DoJ Says Apple's Posture on iPhone Unlocking Is Just Marketing (reuters.com)

New submitter kruug writes: The U.S. Department of Justice filed a motion seeking to compel Apple Inc to comply with a judge's order for the company to unlock the iPhone belonging to one of the San Bernardino shooters, portraying the tech giant's refusal as a 'marketing strategy.' The filing escalated a showdown between the Obama administration and Silicon Valley over security and privacy that ignited earlier this week. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is seeking the tech giant's help to access the shooter's phone, which is encrypted. The company so far has pushed back, and on Thursday won three extra days to respond to the order. Reader Lauren Weinstein writes of this tack: "The level of DOJ disingenuousness in play is simply staggering."

Comments

Apple - standing alone

[Swampash]

Assume that every other hardware manufacturer that is NOT getting threatened by the Federal Government has already rolled over.

Tim Cook: thank you. All you other bitches: FOAD.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[imgod2u]

That's actually exactly what Apple is saying and it's true: they can't access the encrypted data because they don't have the key.

What the FBI wants is for Apple to develop a hacked version of iOS that can be loaded onto the phone and allow external inputs to try different user unlock PINs as well as get rid of both the 10-attempts limit as well as the time-between-tries limit.

Obviously the existence of such a hack -- as well as the ability to load a locked phone with it -- is a dangerous tool that can be used on any iPhone. Apple isn't just refusing to hand such a thing over, they're refusing to even develop (or at the very least, acknowledge the existence of) such a hack. Thus discouraging any hackers from going "shit, it can be done, let's find out how!".

Re:Apple - standing alone

[MikeMo]

That's not the deal at all. Apple can't decrypt it. The FBI wants them to remove the safety measure where the phone will discard the encryption key altogether after 10 failed attempts at guessing the passcode.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[__aaclcg7560]

The fact that Apple can somehow push software onto an existing iPhone that allows the federal government to decrypt the data on that phone without the key seems like a fundamental flaw in iOS.

That's the FBI's position. Apple says it can't be done.

Re: Apple - standing alone

[Midnight Thunder]

If the OS is able to operate, then there must be a zone where encryption is not active, otherwise how does it boot without an entered key? The only part that would be encrypted is with user data. If this is the case, then I suspect they could disable the 10 try functionality., if push came to shove.

Whether or not you agree with the DoJ or Apple, there is certainly a precedent which is going to be set here. The discussion and implications are going to be interesting.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

That's the FBI's position. Apple says it can't be done.

That simply isn't true. Apple is facing a specific order to decrypt a specific iPhone in a specific legal case. If this can't be done, there is nothing for Apple to fight, because the court order only applies to this phone. The fact that Apple is fighting this order and is saying that they are refusing to develop an unlock tool implies that they believe it can be done but are simply refusing to do it.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

That's not the deal at all. Apple can't decrypt it. The FBI wants them to remove the safety measure where the phone will discard the encryption key altogether after 10 failed attempts at guessing the passcode.

Yes, that is likely what this is about (see my other posting). And if they can push a software update with this safety feature to an existing phone without the user unlocking it first, then Apple's software is not secure. That's exactly my point.

That is, Apple is right that such an update would make future iOS devices much less secure, but what this whole spat reveals is that the current system is already not secure precisely because governments can make demands like the US government is making. That is, the fact that we're even having this debate is due to a bad implementation of cryptography on Apple iOS.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

What the FBI wants is for Apple to develop a hacked version of iOS that can be loaded onto the phone and allow external inputs to try different user unlock PINs as well as get rid of both the 10-attempts limit as well as the time-between-tries limit.

Yes, that is probably what the FBI wants. My point is that if Apple can push such a software update to an existing phone without the user unlocking the device first, then iOS cryptography is broken already. And that is likely the case, because if Apple couldn't push such an update to an existing phone without unlocking it first, then it would make no sense for the court to try to force them to develop such an update, since the court can only order Apple to develop such a tool for a specific case, not for future cases that aren't before the court yet.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[sribe]

That's the FBI's position. Apple says it can't be done.

They have NEVER said it cannot be done. In fact, they have quite loudly acknowledged that it can be done. Their position is that a) such a version of iOS does not currently exist and b) to create that special version and load it onto an iPhone most certainly does not fall within the law's definition of "not burdensome".

Re:Apple - standing alone

[__aaclcg7560]

Apple is facing a specific order to decrypt a specific iPhone in a specific legal case.

Apple has previously cooperated with warrants to unlock iPhones for the authorities, but that was before they changed the encryption method to better protect user data hackers and spies. If Apple develops an unlock tool for this specific case, what prevents it from being used for every legal case in the future?

I like the idea that no one — not even the government — can browse through the encrypted data on my iPhone. The Founding Fathers used encryption to protect their own communications from the British government. In fact, under some bills being considered by various national governments today, they would have gone to prison for using encryption technology.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Ken D]

Yes, It should be a requirement that a phone be unlocked before an update is applied.

Although there could be an option to update *and wipe* which would be equivalent to hard reset and update.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

> My point is that if Apple can push such a software update to an existing phone without the user unlocking the device first, then iOS cryptography is broken already.

You should look a bit more into it.

First, if we are talking CRYPTO, lets be real: a 4 digit passcode is triival to brute force. I don't care WHAT you use- Twofish/AES/Serpent in Veracrypt, I will absolutely break your 4 digit passcode in moments. Because it's a fucking FOUR DIGIT PASSCODE.

So, how does Apple try to secure this? The only way it can- with hardware. The crypto is 128 bit AES, so they aren't trying to attack that. Later versions of the iphone have secure hardware implement this sort of logic. The version in question actually IS less secure- it has software that does the task of the wiping. Apple is refusing to build and cryptographically sign software that will do it.

There's no cryptographic way to secure a 4 digit passcode, or a 6 digit passcode. It's physically impossible. Hence the use of hardware. If you have a serious crypto passphrase on your iphone- and you absolutely can- then the only way in is through the crypto, either the AES or the PBKDF2. It's not as strong as AES 256 XTS (because it is AES 128 XTS), but it is still considered unbreakable.

So don't talk shit about their crypto if their crypto isn't even up for debate. This is about a software workaround possible on an older model to brute force requests into the hardware that is expected to defend a 4 digit passcode against repeated attempts. The crypto isn't even in the conversation.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

Again, the current system is secure if you trust the math only by using a crypto secure passphrase. If you don't, you MUST be trusting the hardware or software to guard against the brute force- really the wimp force, because 10k trials is nothing.

You can set up an alphanumeric passphrase of massive length under settings. Then you are secure against brute force no matter what, same as if you used it as your Veracrypt passphrase.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

Again, the current system is secure if you trust the math only by using a crypto secure passphrase. If you don't, you MUST be trusting the hardware or software to guard against the brute force- really the wimp force, because 10k trials is nothing.

That is correct. And I'm pointing out that you cannot trust the Apple hardware/software combination. It is fairly easy to design a phone like the iPhone that uses short unlock codes yet still is cryptographically secure with high probability (1:1000 with ten trials and a 4 digit code before the short key fails), but Apple doesn't seem to have designed such a system.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Razed By TV]

His point is that the crypto isn't worth a god damn thing if all you have to do is load custom firmware.
You can have all the crypto that we will develop in the next 1000 years and it doesn't mean a thing if you're backdoored.
Paging Dr. Pedantic, this would suggest that Apple's crypto may as well be considered compromised.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

There's no cryptographic way to secure a 4 digit passcode, or a 6 digit passcode. It's physically impossible.

Look, you don't seem to understand how these systems work. The 4 digit passcode isn't the cryptographic key, it's something that the user can use to identify himself to the phone a limited number of times. The cryptographic key is some long random string that the user likely never sees.

So don't talk shit about their crypto if their crypto isn't even up for debate. This is about a software workaround possible on an older model to brute force requests into the hardware that is expected to defend a 4 digit passcode against repeated attempts. The crypto isn't even in the conversation.

Key management is an essential part of a cryptosystem. In this case, the key is managed via a passcode, and the passcode-based key management is apparently vulnerable to attack. That makes the entire cryptosystem vulnerable.

Really, you are repeatedly stating the obvious and then arbitrarily (in your own personal definition of terms) excluding key management from the components of a secure cryptosystem.

What this comes down to is that iOS cryptography is vulnerable because their key management appears to be vulnerable. That's something people should realize, and it's something that Apple can and should fix.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[sexconker]

There's no cryptographic way to secure a 4 digit passcode, or a 6 digit passcode. It's physically impossible.

Store hash.
Hash function can be anything, including XOR with some other value.
Good luck!

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

If Apple develops an unlock tool for this specific case, what prevents it from being used for every legal case in the future?

My point is: such a tool should be impossible to develop in principle. The fact that such a tool can be written and Apple simply refuses to write it tells you that there must be some security flaw somewhere in iOS, at least on the phone model in question.

I like the idea that no one — not even the government — can browse through the encrypted data on my iPhone.

Me too. Which is why I think it is worth pointing out that iOS seems to have an intrinsic security flaw, and that the only thing standing between you and the government is Apple's lack of cooperation with the government. I guarantee you, that won't last.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[mysidia]

There's no cryptographic way to secure a 4 digit passcode, or a 6 digit passcode. It's physically impossible.

You could use a key derived from a PBKDF2 hash with such a high number of rounds that it requires 6 hours to unlock the device, after you typed in the correct passcode.

You'll cache a "shortcut" in a special memory circuit that will reduce the time to 10 seconds to unlock, But during a firmware update that changes certain bits, the shortcut will be purged from RAM, after the update, but before the updated firmware starts executing.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[c]

If Apple develops an unlock tool for this specific case, what prevents it from being used for every legal case in the future?

Presumably Apple would get tired of that business and redesign their phones to block that entire class of backdoor attacks. No firmware updates on a locked phone. It might suck for those consumers who actually do forget their passcodes, but at least they'll have security. It wouldn't surprise me if the iPhone 7 team has recently seen some changes to the security specs...

The only way for the FBI to win this in the long run is my making it illegal to manufacture "unhackable" devices.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ljw1004]

Obviously the existence of such a hack -- as well as the ability to load a locked phone with it -- is a dangerous tool that can be used on any iPhone.

That's not true. The deal is: apparently any firmware signed with Apple's key can be loaded onto the phone. The FBI is asking Apple to write a firmware which (1) is tied to this particular phone, (2) is signed by Apple's key, (3) allows rapid and repeated unlock attempts. The FBI is happy for Apple itself to load this firmware onto the phone.

This modified firmware wouldn't be usable on any iPhone because it would contain a check "if (PhysicalPhoneID != hardcoded_constant) abort;". The firmware couldn't be hacked to change the hardcoded constant because doing so would invalidate Apple's key-signing of the firmware blob.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[mark-t]

....since it is, in fact, possible

Do you have any proof of that?

Re:Apple - standing alone

[phantomfive]

It can be broken by trying every possible 4 digit passcode

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Jane Q. Public]

Sure. Now explain how to get that firmware onto a locked phone.

If Apple can do that, then indeed the crypto is compromised. If they can't, it's not.

Android requires user intervention (therefore, unlocked phone) before an OS update.

Re: Apple - standing alone

[ljw1004]

The court order suggested Apple to use "iPhone DFU mode". It's the standard existing way to update firmware on a bricked phone. It doesn't boot the phone's OS, doesn't power up the screen, nothing. It's the iphone's built-in last-ditch way for updating the phone's firmware when the phone us (for whatever reason) unusable.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Rutulian]

My point is that if Apple can push such a software update to an existing phone without the user unlocking the device first, then iOS cryptography is broken already.

It's not about pushing an update to the phone (which does require the phone be unlocked), it is about using the firmware loader to flash itself, much like the way you can flash the BIOS on any PC if you have physical access (yes, even if a BIOS password has been set). The only feasible way to secure this is to encypt the loader itself and design a second loader that unencrypts the update loader, but it is not clear whether this level of complexity is allowed by the chip logic.

No, the real problem, that is not Apple's, is that the pin passcodes are trivially brute-forceable. If you really care about security, you have to guard against brute-force attacks, which you do by using a long alphanumeric password, not a pin code. Apple has done a great thing by trying to mitigate the brute-force vulnerability with their software lockout policy, but there is only so much they can do. There are only three ways out of Apple's current situation: 1) make the firmware completely unflashable, which is not desirable for a number of obvious reasons, 2) make the brute-force limiting rules in hardware instead of software, but then they wouldn't be configurable by the user, 3) eliminate the pin passcode and allow only alphanumeric passwords, which is probably the best option all things considered. But Apple doesn't actually need to force it. They just need to make it clear that security is not guaranteed with a pin passcode.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[INT_QRK]

Yes! Look, I'm fully aware that I don't have the facts. The reporting, in fact, this article and every other press account that I've seen, is just incomplete, incoherent, and confusing. However, my assumptions based on what I think I understand from what I've gleaned from said crappy reporting is that (a) the phone's data being sought by the FBI were encrypted with a private key (in the form of the phone's password) known, presumably and reasonably, only to the dead murderer; (b) Apple doesn't have said password (its hash, maybe, for what it's worth); yet, FBI is demanding that Apple, who again doesn't have the private key, decrypt the data. Whisky Tango Foxtrot? Suppose Apply is using a known good encryption algorithm effectively implemented. Don't know what that might be, but suppose, for example, something like AES (128, 256, 1024?). Maybe Apple really can't decrypt it without the private key. If NIST isn't totally lying, AES 1024, for example, well implemented, is presumed extremely difficult to brute force (like NP Hard?). Are my assumptions off? How can the government legally compel the (near) impossible? What is the legal precedent for compelling the impossible? Can a judge order that I defy gravity, for example, and throw me in jail if I don't comply?

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Aighearach]

Firmware isn't "tied to a specific phone" that is just imaginary thinking that the prosecutor inserted into the request to make it sound better.

Apple firmware is not customized per-user, it is not made-to-order, a firmware file signed with Apple's key can be run on any phone with the right version numbers.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ljw1004]

Please don't spread misinformation. This is a delicate case, and if the privacy-respecting tech community build their arguments on wrong assumptions then our case will fall over by default.

Firmware isn't "tied to a specific phone" that is just imaginary thinking that the prosecutor inserted into the request to make it sound better.

Apple firmware is not customized per-user, it is not made-to-order, a firmware file signed with Apple's key can be run on any phone with the right version numbers.

That's wrong. Firmware is just a piece of software. The court order asks, and Apple can technically accomplish, for a custom written piece of firmware which contains an IF check: "IF this phone doesn't have the correct hardware ID then crash. IF it does have the correct ID, then proceed with something that will allow brute-forcing the PIN".

Are you saying it is technically impossible for Apple to produce a build of their firmware that is customized in this way? I don't know how or why you'd come up with that position. Firmware is just software, and can have custom builds, and those custom builds can have custom checks.

Re: Apple - standing alone

[n0creativity]

Apparently you should be appalled at your own lack of knowledge... Apple can, most certainly, force an update on the phone without user interaction. Every carrier can do this to any smart phone in their catalog. If someone, ie the NSA/CIA/FBI/etc, can use your phone to track/listen to/etc you even when it's off (but battery is in), then you would have to be a complete imbecile to believe that they can't push a simplw software upgrade while the phone is locked. The path that the DOJ is on here is so blatantly dangerous. If they can force apple to customize their software for this one edge case, then I can only imagine the privacy-raping ideas that they'll come up with next under the guise of "Terrorism!", "National Security!", or my all-time favorite "Think of the children!". I am not an apple fan. Quite the opposite, actually, but I applaud Apple for their stance on this. Even if it is slightly motivated by marketing or PR. Apple needs to stand their ground on this and fight with everything they can. Allowing this to happen would have such a devastating effect on privacy in this country. Without freedom, there is nothing worth protecting and without privacy, we have no true freedom.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[KGIII]

The hackers, probably even professional ones who are employed at the nation-state level and have incredible resources to throw at it, are already far from discouraged, regardless of what Apple has to say on the subject. This is not going to dissuade the adept, resourced, and inventive. This is going to be seen as a challenge and a matter of pride as well as a security matter or advantage to some subset of these people. Nobody is dissuaded because of this, this invites the exact type of people who are keen on doing so and have the means to actually act on it - with varied levels of success, of course.

So, I don't think it's gonna impact that. All "hackers" aren't criminals and inept script kiddies and there are some adept hardware hackers with vast amounts of resources available. The very best of the best will see that if they can do this, they are famous for life. They may be reviled by some, but they'll be famous. I think responsible disclosure for such a find would be to put it out in the public immediately. That's not the kind of tool you want to leave restricted to one. Fuck the consequences - if we all know about it then none of us are fooled. That would be the responsible way to do it and ensure that they're well funded, paid huge speaking fees, and able to work as a consultant for any price they want to name.

No, nobody is dissuaded at all by this. This is not a statement about their possibility of success. I am not smart enough to know if it can or can not be done. I am not an authority and not qualified to opine. The only real point is that there's not much more attention than that phone has right now in the eyes of the capable hackers. They are focused on it with a laser-like-focus.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Aighearach]

You accuse me of "misinformation," I'm throwing down the gauntlet on that! You're a liar to accuse me of that. If you disagree, disagree, don't make a false accusation.

You accuse me of "misinformation," and then you verify my statement! As you said, "firmware is just a piece of software." Right. Is a piece of software tied to one computer, or can it also be run on other computers? Is that indeed part of the nature of software?

You're saying that you believe that adding an ID check to the software source code somehow locks it so that it can only be used with one device. I'm a software developer, and I say you're full of shit and don't even realize that software can be easily altered later to work with a different ID. There is no way to "lock" it so that can't happen. Even if it is a compiled binary file, it is easy to find and replace the ID because they already know the ID of the phone it would be written for.

Don't claim I'm "spreading misinformation" when you don't even understand the details. Yes, I am saying it is "technically impossible" for Apple to write firmware that is locked to one device, because of the very nature of what software is. The only way that a piece of software can be locked to one device is if that device has a custom CPU and there are no other devices that can run the code. But iPhones don't come with individually customized processors, all the phones of the same model have the same processor and can indeed run each other's firmware.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[KGIII]

If we want to be pedantic, and technically correct, we should probably say that the security is compromised. I'd say that the crypto still fine, in and of itself, really - so much as the implementation of it or, in this case, a broader sense that is "security" has been reduced. At least I'm pretty sure of this? The crypto is still sound, the math is still fine. The implementation has been worked around and the security is lessened accordingly. If that makes more sense...

Re:Apple - standing alone

[sexconker]

You have no way of knowing which code is correct.
There's a difference between securing the pass code and using that pass code as a key to encrypt data.

It is trivial to secure the pass code perfectly. Securing data with the pass code is trivial as well if the clear text is unknown to the attacker. See one time pads. If some portion of the clear text is known to the attacker, then that helps them. Otherwise, it's literally impossible because you make up any damned thing you want with a simple XOR of some pad.

Re: Apple - standing alone

[n0creativity]

Not quite. The user data is encrypted with a key that is, itself, encrypted with a couple of unique pieces of data, one of which is the pin code to unlock the phone. Since the pin code provides a limited unique key space, it would be extremely easy and fast to use brute force to guess the pin. Currently iOS prevents this by limiting incorrect pin attempts to 10 before it deletes the key that encrypted the users data. This is what the FBI wants help with. The FBI is trying to get Apple to push a special version of iOS software to JUST that phone that would allow them to have unlimited attempts at guessing the pin code and allow them to do it programmatically. This would make it a matter of seconds or minutes for the FBI to guess the correct pin which would in turn allow them to access the encryption key that is protecting the user data. I pray to every god known to mankind that Apple fights this until the DOJ gives up or is bitch slapped back into place by someone with the power and the intelligence to see how overreaching and dangerous this step would be.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[KGIII]

On a broader scale, it can mean that this is true not just for this specific model but to extend to other models and products. If we're going to argue a slippery slope (but not always a fallacy) then we could reason that it would become easier to have done to other things - like other model phones or, perhaps, to other compute devices that are ostensibly in our control. From there, it's a step in name only if they declare such devices illegal. I do not think that's actually a logical fallacy but is a realistic potential.

Basically, the private enterprise has provided something for the masses that allows a modicum of privacy and security and the government is seeking a way to justify giving a court order to circumvent that process. I am not really sure that this sets a precedent that is good. On a broader scale, does it outweigh the potential harm to society as a whole? To that, I say no. I say this does set a bad precedent and the technical merits are insignificant.

I do not care how bad these people were nor how much harm they committed. I do not care that more harm may be had in the future. I can think of no realistic risk that would make me compromise on this. I applaud Apple for their stance. Regardless of the technical merit, this is a bad precedent and one that should not stand. This is happening, oddly enough, at a time when we've got a fucked Supreme Court...

Note: Verbiage specific and intentional.

Re: Apple - standing alone

[Anonymous Coward]

Unless you've set the setting to wipe everything after 10 unsuccessful attempts.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[KGIII]

It is not a difference without distinction to say that there's a difference between a warrant and a court order. This is a court order, a writ I think is one way of referring to it, and is entirely different than the warrants that are issued by the courts. There are several definitions (or usages) for the term 'warrant.' This is not a warrant, however. It's an order. As such, the powers of which are constrained by different amendments. It does have some interesting precedent aspects that need to be weighed while disregarding emotions. This is, I feel, an appropriate action for Apple to be taking and a just time to stand against an order.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[phantomfive]

You have no way of knowing which code is correct.

The OS knows, so you can use the same method it uses.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[KGIII]

The only way for the FBI to win this in the long run is my [sic] making it illegal to manufacture "unhackable" devices.

If this is acted on, if they are forced to do so, then is that next step (the law that you mention) actually a that distant a leap? I think no. I think it is not that big a leap to make and thus I think this court order is a danger. One step back is too many. Unfortunately, we've a society that's lacking in solidarity. We play politics like a combination of a team sport, acting awards, celebrity gossip, yellow journalism, and a ritualized spectator sport.

The odds of us working together to make our voices heard are slightly lower than that of an individual lottery winner. And lest we try to blame someone else, let us realize that we've been failing to uphold our end of the social contract for a very long time. We have been distracted with beer and football (bread and circuses) and scrambling to engage in one-ups-manship, destructive in an additive manner, vengeful, deceitful, dishonest, and corrupt - even when we do get involved. We've become entitled, inattentive, reactionary, and greedy. We've ignored reason and responded to rhetoric. We are ruled by consent.

Speaking of rhetoric, I ask you - what are you going to do about it if it goes that far? Who will you blame for letting it reach that point? I'd submit that if you place that blame on one group of people, you're demonstrating the problem. It is fair, of course, to ask me the same questions. I'll answer honestly, "Fucked if I know. I'm doing anything I can think of."

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Jane Q. Public]

That's pretty much what I meant. Crypto can be compromised without being broken. Or maybe "bypassed" is a better word. I don't know.

There are lots of physical examples. Some makers of safes were so enamored with their high-tech electronic locks they neglected good physical design. One security researcher has posted YouTube videos of his 4-year-old opening some.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Lakitu]

while Apple's doesn't. The fact that Apple can somehow push software onto an existing iPhone that allows the federal government to decrypt the data on that phone without the key seems like a fundamental flaw in iOS.

This is not what's happening here. Apple might be able to push software onto an existing iPhone that allows the federal government to attempt as many PIN unlocks as it wants, without being time-limited or erasing data.

The only fundamental flaw with an iPhone here is anyone thinking that a 4 digit PIN might protect the data on it.

This is both why the FBI is asking Apple to do this and why people should be outraged about the FBI asking Apple to do this.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ljw1004]

You accuse me of "misinformation," I'm throwing down the gauntlet on that! I'm a software developer, and I say you're full of shit and don't even realize that software can be easily altered later to work with a different ID. There is no way to "lock" it so that can't happen. Even if it is a compiled binary file, it is easy to find and replace the ID because they already know the ID of the phone it would be written for.

Gauntlet right back at you. As I said in the GP, the firmware is signed by Apple's cryptographic key. There is no way to easily alter the firmware binary to work with a different phone ID: if you edited the firmware binary to check for a different ID, then the firmware's signature would no longer match, and it couldn't be uploaded to any iPhone. The only people who can ever alter the firmware later to work with a different ID are Apple themselves, by re-signing it after altering it. (or indeed anyone who has somehow obtained the signing key from Apple).

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Aighearach]

Apple's ID isn't per-phone. Signing with that ID allows it to be used with all the iPhones, it doesn't lock it to a device.

Apple doesn't publish technical information about exactly how the firmware signing works. You can't assert details about how much protection is provided. It may be that the phone ID is transmitted unencrypted between the chips, and could be easily changed by a hardware man-in-the-middle.

You made assertions of "misinformation" that you can't back up, and instead of apologizing for going overboard and making person attacks, you just double down and try to defend the accusation. But differences of opinion or analysis are not misinformation; your accusation is not only that you think I'm wrong, but that you think I'm knowingly wrong. That is a serious accusation, and it is obviously false. You should admit you were wrong to make false claims about my motivations, and recognize that I'm presenting a real view that real professionals hold. ;) You're ready to trust something as impossible simply because you didn't find the work-around yet. I believe claims of impossibility require very, very strong proof, and might still be suspect.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[kuzb]

They can push an update, but it won't actually apply until the user agrees to it. You have to be able to sign in to the phone to do that.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[krouic]

No, it can not be easily altered later because it has been signed by Apple. If you alter the binary file to replace the ID, it will not match the signature anymore and will not be allowed to run.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Aighearach]

If you alter the binary file to replace the ID, it will not match the signature anymore and will not be allowed to run.

Maybe. We both know you won't have a citation that explains the actual conditions needed. You fail to recognize that that uncertainty works against you; it precludes the restrictive claims that certain things can't happen. We don't know what conditions are needed to trick that chip on that model to think it is on a different phone.

Can't prove it, can't cite it? Can't believe it secures you.

If this was an open protocol of some sort that is well documented and works the way you imagine, and has no unknown or unexpected attack vectors, then it would be true. But none of those are true. We don't know, and conjecture is not a transparent security audit of the hardware.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[KGIII]

Yeah, I figure it's probably best to be precise in language to avoid confusion and argument. This is a rather nuanced subject with potentially grave consequences. The more clarity and presentation of the root of the problem then the more likely we'll be able to communicate the dangers. The better we can communicate, the more receptive people tend to be. If we present a clear, logical, and accurate portrayal of the concerns then we're more likely to have our views listened to.

It may be futile but it is still worth doing. Of course, it may not be futile. It's important to do everything we can to make sure that any effort is not wasted or actually harmful. At least that's my belief, I'm not seeing any flaws in that belief. I am open to alternative interpretations.

Re: Apple - standing alone

[iapetus]

Yes they do.

The phone in question is not, however, such a device.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[mikael]

http://www.cnet.com/news/how-a...!

http://i.i.cbsi.com/cnwk.1d/i/...

http://www.cnet.com/news/iphon...

http://www.cnet.com/news/iphon...

Re:Apple - standing alone

[serviscope_minor]

I think there is a better way. What you want is some external processor, such as a PIC12F of some sort. You can make that processor responsible for storing and releasing the key when given a pin and trashing it after attempt 10. When a key is requested, the iPhone could simply forward the 4 digit pin to the PIC, and the PIC could reply with either the pin or an error code. You could even give a code for writing on a brand new key, to unbrick a phone.

The nice thing about the 12F is that you can blow the fuses on the flash on a such chips to prevent anything from updating the firmware, but that leaves the 128byte (1024 bit---more than enough for an AES-256 key) EEPROM still usable for storing the encryption key, the pin and the number of unlock attempts. That would give you a self enclosed, non updatable little box for key management. Being such a simple thing, there's no need to have updatable firmware.

It also wouldn't put any restrictions on the main firmware being updated.

This, by the way, is me speculating. I don't know how apple's system works and I'm not a crypto expert. I suspect a lot of care would be needed to avoid side channel attacks from sufficiently determined attackers, though such a system would make it impossible for Apple to do something, or at least put them in a position where they're no moe able to crack it than anyone else.

The cost would not be significant. A COTS general purpose microcontroller costs less than a dollar a pop in medium sized quantities. I'd guess there are actually specific devices out there to do this and anyway, Apple does not buy in medium sized quantities and would have no need to go COTS. Going the non general purpose route, if you were getting serious, you could squeeze it down to a 4 pin package (power, ground, i2c) (actually you could do 3 pin, using a 1 wire bus, but I doubt you'd save space), probably not much larger than 1mm on each side.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[thegarbz]

His point is that the crypto isn't worth a god damn thing if all you have to do is load custom firmware.

You're making the same assumption that everyone else is: That the crypto is broken because the user chose a weak passphrase. The iPhone as well as several other phones allows multiple methods of securing the data, including a 256 character passphrase.

All you need to do is go into the options, set your passphrase and bam you're safe against the brute force attack. This isn't a backdoor at all. My SSH server isn't using weak crypto or a backdoor simply because I don't enforce a 3 login attempt before banning an IP address.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[thegarbz]

What this comes down to is that iOS cryptography is vulnerable because their key management appears to be vulnerable.

Key management isn't vulnerable at all. Only the user's choices make it vulnerable. Just like if I run an SSH server with all the best encryption but the login is "root" and the password is "password", the underlying process isn't weak at all, only the user inputs are.

If you're worried set your unlock key on your phone to a passphrase and use 256 random characters. That choice is yours. If you still think it's insecure, then your can come back and complain about Apple's handling of it. But the reality is you'll come back and complain about how hard it is to access your own phone.

By the way my unlock code is 000000. 6 digit passcodes were enforced by my company. I hate having to type a password in to access my phone. Does that make my phone crptographically insecure? No it just makes me a stupid user with no idea (or maybe no desire) to secure my data.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[c]

If this is acted on, if they are forced to do so, then is that next step (the law that you mention) actually a that distant a leap?

Distant? No. Big? Yes. It's going to come to a head fairly soon, and I haven't the foggiest idea how it'll end. If they wanted to force the game, Apple *could* concede, build a universal iPhone hacking tool, and then immediately and publicly send a copy to the FBI and CC the North Korean, Iranian, Saudi Arabian, Chinese and Russian governments.

Re: Apple - standing alone

[INT_QRK]

Thanks. I finally found an article that explains the issue with detail and clarity, without bias -- on the Reg: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2...

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Hognoxious]

You could certainly write your own bootloader (or whatever the equivalent is) but could you get your new hax0r3d version in there?

Re:Apple - standing alone

[AmiMoJo]

The real issue here is that they can apparently update the firmware of the Secure Enclave. To be secure, that shouldn't be possible. Most secure memory implementations don't allow firmware upgrades, it's burned into ROM and can never change in order to prevent just this kind of attack.

It appears that even newer phones are affected, since updates have changed the delay times between password attempts before.

To the OP, before denouncing other manufacturers, consider that the secure storage in the current Nexus phones and many other devices does not have this flaw.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[AmiMoJo]

They are not a liar, you just don't understand Apple's security model.

Apple requires signed binaries for OS images. Since only Apple has they keys to sign binaries, you can't just use a hex editor to change the ID yourself.

If the FBI plans to do that, they must have stolen Apple's keys. More likely, they plan to simply force Apple to make a new version in every case.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[AmiMoJo]

It wouldn't need to be an update, it could run entirely in RAM and be loaded via the DFU bootloader as the FBI suggests. The bootloader only needs binaries to be signed (or an exploit found), it doesn't need to flash memory to be unlocked with the user's code to run stuff in RAM.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Razed By TV]

How many times do I have to say "His point is that the crypto isn't worth a god damn thing if all you have to do is load custom firmware."

The implementation of crypto is broken if it can be easily bypassed.

Yes, the crypto they are using is great, but the implementation of it is pointless if it is trivial to get around it.

It's like encrypting your harddrive to keep your data safe, while downloading every piece of malware that every banner ad offers you. Works great in theory, but useless in practice. It's an exercise in splitting hairs to talk about how great your crypto is when your system is compromised in short order.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[thegarbz]

The implementation of crypto is broken if it can be easily bypassed.

Yes, the crypto they are using is great, but the implementation of it is pointless if it is trivial to get around it.

I don't think you know what it is they are doing, or exactly what Apple's solution would provide them. I can tell when you use the words "easily bypassed" and "trivial". The ability to bypass the encryption is entirely dependent on the way the user has set this up. This is something that EVERY SINGLE ENCRYPTION SCHEME HAS IN COMMON.

Here's an encrypted string using a standard AES128 algorithm eith ECB:
e2 2f bd 90 28 ed fe c0 75 b3 89 bf 59 4f 7a 2e
a8 36 d3 af 9e b7 b8 bb 0e dd a0 06 24 46 2e ab

Now is it insecure because you have the ability to brute force it? Of course not. What if I told you I was a silly user and only used a single digit as input to the encryption key? Yes it's insecure but again this has NOTHING TO DO WITH THE METHOD OF ENCRYPTION.

The crypto is not easily bypassed by giving someone the ability to brute force the key, and comments like that show a lack of understanding of cryptography.

It's like encrypting your harddrive to keep your data safe, while downloading every piece of malware that every banner ad offers you. Works great in theory, but useless in practice. It's an exercise in splitting hairs to talk about how great your crypto is when your system is compromised in short order.

It's nothing of the sort. The malware presumably runs at the same time as the data on the drive is unencrypted. I.e. the system is only compromised by the fact that the user has chosen to decrypt the data and made it available to the malware. In this case you can load as much firmware, malware, magic funny 1s and 0s onto the device as you want, it won't be any less encrypted as a result.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[kmoser]

...iPhone belonging to one of the San Bernardino shooters...

The iPhone no longer belongs to Apple. Why should Apple be legally obligated to do anything with the phone if it's not theirs?

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Aighearach]

You're making assertions about Apple's security model that you can't support. You don't know the implementation details, and you can't promise that there are no other ways to make the change. You key in a specific technical detail without understanding the point; you can't audit something that is secret. You have to have complete knowledge of a system to even make those types of arguments. There is just no way for you to know how easy it is to make the hardware think it is a different phone. If you make an argument for security, but based on simply being ignorant of the details of a possible crack, that is just dishonesty. There is no way you can just promise your way out of not knowing. The FBI being really-awesome and you trusting them implicitly is fine, but they're not magical super-heros that can prevent theft by not knowing about the details of available cracks.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

Key management isn't vulnerable at all. Only the user's choices make it vulnerable. Just like if I run an SSH server with all the best encryption but the login is "root" and the password is "password", the underlying process isn't weak at all, only the user inputs are.

You appear to labor under the misconception that the pin you use to access the phone is the password or key used for encrypting the data; it is not. Pins (or fingerprints) are merely identifiers you can use to identify yourself a small number of times to a secure piece of hardware; that secure piece of hardware holds the real key that's used for encrypting and decrypting your data. If you fail to identify yourself within a small number of tries with your pin, unlocking with pins needs to be disabled and the system needs to switch to a longer password-based or token-based decryption method that cannot be brute forced.

That "secure hardware" can either be the entire phone, or it can be a secure embedded processors. Most phones actually have a secure, embedded processor just for this purpose in their SIM card. And SIM card authentication works this way: you get a small number of trials with a PIN, and if you fail to enter that correctly three times, it switches to a longer PUK. Assuming the SIM card doesn't have hardware or software back doors, that's also secure against hardware attacks.

Re: Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

Every phone with a SIM card has hardware for just this function: the SIM card itself.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

Apparently not, because if they couldn't do that, then the FBI couldn't try to force them to do that.

(By "update" I mean pushing any kind of software into the phone that can be used to decrypt, not just a regular iOS upgrade.)

Re: Apple - standing alone

[ImprovOmega]

Ideally Apple will change this and allow an option to lock down recovery mode, maybe with the option of "if you forgot you pin, you can erase everything first," and refuse to load even signed software until the pin is entered or the device is erased.

My understanding is that they did change this in iPhone 5S and above models. The vulnerability only exists in this form on the 5C and regular 5 models. The terrorist's phone was specifically a 5C. The downside is if you comply with this order then it's possible to crack every single 5C out there with this method and that's a horrendous precedent to set.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

The only fundamental flaw with an iPhone here is anyone thinking that a 4 digit PIN might protect the data on it.

Properly implemented, a 4 digit PIN is perfectly reasonable. The PIN is used to retrieve the actual encryption key from secure storage. If you give an attacker 3 tries, it means they get a 1:3000 chance of unlocking the phone, that's it. That's a reasonable risk. After that, the phone needs to disable the pin authentication method irrevocably and require a much longer password.

The problem is that for that to work, you need to guarantee that an attacker only gets three tries. That requires careful hardware and software design, but this is such a common problem that there are lots of secure, embedded processors that do this. Every modern phone has at least one of those processors inside a SIM card; Apple could use that. Alternatively, they could put a separate secure processor into their phones for this purpose; they are dirt cheap.

Re: Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

The FBI is trying to get Apple to push a special version of iOS software to JUST that phone that would allow them to have unlimited attempts at guessing the pin code and allow them to do it programmatically.

Yes, and I'm saying: that should be impossible to do. The fact that this is possible on iPhones is a design flaw of iPhones and iOS.

The user data is encrypted with a key that is, itself, encrypted with a couple of unique pieces of data, one of which is the pin code to unlock the phone

PINs need to be implemented in some form of secure hardware, either a special chip or the SIM card itself (that's what it's designed to do). If what you describe is what the iPhone does, then that's the problem: that is not a secure way of implementing PINs. http://nelenkov.blogspot.com/2...

I pray to every god known to mankind that Apple fights this until the DOJ gives up or is bitch slapped back into place by someone with the power and the intelligence to see how overreaching and dangerous this step would be.

The fact that the FBI can demand this from Apple and that we are even talking about it is a technical deficiency in Apple products; that's not going to get fixed by winning legal cases. Manufacturers like Apple need to fix their products, not engage in legal posturing.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

No, the real problem, that is not Apple's, is that the pin passcodes are trivially brute-forceable. If you really care about security, you have to guard against brute-force attacks, which you do by using a long alphanumeric password, not a pin code.

Properly implemented PIN codes can't be brute forced, because you only get a small, limited number of tries.

Apple has done a great thing by trying to mitigate the brute-force vulnerability with their software lockout policy, but there is only so much they can do. There are only three ways out of Apple's current situation: 2) make the brute-force limiting rules in hardware instead of software, but then they wouldn't be configurable by the user,

This is the correct solution, and it is easy to do on phones. You can either use the SIM card itself, or you can put an extra secure element on the phone; either of them is capable of holding passwords securely and rigidly enforcing a small number of attempts at the PIN before switching to a longer password or self-destructing.

The limit rules are still configurable by the user, they simply can't be changed until you have successfully unlocked the hardware.

They just need to make it clear that security is not guaranteed with a pin passcode.

But security should be guaranteed with a PIN. That is, if I configure my phone for three trials and use a 4 digit code, then I should be certain that the risk of someone unlocking the phone by trial and error is no more than 3:10000, short of someone actually modifying the innards of a secure processor.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[thoth_amon]

Actually, ignoring the unique hardware key associated with the Secure Enclave (because it can't be read by anything except the Secure Enclave), each iPhone does have several other unique identifiers that can be used to lock OS firmware to the device, such as the serial number, the cellular radio IMEI, and the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth MAC. As already pointed out, Apple could hard-encode those values in the firmware update and sign that. The resulting binary could not be used with any device where those identifiers did not match. Bad actors could not just change the numbers to match a random victim's phone, because the Apple signature would not match the binary. This is discussed at http://arstechnica.com/apple/2....

It is true that even having the source code for firmware creates a risk, but that risk cannot be turned into an exploit without Apple's secret key. And of course if someone gets Apple's secret key, all iOS devices are in trouble.

I think the real issue we should be talking about is whether the government can force companies to redesign their products to help the government spy on their customers. If it can do this, then why can't the government similarly require that circumvention mechanisms be built into devices in the first place to make snooping easy?

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Rutulian]

But security should be guaranteed with a PIN. That is, if I configure my phone for three trials and use a 4 digit code, then I should be certain that the risk of someone unlocking the phone by trial and error is no more than 3:10000, short of someone actually modifying the innards of a secure processor.

As long as you are operating within the confines of the phone where the arbitrary restrictions on retries are being enforced, then yes. As soon as you can rip out the firmware and access the data directly, no.

Properly implemented PIN codes can't be brute forced, because you only get a small, limited number of tries.

No. The pin code can be brute forced, period. It is an inherent limitation of using them. Other weak passwords (dictionary based, etc) are also subject to the same limitation. The password checking software can make brute-forcing infeasible, but the brute-forcing vulnerability is still there if you can get around the software. The only passwords that can be guaranteed cryptographically secure are long alphanumeric strings.

The limit rules are still configurable by the user, they simply can't be changed until you have successfully unlocked the hardware.

I don't think you've thought this through. If pin checking is implemented in the silicon, not the software, it cannot be changed by the user, unless you include the ability to flash the firmware, and then we are back to the current situation.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

I don't think you've thought this through. If pin checking is implemented in the silicon, not the software, it cannot be changed by the user, unless you include the ability to flash the firmware, and then we are back to the current situation.

This isn't something I "need to think through"; SIM cards and smart cards have been around for decades. All GSM SIMs provide the PIN/PUK system, which does exactly what I say. If you don't understand how that works or why it is secure, I suggest you read up on it before making a fool of yourself.

No. The pin code can be brute forced, period. It is an inherent limitation of using them

Well, I'm sure the same ignorance and stupidity is why Apple is in this mess in the first place. Try brute forcing the PIN on your SIM card some time and see how far you get.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Aighearach]

That is still just hand-waving, though. Those are secret details, without a published datasheet we can't claim them to be secure. It is just an impossible promise. It isn't a technical impossibility to use it on another device; it rests on promises and unknowns. You can't base a guarantee on an unknown. All the FBI can say that is actually true would be, "we promise to try to keep anybody from stealing it." I actually believe them on that part, I might be in the minority there. But they can't enforce it; government computers get broken into all the time, government facilities get broken into, valuable evidence goes missing during trials, even when the evidence was collected by the FBI.

People making impossible promises are not being honest about what they have the capability to promise.

You don't know it can't be exploited without Apple's key. The existence of the key suggests at a minimum that it is harder to exploit without the key, but that is all we really know. There are multiple hardware chips that have to communicate, and it is all proprietary black boxes. There are multiple black boxes. We also know that later models have improved security; why would they have improved it, if there was already no way to bypass? The most obvious answer is that the iPhone 5 is less secure than you claim, and that the public does not currently know the details of the weaknesses.

As far as the bigger issue, most people aren't even aware of what a "magistrate" judge is, and if they even are intended to have the authority to create precedent. ;) This has almost no chance of being sustained on appeal. It will be tossed out, and the funny part is that the legal analysis (check legal blogs for that) is that even the cases the FBI is citing don't actually support their claims. Their main one is the NY pen register case, but the thing there is that the company was already installing the tech for the pen register internally for fraud prevention and service monitoring. They also were also installing it for law enforcement, and getting paid a normal profit for it. So it was their normal business, they just didn't think they were legally allowed to say "yes" in that case until the SCOTUS said it was OK. The key to it being OK is that similar searches were already being done, there just wasn't a specific statute that covered that case at the Federal level. The Court found it to be a fairly normal search, just using new technology. The specific features that the court pointed to in that case could easily lead a person to believe that it helps Apple here. Actually, it rather obviously helps Apple, as they don't normally do this work or install this sort of equipment. The court specifically took up the concern of it being used more broadly, and made clear that it wasn't intended to. The whole thing is slam-dunk for Apple. The FBI is playing a PR game, even while accusing Apple of it; but Apple is the one with a solid case, just going by the cases that the FBI cited.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Rutulian]

Nope, it doesn't. PIN/PUK system has settings (number of pin tries, number of puk tries, as well as the puk itself) hard-coded in the chip. They cannot be changed by the user (although they probably can be changed by the network). While PIN/PUK is a good PIN verification sytem, it is not without limitations and its existence does not contradict anything I have said at all.

Well, I'm sure the same ignorance and stupidity is why Apple is in this mess in the first place. Try brute forcing the PIN on your SIM card some time and see how far you get.

Bear in mind that SIM cards are designed to hold a limited and very specific set of information. It doesn't hold the phone OS, for example. When you want to encrypt the whole device, and not just a part of it, this is not as easy a problem to solve as you are trying to imply.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Razed By TV]

It's a 4 digit passcode to get past the lock screen. That's what they want to brute force. And once they do, they're inside the encryption because the phone thinks you're a legitimate user. You don't have to decrypt any data, the system is going to do it all for you because it thinks you're supposed to have access to it.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Rutulian]

I read the spec. Did you?

http://www.etsi.org/deliver/et...

Re:Apple - standing alone

[thegarbz]

It's a 4 digit passcode to get past the lock screen.

Yes and my above encrypted code has a single character as the encryption key. I'm still waiting for you to tell me how that means the encryption is broken. Just because the USER OPTED to use a 4 digit pass code doesn't mean that Apple is creating a back door to its encryption by allowing the brute force of the login. If the USER OPTED to use a 256 character passphrase the FBI can brute force away until all people associated with the case have long passed off this mortal coil.

So I will say it yet again, this has nothing to do with backdooring the encryption.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[thegarbz]

You appear to labor under the misconception

Says the man who seems to think the key management is insecure due to the number of login attempts on the device.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[Razed By TV]

Just because the USER OPTED to use a 4 digit pass code doesn't mean that Apple is creating a back door to its encryption by allowing the brute force of the login.

In this scenario, if Apple does what the government wants, the encryption is bypassed and the government gets the data. The implementation of the encryption is flawed. How many millions believe their data to be safe? If Apple forced the pass phrase, or made it so their phone cannot possibly be tampered with while locked, then I would agree that it is secure.
I never said the encryption was backdoored, the encryption itself is fine, but the way it is being implemented is useless if the government can compel Apple to bypass it.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

> crypto isn't worth a god damn thing if all you have to do is load custom firmware

Crypto is NEVER worth anything if you use a 4 digit PIN. Apple has a combination of hardware and firmware to attempt to prevent the 4 digit PIN from being brute forced, and that's what this is all about. The later versions have even more enforcement in hardware (though Apple has implied that there exists some manner of attack against that).

The thing is, this isn't a backdoor. This is a hardware level of security that you aren't obligated to use (you can absolutely make a secure passphrase on ios, and the government can't brute force that). If this stuff gets broken, then your security level falls to (roughly) that of LUKS and Truecrypt and such. But those are still pretty fucking secure- just not if you use a 4 digit PIN.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

It's not "getting past the lockscreen". That implies this is a software control. There is a master key that is encrypted by a combination of the user passphrase and some hardware specific stuff. That master key is used to unwrap all the file specific AES-128 XTS keys (or possibly AES-256 CBC keys- I'm not 100% sure which is used on that version of hardware).

https://www.apple.com/business...

So to reiterate, this is NOT a software guard, or "getting past the lockscreen". If you forced your way past the lockscreen, you couldn't access any of the data, which is meaningless. What the FBI needs is to get around the logic that wipes the key, and on this older hardware that's still possible (and possibly on the newer hardware as well), thus allowing many tries. Once many tries are enabled, you are relying on the crypto itself, which, like any crypto, is total shit if you just have a 4 digit fucking PIN.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

Well, Apple has been trying to address this with every hardware rev. Later ones have enforcement in the secure enclave. This attack would absolutely not work on the 6 and 6s, but Apple has implied that there's still some way even there- I bet you see that patched in a later version.

LUKS doesn't force you to not use a 4 digit PIN. Does LUKS suck? Veracrypt will let you use a 1 digit passphrase too. Does Veracrypt suck?

You just implicitly shit on the best crypto engines in the world in the process of finding something about Apple to hate. Yuk yuk yuk, good joke.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

> Key management is an essential part of a cryptosystem

Good thing this has nothing to do with key management.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...

> The 4 digit passcode isn't the cryptographic key, it's something that the user can use to identify himself to the phone a limited number of times

No, actually, the passphrase- which can be a 4 digit code, a 6 digit code, or an arbitrary length passphrase that is crypto secure- is combined, inside the secure enclave, with other data. It's not an if/then check, it's actually crypto happening there. The whole point of the hardware drama is to prevent that from being tried multiple times. It's not a user identification code, it's actually crypto- and obviously a 4 digit passcode is shit for that, hence the hardware and software trying hard to prevent multiple attempts.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

> the pin you use to access the phone is the password or key used for encrypting the data

Good fucking grief.
https://www.apple.com/business...

"The class key is protected with the hardware UID and, for some classes, the user's passcode"

Yes, it's part of the crypto system. Yes, choosing a real one makes it secure and choosing a shitty one means you are trusting other parts to prevent brute force.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

> Store hash.

Do 10,000 attempts. Trivial.

Or do 1 attempt 10,000 times.

It doesn't matter how many repetitions you do of your hash function either- if the ios one takes 10 minutes to check a passcode, then specialized hardware could do that same attempt in a few seconds, and you could buy 10,000 copies of the hardware if you needed to.

You can't solve it with computer science- it can't be done. Hence the reliance on hardware and the hope that the hardware is not breakable. Or you use a real passphrase and then you are safe from this attack.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

> You could use a key derived from a PBKDF2 hash with such a high number of rounds that it requires 6 hours to unlock the device, after you typed in the correct passcode.

Ok, but then I just try it 10,000 times, on a machine that is faster than the little tiny crypto processor on there. Or if I own a farm of them, I can try all 10,000 at the same time.

Rest assured it is ABSOLUTELY impossible. If the PBKDF2 iterations on correct entry will unlock within your lifetime, then it can be brute forced within hours, days, or at worst months. And that's if you are willing to wait like 50 years to unlock your phone.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

Absolutely correct. You cannot, within the field of computer science, ever make a 4 digit PIN secure. This is why they step outside computer science to use hardware tricks to hopefully prevent the brute force attack in the first place.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[cfalcon]

> The real issue here is that they can apparently update the firmware of the Secure Enclave

Correct.

The 5c doesn't have the same security as the 6 and 6s. However, Apple has implied that some attack on those could even be mounted- just not this attack.

I'm sure it will be fixed later.

> consider that the secure storage in the current Nexus phones and many other devices does not have this flaw

I'm not convinced of that.

Hypothetical: Before this happened, pretend someone asked that question here. Wouldn't security folks and Apple fanboys have told you it was impossible?
Spoiler: it isn't really hypothetical. If you look back a few days, there was a slashdot story about this, from before all the details were out. The only reason ANYONE suspects that the 6 and 6s are vulnerable to an attack of this class (having their secure enclave somehow worked around) is that Apple implied that something like that could happen when they posted their letter. No one knows how that would work- we just assume that something like that could exist.

So, is the Nexus immune? Maybe. But on the other hand, the FBI isn't trying to unlock a fucking Nexus, so we don't have them trying to All Writs Act Google. So we won't know for sure.

I do think that this will be fixed in the next ios rev, and if Google's stuff is anything but solid, it will also be addressed in their next wave of stuff.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

Good thing this has nothing to do with key management. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... [wikipedia.org]

It has everything to do with key management, according to the very article you point to. Are you illiterate?

Re:Apple - standing alone

[ooloorie]

Hypothetical: Before this happened, pretend someone asked that question here. Wouldn't security folks and Apple fanboys have told you it was impossible?

Of course it's not "impossible"; hardware and software can always have errors. But if that's what happened, Cook could simply have said "the 5c had weak security, but it's going to get fixed on the next iPhone".

What Cook actually has been saying is that "building a backdoor" to access the data on this particular iPhone 5c would result in backdoors in all of Apple's devices, compromise data security of future iPhones and would "undermine decades of security advancements", and that just doesn't make sense.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[mysidia]

Ok, but then I just try it 10,000 times, on a machine that is faster than the little tiny crypto processor on there.

Seems like you're just trying to move the goalposts around by saying "What if you had an infinite amount of computing power?

To answer that, I will say that you can secure it through combination of two ways: (1) Offload parts of the PBKDF2 algorithm, when it is legitimately being unlocked --- so the phone will calculate PBKDF2_HASH#1, and Apple's 5-billion node compute cloud will calculate PBKDF2_HASH#2, which will both be scaled to higher difficulty for shorter passcodes, AND
(2) Also have the computation for Hash#1 be NON-PORTABLE

The computation of PBKDF2 can be restricted to specific hardware: the input to the PBKDF2 hash will include the passphrase concatenated with an internal 5-Kbyte secret; a secret encoded on write-only memory which can be accessed only by the program on that chip which takes a SHA256 of the password as input, and uses PBKDF2 to generate the final hash used for decryption.

The PBKDF2 hash is just one of the inputs that will be used to generate the decryption key.

The piece of silicon that will yield the final key is tamper-resistant by POT'ing the electrical parts (so physically opening it up will permanently destroy it) and does not accept a PBKDF2 hash as input.

So you are forced to use that one and only phone's hardware to calculate the hash.

Also, that chip is designed with hardwire logic that after a certain number of operations, the performance of the crypto chip will intentionally scale down..... so supposing there has been no hash computation in the past 24 hours, the performance will be maximal, but after every calculated hash, the performance rate will decrease and an internal memory of that decrease, until the chip has been allowed to cool down for at least 24 hours to reset the state.

Thus, it is cryptographically securable to some degree.

Trying 3000 passcodes following a firmware update would take 750 days at a constant rate of 1 hash per 6 hours.

But if the physical characteristics halves the hashrate, allow for a further 4x decrease in the average rate, then you're talking about 3000 days, or 8 years, to attempt 30% of the possible 4-digit numerical passcodes, Or 0.02% of possible 4-character alphanumeric passwords.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[david_thornley]

The firmware update isn't to bypass the encryption, which AFAIK can't practically be done. It's to allow a brute-force attack on the PIN. The AES key can't be fished out of the hardware by custom firmware, so the PIN has to be entered, but in the 5C and earlier the lockout and wipe after failed login attempts is managed in software, and that can be bypassed by changing the software.

Re:Apple - standing alone

[david_thornley]

Excuse me. This is a device deliberately made easy to use. It is in the hands of the government of a wealthy and advanced nation, with access to the megacorp that designed it, and it's putting up a good fight against compromise. I find that very impressive.

Security is a process, not a state. iPhones after the 5/5C, which includes every one Apple's currently selling, are immune to this sort of attack. In those phones, the lockout after unsuccessful login attempts, and the wipe on ten failures, are implemented in secure hardware. Since the attack is based on the lockout and wipe being implemented in the OS, Apple is being ordered to allow brute-forcing of the key.

Doubtless there's some way to crack my iPhone 5S, since security is imperfect, but I doubt anyone knows what it is just now.

it's sort of true

[phantomfive]

On the one hand, Apple tried to make a deal and keep the whole thing secret. So that makes it seem like Apple was willing to go along (for at least this one case) as long as it was kept quiet.

On the other hand, it doesn't really matter. If Apple is doing it as a publicity stunt, then it's doing it because the customers want it. Frankly that's better than a corporation trying to "do the right thing" that people don't want.

Re:it's sort of true

[Frosty Piss]

That's not really what any of the links you provided say.

Re:it's sort of true

[phantomfive]

Here is the quote:

The FBI then made its tailored request, which Apple asked to be placed under seal, according to the New York Times. Instead, the FBI went public, setting off the high-profile drama

Re:it's sort of true

[dsmatthews9379]

Apple did the wrong thing by talking about it publicly, now every despot and dictator in the world knows that forcing them to open up phones is an option, if they can control if Apple can do business in a given region. They can block the MAC addresses of Apple products selectively so that even a smuggled Apple phone will not be able to connect to the phone towers that said despot controls.

And the phone will end up cracked open one way or another, in the end, but just at a far greater cost thus consuming money that could have funded education and healthcare.

Apple's smart marketing move may turn out to be very stupid.

Re:it's sort of true

[Aighearach]

I hate Apple products as much today as yesterday. Hating proprietary gardens and refusing to use them has absolutely nothing to do with this case.

I'm glad it doesn't interfere with my ability to defend Apple's right to choose their own speech, to only write and release software that they choose to release. Doesn't mean I'd use it.

Microsoft used to be evil because they had power. Then over time their power went away. They may or may not still have evil intent; we won't know because they don't have power over anybody anymore, thanks to the DoJ smacking them down for whacking Netscrape and Wordperfect. Who did they whack lately? Oh right, nobody. They wanted to see Nokia's last breath, they had to just pay for the right by buying them out. Most of us run *nix, and if MS is playing by the rules hating them has no purpose or effect. I build my own systems, and I don't have to pay any "Microsoft tax" to do it. Kids these days don't even know what the war was about, or how/why it ended.

Re:it's sort of true

[BasilBrush]

On the one hand, Apple tried to make a deal and keep the whole thing secret. So that makes it seem like Apple was willing to go along (for at least this one case) as long as it was kept quiet.

Apple requested that the FBI keep this request under seal. i.e. not public. That doesn't mean they were intending to comply with it. Simply that they preferred the legal battle to be in secret. Secrecy is hardly unusual for Apple. And neither is doing all they can to protect the secrecy of their customers.

Re:it's sort of true

[BasilBrush]

Apple requested to keep this under seal. It's the FBI that took it public.

As to "every despot and dictator", if the US government doesn't succeed, then they won't either.

And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[Anonymous Coward]

I also hear there's a bridge between Manhattan and Brooklyn for sale.

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[sonamchauhan]

And it works like this: you pay $1.20 and you get a non-exclusive lease of a traffic lane for 5 minutes.

Enough cynicism. The DoJ may not have *your* best interests at heart, but most employees have the American people's best interests paramount.

As long as the DoJ request is to decrypt this *one* iPhone, and tools to do are not permanently given to the FBI, why would Apple fight against doing good.

Is the iPhone holy?

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[FlyHelicopters]

As long as the DoJ request is to decrypt this *one* iPhone, and tools to do are not permanently given to the FBI, why would Apple fight against doing good.

1. Do you honestly think the FBI won't end up with their hands on that tool, sooner or later?

2. Do you honestly think the Chinese government, or the Russian government, won't insist on having it, if Apple wants to sell phones there?

Road to hell, good intentions, and all that...

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[Aighearach]

If you understand evidence handling, you understand that the FBI will indeed receive the tool. They're not going to loan the phone to Apple and have Apple bring back the data. ;)

And it is an interesting thing about electronic tools, especially one that is purely software; you can't just receive your copy back and know that they didn't keep a copy. It just doesn't work that way. If you turn a digital file over to somebody, now they have it. They might indeed keep a backup. They might even accidentally make a backup because of how their workstation is set up by their IT guys.

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[sonamchauhan]

1. Apple can simply destroy the tool once they're done with it.
And just because some technology exists to do some good (say, your SSH private key on a USB stick), should you destroy it because the FBI may eventually have an illegitimate copy?

2. And Apple can't refuse, like Google (once) did? Why should the law bow before Apple's commercial considerations?

The road to hell is equally paved with bullheaded intentions.

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[sonamchauhan]

1. Well, then Apple can obtain a court order precluding such thievery.

2. Or even better, it can arrange for its employees to be deputised and setup a private cleanroom on corporate premises for this purpose.

These are acceptable ways to move forward. What is unacceptable is giving a dead murderer his privacy by doing nothing, when they could make efforts that provide information that prevents future murders.

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[Bing Tsher E]

They're going to go into a room where Apple employees have the tools to load the custom iOS version into the phone. The FBI will have brought the phone with them, and an Apple employee will connect it to the tools Apple has in the room to upload the custom iOS. Then the FBI will take the phone back with them to their labs to do their brute force thing. Apple isn't going to burn the custom iOS version onto a CD and send the CD to the FBI.

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[Aighearach]

It isn't even a "custom IOS version" so your tale of the circumstances is impossible. Details matter, especially when you're trying to argue that something won't be released more broadly.

They'll all be in the room, sure. Whose equipment is being used? Do you know the answer to that? Does it affect the conclusion?

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[Aighearach]

I see, now you want to force them to lease property, too. Nobody who disagrees with compelling their speech is going to think it is a reasonable solution to also compel them to enter into a property contract in order to mitigate the damage done to them by compelling speech.

Also, court orders can't preclude theft. There is no magic dust that stops a thief because a court recognized that theft would be really-super-bad for society in this case. Rather, that a potential theft would have such dire consequences is part of the legal analysis of the potential harm to Apple. That analysis wasn't done by the magistrate judge, who doesn't even have the training or experience to do that part of the analysis. That will be done at the appeals court level.

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[sonamchauhan]

Apple can choose to trust, or it can choose to actively exercise full top-to-tail custody its rootkit to prevent it being stolen if it so chooses. Rather it chooses to play the PR game.

"... a potential theft ... such dire consequences ... potential harm to Apple ... analysis ... analysis ... analysis"

Not at all relevant if deputisation is possible.

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[Aighearach]

Fighting new expansive precedent that points at an old law that had never been interpreted that way is not called "PR," it is called an "appeal."

It is part of the process in this country. Sorry you've never heard of it. I hope you have access to more rights in the future.

Re:And DoJ has our best interests at heart

[sonamchauhan]

Appealing is their privilege. But if you think Apple not exercising PR muscle, you've been imbibing too much of their cider. Interpreting existing laws to new circumstances is called thinking. Apple's tech doesn't make their phones any more special than a locked switchboard did in ye olde telephone exchange.

Make the Devices Secure

[Anonymous Coward]

The DoJ is just trying to make the devices secure.

Kudo's to them for making Apple fix the vulnerabilities in their products.

How did they try to keep that secret?

[SuperKendall]

Apple did nothing to keep this secret. It's already known they have assisted the FBI before.

Instead what happened is no-one cared, not even Apple, until the FBI demanded essentially that Apple break hardware security. That is where Apple drew the line; that is what brought all of the attention to bear.

Re:How did they try to keep that secret?

[phantomfive]

Apple did nothing to keep this secret.

Wow, at least click on the link I provided. Again, here is the quote that directly contradicts what you said:

The FBI then made its tailored request, which Apple asked to be placed under seal, according to the New York Times.

Maybe you forgot what it means to place it under a seal?

Re:How did they try to keep that secret?

[dbIII]

That turns it into a comedy - the FBI going public and then accusing Apple of doing it for publicity.
Did they employ some clowns thrown out of the NSA after Snowden or something? It sounds like something the Star Trek Set guy would do.

Re:How did they try to keep that secret?

[phantomfive]

That turns it into a comedy

Enjoy the circus,
The bread is coming.
Feel the bern.
Burmashave.

Re:How did they try to keep that secret?

[j-turkey]

That turns it into a comedy - the FBI going public and then accusing Apple of doing it for publicity. Did they employ some clowns thrown out of the NSA after Snowden or something? It sounds like something the Star Trek Set guy would do.

Sort of...the FBI didn't do it for publicity. They did it to set precedent, and this case was chosen very carefully by the DoJ in order to achieve this (by tugging at heart strings and a sense of panic in the wake of terrorism). There are plenty of other investigations that they could have made similar demands under. If Apple cooperated with the FBI and it was done under seal, then it could not be used as precedent to use the courts to force Apple to do the same in future cases.

Re:How did they try to keep that secret?

[dbIII]

Sort of...the FBI didn't do it for publicity

They went public when Apple asked them not to. So yes they did do it for publicity and "trial by media" to be more precise. If it was all about the court case they would have done it in court instead of by press release.

Re:How did they try to keep that secret?

[BasilBrush]

Maybe you forgot what it means to place it under a seal?

It means keeping the request secret. It doesn't mean observing the request. You are making an assumption.

Re:How did they try to keep that secret?

[j-turkey]

Sort of...the FBI didn't do it for publicity

They went public when Apple asked them not to. So yes they did do it for publicity and "trial by media" to be more precise. If it was all about the court case they would have done it in court instead of by press release.

That does make sense. If the courts act reasonably and back down, the DoJ may have been successful in appealing to the public's sense of emotion/outrage and push Congress to pass the legislature that they want.

Re:How did they try to keep that secret?

[phantomfive]

You are making an assumption.

Yes, you are right, I am.

stating the obvious

[xfizik]

Give me a break. Who would be naive enough to think Apple would refuse to cooperate with the U.S. government in such a case? Yes, they'll "refuse" on public, get some headlines for "standing up for privacy" and then quietly do what they were told one way or another.

Re:stating the obvious

[The-Ixian]

yep, for sure.

Once the public eye has been jerked away by the next shiny thing, Apple will unlock the phone quietly and the feds will mysteriously drop the case.

Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[sheetsda]

The FBI has the hardware. At the software level it should be game-over. So what is stopping them from copying the phone's memory, putting it in an emulator or another phone, and brute forcing the 5-digit PIN. Every time it self destructs, they load up another copy and continue until the correct PIN is found. What am I missing here?

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[sheetsda]

Excuse the reply to my own comment...

After further thought I think I have my answer, barring some more plausible answer from the community: They don't want an Apple tool so they can crack this guy's phone, he's just politically convenient leverage to get the tool made.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Anonymous Coward]

The data is encrypted using a key fused into the hardware processor. The key is in hardware and not readable. The key is not the 10 digit pin. The 10 digit pin and the encrypted contents are sent to the hardware chip and a decryption attempt is made. The results of that are sent back. If the user fails to decrypt the data within 10 attempts the encryption key in HARDWARE is wiped out making the user brute force AES 256 on the data instead of the 9999 possible pin combinations.

The hardware encryption chip would need to be copied as well as the data. Copying the data alone gives you nothing but random bits of AES 256 encrypted data. Putting that on a phone emulator or another phone will never work unless the unique key in hardware is known and that cannot be read.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[nawcom]

running it in some kind of emulator wouldn't be possible due to its full disk encryption, which uses the UID key making it impossible to clone.

If you're interested in how the hardware-driven encryption works in current versions of iOS: Why can't Apple decrypt your iPhone?

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Anonymous Coward]

They can't figure out how to open it up or replace the battery.

More like the FBI is a head on a pike employer. Meaning everyone is so scared to make a mistake, they won't touch it.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Anonymous Coward]

If I understand correctly, it's the fact that the decryption key, which is much longer and stronger than the PIN, resides solely in the secure enclave chip which, unlike flash memory, can't be copied. So rather than brute-forcing a 4- or 5-digit PIN (equivalent of a 14- to 17-bit key), they'd have to brute-force, say, a 256-bit key. That's about 71 orders of magnitude more difficult.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[suutar]

Part of the process of going from PIN to decryption key is in hardware, and they only have one of that chip.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[h33t l4x0r]

Right, because nobody's going to stand up for the rights of the shooter, but once they get a win it will set a precedent for the rest of us.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Anonymous Psychopath]

The FBI has the hardware. At the software level it should be game-over. So what is stopping them from copying the phone's memory, putting it in an emulator or another phone, and brute forcing the 5-digit PIN. Every time it self destructs, they load up another copy and continue until the correct PIN is found. What am I missing here?

Apple has stated that anything with an A7 or newer CPU has a unique code embedded in the hardware that is combined with the PIN to serve as the encryption key. Apple doesn't record the hardware key, and they are the only ones that possess the keys for the software used by the secured enclave in which it resides. So without Apple's help, the DOJ would have to first break into the secure enclave, which I presume is so difficult as to be impractical, and only then could they try the brute-force method you described, which would be much easier.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[AchilleTalon]

FBI and NSA can break the code, but it will not be acceptable as a proof before the court. That is why they ask and request Apple to perform it. In this particular case, they want the data admissible as a proof before the court. They are not trying to break it in order to organize an operation against a secret target or whatever. So, the conditions under which the data will be made accessible and decrypted matter.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[sheetsda]

That is a reasonable answer - Thanks!

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[penguinoid]

The FBI has the hardware. At the software level it should be game-over. So what is stopping them from copying the phone's memory, putting it in an emulator or another phone, and brute forcing the 5-digit PIN. Every time it self destructs, they load up another copy and continue until the correct PIN is found. What am I missing here?

What you're missing is that Apple engineers aren't idiots, and spent more than the 5 seconds you did thinking of their security. Specifically, half the key is embedded in the hardware and would require some super expensive reverse-engineering to extract.

Meanwhile, the government is making a big fuss about this because what they really want is the ability to crack iPhones in general, preferably remotely, automatically, and without a warrant. They already know who the guy was talking to. But there likely won't be such a good opportunity to set precedent as with this case, not for a loooong time.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Anonymous Coward]

The shooter didn't have rights - it wasn't his phone. It belongs to the county.

Perhaps we should be discussing how an employer issued phone was allowed to have the password lock available in the first place.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[FlyHelicopters]

Proof before the court of... what?

No one is on trial here... the people who did this are dead...

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Wraithlyn]

OK, so after 10 failed attempts, the Operating System (software) wipes the key, right? This in fact is what the DOJ wants Apple to do, push an updated O/S that doesn't wipe the key after 10 attempts. So it follows that the key wiping part must be controlled by software.

So why can't they image the phone, try 9 attempts, and then restore the image? Wouldn't that reset the "failed attempts" counter to 0?

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Cramer]

Because what they need is built into the main processor (specifically the crypto logic) with ZERO interfaces for retrieving it. The flash chip is AES-256 encrypted. It will take, literally, an eternity to break it. (and no, one cannot recover the key via x-ray imaging.)

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Cramer]

In theory, by providing a different firmware for the Secure Enclave (isolated processor) that ignores the "erase me" bit, and does not introduce any per-attempt delays. And then provide a second "app" to allow electronic entry of passcodes (via USB, bluetooth, etc.) They can certainly write that, but getting it into the sterile environment of evidence (run entirely from RAM, touch nothing else) may not be possible.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Cramer]

(a) It's evidence. They cannot "drill into it".
(b) Apple designed to the processor to resist such attempts. (it's actually codified in FIPS-140 standards) It's hardened against x-ray imaging.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Cramer]

Because their security wasn't design by a 3yo in crayon.

The attempts count is tracked by the Secure Enclave (or crypto engine -- Apple isn't clear on that part.) It's information is itself encrypted, and not directly accessible by anything but the SE. (it even scrambles it's part of main RAM) There is no way to "backup" the things the SE is tracking, or the key it's going to destroy. (and it's going to send low-level commands to the flash controller to erase every cell in which the key has ever been stored.)

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Bing Tsher E]

They already know who the guy was talking to.

Furthermore, the guy was most likely talking to whomever on his own phone. Both terrorists had their own personal phones which they destroyed before the FBI could recover them. This is dude's work phone, which probably has nothing at all on it except work related stuff.

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Anubis IV]

The device in question relies on the OS itself to handle the wiping and rate limiting. As such, a malicious OS update could be crafted that removes those safeguards, allowing the passcode to be brute forced. Later devices have dedicated hardware that manage those features, meaning that a simple OS update would be insufficient. You'd also need to update the firmware on the dedicated hardware (i.e. The Secure Enclave).

Re:Can someone explain why the FBI needs Apple?

[Wraithlyn]

First of all, thanks for comparing my question to a 3 year old's understanding of things. What a pleasant way to start your response.

Second of all, if what you say is true, then why would the FBI's demand for Apple to push an update to the device have any effect? The whole story is about how the FBI wants Apple to break the "10 failed attempts erases the key" mechanism with a software update, which apparently is totally possible for Apple to do. So your understanding must be wrong here. Apple has the ability, with a software update, to prevent the device from erasing the key after 10 attempts. If they were unable to do so, they would be refusing the order purely on technical grounds.

Third, this model doesn't feature the Secure Enclave (or at least as you're describing it). That was added in later models. (The 5S and onwards). From one analysis: "On the iPhone 5C, the passcode delay and device erasure are implemented in software".

And finally, learn the difference between "it's" and "its", especially when you're trying to sound smart.

They're correct - because it's about survival

[FireballX301]

Apple knows that complying with this order will essentially destroy most, if not all of their overseas business. If they comply with this order, they will lose anyone who is even remotely suspicious of US govt motives; this includes literally billions of non-Americans around the world. The net result would simply be people moving to phones that are perceived as more secure, there's an easy market opportunity for a non US based company to put out 'secured' phones (for example, a phone that rejects all firmware updates in addition to the secure area tech) and gain all the business that Apple would lose.

The question is, of course, if the government knows this, and I'm pretty sure the law enforcement/'intelligence' personnel here are so scoped into their mindset that they're totally unaware of this, and would reflexively brush it off as hyperbole (hint it isnt).

Re:They're correct - because it's about survival

[FireballX301]

The average person might not give a fuck, but iPhone buyers outside US/EU are not average - they tend to be well off, or enterprise customers (who I can assure you will care very much so about this). More importantly, it'd be very easy for governments to spin this against the US and Apple - how easy would it be for the PRC to talk about how the US is spying on China, and mandate that all Chinese citizens/enterprise buy Xiaomi?

You minimize the impact at your own peril.

Re:They're correct - because it's about survival

[DutchUncle]

I suggest that the law enforcement personnel ARE aware of the issue. Even as NYC police had a press conference pointing out how many cases were blocked because of inaccessible information on smartphones, and the commissioner was blasting Apple's current policy, a subsequent speaker (a prosecutor?) was careful to point out that Apple had formerly cooperated in such cases, and that a narrow set of conditions including a properly-executed court order to work on a single phone at a time for a single case is VERY DIFFERENT from a generic backdoor. I'm betting that something along these lines will become the court-ordered compromise: isolated workspace, isolated cases, some kind of open oversight (like normal search warrants and court orders, not the NSA secret rubberstamp court). Practical side: DoJ doesn't want to be blamed for killing the biggest tech company or crashing the stock market.

Re:They're correct - because it's about survival

[dmbrun]

If they do this for the FBI (US Government) then any overseas government will ask for the same privilege/device. And No, they won't be sending the devices to the USA, the unlocking device will be in the country concerned.

Of course, Apple don't have to agree. Unless they want to keep doing business in that country.

Re:They're correct - because it's about survival

[Bing Tsher E]

The average person might not give a fuck, but iPhone buyers outside US/EU are not average - they tend to be well off, or enterprise customers ...

Woot, woot. The whole thing is hype marketing by Apple. Which some of us have figured out.

Re:They're correct - because it's about survival

[david_thornley]

If the only facilities for such cracking are in the US, how do foreign governments compel compliance? US courts can issue orders to Apple USA, but Latverian courts can't. What happens when Apple Latveria can only request Apple USA to cooperate, not make them?

Re:They're correct - because it's about survival

[dmbrun]

It's China not Latveria, that's the problem.

If China says to Apple we want the same facilities/privileges you gave to the US then Apple will comply. China has enough clout/market share for that to happen.

Re:They're correct - because it's about survival

[david_thornley]

Which may be another reason Apple doesn't want to comply. They're in a much better position to resist Chinese pressure that way. It's possible that giving that capability to the FBI wouldn't be that bad, but I really don't want the Chinese government to have it.

something fishy about iOS encryption

[ooloorie]

It's one thing for the government to talk to Apple about mandating encryption backdoors in future iOS updates. But this spat between the government and Apple is not about that, it is about data on a phone running current iOS software. Apple is essentially saying that they could access data on encrypted iPhones by pushing a software update. That is not how a cryptographic system ought to work. A correctly implemented cryptographic system should allow access to the data only with the key. When a cryptographic system is combined with a biometric identifier like a fingerprint, the biometric identification needs to take place in a tamper-proof environment that only releases the key when the biometric identifier has been given. Upon operating system updates and restarts, the phone should require an actual decryption key from the user.

What the discussion may be about is the fact that the normal iOS keys are weak (4-6 digits), so what the government may be asking for is an operating system update that removes a limit on the number of unlock attempts before the phone erases itself. However, again, Apple should not be able to push such an update to an existing phone without having the user unlock the phone first.

So, while the government position is generally bad, it also seems that, in addition, there is something fishy about Apple's use of encryption on iOS.

Re:something fishy about iOS encryption

[imgod2u]

The second scenario is what's happening here. Whether or not an OS update to a locked device can be done is up for grabs. What's in the letter Tim Cook posted is that they're refusing to even *develop* such a tool if it were possible. It could very well be that it's not possible, but no system is really perfect.

With Secure Enclave in the newer models (the iPhone in question is a 5C), the time limit and retry limit is hardware enforced. So such a hack wouldn't work on newer phones, only iPhone 5C and 5 (and older).

Re:something fishy about iOS encryption

[AchilleTalon]

We are talking about a iPhone 5c. You should read this for more about the actual reason FBI is asking Apple to perform the decryption of the iPhone.

Re:something fishy about iOS encryption

[dbIII]

Apple should not be able to push such an update to an existing phone without having the user unlock the phone first.

I don't have an Apple phone but with others being able to reinstall or patch the system via USB is a useful feature. Some have an option where they only boot as far as a program to do updates.

Re:something fishy about iOS encryption

[BitZtream]

No, Apple isn't saying they could get access to the encrypted data.

The FBI is asking for apple to give them a version of the software that doesn't have the delay between password attempts and doesn't wipe the device after a certain number of tries.

Neither of these things mean it 'isn't encrypted properly', they in fact are an example of it working as it should.

To go further into your comments:

The FBI request won't work however for one glaring reason: You can't update a locked device without unlocking it because THE DEVICE REJECTS THE UPDATE REQUEST.

Apple designed it that way, intentionally.

You can wipe the device clean and put new software on it, but you still won't get at the data cause the device itself deletes it first, THEN starts the update process.

So basically, what you're saying about 'how it should be' is really 'how it is' and the FBI request is bunk.

Re:something fishy about iOS encryption

[ooloorie]

The FBI request won't work however for one glaring reason: You can't update a locked device without unlocking it because THE DEVICE REJECTS THE UPDATE REQUEST. Apple designed it that way, intentionally.

You are missing the point. That is what a properly designed system ought to do. But if this were true, there would be no dispute between Apple and the FBI: in response to the FBI's demand to unlock the San Bernadino phone, Apple could simply say "it is impossible to do that" and that would be the end of it. The FBI might try to exert political pressure on Apple to change their operating system to make unlocking future phones easier, but the legal issues would be instantly over.

The fact that the FBI and Apple are still talking about the San Bernadino phone, and the fact that Tim Cook is vague on this point leads to the conclusion that Apple can do it, that Apple must have a backdoor for pushing updates even without unlocking it.

Re:something fishy about iOS encryption

[ooloorie]

Yes, Schneier's article is essentially correct as far as it goes. He believes that the problem with the iPhone is a lack of code signing. But there is a more fundamental problem. Normally, Apple seems to require a password for updating the phone software. But it appears that Apple has ways of altering the phone software of a locked, encrypted phone even without unlocking it first, otherwise the FBI demand would make no sense in regards to the San Bernadino phone. That means that there must be an existing, gaping security hole in iOS. Code signing would fix this problem either, since the FBI could always order Apple to sign a software update.

They are probably right

[taustin]

Seems likely, anyway. On the other hand, the FBI's posture is just a constitutional overreach and attempt to institutionalize the ignoring of due process, so they're about even.

Did they already blow it?

[Anonymous Coward]

It seems to me that they blew it by saying "no" instead of "we can't". The marketing is that even Apple can't break the encryption, but now they seem to be saying they don't want to. This of course begs the question, can they? If they can, even if they choose not to, then their marketing has always been BS.

Re:Did they already blow it?

[mark-t]

Would *YOU* want to even try to do something that you knew you could offer no guarantee of success within a human lifetime with current technology, and that you would have to do entirely at your own expense? (because I have not seen anywhere that the FBI is required to pay Apple for their time)

Re: Did they already blow it?

[mark-t]

Does Apple get paid even if they don't succeed? How do they prove that they even tried at all if they are unsuccessful?

What Apple should do at this point

[SuperKendall]

A) bring iPhone into Apple facility.
B) OOPS! Destroyed phone in freak Ives latte spill.
C) LOSS

How much could the government fine Apple? A million dollars? 100 million? A billion? Whatever!

Re:What Apple should do at this point

[jklovanc]

DOJ is smart enough to clone the phone first.

Re:What Apple should do at this point

[Anonymous Coward]

You can't clone the hardware chip with the encryption key. Isn't this supposed to be a tech site?

Re:What Apple should do at this point

[suutar]

which does them no good whatsoever without the particular key storage chip from that phone. Otherwise they'd just clone it a hundred times and throw 10 attempts at each clone.

Re:What Apple should do at this point

[DreamMaster]

It wouldn't work, or otherwise the DOJ would have set up an automated cloning of the phone and trying 10 password attempts at a time. What I've gathered from reading the various articles is that each IPhone has it's decryption key stored in hardware, with no way to copy it. Easily, that is, I suppose they could break open the chip and try and chart the pathways using a scanning tunneling microscope, but that would take a great deal of effort, and it would be easy to accidentally destroy the key doing so.

So what they're trying to do is get Apple to create a signed version of IOS which when installed, won't wipe the phone after 10 failed password attempts. They obviously have a way to install new versions of IOS even without a user entering a password. Which is actually sensible, if you think about it.. when an IPhone accidentally gets bricked when an update fails (or deliberately, witness the recent "Error 53"), it makes sense for there to be a way to force reload a fresh version from scratch without destroying the user's phone. The only reaason the DOJ needs Apple's help is, likely, that there's protection in place on IPhones to prevent unsigned code from being installed. Hence they want Apple to create the "poisoned" version of IOS that, when installed, makes doing a brute-force cracking of the phone easier.

Re:What Apple should do at this point

[SuperKendall]

Please define "smart", given that cloning an iPhone is useless.

Re:Why is Apple acting like obstructionist...

[__aaclcg7560]

The keys on the new phones are only five digits. They should be able to find the key in a matter of seconds.

Except you have only ten attempts to enter the correct five digits before the data is automatically wiped. A security feature that prevents a brute force attack to unlock the iPhone.

Not true at all

[Anonymous Coward]

DOJ knows nothing about justice then. Let a backdoor get put into encryption, then all hackers should target all politicians, judges, law enforcement officers and attorneys and see what it means to have a backdoor in encryption.

Might as well just hand over the keys to your house, cars, combos to your safes, SSN, etc. What a bunch of fucking idiots. They have no clue at all what this means. A backdoor in something like this means someone else can crack it too. They need to get over this, it's a shift in the way things have been. They can get into your house because a burglar can too. They can get into your safe, again, because a burglar can too. But can they get into a safe that is buried 10 feet underground and you're the only person who knows where it's at? Not likely. What if all messages were delivered via paper, in person and then burned after being committed to memory and everyone killed themselves after committing the act they were planning? Then there would be no trail for cops to follow either. Sure it's more difficult to do that, but it's doable. \

We as a free people, deserve to have some privacy and our government is trying to erode every last bit of that away.

Re:Not true at all

[Bing Tsher E]

Might as well just hand over the keys to your house, cars, combos to your safes, SSN, etc.

The keys to my car, house, safe, etc. are all trivially obtained by an organization as big and powerful as the government.

Your SSN? You're saying it's a secret number that the government doesn't know? heh.

A Lose-Lose Proposition

[zenlessyank]

If Apple refuses then the tanks roll in so to speak, and if they comply then they will lose potentially a lot of business because the rumors will be valid about 'back-doors'. I assume there is some other crap at play since this smells like a rat.

Re:A Lose-Lose Proposition

[sexconker]

Life in prison, in solitary confinement in a basement if you don't reveal your passwords and encryption keys

That's just as wrong as what they're trying to do now.

Re:A Lose-Lose Proposition

[Aighearach]

No, if Apple refuses then it goes to the appeals courts, and the higher up they fight it the more likely Apple will win, because the FBI is asking to compel speech and the US Courts really don't like that. This ruling was by a "magistrate" judge who is a paperwork pusher who doesn't actually even oversee trials. This is just a typical outlier ruling that a large country sees. There are lots of even worse rulings being overturned every day. They higher up you go, the less deference there is to the other branches of government, and the more judges worry about judicial independence, and defending existing precedents such as not allowing compelled speech.

Dave Ross says: It's honeypot misinformation

[DutchUncle]

Dave Ross, commentator on CBS Radio, proposed: Our vaunted security agencies state, loudly and publicly, that they are incapable of reading an iPhone. Apple refuses, loudly and publicly, to do anything to help, and points to our own constitution for protection. One can easily imagine a rush of bad guys to get iPhones so they can harm us with our own technology. And in the meantime . . . . are the security agencies REALLY incapable of reading it, and is Apple REALLY unwilling to help them, or is it all a honeypot meant to steer those bad guys towards a particular product?

Re:Dave Ross says: It's honeypot misinformation

[Bing Tsher E]

The simpler answer is it's all hype marketing. Apple is the brier rabbit, and they're telling the government "no... don't grab hold of that tarbaby!" and cashing in on all the attention this is giving them.

Re: Why is Apple acting like obstructionist...

[Anonymous Coward]

It's not true, you can have the 4 digit pass code or you can have a 256 character alphanumeric password if you so decide. That and the fact that a brute force will lock it out entirely. I know this for a fact too, my son tried to break the 4 digit passcode on my iPad, I have nothing important on it so I don't need to lock it down that tightly, the password is simply to keep my kids off of it except for when I allow them to be on it. My son tried to unlock it, and I ended up having to factory wipe the iPad to be able to access it again.

Re:If the security is done correcty

[mark-t]

Basically, the FBI doesn't want to have to get a warrant for the phone records from the providers and then track down all the frequently called numbers.

It seems to me that would actually be a whole lot easier than all of this.

Re:If the security is done correcty

[AchilleTalon]

There is a way, dot period. You don't know what you are talking about. Please, take time to search what this case revolves around regarding the breaking of the encryption. Hint: Washington's Post has a nice article about it. The iPhone is a iPhone 5c and is perfectly "breakable" provided some conditions.

Re:Not quite understanding Apple's position.

[rainer_d]

I'm confused by Apple's (and slashdotters') response to this whole thing. I can't see that Apple is in the right here. This case has nothing to do with the actual encryption. There's no back door we're talking about here. Turning off the device wiping safety feature is something Apple can do without affecting anyone else. If the worry is that the government would keep this firmware and use it on anyone's phone, well, they apparently have the power to compel this anyway. And Apple has always had the power to do that. I don't see this as a privacy and security issue above and beyond the status quo. If the question was either, can you crack this encryption for us, or can you add a backdoor to the encryption, then the answer is clearly and legitimately no and a court could have to accept the first and be convinced of the second: it's not physically possible to crack good encryption, and it's a bad idea for everyone add a back door.

But as to the question, "can Apple disable the bad passcode wiping function?" yes they absolutely can. Hence the court order. Apple cannot say this is impossible for them to do. Hence by refusing to comply they are clearly in contempt of court. Will be interesting to hear how they plan to battle this out in the courts (and why they would want to).

I am clearly missing something here.

After all is said and done I doubt the FBI will find much of value on the phone. I'll be the first to admit good, old fashioned detective work is still the key these days, though law enforcement apparently wants things to be quicker and easier electronically.

They don't say it's impossible. They say it sets a dangerous precedent, which people tend to agree to.

I also see why people have issues with Apple doing what they are doing right now - but it's not illegal to exhaust all legal means!

Re: Why is Apple acting like obstructionist...

[The-Ixian]

If that were the case then I don't think the FBI would have such a problem unlocking the phone.

I know, there are political reasons for why the FBI could be pushing this angle so hard even, if they do have the ability to unlock it. But the fact that they would push at all implies that it is not a trivial process and, perhaps, a non-zero chance of failing and wiping the device by accident.

Which part of Get A Warrant don't the Feds grok?

[WillAffleckUW]

It's pretty simple.

Get A Warrant.

A court order.

Stop trying to end run and slurp up all the info.

As all of us who are aware of the actual capabilities know, it's not like there aren't other illegal means for them to get the info anyway.

They just want to not have to do their jobs as prescribed by the US Constitution and get all our stuff for free.

No. Follow the legal prescribed procedures and stop acting like the Stasi.

Re:If the security is done correcty

[koreanbabykilla]

They dont need a warrant, The phone in question was his work phone. He worked for the government.

brute brute

[Anonymous Coward]

If the iPhone has separate memory chips (as opposed to being a single SOC):

1) power down the phone completely, battery out, PS caps shorted

2) physically remove the flash memory

3) copy flash memory off in custom jig

4) brute force without iOS or Apple hardware even being involved.

OTOH, if it's an SOC, then the chip's surround (epoxy or whatever) has to be removed and the chip itself attacked to separate the flash from the rest of the hardware. Much tougher (but still doable, if there's good enough reason and the required budget and gear.) Then, step 4 as above.

Nothing is inherently truly secure if you can get the storage device physically free of the encompassing controller(s.)

But someone up higher probably had it close to right: It's not that people that smart won't work for the FBI, it's that the FBI is institutionally unable to hire people with those skillsets. If ever there was a federal agency with a stick so far up its ass you could build a treehouse on it, the FBI is that agency.

Re:brute brute

[larkost]

The data on the chips is encrypted with AES. No-one has the computational power to try all possible AES keys, or even a reasonable fraction of them. Unless there are unknown weaknesses in AES, then some have speculated that it is not possible to try all combinations using all computers on earth through the heat-death of the universe.

The key to that encryption is in hardware on the phone, is unique to that phone, unknown to Apple or any of its suppliers, and is not recoverable (try to get at it physically and you will certainly destroy it). That hardware will take a 6-digit code, and then spit out the correct encryption key. The FBI is attempting to force Apple to create new firmware that will de-fang both the key-entry delay, as well as the 10-tries and I erase the key code that protects this hardware from brute force attacks (since 999,999 entries are within the realm of brute force).

Re:Which part of Get A Warrant don't the Feds grok

[DutchUncle]

They HAVE a court order. Apple is arguing that the court order is like a military draft, forcing Apple to become an agent of the security agencies, and incidentally costing them something at the same time. I'm betting this will go all the way up to the Supreme Court, by which time some kind of "secure facility" compromise (and remuneration agreement) will have been prepared in the background.

Applehater Agrees With Apple.

[BrendaEM]

'nuff said.

Re: Why is Apple acting like obstructionist...

[__aaclcg7560]

But the fact that they would push at all implies that it is not a trivial process and, perhaps, a non-zero chance of failing and wiping the device by accident.

A defense attorney could challenge the data recovery admission as evidence in public court, forcing the FBI to reveal exactly how they were able to unlock the phone to recover the data. The government does not like reveal sensitive information in public courts, which often withdraws the evidence and/or let the case collapse. The workaround is to set a legal precedent that would force companies like Apple to do the data recovery for them.

Action vs No Action

[duckintheface]

It is not a crime to do nothing. If Apple already has a key, they can be compelled under discovery to turn it over. But they can't be compelled to create one if it does not exist. You can't require someone to act against their will. That is called slavery.

Re:Action vs No Action

[Anonymous Coward]

There are master keys for updates. Not something anyone should ever see though.

Re:Action vs No Action

[Aighearach]

The attempt to argue it that generally fails, because there is precedent for purely commercial action; for example, during WWII farmers were required to grow certain crops, or else turn their farmland over to somebody willing to grow it. It may also be true that there are additional elements of the thing called "slavery" than just being compelled to do a thing you didn't want to do. If somebody is kidnapped, and rescued an hour later, and during that hour they were forced to take money out of an ATM, is it fair to claim they they are now slaves, they are now property? Or are they merely a crime victim, and not actually slaves? Is a person who is sentenced to a work camp for a month now a slave?

It is more useful here to note that the compelled action would be the creation of a copyrighted product, and that means they are attempting to compel new speech that matches their goals, even though they admit the proposed speaker doesn't want to say those things. For that, the precedent goes very much in a different direction than the over-broad analysis. Further, the new product would actually harm their existing product, and the FBI admits that there would be harm accidentally by claiming that Apple's position is "PR" to try to get customers. Darn straight they want their speech to speech that gets them customers, and they may indeed have that right.

This is an inanity by a "magistrate" judge, somebody who job is supposed to be to rule over the routine paperwork stuff because there are too many cases for the real judges that preside over trails to stamp everything. There is no actual chance of this standing, because the appeals courts only contain real judges, and the higher things get, the more serious the analysis given is. The US legal system is constantly correcting these absurdities from the trenches, it is just part of the process of having an independent judiciary.

Re:Action vs No Action

[Anubis IV]

And yet, they're being compelled anyway, using a law that pre-dates the emancipation of the slaves in America, specifically, the All Writs Act of 1789, that the FBI is arguing allows the government to compel citizens to do things they don't want to do. I, for one, do not welcome the idea that the government can compel Apple to make a new version of iOS just for them that is intentionally compromised, which is exactly what's being asked of Apple in the California case.

Re:Action vs No Action

[Alumoi]

You can't require someone to act against their will. That is called slavery.

Nope, it's called law.
I don't want to pay taxes but I have to otherwise I will face fines or incarceration.
I don't want to go to jail/be executed if I steal/kill/traffic something but I will if I get caught.
I don't want to go 100 mph on the highway, I want to go 160, but I must, because it's the law.
I want to smoke in public, but I can't. Shall I go on?
So, you see, the state always requires someone to act against their will and we don't call it slavery.

Re: Action vs No Action

[cthulhu11]

Or "Selective Service"

Re:Which part of Get A Warrant don't the Feds grok

[WillAffleckUW]

Because it's a 'give us everything we might feel like' court judiciary order, not a panel of federal judges limiting the search appropriately.

Let me put this simply for you. The Constitution allows me to only search your home. Or your car. Or your phone. Or your kid's backpack. But I have to specifically limit what I ask for, and for each thing, I need a legal reason to search and I can't just EMPTY YOUR HOUSE, YOUR CAR, YOUR PHONE, AND YOUR KIDS BACKPACKS and use all of it to find anything I feel like. I have LIMITS.

The problem is Apple is saying "where is the limited court order" and the Stasi is saying "we want to take everything and not tell you what it's for and why we need it" and then they burn your house and your car down and sell your kids' backpack contents on eBay in Japan.

Do you get it NOW?

What would apple do

[stabiesoft]

if the phone had the details of where a bomb was placed on the apple campus and it was set to go off april 1st. Would they let their campus go boom or would they decrypt it? I already know this post is going to get downvoted into oblivion...

Re:What would apple do

[mark-t]

That wholly would depend on whether they actually had the ability to decrypt it in that amount of time. If not, they would simply try to find the bomb before the deadline, and not bother trying to decrypt it at all, because that is more likely to produce the desired results than doing something that they already know they could not offer any guarantee of success before their time was up.

Re:The phone belongs to the county, not the shoote

[Fallen Kell]

For which San Bernadino is then looking stupid for not placing the phone under some kind of enterprise mobile device control allowing the true owners the ability to unlock the phone and read the contents.... This is why none of the news and 3 letter agencies are stating the real fact of ownership, because then they look inept for not doing basic device control.

DOJ/FBI is also marketing this

[akgooseman]

In other news, the DOJ/FBIs' insistence that Apple can, but won't, unlock the phone or do some magic that allows them to access the phone's content is also marketing. They're trying to make us sheep believe they need access to all our secrets to keep us safe. I'm not buying their pitch that OMG terrorists, mass shooters, criminals or other element can or will destroy our country if the Feds can't access everyone's devices and accounts.

Re:If the security is done correcty

[Cramer]

provided some conditions

That will be difficult, or not possible, with a piece of evidence. Apple cannot possess the phone at any point. Anything sent to, or run on the phone MUST NOT alter any non-volatile storage AT ALL.

In the end, I'm pretty sure there's nothing of merit on the phone anyway. But, by doing this once, they've been proven to be able to do it AGAIN.

My, hasn't Apple come a long way?

[scdeimos]

It was only a few years ago that SFPD officers and Apple employees were busting down doors together to recover (lost, not stolen) iPhone prototypes. Did Apple Impersonate Police To Recover the Lost iPhone 5?

Re:My, hasn't Apple come a long way?

[Bing Tsher E]

Looking back at that story from 2011 just reminds me that Apple has been playing all of us on every level for the purposes of hype.

Most of us didn't care about the 'stolen' prototypes, because we weren't the people who were going to line up for several days at the Apple store to be some of the first to see the new iThingie.

Apple spurts out hype, at every level possible, for every marketing purpose that can be dreamed up.

This case, for instance is about the terrorist's work phone, in a case where we know they had their own personal phones which they destroyed before the FBI could recover them.

Maybe there's a reason they didn't bother to destroy this work phone, because it was only used for work purposes.

But Apple gets great benefit out of all the hype and hysteria surrounding the phone's existence.

DoJ Spinning

[blavallee]

The FBI made this issue public.
Trying to make Apple look like the bad guy, to generate public sympathy.

Re:Which part of Get A Warrant don't the Feds grok

[DutchUncle]

Yes, I got it the first time, and I wrote that some kind of "secure facility" . . . oh, wait, sorry, I wrote a lot more in another posting separately. Yes, a search warrant has limits (though police are frequently known to go beyond them). OTOH it's not quite as specific as one would like to think, especially if written properly (like any sneaky contract). If they get a warrant to search your home for evidence of a particular crime, say a particular kind of weapon, they CAN go through every room and every item because you might have hidden it anywhere. There was an interesting article in the NY Times pointing out that Apple changed policy about a year ago; they used to work with law enforcement more easily, and then started insisting on specific paperwork at around the same time that they started emphasizing security. They're right. You and I are in violent agreement. Next time, don't be a jerk by assuming that the other person is a jerk.

Re:If the security is done correcty

[innocent_white_lamb]

If there are 10,000 possible passphrases and you can try ten per hour, then you can unlock the phone within, at most, 42 days.

Which is probably less time (and certainly less costly) than this court fight. I wonder if Apple could write and test the custom software in 1000 hours? Likely not, if it's done right.

JUST Marketing?!?

[kenwd0elq]

The DoJ says that Apple's stand on not unlocking the terrorist's iPhone is "just marketing". JUST marketing? This is GENIUS-level marketing. I'm a PC and Android guy, but I'm tempted to buy a 128GB iPad just to show some solidarity with Apple. Most of us Libertarians don't have much use for the big-government stance that Apple has always shown, but if this is the case that it takes to put some daylight between Apple and the Socialists, then I guess I can't complain.

The entire thing is a Trojan horse. The FBI and federal law enforcement agencies in general have spent the last three years trying to find the perfect case; a terrible person with an iPhone and some plausible excuse as to why the feds have to demand that Apple break their own encryption schemes. And here comes Syed Farook, the poster child for terrible, with a locked iPhone that's actually owned by the San Bernardino Department of Health. If there weren't 12 bodies, I'd suspect that it was staged by the feds.

Re:political marketing

[kenwd0elq]

The cops tried, and starting last year, Apple has been refusing to help. Back in iOS7, it wasn't that much of a chore for Apple to unlock a phone - but that's exactly WHY Apple wrote iOS8 and iOS9 to make it nearly impossible for Apple to break into newer iPhones. And even the hack that the Feds are demanding for Farook's phone wouldn't work on an iPhone 6 or newer, because they've enhanced the security in the hardware layer itself.

Of course, I read that the New York DA has a list of a few DOZEN cases they plan to file and demand Apple's help on, if Apple rolls over on this one.

I hope they don't. Apple, take this all the way to the Supreme Court!

Re:Why is Apple acting like obstructionist...

[kuzb]

Because if you fail to enter the appropriate key too many times it locks down the device.

Have I said thanks?

[Impy the Impiuos Imp]

> just marketing

Yes, much like your instructions to create a 1984-like warrantless panopticon is just political marketing by politicians preening in front of voters.

Re:The gov wants to destroy the tech market

[tom229]

This would be a duplicated effort. The large companies involved and the mindless apathetic user are already doing a pretty good job of ruining the tech industry.

Truth be told.

[Bill_the_Engineer]

The DOJ's position of the matter is marketing. Giving hyperbole speculative statements about what they MIGHT find to justify setting a precedence that the government can limit how much encryption its citizens can actually own.

Irresistable force, meet immovable object

[blindseer]

The US federal government has been acting like a barely trained 800 pound orangutan with a moderately educated owner at the leash. When the government sees an obstacle you get the orangutan owner saying "Right turn, Clyde." (Is that too obscure of a reference?)

The government has had success with having their trained ape beating results out of the public and the public has responded. We created something that their trained ape can't just beat out of people. Had the government not been so willing to break into our records then we would not have developed such encryption so quickly and used so widely.

Basically the government made this bed and now they have to sleep in it. Forgive me if I have little sympathy for their problem.

Re: Why is Apple acting like obstructionist...

[DahGhostfacedFiddlah]

Brilliant! You should call the FBI immediately and let them know!

Re:The phone belongs to the county, not the shoote

[ImprovOmega]

Even with MDM solutions you can't unlock the phone. You can *wipe* it, and if you control the email for the iCloud account you can even restore it to factory default and reuse the hardware. But you can't just open it and see what's inside.

Incorrect

[SuperKendall]

Wow, at least click on the link I provided

I read through everything there which is more than you did, moron.

The FBI then made its tailored request, which Apple asked to be placed under seal

So Apple didn't hide anything THEY did, they asked the FBI request to be sealed. Moron.

Did I mention you are a moron?

Re:Incorrect

[phantomfive]

ok, technically they asked that the FBI hide the request. What's the difference?

Moron

Same to you, man.

Re:The gov wants to destroy the tech market

[swalve]

To what end?