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The Tech Failings of Hawaii's Missile Alert

Over the weekend, Hawaii incorrectly warned citizens of a missile attack via their phones. According to The Washington Post, the error was a result of a staffer picking the wrong option -- missile alert instead of test missile alert -- from a drop down software menu. Hawaiian officials say they have already changed protocols to avoid a repeat of the scenario. The report goes on to add: Part of what worsened the situation Saturday was that there was no system in place at the state emergency agency for correcting the error, HEMA (Hawaii Emergency Management Agency) spokesman Richard Rapoza said. The state agency had standing permission through FEMA to use civil warning systems to send out the missile alert -- but not to send out a subsequent false alarm alert, he said. Though the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency posted a follow-up tweet at 8:20 a.m. saying there was "NO missile threat," it wouldn't be until 8:45 a.m. that a subsequent cellphone alert was sent telling people to stand down. Motherboard notes that new regulations require telecom companies to offer a testing system for local and state alert originators, but because of lobbying by Verizon and CTIA, this specific regulation does not go into effect until March 2019.

In a piece, The Atlantic argues that the 90-character messages sent by the system aren't suited to the way we use our devices.

232 comments

  1. Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 3, Insightful

    You need a mechanical physical switch with a switch guard. The very fact that an actual alert would be triggered by a menu item, indicates a completely incompetent design. I seldom call for people's jobs, but I'll make an exception in this case..

    --
    The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    1. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You are incorrect about a mechanical switch/guard. We are well past that era. What we need is someone other than Homer J. Simpson level people manning the system.

    2. Re:Uforgiveable by pablo_max · · Score: 5, Insightful

      What's worse, is that the menu items were right under each other. "Missile alert" and "Missile alert Test". Both items give the same "are you sure" confirmation.
      While it was certainly a bone headed mistake, it was one what was easily possible for someone in a hurry. As this fellow was just wrapping up his shift, he was clearly trying to get everything done in time.

      I don't get the people calling for this guy to get fired. Like none of those assplugs have ever made a mistake on their job. How many know someone in the office that accidentally did reply to all, or forward some email chain to external Eric rather than the internal Eric.
      Shit happens. Clearly the design of that system isn't the best.

    3. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 4, Insightful

      What's worse, is that the menu items were right under each other. "Missile alert" and "Missile alert Test". Both items give the same "are you sure" confirmation. While it was certainly a bone headed mistake, it was one what was easily possible for someone in a hurry. As this fellow was just wrapping up his shift, he was clearly trying to get everything done in time.

      I don't get the people calling for this guy to get fired. Like none of those assplugs have ever made a mistake on their job.

      I was perhaps not clear. I'm calling for the people who designed and implemented a system that was so mistake prone to be sent on permanent vacation. The guy who sent out the alert was just a person making a mistake on fatally flawed software.

      Their design and implementation indicates either a lack of knowledge of life critical systems, or a callous indifference to it. You have to place interrupt safe (yeah an oxymoron) points at places. Running a alert test? Have a nice Alert test physical switch. Switch guard, different color. Actual alert? Another switch with a guard and a different color. Never a menu item. The colors indicate the difference, the switch guards function as an "Are You Sure?" message. A degree of separation between testing the system and activating the system must be in place. There was essentially no separation in this incompetent implementation. How many know someone in the office that accidentally did reply to all, or forward some email chain to external Eric rather than the internal Eric. Shit happens. Clearly the design of that system isn't the best.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    4. Re:Uforgiveable by Gaxx · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Whilst I believe that you are right in identifying an mechanical failsafe as an incorrect approach I don't think this should fall to the user to pick from two items next to each other on a drop-down. Intelligent, highly-skilled operators make mistakes in these sort of circumstances and a bit of decent UI design goes a long way in preventing such things (without the need for mechanical safeguards).

      Something as simple as giving obvious visual clues between test and live messages (icons, colour, font weight etc), separating the items on the drop down into obvious lists for test and live messages etc.

      Getting only a _little_ more complicated in UI, a subsequent message confirming a live message (possibly with an action that requires a user to type 'live' or something to ensure that the validation request has been received and understood) would almost certainly eliminate any chance a live message being sent in place of a test one.

      Decent design does not rely on users doing the right thing any more than it has to.

      --
      -- Gaxx
    5. Re:Uforgiveable by pablo_max · · Score: 1

      I was perhaps not clear. I'm calling for the people who designed and implemented a system that was so mistake prone to be sent on permanent vacation. The guy who sent out the alert was just a person making a mistake on fatally flawed software.

      .

      I was not meaning you in particular. Just in general that there is a lot of people calling for that.

    6. Re: Uforgiveable by tripleevenfall · · Score: 0, Flamebait

      They had a shitHOUSE? Ah man. In my country we only have holes. We dream of having a shithouse one day. Perhaps my children or grandchildren will have one to call their own.

    7. Re:Uforgiveable by iamgnat · · Score: 5, Insightful

      What's worse, is that the menu items were right under each other. "Missile alert" and "Missile alert Test". Both items give the same "are you sure" confirmation. While it was certainly a bone headed mistake, it was one what was easily possible for someone in a hurry. As this fellow was just wrapping up his shift, he was clearly trying to get everything done in time.

      I don't get the people calling for this guy to get fired. Like none of those assplugs have ever made a mistake on their job. How many know someone in the office that accidentally did reply to all, or forward some email chain to external Eric rather than the internal Eric. Shit happens. Clearly the design of that system isn't the best.

      I agree. Shit happens. Just was unfortunately some really bad shit in this case. I haven't made such public mistakes, but I've made some big ones. He is just a scape goat here.

      The real problems I see here is that A) it wasn't blatantly obvious (through using a different workflow and by clear visual (and audio?) indicators) that he was going down the live path rather than Test and B) that having permission to use the EBS doesn't automatically carry the ability to send a "oh shit! we didn't mean to do that" message as well.

      At the point where the workflow path deviates between Test and Real it should be impossible for someone, no matter how rushed/tired/bored, to get it wrong. Glaringly different color schemes. Audio prompts. Full screen dialogs so they can't be paying attention to something else. Extra steps down the Live path. Having a second account confirm the action. Etc...

      Make it so that you have to be either blatantly ignorant or blatantly malicious to get to the point of sending a Live alert when you shouldn't. The timeliness nature of the system, however, does present some challenges since you want to delay getting the alert out as little as possible.

      Now what I think is really being missed here is that this was a blessing in disguise. Yes it inconvenienced and scared the crap out of a lot of people, but based on all the reports I've seen no one had a clue what to do with it. Given the short time involved for a missile to get from NK to Hawaii and the devastation a nuclear warhead would do I question the point of giving warning (I'd rather die blissfully ignorant rather than in a panic or linger through injury/radiation poisoning), but if there is going to be a warning people need to know what to do and react accordingly.

      They are concerned enough to spend money on the warning system, but have they spent the money on enough bunkers to hold the population of the islands? Are they located so that everyone has a reasonable chance of getting to one regardless of traffic/panic of everyone else trying to get there?

    8. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 2

      You are incorrect about a mechanical switch/guard. We are well past that era. What we need is someone other than Homer J. Simpson level people manning the system.

      Your thinking is exactly what produced this system. Physical switches are so 1968! We can trigger the alert through a menu, and since we need a shortcut we'll use Ctrl+D so it will be easy.

      So anyhow, the situation stands in evidence as to how software people and pus dripping edge folk produce failures.Deal with it.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    9. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Wow. What an ignorant statement. Let me guess - you have never worked in an emergency setting. So how many physical switches do you want? You already want 2 for missile alerts. How about 2 for wild fires (one actual, one test), then there would be 2 more for mud slides. I guess tornado warnings would require two as well. What about civil disturbance - should that require a physical switch? Then there's any type of hazmat incident.

      Why don't you learn a bit about emergency management before you make an ass of yourself!

    10. Re:Uforgiveable by hawguy · · Score: 1

      A mechanical switch is prone to failure so will need to be tested regularly, and runs the risk of being tested with the system in "live-fire" mode. The switch output is going to be converted to a software signal anyway, so it makes the system more complicated for no real benefit. There's no reason why a software trigger can't be protected with a confirmation dialog, like "You are about to send a live missile alert, type 'YES' to continue"

    11. Re:Uforgiveable by hey! · · Score: 1

      I don't know. In my experience every design choice has unintended (although hopefully not unaccounted-for) consequences.

      You have to add up all the foreseeable failure modes of a system with a mechanical switch -- including but not limited to a mechanical failure when you actually need to use it -- weighted by the probabilities of those failure modes. Just throwing a mechanical switch into a system because you had a failure is not engineering. In engineering you don't just focus on the desired result of a feature.

      I'm not saying that a physical arming switch isn't the best option, but designing a solution to this problem is a job for someone with experience dealing with human factors in systems. I suspect having distinct armed/test modes is a good idea, but a switch alone isn't going to be enough, you'd need to have other indications the system is live -- e.g. klaxons and flashing lights.

      --
      Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
    12. Re:Uforgiveable by 14erCleaner · · Score: 1

      "Missile alert" and "Missile alert Test". Both items give the same "are you sure" confirmation.

      Their fix will probably be to add an extra "are you REALLY sure?" confirmation to the real one.

      These guys probably stopped reading the text in the confirmation box years ago. It's easy to form bad habits like that.

      --
      Have you read my blog lately?
    13. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Dialog boxes are not the answer. Too many ways to accidentally trigger them, and users are trained to just make them go away without reading them.

    14. Re:Uforgiveable by DaMattster · · Score: 1

      I wouldn't blame the person that sent out the mistaken alert. Blame should fall on the designer of the system.

    15. Re: Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But the UI designers were Agile!
      Three Six Sigma Black Belts oversaw the project!

      Or maybe the bigger problem is thinking that fucking Twitter is a valid public communication tool. Fuck that narcissistic site.

    16. Re: Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      not even holes but streets

    17. Re:Uforgiveable by Megol · · Score: 1

      What a well reasoned posting, I especially like the respectful way you describe the people involved in a system you have no f-ing clue how it operates.

      And no, that thinking isn't the problem which should be obvious if you spent some seconds thinking about it - assuming you have an IQ higher than an amoeba.

    18. Re:Uforgiveable by Megol · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Yes this is clearly a system design problem and something that can be solved in several obvious ways. The easiest would be to have a confirmation stage that makes it very clear if it's a test or if it is a "sharp" alarm that will be triggered.

      Note that how to make it very clear is still a problem but one that have been studied.

      That the same system that can send an alert can't also send a false alarm alert is also an obvious systems design flaw.

    19. Re:Uforgiveable by jools33 · · Score: 1

      If anyone should be fired it should be the designer of the software that allowed this option so easily without a possibility to undo and without any kind of confirmation dialogs.

    20. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The person who clicked the wrong menu item certainly should not be fired.

      The people who designed, coded, tested, and approved the UI need to be triple-teamed with the cluebat, cluestick, and cluehammer.

    21. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Whilst I believe that you are right in identifying an mechanical failsafe as an incorrect approach I don't think this should fall to the user to pick from two items next to each other on a drop-down. Intelligent, highly-skilled operators make mistakes in these sort of circumstances and a bit of decent UI design goes a long way in preventing such things (without the need for mechanical safeguards).

      Something as simple as giving obvious visual clues between test and live messages (icons, colour, font weight etc), separating the items on the drop down into obvious lists for test and live messages etc.

      Getting only a _little_ more complicated in UI, a subsequent message confirming a live message (possibly with an action that requires a user to type 'live' or something to ensure that the validation request has been received and understood) would almost certainly eliminate any chance a live message being sent in place of a test one.

      Decent design does not rely on users doing the right thing any more than it has to.

      The testing & live choices should have the same UI, but not be on the same dropdown menu!

      At least use different coloring & warnings to alert to the fact that this is NOT a test!

    22. Re:Uforgiveable by plopez · · Score: 2

      Don't even put it in the same location. And reverse responses e.g., yes cancels the alert and no triggers it. It was an approach used at a refinery I worked at (left handed valves etc.), and also was relayed to me by a coworker who was a submarine Nuclear Reactor Operator. Force people to think. This is SOP in mission critical applications, and I mean mission critical as in people will die. Not mission critical in terms of a person not making their bonus so they can't buy that new Mercedes.

      --
      putting the 'B' in LGBTQ+
    23. Re:Uforgiveable by careysub · · Score: 2

      Not a routine looking one anyway. But a strangely shaped bright red dialog box that only appears in this context might be a good idea.

      Or better yet, some unusual additional but easy to perform action that is also hard to do accidentally like "type in user name".

      --
      Starships were meant to fly, Hands up and touch the sky - Nicky Minaj
    24. Re:Uforgiveable by aicrules · · Score: 1

      I'd blame them both. Short of the system design being wrong to where "test" sends the actual alert, there is some blame for the operator. Yes, bad to put such an important selection right next to the test version of it, but the operator of such a system better be very proficient in using the system, otherwise that's a huge risk.

    25. Re:Uforgiveable by gnick · · Score: 1

      How about 2 for wild fires (one actual, one test), then there would be 2 more for mud slides. I guess tornado warnings would require two as well. What about civil disturbance - should that require a physical switch?

      I'm not defending GP's idea of using a switch, but this is obviously not what he meant. One switch for all live alerts would serve the purpose. There are plenty of reasons to criticize that as a bad idea without getting silly.

      --
      He's getting rather old, but he's a good mouse.
    26. Re:Uforgiveable by butchersong · · Score: 2

      It is very easy to do especially when you have to test and troubleshoot these things. I've several times had "oh crap" moments like this. For example if trying to figure out say an email delivery problem and... oops probably don't want to point this to the actual smtp server or oops... that's a comma separated list of all our customer's emails.. don't want to use that.

    27. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why not fire the user interface designer? Surely testing of the interface would have found the wrong selection being chosen, unless testing wasn't done.

    28. Re:Uforgiveable by Mysticalfruit · · Score: 1

      A system like this should be engineered to have some set of distinct modes like "Standby", "Testing" and "Live".

      In order to put the system into "Live." should require a physical interconnect such as a key.

      I would imagine from the "console" where you'd choose "Live" be prompted to turn the key. Then once it verified the circuit has been closed you'd then be able to choose from the live menu which thing you wanted to send, you'd then be presented with a big blinking red dialog box saying something like "THIS WILL SEND A MESSAGE STATEWIDE!" where they'd have to accept.

      Once the message is sent, the system would automatically transition back into "Standby" mode. The user would then be prompted to open the circuit and remove the key. At that point the user could then choose "live" or "test" again.

      I would also make these different modes have different colors / borders etc so there's zero confusion which mode you're in.

      --
      Yes Francis, the world has gone crazy.
    29. Re:Uforgiveable by Mashiki · · Score: 1

      Plain old mechanical mercury switch is good for around 70-90 years after the initial test, and require no secondary yearly testing as long as the mercury hasn't leaked. And that it can along with the wiring be checked with a spot inspection. They're still used in a lot of stuff, that require one-off emergency trip fails. One of the heavy industry companies I worked for exclusively used them as part of the auto-stop system in the event of an emergency. Because they always work, sure mercury is toxic, it hurts the environment. But when you want a 99.99999% of there being zero failure? Sometimes old tech is still best tech.

      --
      Om, nomnomnom...
    30. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      At a bare minimum they could have broken things out into two drop downs. First an "Alert Type" in nice big bold letters, such as Test/Alert/Diagnostic. After choosing the type of alert then you could choose from the options (Missile/earthquake/volcano/etc). After selecting your options and clicking OK you should then get another popup detailing the alert about to go out and a "Are you sure you want to send out this alert" button, perhaps with a color coded severity warning.

    31. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      I was perhaps not clear. I'm calling for the people who designed and implemented a system that was so mistake prone to be sent on permanent vacation. The guy who sent out the alert was just a person making a mistake on fatally flawed software.

      .

      I was not meaning you in particular. Just in general that there is a lot of people calling for that.

      Understood. My position is not vengeance like most people, just complete shock that such a terrible system would be implemented. So many times, we see that these systems are just about guaranteed to fail.

      I guess that is the price we all pay for a world of Yes Men, and people thinking only the way things will work, and not the way they might fail.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    32. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Colour coding. Some of our servers have this - green screen border for dev, yellow for UAT, red for production.

      It's much harder to ignore the colour than the content of a confirmation message.

    33. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      Wow. What an ignorant statement. Let me guess - you have never worked in an emergency setting. So how many physical switches do you want? You already want 2 for missile alerts. How about 2 for wild fires (one actual, one test), then there would be 2 more for mud slides. I guess tornado warnings would require two as well. What about civil disturbance - should that require a physical switch? Then there's any type of hazmat incident.

      Why don't you learn a bit about emergency management before you make an ass of yourself!

      I am a technical consultant for Emergency communication systems. And I have to say, little Coward - you would be escorted to the front door as your last involvement with that 'tude. Rather than just an argument which has nothing to do with what I posted, you are at best amusing, but have no place in emergency management.

      Arguing for a system that has failed, and we know why it has failed, is a pretty weak starting point. It was going to happen, it was going to happen because it was a menu item for activation besice a menu item for testing, and by golly, it happened. It was the opposite of a fail safe system. All of the intermediate steps I propose of Mechanical switches and Switch guards are fail safes.

      And if you don't understand what a fail safe is, you might do some studying before you claim that others need to learn a bit. Just sayin'

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    34. Re: Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But that person that designed it was already fired and the job outsourced to a friend of a senior official... What more do you want to do to this unemployed IT worker?

    35. Re:Uforgiveable by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

      Most likely the responsible guys are not the programmers but the "product managers".
      Programmers like to play with their software. You can not call it "testing" but everyone once a while "clicks through" his work.
      But as soon as a programmer raises his finger he gets put down as "you have no clue anyway!"

      --
      Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    36. Re:Uforgiveable by pipingguy · · Score: 1

      "Intelligent, highly-skilled operators make mistakes in these sort of circumstances"

      A favorite of mine is when the RAM is refreshing and you end up double-clicking because you thought the first click wasn't registered.

    37. Re:Uforgiveable by apoc.famine · · Score: 2

      The larger blame lies with the government and the (I hate the term, but it's so applicable here.) sheeple who call for this sort of a warning system.

      There is no legitimate reason to have this sort of warning in place. None! North Korea has established that it can hit the ocean with its missiles most of the time. (They took out a neighborhood in one of their cities within the last 6 months!) Until North Korea is a) demonstrating that it can actually get an ICBM within 100 miles of its intended target, and b) is actively threatening to blow up parts of the US, it's insane fear mongering to have such a system in place.

      I just don't understand how we got to a place where a sizable percent of the population of the US lives in daily fear of highly improbable shit. It's so utterly stupid, and unfortunately, these dumbasses vote in dumbasses who play on these fears.

      Any suggestions for what we replace "the land of the free and the home of the brave" with?

      --
      Velociraptor = Distiraptor / Timeraptor
    38. Re:Uforgiveable by pipingguy · · Score: 1

      What do you expect from software running on Windows 3.1?

    39. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      How about 2 for wild fires (one actual, one test), then there would be 2 more for mud slides. I guess tornado warnings would require two as well. What about civil disturbance - should that require a physical switch?

      I'm not defending GP's idea of using a switch, but this is obviously not what he meant. One switch for all live alerts would serve the purpose. There are plenty of reasons to criticize that as a bad idea without getting silly.

      if you have a fail safe in the system, it does not cut the computer out. You simply select the message to be sent, then use the mechanical switch to send it. The concept is that a physical action of raising the guard is a step that makes you think foro a second - am I sure? then the last step is the switch - am I really really sure??

      I understand this is a tech site, where many people believe in the infallibility of computers, and that humans are considered the weak link. I would suggest that they do some study on Stanislav Petrov, known as "The man who saved the world." https://www.theatlantic.com/te...

      Had he relied on the computing facilities and launched, the world would be a quite different place. It was a matter of throwing a switch or switches, but the control was outside the computer. Imagine if y'alls presumably much superior menu item launch with it's proven mistake prone operation was in control.

      Here's the challenge show how a completely menu driven system controlled only by software will be more fail safe than a system that makes you think hard about activating it. Since y'all know I am wrong - you must have the right way to do this ready to implement.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    40. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Given [...] the devastation a nuclear warhead would do I question the point of giving warning (I'd rather die blissfully ignorant rather than in a panic or linger through injury/radiation poisoning)

      This is ridiculous. Any nuclear warhead North Korea could practically lob at Hawaii will only kill a few percent of the population. Is the blissful ignorance of those few percent worth more than an improved chance of survival for everyone else?

      And don't get hung up on bunkers. Heck, even ducking and covering, per the instructional film, massively increases your chance of survival if you're outside the fireball but inside the blast zone.

    41. Re:Uforgiveable by reboot246 · · Score: 1

      My guess would be that the software is so old that the person (persons) who designed it is already retired. Or, it's possible that they've moved on to another job with another company.

    42. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I alao don't understand the call for him to be fired. There should be criminal charges. You don't get fired for yelling "fire" in a crowded theater, whether you meant it maliciously or not.

    43. Re:Uforgiveable by RockyMountain · · Score: 1

      I seldom call for people's jobs, but I'll make an exception in this case..

      I agree! And I also seldom call for people to be fired.

      But, just to be totally clear -- the person/people who should be fired is NOT the operator who selected the wrong drop-down box on the badly-designed UI. And NOT the one who coded it, either.
      The real culprit here is whoever reviewed, and approved the architecture. Probably a _much_ higher level person than the one who will most likely be blamed -- given what I know about typical government and corporate scapegoating habits.

    44. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      A mechanical switch is prone to failure so will need to be tested regularly, and runs the risk of being tested with the system in "live-fire" mode.

      Everything is susceptable to failure. Mechanical switches caan certainly be more reliable than a software program.

      The switch output is going to be converted to a software signal anyway, so it makes the system more complicated for no real benefit.

      So are you positing that all mechnical switches and keys be removed from nation's nuclear arsenals because a computer only system is safer?

      So these computer thingies. They don't have any switches in them? Computer keyboards and on off switches will be prone to malfunctions, certainly more so than a heavy duty industrial quality. There are inputs and outputs like Ethernet connectors as well.

      fail safe does not mean that no errors or failures will occur. What it means is that a failure is isolated and ends up in a safe condition. Such an external switch is no disconnected from a computer either. It's just the last step in activating a life critical system.

      There's no reason why a software trigger can't be protected with a confirmation dialog, like "You are about to send a live missile alert, type 'YES' to continue"

      You mean kind of like what they had, and what was ignored? This is my whole point. And yet here we are people arguing to the system that failed. That dialog box, Would you be willing to bet your life that the software is so good, so well tested that it will never ever have a problem? That the software is so perfect that it is 100 percent impossible that it will not be activated by a software problem? I suspect you will answer no, and if yes, you need to study history of the software events of the nuclear age.

      At very best, perhaps a blinking rde screen, and a klaxon horn at 120 decibles might alert the person actiuvating the menu item might help, but that won't cure accidental software provided auto activation.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    45. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      Not a routine looking one anyway. But a strangely shaped bright red dialog box that only appears in this context might be a good idea.

      Or better yet, some unusual additional but easy to perform action that is also hard to do accidentally like "type in user name".

      That still doesn't negate software failure. Need a human in the loop who is willing to think.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    46. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      Plain old mechanical mercury switch is good for around 70-90 years after the initial test, and require no secondary yearly testing as long as the mercury hasn't leaked. And that it can along with the wiring be checked with a spot inspection. They're still used in a lot of stuff, that require one-off emergency trip fails. One of the heavy industry companies I worked for exclusively used them as part of the auto-stop system in the event of an emergency. Because they always work, sure mercury is toxic, it hurts the environment. But when you want a 99.99999% of there being zero failure? Sometimes old tech is still best tech.

      I'm having fun here arguing with people who think that software is more dependable than things like mercury switches. Even more so, they are arguing the superiority of a system that has already demonstrated failure.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    47. Re:Uforgiveable by sjames · · Score: 1

      Agreed. Even a minor muscle twitch at the wrong moment or needing new glasses can cause the wrong menu item in a list to be clicked.

      The click sequence for test vs live should be different, starting with selecting from the test rather than the live menu. Perhaps even make the user select "enable live" from somewhere before the live menu will drop down. That makes it a lot harder to do accidentally.

      On the bureaucratic side, permission to send an alert should include permission to send a false alarm and all clear for that alert.

    48. Re:Uforgiveable by cwsumner · · Score: 1

      A mechanical switch is prone to failure so will need to be tested regularly, and runs the risk of being tested with the system in "live-fire" mode. ...

      True but beside the point, any input will need to be tested. The only reason Not to use a physical switch is cost, which should be insignificant for this application.

      The advantage of a physical switch, for actual commands, is that it is a completely different physical movement. That reduces error rate quite significantly.

      P.S., Note when using physical switches, use a double-throw switch with three contacts. And use set-reset logic in the electronic input, that will completely debounce the switch. Never use timeouts or delays for debounce, never use single-throw switches! 8-)

      ("If Engineers built buildings the way Programmers write programs, the first woodpecker to come along would destroy civilization!")

    49. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Mistakes are inevitable and unavoidable. Your post tells me that you don't believe you make mistakes (ironically a mistake in itself), which makes you dangerous.

    50. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      I don't know. In my experience every design choice has unintended (although hopefully not unaccounted-for) consequences.

      You have to add up all the foreseeable failure modes of a system with a mechanical switch -- including but not limited to a mechanical failure when you actually need to use it -- weighted by the probabilities of those failure modes. Just throwing a mechanical switch into a system because you had a failure is not engineering.

      In no way shape or form is the idea to "throw a mechanical switch into a system:" because you had a failure. The mechanical switch should have been in the initial engineering design from teh very beginning, because it will prevent a failure. A failure that happened because people who don't know any better thought that the entire thing could have been controlled without failure by menu items.

      But that didn't happen did it? If this system was part of the launch system for nuclear missliles the world would have been in an interesting state today, would it not? In engineering you don't just focus on the desired result of a feature.

      I'm not saying that a physical arming switch isn't the best option, but designing a solution to this problem is a job for someone with experience dealing with human factors in systems.

      Right, now just google "The man who saved the world". This will bring you to a very interesting story about one Stanislav Petrov, who after receiving commands to launch nuclear tipped missiles via a satellite problem, he reasoned that the US wouldn't be likely to launch only the 5 missiles th esatellite indicated were heading to the Soviet Union. He probably saved the world from a very interesting future. That is Human Factors by definition. And a needed disconnect from people's trusting of all things computerized.

      I suspect having distinct armed/test modes is a good idea, but a switch alone isn't going to be enough, you'd need to have other indications the system is live -- e.g. klaxons and flashing lights.

      The switch isn't replacing the computer. And wouldn't be used in the test mode at all. (note I'm not certain of the exact details, but for the test of the system, a menu item would suffice).the physical switch means go time. But its something that is external and connected to the computerized system.

      This is not dissimilar to launching systems for ICBMs. They have multiple physical keys that actuate switches. Do you have a software only solution that you would propose that would be more reliable?

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    51. Re:Uforgiveable by omnichad · · Score: 1

      and since we need a shortcut we'll use Ctrl+D so it will be easy.

      Yo dawg, I heard you like shortcuts so I made the shortcut the same button that makes shortcuts (bookmarks).

    52. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      The larger blame lies with the government and the (I hate the term, but it's so applicable here.) sheeple who call for this sort of a warning system.

      There is no legitimate reason to have this sort of warning in place. None! North Korea has established that it can hit the ocean with its missiles most of the time.

      Warning systems are not just for North Korea. Russia and America also have some big boomy candles. My guess is that both Hawaii and the west coast are in the targets. These systems were in place a long time ago. Russia has early warning systems as well.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    53. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      What a well reasoned posting, I especially like the respectful way you describe the people involved in a system you have no f-ing clue how it operates.

      And no, that thinking isn't the problem which should be obvious if you spent some seconds thinking about it - assuming you have an IQ higher than an amoeba.

      Speaking of respectful. Wanna talk about fail safe systems? Use the big words - I might just understand a lot more than you think I do.

      There's your challenge, Accepted? Prove that a software only system is fail safe.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    54. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      If your missile alert system has fewer safeguards than the GUI to reformat a hard disk, you're doing it wrong.

    55. Re: Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Someone solved your problem years ago, explaining their solution like this: "When we get back to our hole, we're going to have a long boring conversation about our relationship." You're never going to have a shithouse unless you work on it.

    56. Re:Uforgiveable by Strider- · · Score: 1

      That's why you use a normally closed switch, rather than a normally open. By default, the switch is in the "ON" position, actuating it causes it to break the circuit, thus indicating the actuation. In emergency stop type buttons, mashing the big red mushroom breaks the circuit, causing the equipment to be de-energized. These are extremely reliable.

      --
      ...si hoc legere nimium eruditionis habes...
    57. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Their design and implementation indicates either a lack of knowledge of life critical systems

      Who says the system remains in the vanilla state that existed when it was released? Maybe the labels are under user control, or the user specifically requested these labels, or they came out in different releases, etc. Given that this is likely custom government software, it was probably built on a set of skimpy requirements and not analyzed by anyone who might have known better.

    58. Re:Uforgiveable by gweihir · · Score: 1

      Indeed. Setting a trigger this loose is asking to get shot. Only the truly incompetent do this.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    59. Re:Uforgiveable by gweihir · · Score: 1

      It is not the fellow that did this that should lose his job and possibly do time. It is the ones that signed off on this design and the ones that proposed it.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    60. Re:Uforgiveable by gweihir · · Score: 1

      Mechanical switches come in very, very reliable variants if you spend more then $1 on them. And you can easily have a backup switch on a separate circuit. And, even better, you can get them with a protective cap.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    61. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Posting anon to avoid undoing moderations.

      Just pointing out that real-time warning systems are considered critical infrastructure because of the risk of tsunamis for any territories that face the Pacific or Indian oceans. I'm sure this was using that same system - which is why the messages are just items in a dropdown. Didn't you consider what the other items may be? One of them undoubtedly says "Incoming tsunami! Find higher ground immediately!"

    62. Re:Uforgiveable by Shogun37 · · Score: 1

      Send them some /. editors? (Ducks chair.)

    63. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      A system like this should be engineered to have some set of distinct modes like "Standby", "Testing" and "Live". In order to put the system into "Live." should require a physical interconnect such as a key.

      Bingo! "Sokath, his eyes opened"

      All critical systems I have worked with need that key or guard, which closes a switch. Which goes someplace, which activates the final step, whatever that is. Previously it was activating some machinery which might kill people if it started when they were around it. Now it isn't usch an issue on present systems.

      I would see this system as one enabling the computerized message to go out to everyone. Activate the key which is the switch, and the computer knows it is go time. Sends out the emergency message for whatever emergenct message is chosen via the software.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    64. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      Most likely the responsible guys are not the programmers but the "product managers".

      I definitely agree. The programmers get their directions from the managers.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    65. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      I agree! And I also seldom call for people to be fired.

      But, just to be totally clear -- the person/people who should be fired is NOT the operator who selected the wrong drop-down box on the badly-designed UI. And NOT the one who coded it, either. The real culprit here is whoever reviewed, and approved the architecture. Probably a _much_ higher level person than the one who will most likely be blamed -- given what I know about typical government and corporate scapegoating habits.

      Exactly. The person who accidentally activated the alarm was almost blameless, the programmers were just working with their marching orders.

      I'm expecting the guy who empties the trash cans and mops the floors to be the chosen culprit.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    66. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      Their design and implementation indicates either a lack of knowledge of life critical systems

      Who says the system remains in the vanilla state that existed when it was released? Maybe the labels are under user control, or the user specifically requested these labels, or they came out in different releases, etc. Given that this is likely custom government software, it was probably built on a set of skimpy requirements and not analyzed by anyone who might have known better.

      Well My failsafe is that switch, or Key to activate the system. If that was removed, I'd consider that a criminal act.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    67. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I disagree alarms often benefit form being "fail loud" rather than fail quiet.

      Which is worse: a test accidentally goes out as a real alert causing people to take action, or a real alert accidentally gets classed as a test and not forwarded causing people to be out in the open when the missiles arrive?

      It should be easier to send the real alert than the test, and setting it as a test should require the extra step every time so tehre's no chance of forgetting to rearm the real alert.

    68. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      Indeed. Setting a trigger this loose is asking to get shot. Only the truly incompetent do this.

      My guess is that the decision was made on a financial basis, perhaps some suits in a conference room. It really indicates a lacl of knowledge about programming and computers in general.

      Perhaps it wasn't considered a life critical system. I'd differ given that it scared the crap out of a lot of people, hopefully no one was injured or killed.

      But we've all accidentally hit a wrong menu item, especially when using a mouse. An emergency system needs anumber of attributes

      It needs good accuracy - we don't know about that in this system

      It needs flexibility - I suspect it has it.

      It needs an effort to trigger it. - This system fails miserably in that aspect. Activating a test is almost identical to activating the system.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    69. Re: Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      we didn't even streets, we had dirt roads

    70. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The guy who sent out the alert was just a person making a mistake on fatally flawed software.

      The guy who sent out the alert should have noted the design flaw and made accommodation. He also should have notified his superiors of the situation, requesting an update. Clearly he wasn't fit for the job.

    71. Re: Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Dirt roads? Pshhhh. Everywhere we went, we had to carry around machetes to carve our own paths. True pioneers.

    72. Re:Uforgiveable by chihowa · · Score: 1

      Another aspect of this is that it is apparently just as easy to accidentally select the test option instead of the actual alert option. If a shift change is enough to mix these up, in an actual emergency an operator could easily end up thinking he sent an alert out when he really just triggered a test.

      --
      If you want a vision of the future, imagine a youtube comments section scrolling - forever.
    73. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I would also make that "Missile Alert" and TEST Missile Alert"

    74. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      And while we're harping on the design and installation, why isn't there a "FALSE ALARM DISREGARD LAST ALERT" message button, for when this does happen?

    75. Re:Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      typing in something specific seems to work fine for deleting characters from MMORPG servers. And that is something that's a lot less critical than an emergency alert system.

    76. Re:Uforgiveable by TheFakeTimCook · · Score: 1

      You need a mechanical physical switch with a switch guard. The very fact that an actual alert would be triggered by a menu item, indicates a completely incompetent design. I seldom call for people's jobs, but I'll make an exception in this case..

      I thought the same thing about the keyswitch/switchgaurd.

      But even a simple, glaring-red "ARE YOU SURE?!?" Confirmation Dialog would have probably prevented this frickin' FIASCO!!!

    77. Re:Uforgiveable by TheFakeTimCook · · Score: 1

      Another aspect of this is that it is apparently just as easy to accidentally select the test option instead of the actual alert option. If a shift change is enough to mix these up, in an actual emergency an operator could easily end up thinking he sent an alert out when he really just triggered a test.

      No shit.

    78. Re:Uforgiveable by TheFakeTimCook · · Score: 1

      You are incorrect about a mechanical switch/guard. We are well past that era. What we need is someone other than Homer J. Simpson level people manning the system.

      Your thinking is exactly what produced this system. Physical switches are so 1968! We can trigger the alert through a menu, and since we need a shortcut we'll use Ctrl+D so it will be easy.

      So anyhow, the situation stands in evidence as to how software people and pus dripping edge folk produce failures.Deal with it.

      Hey, it's probably a Windows-based system. We're lucky it didn't just decide to do a "Critical Update" at that moment!

      I heard on one news report that the reason it took so long to cancel the Alert was that the Application that was supposed to do that "wasn't loaded"

      (Now was it CANCEL.EXE, OR CANCEL1.EXE...?)

      It is REALLY amazing we haven't had a bug-related missle launch in all this time...

    79. Re:Uforgiveable by TheFakeTimCook · · Score: 1

      What a well reasoned posting, I especially like the respectful way you describe the people involved in a system you have no f-ing clue how it operates.

      And no, that thinking isn't the problem which should be obvious if you spent some seconds thinking about it - assuming you have an IQ higher than an amoeba.

      Speaking of respectful. Wanna talk about fail safe systems? Use the big words - I might just understand a lot more than you think I do.

      There's your challenge, Accepted? Prove that a software only system is fail safe.

      Ask the people aboard Flight 800.

      Oh, wait...

    80. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      The guy who sent out the alert was just a person making a mistake on fatally flawed software.

      The guy who sent out the alert should have noted the design flaw and made accommodation. He also should have notified his superiors of the situation, requesting an update. Clearly he wasn't fit for the job.

      Clerly you haven't worked in this sort of system. Input from the user is seldom accepted. If the guy on th efront liine knew what they were doing, they would be in charge. At least that's what the people in charge think.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    81. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      And while we're harping on the design and installation, why isn't there a "FALSE ALARM DISREGARD LAST ALERT" message button, for when this does happen?

      That is definitely needed.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    82. Re:Uforgiveable by kenai_alpenglow · · Score: 1

      If engineered correctly, that mechanical switch is likely to outlive that computer by several orders of magnitude. Yeah, still need to test it, but since that is an "odd" event, the human would be less likely to just "click "...

    83. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      You need a mechanical physical switch with a switch guard. The very fact that an actual alert would be triggered by a menu item, indicates a completely incompetent design. I seldom call for people's jobs, but I'll make an exception in this case..

      I thought the same thing about the keyswitch/switchgaurd.

      But even a simple, glaring-red "ARE YOU SURE?!?" Confirmation Dialog would have probably prevented this frickin' FIASCO!!!

      Probably. But it's still a computer driven thing, and if there is one thing I've learned it's that peoople trust computers too much. If they really worked all that well, they'd be the ones launching missiles automatically, no human intervention needed.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    84. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      Hey, it's probably a Windows-based system. We're lucky it didn't just decide to do a "Critical Update" at that moment!

      I heard on one news report that the reason it took so long to cancel the Alert was that the Application that was supposed to do that "wasn't loaded"

      (Now was it CANCEL.EXE, OR CANCEL1.EXE...?)

      It is REALLY amazing we haven't had a bug-related missle launch in all this time...

      We'ce come so close to accidentally incinerating ourselves on multiple occasions. Sensors fail, computers have software issues. In these cases, a human managed to believe something was askew when the computers were skwacking at them to start WW3. The scariest one was the Soviet satellite problem where it insisted the US had launched 5 nuc tipped missiles, and the funniest Strangelovian moment was when we almost ednded th eworld as we know it when a moonrise over Norway became a Soviet missile launch. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/0... Seriously, North Korea has nothing on the Nuclear Follies.

      But to be serious, we might be in a situation now where caution won't be exercised. We have NK and the Present Occupant in a weenie waving contest, and said occupant does seem to want to use these big boys, which might cement his position in history pretty solid. So I for one, take accidental incoming missile strike oppsies pretty seriously, just for the potential escalation. It isn't likely to happen, a reality check should show no launch signatures, but these are not normal times.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    85. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      What a well reasoned posting, I especially like the respectful way you describe the people involved in a system you have no f-ing clue how it operates.

      And no, that thinking isn't the problem which should be obvious if you spent some seconds thinking about it - assuming you have an IQ higher than an amoeba.

      Speaking of respectful. Wanna talk about fail safe systems? Use the big words - I might just understand a lot more than you think I do.

      There's your challenge, Accepted? Prove that a software only system is fail safe.

      Ask the people aboard Flight 800.

      Oh, wait...

      And the Airbus too. Remember the early flight where the computer insisted that the plane fly below treetop level? "Fortunately" there were not that many on board.

      Ot the one over in Europe where there was a strike that damaged thte engines on takeoff? Yeah, the SOP is to reduce power to as low as possible and return to land the plane while you still have engines. But apparently pilots would often throttle back shortly after takeoff to lower noise level in nearby developments. Well, that was considered bad by some folk, so they inserted some new software that wouldn't allow you to throttle back. You could play with the throttle all you want, but it didn't matter. They didn't bother to tell the pilots either. So the poor schmedlocks were desperately trying to reduce engine RPMs to save the engines enough to land, while the computer destroyed them by running at full power. They crashed in a field a few miles from the airport. Fortunately no one was killed. There were plenty of injuries though.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    86. Re:Uforgiveable by TheFakeTimCook · · Score: 1

      The larger blame lies with the government and the (I hate the term, but it's so applicable here.) sheeple who call for this sort of a warning system.

      There is no legitimate reason to have this sort of warning in place. None! North Korea has established that it can hit the ocean with its missiles most of the time. (They took out a neighborhood in one of their cities within the last 6 months!) Until North Korea is a) demonstrating that it can actually get an ICBM within 100 miles of its intended target, and b) is actively threatening to blow up parts of the US, it's insane fear mongering to have such a system in place.

      I just don't understand how we got to a place where a sizable percent of the population of the US lives in daily fear of highly improbable shit. It's so utterly stupid, and unfortunately, these dumbasses vote in dumbasses who play on these fears.

      Any suggestions for what we replace "the land of the free and the home of the brave" with?

      So, we wait until they DO have that capabilty, and THEN start developing a warning system?

      You are frickin' waste of DNA.

    87. Re:Uforgiveable by apoc.famine · · Score: 1

      My point still stands. There is no reason for a warning system for Russia, China, or any other country. We are not at war. And "duck and cover" was never a valid strategy anyway.

      Failing large-scale nuclear war preparations, there is no use for a warning system except for this sort of occasional panic. If we don't have months of food and water stocked up for the bulk of the populace, fallout scrubbing air filters, large capacity nuclear bunkers, etc., what's the point of warning people? Better off getting fried or crushed in the blast wave so it's quick, rather than the next several weeks of radiation poisoning and starvation.

      Where I live we have tornado sirens. Why? Because several times a year we get tornadoes, and in general, we have safe places to go until it's all clear. That's a useful warning system. "Oh shit we're all going to die!" isn't.

      --
      Velociraptor = Distiraptor / Timeraptor
    88. Re:Uforgiveable by TheFakeTimCook · · Score: 1

      Bingo! "Sokath, his eyes opened"

      Temba, at rest.

    89. Re:Uforgiveable by TheFakeTimCook · · Score: 1

      You need a mechanical physical switch with a switch guard. The very fact that an actual alert would be triggered by a menu item, indicates a completely incompetent design. I seldom call for people's jobs, but I'll make an exception in this case..

      I thought the same thing about the keyswitch/switchgaurd.

      But even a simple, glaring-red "ARE YOU SURE?!?" Confirmation Dialog would have probably prevented this frickin' FIASCO!!!

      Probably. But it's still a computer driven thing, and if there is one thing I've learned it's that peoople trust computers too much. If they really worked all that well, they'd be the ones launching missiles automatically, no human intervention needed.

      Yup.

    90. Re:Uforgiveable by TheFakeTimCook · · Score: 1

      Hey, it's probably a Windows-based system. We're lucky it didn't just decide to do a "Critical Update" at that moment!

      I heard on one news report that the reason it took so long to cancel the Alert was that the Application that was supposed to do that "wasn't loaded"

      (Now was it CANCEL.EXE, OR CANCEL1.EXE...?)

      It is REALLY amazing we haven't had a bug-related missle launch in all this time...

      We'ce come so close to accidentally incinerating ourselves on multiple occasions. Sensors fail, computers have software issues. In these cases, a human managed to believe something was askew when the computers were skwacking at them to start WW3. The scariest one was the Soviet satellite problem where it insisted the US had launched 5 nuc tipped missiles, and the funniest Strangelovian moment was when we almost ednded th eworld as we know it when a moonrise over Norway became a Soviet missile launch. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/0... Seriously, North Korea has nothing on the Nuclear Follies.

      But to be serious, we might be in a situation now where caution won't be exercised. We have NK and the Present Occupant in a weenie waving contest, and said occupant does seem to want to use these big boys, which might cement his position in history pretty solid. So I for one, take accidental incoming missile strike oppsies pretty seriously, just for the potential escalation. It isn't likely to happen, a reality check should show no launch signatures, but these are not normal times.

      Yep, I've heard about all of those foibles.

      And yes, this isn't the time to have President Itchy-Trigger-Finger misguided by a flock of geese...

    91. Re:Uforgiveable by TheFakeTimCook · · Score: 1

      What a well reasoned posting, I especially like the respectful way you describe the people involved in a system you have no f-ing clue how it operates.

      And no, that thinking isn't the problem which should be obvious if you spent some seconds thinking about it - assuming you have an IQ higher than an amoeba.

      Speaking of respectful. Wanna talk about fail safe systems? Use the big words - I might just understand a lot more than you think I do.

      There's your challenge, Accepted? Prove that a software only system is fail safe.

      Ask the people aboard Flight 800.

      Oh, wait...

      And the Airbus too. Remember the early flight where the computer insisted that the plane fly below treetop level? "Fortunately" there were not that many on board.

      Ot the one over in Europe where there was a strike that damaged thte engines on takeoff? Yeah, the SOP is to reduce power to as low as possible and return to land the plane while you still have engines. But apparently pilots would often throttle back shortly after takeoff to lower noise level in nearby developments. Well, that was considered bad by some folk, so they inserted some new software that wouldn't allow you to throttle back. You could play with the throttle all you want, but it didn't matter. They didn't bother to tell the pilots either. So the poor schmedlocks were desperately trying to reduce engine RPMs to save the engines enough to land, while the computer destroyed them by running at full power. They crashed in a field a few miles from the airport. Fortunately no one was killed. There were plenty of injuries though.

      Niiiice. I hadn't heard about that last one. Need to watch more "Air Disasters", I guess, LOL!

      And we both failed to mention the first failure of the Windows XP-based Aegis missle system, which splashed a commercial airliner in the Mediterranean (can't remember the number) because it didn't know how to do IFOF with a civilian aircraft.

    92. Re:Uforgiveable by systemeng · · Score: 1

      Therac 25 teaches us that mechanical interlocks and switches are a good thing. The probability of failure of a well designed switch (1e-5 to 1e-6) is a lot lower and better analyzed than the probability of failure of half baked (or any kind of) software.

      Making the final output of the system go through a mechanical switch for a real alert means that the system can't send a real alert without the switch being closed e.g. the signal path is physically open at the switch. P(false alert)=P(software fails)*P(switch fails)

      If you feed the output of the switch through possibly defective software, you've changed the equation to P(failure)=P(software fails)+P(switch fails) which is similar to what caused the Challenger disaster.

      In Challenger, the two seals on the booster rockets were deemed redundant with independent failure probabilities P(failure)=P(fail_seal1)*P(fail_seal2) however a common failure path for both seals,low temperature, was overlooked giving the equation as roughly P(failure)=P(fail_seal1)+P(fail_seal2).

      Since the probability of the switch failing is near zero, with the switch in place as the sole last step, the chance of a false alert is near zero. If the switch is read by software then the chance of sending a false alert reverts to the failure percentage of the software negating the value of adding a switch to begin with .

    93. Re:Uforgiveable by systemeng · · Score: 1

      Most likely, this is part of the civil defense warning systems used for tornadoes, floods, mudslides, fires, etc. Somebody in local civil defense most likely got the idea to add Nuclear Missile Alert and the whole thing "mushroomed" into a mess.

    94. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      My point still stands. There is no reason for a warning system for Russia, China, or any other country. We are not at war.

      This is some pretty interesting logic, you don't need a warning system until after you are attacked. Considering the efficiencey of nucs as far as killing goes, that's a little late.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    95. Re:Uforgiveable by arglebargle_xiv · · Score: 1

      Your thinking is exactly what produced this system. Physical switches are so 1968! We can trigger the alert through a menu, and since we need a shortcut we'll use Ctrl+D so it will be easy.

      Ctrl-D? For what, Dumbass? It has to be mnemonic, M is for Missile, so make the missle-alert hotkey Ctrl-M. As soon as anyone hits Ctrl-M on the keyboard, a nuke warning goes out. That'll make it practically immune to errors.

    96. Re:Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      Your thinking is exactly what produced this system. Physical switches are so 1968! We can trigger the alert through a menu, and since we need a shortcut we'll use Ctrl+D so it will be easy.

      Ctrl-D? For what, Dumbass? It has to be mnemonic, M is for Missile, so make the missle-alert hotkey Ctrl-M. As soon as anyone hits Ctrl-M on the keyboard, a nuke warning goes out. That'll make it practically immune to errors.

      Whoosh!

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    97. Re: Uforgiveable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      My bmws have a mechanical switch guard before you can hit the need assist button. Itâ(TM)s basic stuff.

    98. Re:Uforgiveable by cyberchondriac · · Score: 1

      True, those are generally useless. How many users just click through "bothersome" confirmation Windows when they think they know what they're doing. They rarely attempt to read an actual error message either, to get a clue what went wrong.
      Making them actually type something like "not a test" in the confirmation window might wake them up though, and have them go, "Huh?... shit, cancel !".

      --

      Look back up at my post, now look back down, you're on the Internet. Now look back up. I'm a signature.
    99. Re:Uforgiveable by cyberchondriac · · Score: 1

      It also beats seeing a real missile incoming and mistakenly choosing a "test" warning instead.
      Not that there's anything Hawaiians could do about it anyway, they don't have basements or fallout shelters, apparently. Maybe they'd have enough just time to leave work/school and huddle with their loved ones.

      --

      Look back up at my post, now look back down, you're on the Internet. Now look back up. I'm a signature.
    100. Re: Uforgiveable by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      TWA 800 was not a software problem.

      The Airbus crash you're taking about is, I assume, Air France Flight 296? If so, this was not a software problem either; while some controversy exists, the official cause was pilot error.

      The third crash you mentioned ... I have no clue what you're referring to there; I'm not familiar with any such crash and the details you've given sound like bullshit. If you can provide an actual reference on that one I would love to check it out.

    101. Re:Uforgiveable by cyberchondriac · · Score: 1

      Make them type in, "This is not a test".
      If they still go ahead after that point and send, then they are idiots.

      --

      Look back up at my post, now look back down, you're on the Internet. Now look back up. I'm a signature.
    102. Re:Uforgiveable by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      Prove that a software only system is fail safe.

      You might want to look into railroad operations. Signals controlling sections of track must always fail to a "stop - don't go on this track" default, because the alternative is to have two trains trying to occupy the same space at the same time, given the correct mixup. It took a long time for them to come up with reliable software solutions, having previously used elaborately designed relay logic.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
    103. Re:Uforgiveable by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      Some people are color-blind. Never use color alone to distinguish things.

      So, the test confirmation could have been a small yellow popup with standard yes/no buttons that plays Happy Birthday, while the real confirmation could have been a large red popup in another place playing the Imperial March, and with buttons that changed position in the popup so the operator would have to read the "Send Alert Message" button to distinguish it from the "False Alarm" button. (Yes, the latter is harder to do in MFC.)

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
    104. Re:Uforgiveable by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      "Duck and cover" can be a viable strategy if you're far enough away. There's nothing you can do if you're too close to ground zero, but if you're further from it getting in shelter can be useful. You seem to think survival precautions don't vary with distance from the blast.

      The time from "not at war" to "BOOM" can be pretty darn short nowadays. Back in WWII, the Japanese tried half-heartedly to time a very nasty-sounding breakoff of negotiations to be just before the Pearl Harbor attack (the Japanese declared war hours after the attack). Had there been a good alert system in place, the Japanese attack could have been far less successful. (US codebreakers had determined that there would be a major diplomatic event at about sunrise, Pearl Harbor. This message was delayed in processing because nobody in charge was being urgent, and then the Army main transmitter in Washington was down, so they sent the alert by Western Union. The person delivering the telegram was approaching the base when the air attack started.)

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
    105. Re: Uforgiveable by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      TWA 800 was not a software problem.

      The Airbus crash you're taking about is, I assume, Air France Flight 296? If so, this was not a software problem either; while some controversy exists, the official cause was pilot error.

      The third crash you mentioned ... I have no clue what you're referring to there; I'm not familiar with any such crash and the details you've given sound like bullshit. If you can provide an actual reference on that one I would love to check it out.

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... Yeah, this is the one. Kinda weird that the pilots couldn't tell there were trees in front of them. Regardless, there is a level of controversy there. It certainly looked like a highly controlled flight into the trees. Operating from memory, I used the wrong plane as an example, and I knew it right after I posted it. Mea Maxima culpas all around. It was an MD-80, Scandanavian airlines Flight 751, leaving Stockholm airport to Denmark in 1991. hhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6oJUt4WWdQ There's your reference, and sorry for the error.

      Point was that depending on automated processes might not always bring optimum results. While flight 751's problems were initially caused by a flawed de-icing process, the automation on the plane prevented the pilots from using the best practices - reducing power to the minimum needed - that might have allowed them to return safely to the airport. The people who determined that reducing power right after takeoff was a bad thing because pilots often tried to mitigate noise after takeoff just contributed to the destruction of the engines and plane, and it surely would have been helpful if they told the pilots about it. I don't know exactly the MD-80 control scheme, but do know that there was a level of automation involved since pilot input could be ignored. I'm pretty certain you would agree that damaged engines that are surging shouldn't be run at takeoff power. Point is also it is really nice if the plane obeys the pilots in an emergency.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    106. Re: Uforgiveable by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      Ah, OK. You're taking about an "automatic thrust restoration" system, but describing both it's operation and it's purpose incorrectly.

      It has nothing to do with noise levels or whatever. There are many types of systems which provide some type of automatic control of thrust during takeoff. This is not "because some guy doesn't like it when pilots throttle down"; it's a safety feature. Most crashes occur shortly after takeoff or shortly before landing, so a bunch of safety systems have been designed to correct for various problems during these phases of flight.

      The specific system in question here is one which is designed to ensure that the aircraft maintains sufficient thrust during the climb phase immediately after takeoff. In the case of a sudden engine failure the remaining engine is throttled up. In case of human error where too little thrust is selected, both engines can be brought up to provide sufficient thrust. In either case, the computer prevents a low-altitude stall, which quite likely prevents a crash.

      During the accident you're talking about, the system worked as advertised; unfortunately the pilots were apparently unaware that their aircraft was equipped with this feature. At that time ATR was brand new; these days every pilot knows about it, and learning when and how to manually override it is part of standard training on any aircraft which has it.

      Anyway, long story short, it wasn't a software problem, it was human error due to insufficient training.

      As a side note, I'm not saying software is never the problem; there was a fairly serious software issue on the fleet which I worked on. Thankfully it didn't result in a crash, but the potential for a loss of aircraft was definitely there. However, software problems are relatively rare, and the vast majority of accidents are due to human error, followed by the physical failure of components. Software is way, way down on the list.

    107. Re: Uforgiveable by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      Small followup on this:

      It certainly looked like a highly controlled flight into the trees.

      That's basically what it was. They flew too low, and didn't realize their mistake in time. Going by the cockpit voice recorder there was less than 5 seconds between them realizing their mistake and the time they hit the trees. At the time when they realized that they had fucked up they were moving at the slowest possible speed for the aircraft to maintain lift. They immediately applied power, but 5 seconds was not enough time for the aircraft to increase speed to the point where it could safely climb.

      The article you linked to says that they attempted to climb immediately after applying power, but that the aircraft overrode that decision. That's about the only point where some uncertainty exists. Had the aircraft allowed them to try and climb it's quite likely, given their slow speed and already high angle of attack, that they would have simply stalled the aircraft and plumetted to the ground. In that sense, the computer may actually have prevented a worse crash, allowing them to glide into trees instead of stalling and falling straight down. On the other hand there's some small possibility that they might have managed to climb enough to clear the trees without stalling.

      It's hard to say for sure, but what we can say without a doubt is that the incident was largely due to the demonstration itself calling for risky manouvers, and the pilots making mistakes which led them to fly too low. If the software was a contributing cause, it was only the last link in an already incredibly weak chain.

  2. There was no tech âoefailingâ. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Insightful

    The alert went through as chosen and selected. It worked as designed.

    What failed was the operator not paying attention to their work.

    1. Re:There was no tech âoefailingâ. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There's a very obvious tech failing right there - in your âoesubject lineâ.

    2. Re:There was no tech âoefailingâ. by RobinH · · Score: 4, Insightful

      No, you're wrong. UI design plays a major role in the correct operation of a system. Very few people in my experience are detail-oriented people, and even the ones who are still make predictable mistakes. The system must account for how real people actually behave. To do otherwise is bad system design. Looks like this was just a test of connectivity. I don't know why they didn't automate the test (send a test file once every 8 hours, write in the log that it got sent, and write in the log that a confirmation came back, then have another job that looks for those log entries in the appropriate time range and alerts the operators if it didn't work). Yes, you still need to manually test, but not as often. In a case like this, there should be a prior action required to "arm" any of the "real" messages, so there's two different processes that you won't mix up. A generic "are you sure" query isn't good enough because it's the same message whether you picked a real message or a test message. Muscle memory kicks in and you just click Yes, after all that's what you did the last several hundred times.

      --
      "I have never let my schooling interfere with my education." - Mark Twain
    3. Re:There was no tech âoefailingâ. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      What failed was the operator not paying attention to their work.

      If you're designing software without assuming users occasionally make stupid mistakes, then you, the UI designer, are both lazy and stupid.

    4. Re:There was no tech âoefailingâ. by cwsumner · · Score: 1

      Humans are part of the system. If a human error is made, then the system design has failed.

      Blaming it on the operator is a "pointy-haired-boss" excuse, even if it is (partly) true.

    5. Re:There was no tech âoefailingâ. by gweihir · · Score: 1

      Wrong. The screw-up here is a system that makes it far too easy to screw up. It was bound to happen given this abysmally bad design.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
  3. Hi, I'm Clippy by 110010001000 · · Score: 5, Funny

    They need to add some AI:

    "Hi, I'm Clippy! Are you sure you want to send a missile alert?"
    "No, Clippy"
    "OK then, launching missiles".

  4. UI failure by OffTheLip · · Score: 1

    If the selections were in the same menu then that's just horrible UI design. I assume both selections require a strong confirmation of the action too.

    1. Re:UI failure by DigiShaman · · Score: 2

      Sorta like how a common utility function often used is right next to "delete". Drift a few pixels over and *poof*, gone!

      Hey UI devs, just because you're having a shitty day doesn't me the rest of us deserve it too.

      --
      Life is not for the lazy.
    2. Re:UI failure by RobinH · · Score: 1

      Exactly. Having them in there and grayed out so you can't select them would be fine too. Then you have to take some action to manually "arm" or "enable" the real ones, and then you can select them. That clearly would have been enough to stop this error.

      --
      "I have never let my schooling interfere with my education." - Mark Twain
    3. Re:UI failure by Calydor · · Score: 1

      Strong confirmation? "Send Alert?" [Yes] [No]

      --
      -=This sig has nothing to do with my comment. Move along now=-
    4. Re:UI failure by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Or lets use Ctrl+W to close a tab and Ctrl-Q to quit the browser and make it so no one can reconfigure those bindings. No one will ever press the wrong key and lose all their private browsing tabs. Why is the SW industry seemingly getting dumber and dumber? Too much screen time like our parents warned?

  5. Tech failed? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The tech did exactly what you asked. The tech didn't have a cancel option because the tech didn't make a mistake.

    1. Re:Tech failed? by hey! · · Score: 1

      Give that some systems are worse than others in inviting operator error, you can't just assume it's not the tech because operator error was involved. However even if the tech is as good as humans can possibly make it, that still wouldn't prevent operator error.

      This kind of fault is hard to test for, because it's a non-functional requirement. You can't simply do a functional test and check off "prevent accidental message from being sent". At best you can simulate various scenarios, but those simulations are unreliable because you're dealing with testers, not people who are habituated to the system and who thus use it differently.

      Clearly there were several kinds of operational faults here that may have been compounded by design flaws. But one of the operational mistakes was purely a matter of planning: not programming in a "false alarm" message to be sent after the inevitable operator error. This also suggests a design shortcoming in the system in that designers didn't anticipate the need to ever issue an ad hoc message on short notice.

      --
      Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
    2. Re:Tech failed? by plopez · · Score: 1

      "you're dealing with testers, not people who are habituated to the system and who thus use it differently."

      This is a direct violation of Agile. developers should be given close contact and ability to collaborate with the end users. Not having 5 degrees of separation between developers is the key to bad software. You end up playing telephone and with no understand of the real problem.

      I am appalled at the SW development I have seen in large SW companies. the waste, mis-management, slippage, and distain users and developers develop for each other. Layers of management who seem to have as a purpose only in preserving their jobs.

      That's why I prefer smaller companies with in-house projects, as opposed to larger companies with outhouse projects.

      This is

      --
      putting the 'B' in LGBTQ+
    3. Re:Tech failed? by hey! · · Score: 1

      First of all, Agile doesn't work in every situation unless you stretch the definition to include non-agile practices where warranted. Second, the distinction between users and testers isn't as clean as you suggest. Users *are* testers until they become habituated to the system.

      --
      Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
    4. Re:Tech failed? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yeah, it was an unusually stupid headline, but I think most of us have come to understand that Slashdot editors don't put the same level of caring and effort into their jobs, as say, a typical state government worker 4 months before retiring with full pension, while on a smoke break.

      Anyway, the system failed, the system being a combination of tech and tools, management organization and rules, and the people within all that. The tech did what it was designed to do, and the system utterly, spectactularly, and embarassingly failed to do what it was designed to do.

    5. Re:Tech failed? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The system should _never_ _ever_ send "false alarm". That would make any message from the system "incoming missiles -- take cover! (maybe we might change our minds.)" Adding ad hoc messages is an even worse idea. At some point a politician will get the bright idea of using the system for trivial notifications (like "air quality alerts") that are better handled via other channels.

    6. Re:Tech failed? by hey! · · Score: 1

      The system should _never_ _ever_ send "false alarm".

      Sure, but how do you design a system where that never happens?

      Adding ad hoc messages is an even worse idea. At some point a politician will get the bright idea of using the system for trivial notifications (like "air quality alerts") that are better handled via other channels.

      And how do you design a system that cannot deliberately be misused?

      --
      Post may contain irony: discontinue use if experiencing mood swings, nausea or elevated blood pressure.
  6. \o/ by easyTree · · Score: 1

    You need a mechanical physical switch with a switch guard. The very fact that an actual alert would be triggered by a menu item, indicates a completely incompetent design. I seldom call for people's jobs, but I'll make an exception in this case..

    For all we know this menu-option-no-confirmation approach was dictated during a 'pair programming' session with an over-the-shoulder manager.

  7. UI Design...again by grasshoppa · · Score: 0

    It's like no one gives any thought to user interface designs. As long as the functionality is there, who cares if it's hidden behind layers of idiocy?

    MS is particularly bad at this; anytime they actually stumble on decent design, they spend the next several versions killing it with prejudice. However, they are only the most visible, not the worst by far.

    Is it because we put art majors in charge of UI design? Is that it?

    --
    Mod me down with all of your hatred and your journey towards the dark side will be complete!
    1. Re:UI Design...again by cascadingstylesheet · · Score: 2

      Is it because we put art majors in charge of UI design? Is that it?

      Could be.

      I've almost given up on pushing back on UI design.

      Their two overriding and incompatible drives are to 1. hide complexity and 2. make things super easy.

      The result is that it's super easy to do things that you don't understand.

    2. Re:UI Design...again by plopez · · Score: 1

      No, we put BAs in charge. Arts majors would probably know more about it than your typical manager.

      --
      putting the 'B' in LGBTQ+
  8. Slashdot's fault. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    While it was certainly a bone headed mistake, it was one what was easily possible for someone in a hurry. As this fellow was just wrapping up his shift, he was clearly trying to get everything done in time.

    No. I was in a rush to flame someone on Slashdot for posting something stupid.

    Gotta have priorities ya know.

  9. however by Kierthos · · Score: 1

    Yes, there are tech failings in this incident. There were also human failings. Let's not let the tech failings overshadow the human ones.

    I mean, sure, let's get better tech solutions for this. But we can't ignore the fact that the President, who tweets about anything that upsets him, couldn't be bothered to interrupt his golf game to say that this was a false alarm.

    --
    Mr. Hu is not a ninja.
    1. Re:however by nwaack · · Score: 1

      But we can't ignore the fact that the President, who tweets about anything that upsets him, couldn't be bothered to interrupt his golf game to say that this was a false alarm.

      Regardless of how much you don't like him, it's not the president's job to correct false emergency alerts. There was a chain of command about 20 people long who should've done something about this but they were all asleep at the wheel. Yeesh, I'm really starting to think that Trump derangement syndrome is a real thing.

    2. Re:however by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      This was an alert sent by a state that turned out to be wrong. There's absolutely no reason for the President, whether Donald Trump or Abraham Lincoln, to get involved.

      There's so many legitimate complaints about Trump that there's no point in illegitimate ones.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  10. Follow up Tweet? by ogar572 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Seriously, contact all the major TV and radio stations in the area first. The expectation that everyone should get critical information from "social" media is a joke.

    1. Re:Follow up Tweet? by geekmux · · Score: 1

      Seriously, contact all the major TV and radio stations in the area first. The expectation that everyone should get critical information from "social" media is a joke.

      Contact all major TV and radio stations? The GenY/Z'er is still wondering what the fuck a radio is, and they cut the TV and cable cord long ago. They consume all of their "news" via Social Media and streaming now. You got something to say, it better be in an Insta-Netflix-Tweet format. The joke is assuming the younger generation knows about ancient tools of communication.

      Hell, even the POTUS uses Twitter to get his messages-on-fire out to the masses. Love it or hate it, social media has become the de facto standard to communicate to the masses, so we might as well modify our emergency broadcast systems to accept this fact.

    2. Re:Follow up Tweet? by cascadingstylesheet · · Score: 1

      Seriously, contact all the major TV and radio stations in the area first. The expectation that everyone should get critical information from "social" media is a joke.

      Given how most media these days just republish and comment on tweets anyway, it worked out OK though.

      (/sarc)

    3. Re:Follow up Tweet? by BKDotCom · · Score: 1

      How does text/email fall under "social media"?
      Do robocalls also fall under "social media?"

    4. Re:Follow up Tweet? by h4ck7h3p14n37 · · Score: 1

      Hell, even the POTUS uses Twitter to get his messages-on-fire out to the masses. Love it or hate it, social media has become the de facto standard to communicate to the masses, so we might as well modify our emergency broadcast systems to accept this fact.

      I have seen exactly zero restaurants and businesses that have replaced their televisions with Twitter feeds.

    5. Re:Follow up Tweet? by pipingguy · · Score: 1

      Shouldn't we call it social engineering media from now on?

    6. Re:Follow up Tweet? by geekmux · · Score: 1

      Hell, even the POTUS uses Twitter to get his messages-on-fire out to the masses. Love it or hate it, social media has become the de facto standard to communicate to the masses, so we might as well modify our emergency broadcast systems to accept this fact.

      I have seen exactly zero restaurants and businesses that have replaced their televisions with Twitter feeds.

      I have seen exactly zero emergency broadcast systems that do not also use some form of social media or cellular broadcast. Reverse 911 systems had to be modified to include cell phones because of the death of the landline phone. Almost every major news outlet now has a live stream channel on YouTube, and an app on a smartphone.

      And yeah, our business has a television hanging on the wall. It's full of reporters who scrape social media to report the news. People still watching it will say "did you heard abou...", and the younger generation responds with "yup, already heard about it. Hit social media hours ago."

      Not saying television isn't still a communication tool. It's simply not the most effective or timely tool anymore.

  11. How fix? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    You have a operator running something important without paying attention.
    In other words he's a bored human govt employee.
    The proper fix is motivation, but what could the software do?

    The UX probably already asks if you are sure you want to send something.
    For commands that send an alert instead of a test, it could ask if you are sure you are sure, and in different color, with a different sound, and with a 10 sec countdown.
    It should be subconciencly obvious that you were not just doing a test.

    A computer probably can't fix stupid, but you can try, and eliminate any further excuses for this particular error happening again.

    1. Re:How fix? by careysub · · Score: 2

      The UX probably already asks if you are sure you want to send something.

      Ah, the old AC favorite - I'll just make some facts up which I assume are true.

      --
      Starships were meant to fly, Hands up and touch the sky - Nicky Minaj
    2. Re:How fix? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Get the operator to *type* the word 'live' or 'test'.

    3. Re:How fix? by gweihir · · Score: 2

      Classically, you have to break a piece of glass or at the very least turn a key to trigger something like this. The UI design bears all of the blame here. It was asking for something like this to happen. It is absolutely no surprise it happened. The ones at fault are the ones that did design this broken UI and the ones that signed off on it. These should at the very least lose their jobs and probably face criminal penalty, because negligence does not get any more gross than this.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    4. Re:How fix? by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      Have a GUI that works.
      Verification and a clear command structure to initiate an alert.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  12. Of mice and menus by chthon · · Score: 1

    Who hasn't had the same issue with drop-down menus in standard software? Unfortunately there is no 'bitch-slap' feedback button to the designers or the software producer.

    Menus are designed with so called logically ordered groups, but in many cases have things underneath each other which look the same, but have different effects. And a slip of the mouse sometimes makes the wrong selection.

    1. Re:Of mice and menus by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      Let who has never clicked on the wrong Slashdot moderation cast the first flame.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  13. Of mice and FF. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The "history" menu in FF. "Show" and "Clear" are right next to each other.

  14. Prod vs. Subprod? by asylumx · · Score: 2

    Everyone is talking about bad UI, and they are right, but isn't the bigger problem that this is all being tested in production? Why does the "test missle alert" option even exist in production -- that should be in a sub-prod system that isn't actually connected. Maybe it has something to do with how the EBS works but seems ridiculous to me to even have those two options in the same system.

    1. Re:Prod vs. Subprod? by EvilSS · · Score: 1

      The test is to ensure that the production system is working, so putting it on a full test system would make the test meaningless.

      --
      I browse on +1 so AC's need not respond, I won't see it.
    2. Re:Prod vs. Subprod? by nevermindme · · Score: 1

      Every message on EBS is the same priority to the EBS system, the drill tag is for human consumption. Deliver message x to y group of broadcasters, remote stations, cellular towers and other emergency subsystems. The delivery circuit is the same for drill messages as actual weather, terrorism, acts of war and end of world alerts. The failing is that a plausible situation, a limited NK missile launch towards a reachable target, has no useful civil defense preparation or response. The 49 other US states do have limited interceptors but have had no public policy desire even to consider the marking of suitable bomb shelter locations.

    3. Re:Prod vs. Subprod? by Megol · · Score: 1

      I don't know if you are serious...

      Any system that isn't actively working all the time have to be regularly tested to ensure that it is working. How else would one know if the system can do what it's designed to do when the time comes?

      E.g. nuclear launch is trained and tested not only to ensure the people involved are ready to do their job if required, but also so that the system up until the last operation (arming of the warheads/actual launch) is known to work. And yes that is being tested "in production".

    4. Re:Prod vs. Subprod? by quetwo · · Score: 3, Insightful

      This is actually a test OF the prod system. You can have a totally separate system for testing, but you do need to test the production system to make sure that some system hasn't broke, bird eaten through a wire, or service credential expired. Data Centers test transfer switches once a month in production. Across the midwest, they test tornado sirens once a month.

    5. Re:Prod vs. Subprod? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      To make sure all the rest of the system is working. This wasn't a software test, it was a systems check. Just like you're supposed to press the test button on your smoke alarm and then it beeps as it normally would. If it would only flash a test light you'd never know if the speaker was broken. If there was no test button, because it was tested in design, then you'd never know if some part wore out. May areas tests their emergency alert sirens at a specific time on a specific day at a specific interval to make sure everything is still functional.

      Critical systems need to be testable in the environment they're operating under. Drills need to be run to make sure everyone actually understand what they're supposed to do rather than just thinks they understand.

    6. Re:Prod vs. Subprod? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      > That should be in a sub-prod system that isn't actually connected.

      I guess the aim of this was to test that everythin will work when needed.
      Testing a a system that isn't actually connected would be rather pointless.

    7. Re:Prod vs. Subprod? by plopez · · Score: 1

      OK, all you have to do is create a simulator. Which captures every nuance of all the alert paths with will be taken; twitter, FB, radio, shortwave radio, police radio, fire department radio, hospital alert systems, maritime systems, etc. Get it?

      --
      putting the 'B' in LGBTQ+
    8. Re:Prod vs. Subprod? by RockyMountain · · Score: 1

      YES. Mod parent up, please, anybody who has points!

    9. Re:Prod vs. Subprod? by asylumx · · Score: 1

      Good point, I wasn't considering the physical aspects of test, just software.

  15. Takes time by DrYak · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Seriously, contact all the major TV and radio stations in the area first.

    Which should take some time, unlike sending a tweet on an account already owned by the emergency center.

    Also, the contacting of TV and Radio station might be hampered by people actually attempting to follow the instruction of the previous wrong alert.

    Though most TV and Radio crew might wonder how come there's an alert about a missile attack on their *phones* while, at the same time they do not receive a full list of information that they have to broadcast immediately to the population while interrupting the normal programming.

    So, while the HEMA guys are heading for the simplest thing to do to communicate information (blasting it on accounts that they actually own, like Twitter), the TV and Radio station should be the one trying to contact HEMA to understand why they weren't asked to broadcast any emergency information (it might have been an error like in this case. Or in the alternative case of an actual live attack, the general population might be missing critical information that the Radio should have been broadcasting and that got stuck somewhere in the process).

    --
    "Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]
    1. Re:Takes time by mrbester · · Score: 1

      How many people follow their local emergency centre on Twitter? How many even know that they can (or even if it has an account to follow in the first place)? Upon receiving an emergency message on their phones, would people even consider any attempt at verifying via a private party (social media)?

      Unlikely scenario: hey, I've just got a flash message that we're all about to die. I'll just look on that arbiter of truth called Twitter to double-check.

      I don't see anything, so I'll Google the centre to see if it has an account to follow, give me a minute...

      (waiting) That's odd, I'm not hearing any sirens, they must have knocked them out by hacking them before launching. I heard they've got all kinds of stuff connected to the Internet and there was that story about power stations not that long ago...

      Oh, no results. Maybe I typed the name wrong, hang on, I'll try a more generic search... ah, here it is. Nope, nothing mentioned. I'll look at the "contact us" section. Wow, crappy website, takes ages to load and looks rubbish on mobile, but that's standard for public sector sites I suppose...

      Ah, here we go (finally). Nope. No account. Hmm, what to try ne... *immolated by blast*

      --
      "Wait. Something's happening. It's opening up! My God, it's full of apricots!"
    2. Re:Takes time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Part of being a "test" is that you have time to prepare. They would have had time to notify local news outlets that a test was scheduled.

  16. DemocRATS by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Iâ(TM)d definitely fuck Hillary

  17. Plan B by ISoldat53 · · Score: 1

    I wonder how many doses of Plan B were used this weekend?

  18. If This Were A Prison Administrator App by careysub · · Score: 1

    It would have a menu with consecutive items reading "kill prisoner" and "release prisoner".

    --
    Starships were meant to fly, Hands up and touch the sky - Nicky Minaj
    1. Re:If This Were A Prison Administrator App by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "Execute Prisoner Process" and "Execute Prisoner Release Process"

  19. Their Software by sycodon · · Score: 1

    What the dialog box probably was:

        Send Message?

        Test: (check box...off by default)

        (Send Button)

    --
    When Fascism comes to America, it will call itself Anti-Fascism, and tell you to give up your guns.
  20. I'm almost disappointed by hackertourist · · Score: 1

    the alert wasn't sent by WOPR.

  21. test alerts are part of the EBS system! by Joe_Dragon · · Score: 0

    test alerts are part of the EBS system!

  22. Differentiated confirmation actions by jockeys · · Score: 1

    I don't pride myself on UX work (mostly write tools for other engineers) but seriously, wouldn't you have a different (and much harder) confirmation for "Real Missiles Ahoy" vs "This has been A Test?" e.g. confirmation modal dialog box for the test (Are you sure? yes/no) vs. do a CAPTCHA && type a word && click something that moves around, etc. If everything in the system has a same (or materially similar) confirmation mechanism, you are basically training folks to ignore it; this is why only serious things (delete, etc.) have them.

    --

    In Soviet Russia jokes are formulaic and decidedly non-humorous.
  23. Hindsight 20/20, Foresight 20/200 by ancientt · · Score: 4, Insightful

    You're right. If I had mod points, I'd give you a bump. Your insight that the blessing here outweighs the cost is one I haven't seen given enough attention. Fresh eyes will be looking at how the process should work to prevent mistakes and that's a good thing. Likely they'll find other areas that need improvement.

    Using a system intended for conveniently notifying the public with information to instead notify the public of an emergency is a dangerous mistake, one of which they're now aware. Finding out that the public doesn't know how to respond is priceless information that they have now. The guy who clicked the wrong menu option may not deserve a medal, but put him on the committee determining how to fix the system and plan responses. Redemption is a strong motivator.

    Now the public knows that they need a response plan for such an emergency. Having public pressure to get prepared is perhaps the greatest thing that could happen. People trying to get the public prepared would have been frustrated before this, but now they'll have the public on their side. That's the kind of thing that makes budgets happen.

    --
    B) Eliminate all the stupid users. This is frowned upon by society.
    1. Re: Hindsight 20/20, Foresight 20/200 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They won't see this as a call to action to better prepare. You're talking about a population that is almost 30% on welfare. Their entire lives have been spent hour-to-hour, with the most difficult decision being between McDonald's or meth.

      For them, this is simply a reason to ignore future warnings.

  24. Slashdot Moderation UI by jdschulteis · · Score: 1

    Judging from the number of "posting to undo mis-moderation" posts I've seen, maybe Slashdot could learn from this fiasco and group the "up" and "down" moderations in the drop-down list.

    1. Re:Slashdot Moderation UI by zenbi · · Score: 1

      They did - in the beta. The drop down actually had two columns, one side was positive and the other side was negative.

  25. The error is in process, not execution by sjbe · · Score: 3, Insightful

    While it was certainly a bone headed mistake, it was one what was easily possible for someone in a hurry. As this fellow was just wrapping up his shift, he was clearly trying to get everything done in time.

    It this was indeed the setup the mistake was idiotic programming and software design. The end user screwing it up was entirely predictable and probably inevitable. The problem occurred when the system was designed. If a system can fail because of the design, it almost certainly will fail sooner or later.

    Part of my day job is to write work instructions and design procedures. When something goes wrong the first question I have to ask is "what did I do wrong", NOT "who screwed up"? 90+% of the time the problem was unclear/wrong/misleading instructions, a badly designed process, or some other problem where the person tasked with carrying out the instructions was set up to fail. In other words, my fault. We as engineers tend to take too little responsibility for our own failures and blame user error when in fact the error was a badly designed program or procedure. We tend to think we are the smartest people in the room and while that may be true sometimes it doesn't mean we are perfect.

    1. Re:The error is in process, not execution by evil_aaronm · · Score: 1

      Agreed: The process has to be annoyingly, painstakingly defined at every turn. I wrote some instructions for an add-on module to an existing product in the healthcare industry: it was actually just a Linksys router used in an internal configuration with maybe 3 changes at the setup screen. I figured, based on my experience researching the module add-on and configuring/testing it, it would be easy-peasy for the field people to get it working. I assumed they'd probably set up similar devices in their own homes. At the first training session, I was shocked by how badly these guys could bungle what should've been an incredibly simple task for anyone with a modicum of technical acuity. After that class, I went back to my desk, tossed all of my assumptions, and rewrote the two page quick sheet into a five page highly detailed set of instructions.

  26. Cost vs benefit by sjbe · · Score: 1

    They are concerned enough to spend money on the warning system, but have they spent the money on enough bunkers to hold the population of the islands? Are they located so that everyone has a reasonable chance of getting to one regardless of traffic/panic of everyone else trying to get there?

    A reasonable question with and unfortunately unreasonable answer. You have to weigh the costs of providing such shelter against the likely benefits. Odds are you'll find that building and maintaining such shelters is too costly to justify even presuming they would work as intended. (and it's not clear how useful such shelters would be) Folks in Hawaii are thinking about the problem seriously but the answers aren't simple ones.

  27. Force them to think? Good luck by sjbe · · Score: 1

    Force people to think.

    HA! Good luck with that. In my experience far too many people will fight tooth and nail to not have to engage their brains.

  28. There's no confirmation? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This kind of alert doesn't have some kind of independent confirmation system built in? I would think something that has the possibility of causing a mass panic or other immediate ramification would have to be approved by at least two separate personnel. For example one person commands the alert but someone else in the EOC (Emergency Operations Center) gets a popup asking for approval, if at least one other designated person doesn't confirm the alert doesn't go out.

    1. Re:There's no confirmation? by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      Independent confirmation?
      A generation of gov/mil/clandestine services workers are back to their cabins (bunkers) in Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Oregon and Washington days before?
      NORAD will get US leadership to a safe place.
      DEFCON get the US mil ready.
      Civilian notification would not be part of that kind of alert as its not linked.
      A tsunami warning system would be what an Operations Centre would be doing.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  29. Re:however (Trump Derangement Syndrome edition) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Yep, let's blame the President for this. While we're at it, he's to blame for quite a few things:

    False missile launch alert: Trump's fault.
    Inner city violence: Trump's fault.
    Ran out of toilet paper: Trump's fault.
    Demise of the dinosaurs: Trump's fault.
    AIDS: Trump's fault.

  30. Hack by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Am I on the only one whose first thought was that this may have been a hack by the NK to probe responses?

  31. The best test possible by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Well they wanted a "test", and they got the best test possible. Be grateful for this opportunity and use the data to answer the all important question of "Did the people move in response to the missile alert to minimize fatalities?"

    Of course NK can use this data as well to see where the people concentrated when there was a missile alert...

  32. North Korea by snookiex · · Score: 2

    I really hope North Korean UI designers made a separate button for "Wipe Seoul Off the Face of the Earth" and "Test Wipe Seoul Off the Face of the Earth"

    --
    Open Source Network Inventory for the masses! Kuwaiba
    1. Re:North Korea by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      NK had to consider that its own mil has been in contact with the NSA and CIA long term.
      So the NK system would be very different and have to take into consideration a lot of top NK mil will not do their job.
      A system thats more about rockets kept ready. Not allowing the NK mil the ability block a command.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  33. The single biggest failing.... by mark-t · · Score: 2

    ... is in the political climate which exists today that made such a report seem plausible.

    No single person can be blamed for that, however.

    1. Re:The single biggest failing.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Right. We have a long line of American presidents choosing North Korean appeasement, creating the opportunity to build nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. We really can't blame any one of them.

    2. Re:The single biggest failing.... by evil_aaronm · · Score: 1

      Ya know, back in the '50s, we tried to take out N. Korea with a "conventional" war. Didn't work so well. Maybe you should read up on it, but I'm guessing that failure, leading to something of a detente', is why following presidents were reluctant to engage in another war. But if you're smarter than all of those administrations, please do run for office and fix things.

    3. Re:The single biggest failing.... by evil_aaronm · · Score: 1

      Yes and no. I'm old enough to remember the "duck and cover" drills in second grade. By third and fourth grade, we no longer had to do those. And in the decades since, even when the Cold War waged heavily, I never actually feared an attack: level heads generally prevailed. However, with the recent childish goading of an unstable nut job with nuclear abilities at his fingertips - and I'll leave you to figure out who is whom, because it works both ways - I don't feel nearly as safe as I used to. And that does come down to one of two people.

    4. Re:The single biggest failing.... by cold+fjord · · Score: 1

      North Korea has made repeated public statements that for them an attack on the United States was inevitable. That is a matter of "when", not "if". They have repeated stated that their ICBMs and nuclear weapons only target the United States. They have repeated stated that they are at war with the US, and that the truce is off. The war is back on, but there hasn't been any shooting by the UN forces lead by the US, only by North Korean forces, including the recent border incursion by North Korea. I'm curious, . . . who were you thinking?

      --
      much of left-wing thought is a kind of playing with fire by people who don't even know that fire is hot - George Orwell
  34. Message is message fail by metoc · · Score: 1

    In addition to a poor design it is a happy path system and doesnâ(TM)t account for real world exceptions. The project obviously chose fast and cheap over good.

  35. Authentication by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Why not a biscuit? "Are you sure? Enter code to authenticate:"
    Obviously the test version wouldn't prompt for that, or could be a static code posted on the wall.

    I realize time is of the essence, but this method is fast & secure enough for the actual apocalyptic launch.

  36. Re:however (Trump Derangement Syndrome edition) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Oh no, the GP has triggered a trumpflake, some one find him a safe space!

  37. Look on the positive side by houghi · · Score: 1

    At least they now know it works for all users, not just a few test users.

    --
    Don't fight for your country, if your country does not fight for you.
  38. I was there, had 38 minutes of contemplation... by DanDD · · Score: 1

    I was there, vacationing in Hawaii. Got the alert, noted the time. Then I finished eating breakfast while listening to the morning riot of birds as the last hints of sunrise's color faded into daylight. I'm old, and my kids were thousands of miles away...

    The biggest failure wasn't the bogus "BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER. THIS IS NOT A DRILL."

    The biggest failure, in my opinion, is the waste of a whole lot of tax money on stupid shit, and unaccountable politicians, government agencies and defense contractors that have inspired zero public confidence.

    If the military can only 'maybe' defend it's own assets against such an attack from an adversary such as North Korea, why are we allowing our elected leaders to spend so much money on a questionable approach to national defense?

    Why would any rational entity ever deploy a weapon system without also committing to developing a means to defend against it? An no, mutually assured destruction has not been, is not, and will never be a 'defense'. It's simply a guarantee of more destruction.

    --
    "Every time I see an adult on a bicycle, I no longer despair for the future of the human race." - H. G. Wells
    1. Re:I was there, had 38 minutes of contemplation... by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      It depends on the past decades of party political tinkering with the US mil.
      The US will respond on detection only and without hesitation? As any enemy is detected launching, the US launches too.
      Every enemy of the US then understands they might not get their platforms into the USA and that the USA has already launched.
      The US is ready as another nation spins up its rockets.

      What has the US changed that to?
      Wait, absorb and respond much later after the US mil has been given new party political rules?
      Such political changes to US mil launch on detection after 1990's, 2000's have to be considered.
      If this is the quality of the alert system, what must this generation of US mil be selected from for detection and launch on detection?
      The US is not sure about the quality of this generations contractors, mil staff and what they will do when given the direct command to launch on detection.
      Spies have found out about such political changes to US mil command and control and other nations see an opening to try new tactics.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
    2. Re:I was there, had 38 minutes of contemplation... by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      Why would any rational entity ever deploy a weapon system without also committing to developing a means to defend against it?

      You may be unaware of this, but we don't normally worry about attacks from systems we deploy. We worry about attacks from systems other countries who are potentially hostile deploy. When the Soviets got nukes, we also committed to developing a means to defend against them. Know what? We couldn't develop a defense against nuclear weapons. Therefore, we should have stopped the Soviets, the Chinese, and the North Koreans from deploying such systems - how?

      An no, mutually assured destruction has not been, is not, and will never be a 'defense'. It's simply a guarantee of more destruction.

      We still haven't had an exchange of nuclear weapons. There still have been only two used against any sort of enemy, at the end of WWII. There's been a lot of crises and accidents in which such an exchange could have happened, and it never did. That's not the result of a guarantee of more destruction, but rather a successful defense.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
    3. Re:I was there, had 38 minutes of contemplation... by DanDD · · Score: 1

      General Turgidson, is that you?

      Words are important. They convey real meaning, and offer a glimpse into the thought process of those who compose them. Here's how I'd edit your words:

      An no, mutually assured destruction has not been, is not, and will never be a 'defense'. It's simply a guarantee of more destruction.

      We still haven't had an exchange of nuclear weapons, yet . There still have been only two used against any sort of enemy, at the end of WWII. There's been a lot of crises and accidents in which such an exchange very nearly occurred , but it hasn't happened yet. That's not the result of a guarantee of more destruction, but rather a successful defense, for now.

      During those few minutes in Hawaii, few people considered MAD a successful defense. They are justifiably upset, but the careless operator or the wrong button that he pushed isn't the real problem. The real problem is more fundamental.

      --
      "Every time I see an adult on a bicycle, I no longer despair for the future of the human race." - H. G. Wells
    4. Re:I was there, had 38 minutes of contemplation... by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      The real problem is that the ability to attack has improved more than the ability to defend. This is reality. We don't have missile defenses because they're extremely expensive and don't work very well. If another country develops nukes. we really can't stop them.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  39. A few points by dkman · · Score: 1

    The test can go at the click of a button, but the "Live" message should have an "Are you sure you want to send a LIVE message? This is NOT a test!" prompt before shooting out.

    If nothing else, the chaos caused should be used as a talking point so people are a little more prepared for a live event. Though I doubt that will happen.

    Why the hell do they have the authority to send a live message, but not the authority to send a false alert message? That was a dumb decision.

    Yea the guy made a mistake. It sucked, but he learned from it. So move on. If you fire him and bring in a new inexperienced guy who could make the same mistake down the road you're not doing yourself any favors. The original guy will make a point of not doing that again.

    --
    I refuse to sign
  40. No way to correct or cancel? by cwsumner · · Score: 1

    This system seems to have been designed by programmers who made a habit of ignoring error conditions, This is called incompetents, I think.

    Mistakes made by people are still "error conditions" and should be handled as needed. 8-)

  41. 37 minutes by tacokill · · Score: 1

    If the summary is true....that an incorrect drop down was selected...then why did it take 37 minutes to correct? Please explain why it wasn't corrected immediately.

    Something is fishy here....

    1. Re:37 minutes by jeff4747 · · Score: 1

      The answer to your question is in the summary. Might want to actually finish reading it.

    2. Re:37 minutes by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      To see what a nation would do. What the uS gov/mil all the new contractors would do.
      Who phones their family, who runs to their bunker, who drives out of a city to their bunker/cabin.
      What do spies all over Hawaii do? Do they contact their gov, embassy, their own nation?
      Faith groups, cults, dual citizens, criminals, spies in the US mil/gov/police? How do they react?
      Do people stay in place and wait for their orders? Do they make a lot of phone calls, send messages?
      The NSA and GCHQ will have fun with all the messages, calls to sort over that time.

      Who stayed loyal, who ran away, who started making calls, who was in contact with another gov/mil? Who is in a militia, is a survivalist?
      Who put their faith, cult, another nation before the USA?
      It was a test and a lot of once trusted people showed what they would do.
      Some stayed and waited for orders. Others did very unexpected things and the US gov has now has a list of who it can trust.

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  42. Comment by WallyL · · Score: 1

    Yeah, well, in his defense the system was Emacs-systemd, and he got a little confused as to whether it was C-x C-m M-a or C-x C-m M-t in the current runlevel...

    (Yeah, couldn't decide whether to hate on emacs or systemd, so here's both!)

  43. But, but ... by PPH · · Score: 1

    ... I received a valid message from Colonel Panic.

    --
    Have gnu, will travel.
  44. Earthquake people prefer short direct messages by peter303 · · Score: 1

    At the AGU meeting meeting last month a talk said that 75 character message was optimal. Some ancient computers still have 80 character buffer. A short, direct message like "A nearby earthquake has just occurred. Take cover." Messages with more details could be broadcast later. Damaging earthquakes have shorter warnings versus ballistic missles- 5 to 120 seconds vesus 17 minutes. It is based only a single station impulse be interpreted as an earthquake with a rough magnitude estimated. More precise determinations of quakes like at the NEIC require hitting several stations across the world. This is too late for a warning in most cases. The US is fourth country to implement a quake alert system. (Painfully slow due to low funding.)

  45. Best Thing Hawaii Can Do Is... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Succeed from the United States.

    Then everyone will leave them alone and those living on the islands will be safe.

  46. False positive vs false negative by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    While this mistake is terrible, what I haven’t seemed mentioned is that the equivalent “false negative” case could have occurred. That is, a real missive strike may not have been broadcast if the “test” menu option had been picked by the operator (under considerable, presumably).stress).

  47. Big Red Button by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    "Don't Push."

  48. No, you DON'T! by Ungrounded+Lightning · · Score: 1

    You need a mechanical physical switch with a switch guard.

    No, you DON'T!

    If you had such a switch, pushing it would have to be part of the test. Otherwise you've created a single point of failure that causes the live function to fail even though the test psses - and you don't find out until the missiles are inbound.

    Yes, they should have done things like word and position the menu items differently, so hitting the wrong one by accident was less likely, and have glaringly different text and graphics (by selection, with the function still identical) for the confirm popups. But the further the test and live functions diverge, the more opportunity you have to build a system that passes the tests but doesn't work when you need it.

    Conelrad (cold-war predecessor to the Emergency Broadcast System) had a similar failure: The test and inbound-nukes kickoff keys were paper tapes on adjacent pegs, and one day the low-ranking communications guy put the wrong one in the teletype tape reader on weekly test day, telling the whole country to duck and cover. Nothing new here.

    (The teletypes had a bell and the newswires had a number-of-bings code for how urgent a message would be. I think major stories rated about a three. Max was ten, which was reserved for nuclear war warning activations. I recall one time in '65 or '66 when the AP wire tape got stuck on the bell code and that thing rang something over 30 times before they got it unstuck... Fun times.)

    --
    Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
    1. Re:No, you DON'T! by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 1

      You need a mechanical physical switch with a switch guard.

      No, you DON'T!

      If you had such a switch, pushing it would have to be part of the test. Otherwise you've created a single point of failure that causes the live function to fail even though the test psses - and you don't find out until the missiles are inbound.

      If you don't have feedback you don't even have a system. You know, it's like you turn the key in the ignition, and the car starts, In this case, the computer notes that the emergency message has been sent. This isn't rocket surgery. Worst built in feedback case that I'd use - although it would be ground truth - would be looking at a phone to see that it had the emergency alert on it.

      Of course it would have feedback, and it's point of failure is no more a single point than the computer's. And go ask an engineer what is more reliable, a computer or a high quality on off switch. Seems that they use them for serious things like launching boomy candles.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    2. Re:No, you DON'T! by TheFakeTimCook · · Score: 1

      If you had such a switch, pushing it would have to be part of the test. Otherwise you've created a single point of failure that causes the live function to fail even though the test psses - and you don't find out until the missiles are inbound.

      And the keyboard and left mouse button are also "Single Points of Failure", and the Display is a "Single Point of Failure", and the Power Supply is (probably) a "Single Point of Failure", etc, etc.

      Removing the physical switch in the name of eliminating a "Single Point of Failure" is false reassurance.

      I am old enough to remember that ConelRad snafu. That was like 1968, right? Pretty amazing something like that has only happened twice since the early 1950s...

  49. S--- countries.. by formfeed · · Score: 1

    The USA seems to be surrounded by these failing island nations like Puerto Rico and Hawaii. They just can't get their act together. Very sad.

  50. This is an interface(tech) error! by squash_me_quickly · · Score: 1

    To sound a "real" alarm should be easy, and 99.999% idiot proof.
    It should rely on the minimum amount of technology, as we don't want a situation where the alarm can't be sounded because the software crashed or the mouse has dust on the sensor

    The activator for the real alarm should be a large red button, which sits in a red box with the instructions:
    "break the glass, and hold the button down for 5 seconds",

    next to is there should be a white button with which can't be mistaken for the "real" button with the text:
    "hold the button down for 5 seconds to sound the test alarm" if it is a part of the procedure an alarm cancelled message should be sent automatically

  51. HumanCenteredDesign and False Alert by MauiJerry · · Score: 1

    This analysis was posted by Scott Roberson, Chair of Information Systems & Computer Science, U.Hawaii before the screen shots and related information was available. Even with that info, his analysis is relevant and insightful... https://medium.com/@scottrob/h...

  52. Re:however (Trump Derangement Syndrome edition) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Oh look! One of the leftist flakes hanging around has decided to troll! Awwwwww! Isn't that cute?

  53. Re:Missile was real you stupid fucks by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Word salad! Word salad! It's all a conspiracy I tell you! Follow the cattle mutilations! Avoid cream of wheat, it's how they project the mind control rays! Argle bargle bargle bargle!

    The alt-right is fucking retarded.

  54. Failure assured at every level by An+dochasac · · Score: 1
    This failure needs to be addressed at all levels:
    1. Obtuse template names
    2. No "Are you sure you want to send "(contents of template") as a live message?
    3. No "this was only a test, "ignore previous message..." template indicates that no one thought this through until it became a production system.
    4. Testing on live a production system.

    But at a higher level, why is this-- as our duffer in chief calls it, "...purely a state exercise?" Isn't national security a national issue-- provide or the common defence or something like that? Apparently not in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, California or those pesky blue states.

    If in this age of de-federalizing and privatizing, POTUS wants to pass the buck and treat this as a state issue, why does the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency have that "DOD" prefix? Imagine if we spent $80 million (roughly the DOD's ED expenditure) on a national emergency communications system and as a condition for consuming public RF bandwidth and government-subsidized internet infrastructure, the communications cartels (Comcast/TimeWarner/AT&T/Verizon/Disney...) would provide a channel for this information.

    The other option is to follow the "every man for himself!" libertarian approach of the Trump fork of the Republican party. In which case, I'd like to direct you to our subscription-only missile warning communications service where for a monthly price of $59.95 per family member ($25.95 for pets), you too can receive notification of impending doom. (Ask about our premium $99.95 astrology-assisted version where you'll receive missile notification 14 minutes earlier than all of your neighbours!)

  55. Oblig. XKCD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'm shocked this hasn't been posted here yet. In the continuing tradition of XKCD having an appropriate strip for every situation...

    https://xkcd.com/970/

  56. BULLSHIT by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    We have been predicting for a couple of years that somebody would use a Nuke attack false flag as a distraction and/or way to start a war between the United States and North Korea.

    There is no way a single button will send out a detailed message including "This is not a drill" and would not activate the sirens also.

    There is no way it would take 40 minutes for a correction to go out.

    There is no way the employee would simply be re-assigned.

    Somebody initiated it intentionally, and we need to obtain and question those that were involved with it at that location.

  57. I support the shareware concept by holophrastic · · Score: 1

    Back 30 years ago, there were shareware games. These were basically "demos" or the first level, distributed freely everywhere, and encouraged gamers to copy them to friends, in the hopes that you'd then buy the complete game.

    One game in particular -- and I may never remember which -- had a splash screen. This splash screen described the shareware concept. But, instead of "press enter to continue" (this was back in the keyboard-only days), it forced the gamer to type the sentence: "I support the shareware concept" in order to continue. Simple, effective, I remember it thirty years later.

    Any button can be pressed accidentally. Any two buttons can be similarly pressed in sequence. Any swipe. Any confirmation. Hey buddy, I need you to press this button too -- also goes without a second decision-maker.

    On attack subs, two officers, each with a key, standing twenty feet apart, both need to turn the keys together. But what makes that so much better is what came before -- breaking the glass and revealing the code and confirming the radio transmission.

    If you're going to send a message to a million humans, it's never going to be good enough to confirm the sending of that message. In this case, they wanted to send a message, so they confirmed sending the message. Any number of humans would have backed up that decision.

    What they needed to do was to confirm the message itself.

    So, here's my thought. For all messages that the system is going to send to the public, (i.e. not test messages) the operator simply gets to re-type the message as displayed on-screen. Five seconds to type that message. And I promise, if I were to find myself typing that message, I would have understood what I was doing.

    Each letter is effectively a confirmation. So that's what, fifty confirmations of the message content itself. And of the fact that it's being sent. And of the fact that it's going out to the public -- because tests aren't confirmed like that.

    The real problem now is the very simple notification fatigue. How long will it take for you to believe it next time?

    Not to mention the fact that your government just terrorized its own people -- making your government a terrorist organization.

  58. Scroll wheel by dacaldar · · Score: 1

    How many times have you been to a website, and after selecting something from the last drop-down box, you go to scroll further down the page, but your scroll wheel is still focused on the drop down box?

    You end up changing its selection (barely noticeable since your eyes have moved away) before you finally move the mouse far enough, or click off the boxes, or just scroll to the end of the drop down list, and then it finally does what you expect, scrolls the page, with the change to what you had intended already scrolled up out of sight.

    I could see that happening here.

  59. Positive Spin by DarthVain · · Score: 1

    To put a positive spin on it, they also know their system works as it should if a real one was required. I mean that isn't nothing. Obviously they need some safe guards in place. As you say, it is likely a bit of a heads up for public awareness of preparation (or lack thereof currently) as to what to do in such an event (apart from bending over and kissing your ass goodbye, or looking for a good vantage point to watch the final show).