outbound ports not just incoming ports.

Stop trusting these dickheads people.

Yet another reason not to buy Seagate...

[Drakonblayde]

On the other hand, anyone who expects a hard drive in a cheap enclosure that offers network services to have a focus on security is a little whacko. If you're serious about network storage, you buy bare drives and put them in something like a Synology, QNAP, or Drobo. I stopped buying external drives with embedded software that I couldn't wipe awhile ago. RIght now, the only external drives I use are WD Elements because they provide what I'm looking for in an external drive - storage on a USB cable and nothing else

Hilarious extract from website

[Tokolosh]

From CERT website, with prominent NSA logo (https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/903500):

"Tangible Security would also like to publically thank Seagate for their cooperation and desire to make their products and customers more secure."

Not a backdoor

[javispedro]

This is not a backdoor.

• It is not undocumented. It uses Arago, an actually open GNU/Linux distribution as firmware (so it is more open source than your average android device!), and the ability to root it via telnet has been available since day 1, with a widely known password.
• It is not remote, since to access it you need to join the NAS WLAN, and for that you need to passphrase created by the user. If you've managed to guess the passphrase/break that layer, then you've already crossed the airtight hatchway: at that point you can already view all the files on the disk, install adware, viruses, etc.
• This was being used by plenty of people to install custom Linux distributions such as Debian or Arch on relatively inexpensive hardware. There's even a user focused distribution for the device

Basically, another group of security ``researchers'' (use of quotes intentional) manage to force a company making a relatively open embedded product to close it down for tinkerers, while not improving the security of the product at all.

I hate this world.