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Hashcat Developer Discovers Simpler Way To Crack WPA2 Wireless Passwords (hashcat.net)
New submitter Woodmeister shares a report: While looking for ways to attack the new WPA3 security standard, Hashcat developer Jens "Atom" Steube found a simpler way to capture and crack access credentials protecting WPA and WPA2 wireless networks. The attacker needs to capture a single EAPOL frame after requesting it from the access point, extract the PMKID from it by dumping the recieved frame to a file, convert the captured data to a hash format accepted by Hashcat, and run Hashcat to crack it. Once that's done, the attacker has the Pre-Shared Key (PSK), i.e. the password, of the wireless network. Depending on the length and complexity of the password and the power of the cracking rig, that last step could take hours or days. "The main difference from existing attacks is that in this attack, capture of a full EAPOL 4-way handshake is not required. The new attack is performed on the RSN IE (Robust Security Network Information Element) of a single EAPOL frame," Steube explained. This makes the attack much easier to pull off, as the attacker doesn't depend on another user and on being in range of both the user and the access point at the exact moment when the user connects to the wireless network and the handshake takes place.
with wired tools, you have a way to pull them out of your ass if you stick them too far up
#lifehacks
A good password for wifi, since it doesn't really need to be memorized, is one generated by something like keepass2: 15 characters long random letters numbers and punctuation:
DHDukBDL04Pt2ZT
for example (note that is not a password I use, just one I randomly generated).
Since no-one actually has to type this in more than once per device, it's really not a major problem that you can't memorize it.
((lambda (x) (x x)) (lambda (x) (x x))) http://www.endpointcomputing.com a scientific approach to custom computing.
While looking for ways to encrypt unencrypted data stored on my hard disk I discovered if you forget the password to your computer all files can still be accessed by mounting hard disk on a different system or by booting an alternate operating system from a USB stick.
Stay tuned for full article, naming party and mascot imagery for new vulnerability I just "discovered".
I have CAT5 all over my house so none of this applies to me at all.
If it is as easy as described, we may as well add the functionality to the WiFi-drivers:
In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
The computer user password is not to protect against local access to the data.
You need to encrypt the files or entire drive like you are planning.
Like: 112364AB5F777752452A57CAC066DE0737DE451E0CC21BE86D01278A6050297B
64 character pseudo random hexadecimal key the max length supported by the standard.
Is that still considered secure or would that only take a few days to crack?
From what I read it looks like it should still be secure enough.
Minimum threshold fixed. Thanks!
Amazing that people do not understand this....
You don't seem to understand this attack at all. It makes it possible to precompute the password to a WPA2-PSK network without having to wait for a valid client to authenticate against the network in the first place.
So you can just walk around an apartment block with your phone asking each AP for the needed packet. Go back home, crack it all offline and come back doing automated attacks on every network. Each visit takes a few minutes each time instead of having to wait for a valid authorized client for each network. Can be dronified of course for extra flare.
This breaks WPA2-PSK by making attacks trivial to do. I wonder how the Enterprise versions hold up.
Your sarcasm detector is broken.
"I'm so moist I'm sticking to the leather." -Kermit the Frog on The Late Late Show
This breaks WPA2-PSK by making attacks trivial to do
No, it doesn't; it merely makes it more vulnerable for users who aren't following good password guidelines (which, admittedly, is most of them).
WPA2 supports a maximum password length of 64 characters; if your target is using a password of sufficient complexity then the attack is going to be impossible rather than trivial.
It seems to me that this means the router provides the hash of the PSK when first making the connection? Seems like an obvious oversight, I
m sure most security exchange protocols aren't handing out hashes of the key, but instead use a MAC. I hope this is fixed in WPA3.
The password for my home network is a correctly capitalized and punctuated sentence.
Everyone on my network can spell, and knows where the shift key is, even the guests.
To a Lisp hacker, XML is S-expressions in drag.
Why wasn't stronger encryption used to protect the hashed Pre Shared Key? For a strong enough password it doesn't matter who gets the hash, but for a weak password, it's a big deal.
It must have been something you assimilated. . . .
Was having fun with analogy.
The computer user password is not to protect against local access to the data.
PSK algorithm is not designed to protect against offline brute force campaigns. Well known property of PSK. It's why people have always had to chose increasingly absurdly long passwords to secure their APs.
You need to encrypt the files or entire drive like you are planning.
You need to use a secure authentication protocol like what's included with WPA3 to avoid susceptibility to offline brute force campaigns.
Only for WPA3 they chose a crappy authentication protocol out of the gate opting for a balanced PAKE when better (augmented) versions are readily available on similar terms.
Difference between balanced and augmented is a bit like the difference between a password file stored as plaintext or hashed.
If it's hashed (augmented) and stolen someone needs to crack it before they can login as you. If it's plaintext (balanced) as what was selected for WPA3 they can login as you immediately without cracking it.
A lifetime ago Cisco released an undocumented authentication protocol for username/password wireless authentication (LEAP) that was quickly revealed in all ways that mattered to essentially be MSCHAPv1.
At the time of release shortcomings of MSCHAPv1 were well known. Surely someone must have known yet they went ahead and did it anyway. While not nearly as egregious the same theme is being repeated with WPA3. Better algorithms with better properties are readily available yet they elect to go forward with the inferior one anyway.
I wonder if taking a two-pronged approach to this would work better. Hashcat plus the same AES-busting technique used to break the password on Julian Assange's Insurance files. First reduce the possible keyspace with the AES busting technique, then Hashcat the remainder.
Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
...and you never have to worry about password or any of this BS. My open wifi in a densely populated neighborhood has been running for 6 1/2 years getting around 30 unique visitors/day, 200 unique visitors/month. Why are people so stingy with their wifi? Most everything is encrypted end to end nowadays.
Here's a fun piece of information! On Windows 10, if you boot from a live linux distro and rename sethc.exe to sethc.exe.bak and copy cmd.exe to sethc.exe. Now when you reboot, at the Windows 10 login screen you can get an administrator-level command prompt by hitting the shift key 5 times. \o/
Security at its finest.
What kind of people are creeping around on /. these days???
You don't seem to understand this attack at all.
I don't care about the distinctions. All irrelevant as far as I'm concerned.
It makes it possible to precompute the password to a WPA2-PSK network without having to wait for a valid client to authenticate against the network in the first place.
So what? Being patient or deauth yields same result. Hurdle to successful compromise has not substantially changed has it? Brute force campaign required in either scenario is substantially more labor intensive.
This breaks WPA2-PSK by making attacks trivial to do.
No more or less trivial than brute force campaign required to crack the password.
The length of a passphrase is most important. Using punctuation or not doesn't make as much difference. That's true of passphrases generally.
For WPA2 specifically, it ends up being turned into a 128-bit key, which is 22 random keyboard characters. You can easily get the same 128 bits by using a few words, especially non-dictionary words such as Greystone or Jamerican.
If you can brute force my passphrase via Hashcat, you DESERVE to get access to my network.
Well, the Wi-Fi segment anyway. All my networks are isolated from each other. Wi-Fi traffic isn't allowed to talk with anything on the local network. Not even other clients.
The key you need to brute force:
Thirty two characters long. Upper / lower case, numbers and symbols.
Doing the math tells me I have nothing to worry about from Hashcat any time soon.
It's far more likely folks will resort to means other than brute force to obtain my key. Assuming access to my network is important enough for someone to try.
Which, it's not.
Use radius. Problem solved.
Surely someone must have known yet they went ahead and did it anyway. While not nearly as egregious the same theme is being repeated with WPA3. Better algorithms with better properties are readily available yet they elect to go forward with the inferior one anyway.
This has been a common theme since wireless encryption has been a thing. I am reminded of a saying: Once is happenstance. Twice is suspicious. Three times is enemy action.
We have achieved the enemy action stage.
"Someone needs to talk to the tree of liberty about its ghoulish drinking problem." by ohnocitizen