Bacon writes:
"In the year of our Lord 1432, there arose a grievous quarrel among the brethren over the number of teeth in the mouth of a horse. For 13 days the disputation raged without ceasing. All the ancient books and chronicles were fetched out, and wonderful and ponderous erudition, such as was never before heard of in this region, was made manifest. At the beginning of the 14th day, a youthful friar of goodly bearing asked his learned superiors for permission to add a word, and straightaway, to the wonderment of the disputants, whose deep wisdom he sore vexed, he beseeched them to unbend in a manner coarse and unheard-of, and to look in the open mouth of a horse and find answer to their questionings."
Of course, Bacon was attempting to adjudicate the debate between rationalists and empiricists. For all of our arm chair reasoning about the Monty Hall problem, perhaps the best way to resolve the matter is to perform an experiment...Click on the link to the Times article and run a few hundred trials. My results - 200 attempts, 133 cars = ~67%.
My understanding is that the received view of animal coprophagy is that nutritionally-deficient animals eat feces because they are a reliable source of vitamin B12.
Regarding the MacBook, I grant that there is some ambiguity with respect to whether "display depths up to 24 bits per pixel" refers to the display or the video subsystem. But, that same ambiguity is not present in Apple's description of the MacBook Pro. Regarding that system (all releases and all screen sizes), they use virtually the same language:
"The MacBook Pro computer announced in April 2006, based on the Intel Core Duo microprocessor, has a 17-inch widescreen flat-panel display (measured diagonally). The TFT (thin-film transistor) technology provides high contrast and fast response. The display supports 3D acceleration and display depths up to 24 bits per pixel at all supported screen resolutions.
The 17-inch MacBook Pro supports an LCD display size of 1680 x 1050 pixels at 116 dpi and shows up to millions of colors."
Given the use of the definite article, "display" could only refer to the MacBook Pro's attached monitor (in this case, its "17-inch widescreen flat-panel display"). This product description unequivocally indicates that that monitor "supports...display depths up to 24 bits per pixel at all supported screen resolutions." The first use of "display" is the only word that could serve as the subject of that sentence and, as such, is the only thing that could "support...depths of up to 24 bits per pixel."
Fanboys and haters can disagree about how to interpret "millions of colors". But, in point of fact, Apple, in its "Video Developer Note" [http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Hardware /Conceptual/HWTech_Video/index.html#//apple_ref/do c/uid/TP40003504] claims that MacBook Pro monitors are capable of "display depths up to 24 bits per pixel at all supported screen resolutions." If this statement is false, it doesn't matter how we parse the phrase "millions of colors".
"Highly relevant" to what? All you have said is that the fact that they are suing the poor, weak, and/or infirm is "highly relevant" - you haven't identified any question a proper evaluation of which must take into account the fact that the targets of their suits are poor, weak, and/or infirm. So, here are a few questions and answers:
(1) Is the fact that a particular defendant is poor, weak, and/or infirm relevant as to the determination of the extent of the RIAA's *actual* damages? Obviously not. The RIAA may be misrepresenting their actual damages in these cases (I suspect that they are). But, the wealth and health of a defendant have no bearing on the actual extent of their damages.
(2) Is the fact that a particular defendant is poor, weak, and/or infirm relevant as to whether or not that party is liable for the damages that s/he caused the RIAA? The answer to this question, too, is clearly "No" - those circumstances are irrelevant in determining whether or not a defendant in one of these cases is liable. What could health or wealth possibily have to do with whether or not a defendant was the proximate cause of the RIAA's damages?
(3) Is the fact that a particular defendant is poor, weak, and/or infirm relevant as to whether or not the RIAA should recover against a defendant, or to what extent it should recover, if that defendant is found liable? If propriety and fairness are essential to the dispensation of civil justice (and I believe that they are), then the wealth of a defendant may be relevant in determining the extent to which a defendant should be required to make the RIAA whole for its losses - after all, proportionally speaking, the economic harms done to the RIAA by any particular defendant are quite small in comparison with the economic and personal losses that a poor defendant would suffer if s/he were forced to fully compensate the RIAA. But, again, what is the significance of being weak or infirm if such a party is capable of compensating the RIAA for its losses? Why shouldn't the RIAA recover against a wealthy person who is weak or infirm?
(4) Is the fact that a particular defendant is poor, weak, and/or infirm relevant as to our moral evaluation of the RIAA? Sure - if the RIAA sues an indigent person and a verdict in its favor might leave that person homeless or otherwise in dire straits, then the fact that that person is poor is relevant to our moral evaluation of the RIAA's actions. But, again, what is the moral significance of being weak or infirm, so long as such a person isn't also poor? How is the RIAA treating such a person unfairly?
The RIAA is arguing that it has been damaged and that it should be able to recover its losses. In my judgment, the facts that I mentioned in my original post are being exploited in order to arouse moral indignation for the defendant - an effort to supplant reason with emotion. That is, by definition, a fallacious ad hominem.
Even if everything that you have said here is correct, all that you have shown is that *who* is important insofar as financial means are concerned. You have said nothing to suggest that whether or not a person has MS, or has five children, or is divorced, or is the relative of the recently deceased is relevant to the questions of whether the RIAA should recover against that defendant, or in what amount.
I have as strong a sense of propriety and fairness as most, so, like most, the fact that the RIAA has filed suits against people who have had misfortunes heaped upon them by life's circumstances has aroused in me a sense of moral scorn for the RIAA. But, enough with the ad hominem. It is gratuitous for every story to highlight the adverse circumstances of a defendant, as if the unfortunate circumstances of that defendant is the dispositive feature of the case. Not every headline needs to be of the form: RIAA sues divorced mother (cf. this article); RIAA sues stroke victim (cf. http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/03/17/05 1234); RIAA sues illiterate mother of five (cf. http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/12/21/20 45219); RIAA sues family of two dead men (cf. http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/08/15/20 23250); RIAA sues woman with multiple sclerosis (cf. http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/12/07/23 51238); etc.
I take it that the original poster's point was that the question, "Why is this action the morally correct one?" cannot be answered by biologists. And the answer to that question is neither simple nor straightforward. There are countless metaethical theories purporting to answer this question, and none of them is heavily favored, even among philosophers. Some, such as Kant, claim that our rationality gives us moral rules - i.e., we construct moral truths in much the same way that mathematical intuitionists claim that we construct mathematical truths. Others believe that moral laws are akin to natural laws - i.e., moral truths aren't much different from other truths about the natural world. Still others believe that divine command *makes* certain actions right and others wrong - i.e., moral rules are given their status by divine fiat. There are other views, of course. No...while there is rather wide (but not complete) agreement about which moral rules are correct - e.g., you should not torture children - the question of *why* these are the correct moral rules...that's the hard part.
I must say that I don't understand your policy. You say, (1) that you aren't going to adopt a belief about this matter unless you read a series of detailed papers about it, and (2) that you aren't going to read a series of detailed papers about it. If (the apparent majority of) climate-change scientists are correct, then this is one of the most important and pressing problems facing the world today. Isn't it socially irresponsible for an educated person to refuse to inform himself about such an issue and modify his actions accordingly (if necessary)?
I take it that by "either side" you mean those who support the claim that we are causing global warming and those that resist the claim. But, I don't see how we "can't seriously believe either side" simply because "both sides have their hysterical evangelists and paid shills." I would note, first, that both sides of *every* issue of any magnitude have hysterical evangelists and paid shills. And we can't take that fact as reason to not seriously believe either side of every issue of any magnitude. Moreover, I'm a philosopher, not a scientist. I don't take myself to be among those that can credibly resolve questions as complicated as those surrounding global warming. As such, I doubt whether my "logic" or ability to examine all of the facts will provide me with a better justified belief about the matter than I would have by relying on the considered opinion of the majority of researchers.
The parties to a civil litigation are almost always free to compromise and settle their claims, including disputes about attorney fees. Once a court approves a compromise settlement, its role in the matter is terminated, and orders of production are rescinded as a consequence of the court's loss of jurisdiction.
Well, you're right to suggest that not all public laws are premised in the moral law and that not all moral laws become public laws (at least in this country). But, your analysis did not take you back far enough. A careful look at the opening passages of the Declaration of Independence and the (US) Constitution reveals that the founders of this country believed that many of the natural rights of men - which determine what one man may permissibly do to another - should be codified in public law. You should note, for instance, that listed among the inalienable (natural) rights of men in the Declaration of Independence are life and liberty and that those rights are explicitly codified in the Constitution. So, even on your view, it is not the case that morality is neither here nor there, as the legal rights of which you speak were granted on the assumption that they are among the natural rights of men.
Muscle action and nerve conduction are totally independent processes. No one is disputing the widely held belief that electrical impulses are responsible for muscle action. Thus, no one is disputing what makes a frog's legs twitch. What is being disputed is the mechanism by which signals are ordinarilly transmitted down nerve pathways - whether electrically or by sound waves. There is no reason to expect that a nerve could not conduct an electric current even if the natural method of impulse propagation is by sound waves.
Moreover, Galvani's experiment supports, not undermines, the case that sound waves propagate nervous impulses. One of the claims that these researchers are making is that if nerve impulses were electrical impulses, then we would expect more heat than we are finding. Hook a frog up to a battery for a while and watch its legs twitch...then touch it, and you'll notice that it's warm.
IANAL(ogician), but you are confusing necessary and sufficient conditions. Granting that passing an electric current down the proper nerve is *sufficient* for making a frog's legs twitch, that does not imply that passing an electric current down that nerve is *necessary* for making a frog's legs twitch.
Slashdot Mirror
Bacon writes: "In the year of our Lord 1432, there arose a grievous quarrel among the brethren over the number of teeth in the mouth of a horse. For 13 days the disputation raged without ceasing. All the ancient books and chronicles were fetched out, and wonderful and ponderous erudition, such as was never before heard of in this region, was made manifest. At the beginning of the 14th day, a youthful friar of goodly bearing asked his learned superiors for permission to add a word, and straightaway, to the wonderment of the disputants, whose deep wisdom he sore vexed, he beseeched them to unbend in a manner coarse and unheard-of, and to look in the open mouth of a horse and find answer to their questionings." Of course, Bacon was attempting to adjudicate the debate between rationalists and empiricists. For all of our arm chair reasoning about the Monty Hall problem, perhaps the best way to resolve the matter is to perform an experiment...Click on the link to the Times article and run a few hundred trials. My results - 200 attempts, 133 cars = ~67%.
My understanding is that the received view of animal coprophagy is that nutritionally-deficient animals eat feces because they are a reliable source of vitamin B12.
Regarding the MacBook, I grant that there is some ambiguity with respect to whether "display depths up to 24 bits per pixel" refers to the display or the video subsystem. But, that same ambiguity is not present in Apple's description of the MacBook Pro. Regarding that system (all releases and all screen sizes), they use virtually the same language:
"The MacBook Pro computer announced in April 2006, based on the Intel Core Duo microprocessor, has a 17-inch widescreen flat-panel display (measured diagonally). The TFT (thin-film transistor) technology provides high contrast and fast response. The display supports 3D acceleration and display depths up to 24 bits per pixel at all supported screen resolutions.
The 17-inch MacBook Pro supports an LCD display size of 1680 x 1050 pixels at 116 dpi and shows up to millions of colors."
Given the use of the definite article, "display" could only refer to the MacBook Pro's attached monitor (in this case, its "17-inch widescreen flat-panel display"). This product description unequivocally indicates that that monitor "supports...display depths up to 24 bits per pixel at all supported screen resolutions." The first use of "display" is the only word that could serve as the subject of that sentence and, as such, is the only thing that could "support...depths of up to 24 bits per pixel."
Fanboys and haters can disagree about how to interpret "millions of colors". But, in point of fact, Apple, in its "Video Developer Note" [http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Hardware /Conceptual/HWTech_Video/index.html#//apple_ref/do c/uid/TP40003504] claims that MacBook Pro monitors are capable of "display depths up to 24 bits per pixel at all supported screen resolutions." If this statement is false, it doesn't matter how we parse the phrase "millions of colors".
"Highly relevant" to what? All you have said is that the fact that they are suing the poor, weak, and/or infirm is "highly relevant" - you haven't identified any question a proper evaluation of which must take into account the fact that the targets of their suits are poor, weak, and/or infirm. So, here are a few questions and answers:
(1) Is the fact that a particular defendant is poor, weak, and/or infirm relevant as to the determination of the extent of the RIAA's *actual* damages?
Obviously not. The RIAA may be misrepresenting their actual damages in these cases (I suspect that they are). But, the wealth and health of a defendant have no bearing on the actual extent of their damages.
(2) Is the fact that a particular defendant is poor, weak, and/or infirm relevant as to whether or not that party is liable for the damages that s/he caused the RIAA?
The answer to this question, too, is clearly "No" - those circumstances are irrelevant in determining whether or not a defendant in one of these cases is liable. What could health or wealth possibily have to do with whether or not a defendant was the proximate cause of the RIAA's damages?
(3) Is the fact that a particular defendant is poor, weak, and/or infirm relevant as to whether or not the RIAA should recover against a defendant, or to what extent it should recover, if that defendant is found liable?
If propriety and fairness are essential to the dispensation of civil justice (and I believe that they are), then the wealth of a defendant may be relevant in determining the extent to which a defendant should be required to make the RIAA whole for its losses - after all, proportionally speaking, the economic harms done to the RIAA by any particular defendant are quite small in comparison with the economic and personal losses that a poor defendant would suffer if s/he were forced to fully compensate the RIAA. But, again, what is the significance of being weak or infirm if such a party is capable of compensating the RIAA for its losses? Why shouldn't the RIAA recover against a wealthy person who is weak or infirm?
(4) Is the fact that a particular defendant is poor, weak, and/or infirm relevant as to our moral evaluation of the RIAA?
Sure - if the RIAA sues an indigent person and a verdict in its favor might leave that person homeless or otherwise in dire straits, then the fact that that person is poor is relevant to our moral evaluation of the RIAA's actions. But, again, what is the moral significance of being weak or infirm, so long as such a person isn't also poor? How is the RIAA treating such a person unfairly?
The RIAA is arguing that it has been damaged and that it should be able to recover its losses. In my judgment, the facts that I mentioned in my original post are being exploited in order to arouse moral indignation for the defendant - an effort to supplant reason with emotion. That is, by definition, a fallacious ad hominem.
Even if everything that you have said here is correct, all that you have shown is that *who* is important insofar as financial means are concerned. You have said nothing to suggest that whether or not a person has MS, or has five children, or is divorced, or is the relative of the recently deceased is relevant to the questions of whether the RIAA should recover against that defendant, or in what amount.
I have as strong a sense of propriety and fairness as most, so, like most, the fact that the RIAA has filed suits against people who have had misfortunes heaped upon them by life's circumstances has aroused in me a sense of moral scorn for the RIAA. But, enough with the ad hominem. It is gratuitous for every story to highlight the adverse circumstances of a defendant, as if the unfortunate circumstances of that defendant is the dispositive feature of the case. Not every headline needs to be of the form: RIAA sues divorced mother (cf. this article); RIAA sues stroke victim (cf. http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/03/17/05 1234); RIAA sues illiterate mother of five (cf. http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/12/21/20 45219); RIAA sues family of two dead men (cf. http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/08/15/20 23250); RIAA sues woman with multiple sclerosis (cf. http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/12/07/23 51238); etc.
I take it that the original poster's point was that the question, "Why is this action the morally correct one?" cannot be answered by biologists. And the answer to that question is neither simple nor straightforward. There are countless metaethical theories purporting to answer this question, and none of them is heavily favored, even among philosophers. Some, such as Kant, claim that our rationality gives us moral rules - i.e., we construct moral truths in much the same way that mathematical intuitionists claim that we construct mathematical truths. Others believe that moral laws are akin to natural laws - i.e., moral truths aren't much different from other truths about the natural world. Still others believe that divine command *makes* certain actions right and others wrong - i.e., moral rules are given their status by divine fiat. There are other views, of course. No...while there is rather wide (but not complete) agreement about which moral rules are correct - e.g., you should not torture children - the question of *why* these are the correct moral rules...that's the hard part.
I must say that I don't understand your policy. You say, (1) that you aren't going to adopt a belief about this matter unless you read a series of detailed papers about it, and (2) that you aren't going to read a series of detailed papers about it. If (the apparent majority of) climate-change scientists are correct, then this is one of the most important and pressing problems facing the world today. Isn't it socially irresponsible for an educated person to refuse to inform himself about such an issue and modify his actions accordingly (if necessary)?
I take it that by "either side" you mean those who support the claim that we are causing global warming and those that resist the claim. But, I don't see how we "can't seriously believe either side" simply because "both sides have their hysterical evangelists and paid shills." I would note, first, that both sides of *every* issue of any magnitude have hysterical evangelists and paid shills. And we can't take that fact as reason to not seriously believe either side of every issue of any magnitude. Moreover, I'm a philosopher, not a scientist. I don't take myself to be among those that can credibly resolve questions as complicated as those surrounding global warming. As such, I doubt whether my "logic" or ability to examine all of the facts will provide me with a better justified belief about the matter than I would have by relying on the considered opinion of the majority of researchers.
The parties to a civil litigation are almost always free to compromise and settle their claims, including disputes about attorney fees. Once a court approves a compromise settlement, its role in the matter is terminated, and orders of production are rescinded as a consequence of the court's loss of jurisdiction.
Well, you're right to suggest that not all public laws are premised in the moral law and that not all moral laws become public laws (at least in this country). But, your analysis did not take you back far enough. A careful look at the opening passages of the Declaration of Independence and the (US) Constitution reveals that the founders of this country believed that many of the natural rights of men - which determine what one man may permissibly do to another - should be codified in public law. You should note, for instance, that listed among the inalienable (natural) rights of men in the Declaration of Independence are life and liberty and that those rights are explicitly codified in the Constitution. So, even on your view, it is not the case that morality is neither here nor there, as the legal rights of which you speak were granted on the assumption that they are among the natural rights of men.
Muscle action and nerve conduction are totally independent processes. No one is disputing the widely held belief that electrical impulses are responsible for muscle action. Thus, no one is disputing what makes a frog's legs twitch. What is being disputed is the mechanism by which signals are ordinarilly transmitted down nerve pathways - whether electrically or by sound waves. There is no reason to expect that a nerve could not conduct an electric current even if the natural method of impulse propagation is by sound waves. Moreover, Galvani's experiment supports, not undermines, the case that sound waves propagate nervous impulses. One of the claims that these researchers are making is that if nerve impulses were electrical impulses, then we would expect more heat than we are finding. Hook a frog up to a battery for a while and watch its legs twitch...then touch it, and you'll notice that it's warm.
IANAL(ogician), but you are confusing necessary and sufficient conditions. Granting that passing an electric current down the proper nerve is *sufficient* for making a frog's legs twitch, that does not imply that passing an electric current down that nerve is *necessary* for making a frog's legs twitch.