Backdoor Discovered Into Seagate NAS Drives
Mark Wilson writes: If you have not recently updated the firmware for your Seagate wireless NAS drives, now is the time to do so. Researchers at Tangible Security have discovered a series of vulnerabilities in a number of devices produced by Seagate that could allow unauthorized access to files and settings. An undocumented Telnet feature could be used to gain control of the device by using the username 'root' and the hardcoded default password. There are also other vulnerabilities that allow for unauthorized browsing and downloading of files, as well as permitting malicious files to be uploaded. Tangible Security says that Seagate Wireless Plus Mobile Storage, Seagate Wireless Mobile Storage, and LaCie FUEL drives are affected, but there may also be others. The security issues are confirmed to exist with firmware versions 2.2.0.005 to 2.3.0.014.
Who wrote the code. What explanation do they have for inserting such features in a supposedly secure storage device. Is there a more sinister explanation for this?
Closed-source firmware?
My gosh, you would think in this day and age that firmware developers would know better than this. Hard-coded telnet passwords? Seriously?
Seriously, who uses telnet instead of ssh in this day and age? I think we're at the point where including telnet - even optionally - in any Internet-facing device should be classified as a malicious act.
When a company's firmware is backdoored, you don't just download the patch and hope they won't do it again. You buy from somewhere else.
On the other hand, anyone who expects a hard drive in a cheap enclosure that offers network services to have a focus on security is a little whacko. If you're serious about network storage, you buy bare drives and put them in something like a Synology, QNAP, or Drobo. I stopped buying external drives with embedded software that I couldn't wipe awhile ago. RIght now, the only external drives I use are WD Elements because they provide what I'm looking for in an external drive - storage on a USB cable and nothing else
Basically, another group of security ``researchers'' (use of quotes intentional) manage to force a company making a relatively open embedded product to close it down for tinkerers, while not improving the security of the product at all.
I hate this world.