If you had read the fine article, you would have seen the part saying that the magnetic field was strong enough to erase a disk that was inside a metal housing.
The recycling savings may already be reflected in the price of new batteries. I watched a documentary on metal production that said that 98% of lead is recycled. That's a huge amount of lead that doesn't have to be mined and smelted.
I think the companies need a different approach to the use and storage of sensitive information. They need to reorder their priorities. Over the years, I've had jobs where I worked with classified and/or sensitive information. It's a different world. You don't assume that people will be intelligent and honest, or that computers and networks are secure. You don't put a database on a computer that can be accessed from public networks. Every part of the system, hardware, software, people, and procedures, is evaluated and certified. In the commercial world, all they seem to care about is cost and speed. Cheaper is better. Why build a private network when you can use the existing Internet. Why use a dedicated workstation when you can use generic PCs running COTS software. Why write your own software when you can kludge together something from commercial products or outsource it to somebody else. Why spend money on physical security, audit trails, security audits, background checks, etc.
It wasn't a dumb question. When I use my current cell phone, the microphone is a good distance away from my mouth, due to the small size of the cell phone (101 mm). The microphone is on the bottom surface of the cell phone.
I wouldn't want to be a storekeeper with a dozen Nintendo DS Lites on the shelf, all with missing serial numbers. How are you going to explain that to the police?
Assuming that the police have a list of the serial numbers, the thieves may have a hard time unloading their loot without being caught. "I bought it from some guy off the back of a truck" is not a good defense to buying stolen goods.
Possibly, but the point is that it would create a real financial penalty for security lapses, which would be an improvement over the current situation, where, other than some bad p.r., the costs are borne by others.
We might be better off if there were statutory damages, say $1,000 per individual affected by the security lapse. That would put a value on the data, and encourage organizations to take measures to protect it.
...but to the rest of the world it's well known that Japan was about to surrender anyway.
It wasn't "well known" to the Japanese. Even after two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, there were many in the government and military who wanted to keep fighting, and they tried to prevent the Emperor from making a broadcast to the nation. It could have gone either way.
I used to have an account at a local bank. After about five mergers, it had become assimilated by Bank of America. I dumped them and switched to my local credit union.
Recent events, such as the debate on net neutrality, NSA data collection, and efforts to get ISPs to spy on their own customers, have led me to think about the design of IP, TCP and UDP. What does the network really "need to know"? If its job is to just route packets, not much beyond source, destination, and data length. It doesn't need access to the information in the UDP and TCP headers. If the network is no longer considered friendly, why are we exposing this information to people who may not have our best interests in mind?
Enigma failed because of the efforts of Marian Rejewski and his associates. It was mathematical analysis that won the day. Similarly, the Japanese Purple machine was broken and reverse engineered without any access to Japanese hardware.
I wouldn't be too critical of the General. A Vigenere cipher was high security compared to many of the ciphers in use at the time. I am puzzled by the Confederate reliance on three "sacred keys". I would have expected them to change keys on a regular basis.
The telegraph was new technology and it must have taken time to understand its advantages and vulnerabilities. Similar problems accompanied the introduction of radio telgraphy.
That's why you have redundancy and spares, so that you can take a system down for preventative maintenance, hardware maintenance and software updates, without interrupting service to the customer.
Re:Where are the bunkers to protect Citizens ?
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Back to the Bunker
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Even at ground zero?
No, but it dramatically reduces the "kill radius" of the weapon. For a 15 kt blast, from 2.1 km to 684 m. It provides protection from thermal radiation, ionizing radiation, flying debris and structural failure of buildings.
Re:The late great Mancur Olson
on
Death By DMCA
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· Score: 1
The TUC?
Re:Where are the bunkers to protect Citizens ?
on
Back to the Bunker
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· Score: 1
A slit trench is excellent protection from the immediate effects of a nuclear blast. The next problem is avoiding the fallout footprint. You don't want to be downwind from the point of detonation.
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Don't quit your day job. A generic $30 degausser is thoroughly useless for erasing high-coercivity media. I've tried it, it doesn't work.
If you had read the fine article, you would have seen the part saying that the magnetic field was strong enough to erase a disk that was inside a metal housing.
Dwight D. Eisenhower.
The recycling savings may already be reflected in the price of new batteries. I watched a documentary on metal production that said that 98% of lead is recycled. That's a huge amount of lead that doesn't have to be mined and smelted.
I think the companies need a different approach to the use and storage of sensitive information. They need to reorder their priorities. Over the years, I've had jobs where I worked with classified and/or sensitive information. It's a different world. You don't assume that people will be intelligent and honest, or that computers and networks are secure. You don't put a database on a computer that can be accessed from public networks. Every part of the system, hardware, software, people, and procedures, is evaluated and certified. In the commercial world, all they seem to care about is cost and speed. Cheaper is better. Why build a private network when you can use the existing Internet. Why use a dedicated workstation when you can use generic PCs running COTS software. Why write your own software when you can kludge together something from commercial products or outsource it to somebody else. Why spend money on physical security, audit trails, security audits, background checks, etc.
It wasn't a dumb question. When I use my current cell phone, the microphone is a good distance away from my mouth, due to the small size of the cell phone (101 mm). The microphone is on the bottom surface of the cell phone.
I wouldn't want to be a storekeeper with a dozen Nintendo DS Lites on the shelf, all with missing serial numbers. How are you going to explain that to the police?
Assuming that the police have a list of the serial numbers, the thieves may have a hard time unloading their loot without being caught. "I bought it from some guy off the back of a truck" is not a good defense to buying stolen goods.
Possibly, but the point is that it would create a real financial penalty for security lapses, which would be an improvement over the current situation, where, other than some bad p.r., the costs are borne by others.
We might be better off if there were statutory damages, say $1,000 per individual affected by the security lapse. That would put a value on the data, and encourage organizations to take measures to protect it.
It wasn't "well known" to the Japanese. Even after two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, there were many in the government and military who wanted to keep fighting, and they tried to prevent the Emperor from making a broadcast to the nation. It could have gone either way.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were valid military targets, despite all the modern hand-wringing about civilian casualties.
That depends on where you live. I've seen a very limited number of "core" systems in local stores, and not one "premium" system.
Young adults are, in general, idiots. Most of them grow out of it.
What's "dirty sex"? I'd hate to think that I was missing out on something fun.
I used to have an account at a local bank. After about five mergers, it had become assimilated by Bank of America. I dumped them and switched to my local credit union.
Recent events, such as the debate on net neutrality, NSA data collection, and efforts to get ISPs to spy on their own customers, have led me to think about the design of IP, TCP and UDP. What does the network really "need to know"? If its job is to just route packets, not much beyond source, destination, and data length. It doesn't need access to the information in the UDP and TCP headers. If the network is no longer considered friendly, why are we exposing this information to people who may not have our best interests in mind?
I'd try something like doppler radar to detect the motion of ocean surface features.
Enigma failed because of the efforts of Marian Rejewski and his associates. It was mathematical analysis that won the day. Similarly, the Japanese Purple machine was broken and reverse engineered without any access to Japanese hardware.
The telegraph was new technology and it must have taken time to understand its advantages and vulnerabilities. Similar problems accompanied the introduction of radio telgraphy.
It's optional, weak, and usually turned off in the USA.
That's why you have redundancy and spares, so that you can take a system down for preventative maintenance, hardware maintenance and software updates, without interrupting service to the customer.
No, but it dramatically reduces the "kill radius" of the weapon. For a 15 kt blast, from 2.1 km to 684 m. It provides protection from thermal radiation, ionizing radiation, flying debris and structural failure of buildings.
The TUC?
A slit trench is excellent protection from the immediate effects of a nuclear blast. The next problem is avoiding the fallout footprint. You don't want to be downwind from the point of detonation.