(More broadly, though, the point is largely valid. Reel-to-reel deserved to die, technologically; but damn did it look 'high tech' churning away in the background, now that everything fits in standard 72u racks, it's mostly just a 'Should we go for 'basic black, or spring for custom powdercoat and a cool cutout design for the doors?' game.
Of course, seeing as the CM-2 won 'coolest-looking computer of all time', with the CM-5 playing 'solid; but ever-so-slightly-disappointing-sequel', perhaps it's only fair for everyone else to just stop trying.
I don't think they've kicked out an original processor design in ages; but they are still(among) those you talk to if you want something a little more tightly coupled, and/or a bit more 'turnkey' than "10,000 of whatever dell is selling, and some 10GbE switches".
There are arguably use cases where DRM would be convenient(eg. media rentals, which are a relatively uncontroversial and popular service in physical media, pretty much need to time-out to work, 'snapchat' and its ilk are designed explicitly, if not effectively, to enforce transience, again only doable with DRM).
The problem is architectural, though. In order for DRM to work, the root of control for a device cannot be its user/owner. It has to be the DRM-enforcing entity, or else the 'DRM' is simply some obfuscation. There just isn't a way around that. Further, to deal with analog hole/leaks from compromised devices or the production chain/etc. there is a strong incentive to make devices 'default-deny' rather than 'default-allow'(compare a PC, which will execute more or less any program that isn't explicitly self-destructive, with an iDevice or console, that will reject otherwise well-formed applications that aren't signed correctly).
And the trouble continues: in order to prevent 'leaky-by-design' hardware from being produced(eg. cheapy DVD players that are... lax about region coding and macrovision), the DRM mechanism essentially has to be legally encumbered in some way('hook IP', DMCA-style laws, etc.) to prevent the easy manufacture of HDCP strippers, region-free DVD players, and other 'claims to be DRM-compliant; but with a backdoor by design' circumvention tools.
This places extraordinary power in the hands of whatever licensing entity controls the DRM scheme: at a bare minimum, it's a steady stream of licensing revenue(even for hilariously broken systems like CSS, they still get their cut per DVD player). It may also include power over who is and isn't allowed to enter a market or exist on a given platform, and substantial control over the activities of everything going on within systems that include a given DRM scheme.
That's the real problem, ultimately. It isn't that there are zero uses for DRM, it's that (by necessity) you have to make some pretty radical changes to get DRM working at all, and once you make them, the uses that you don't want are every bit as available as the uses that you do want, and there is no way of allowing only the former and preventing the latter.
It also doesn't help, of course, that a system sufficiently-robust to be a DRM system is almost certainly sufficiently capable to be extremely useful for fun censorship and surveillance purposes.
"Their direct costs and the costs of losing them will by far exceed the cost of remedial activities."
Unfortunately, logic like that doesn't work on elected officials. It will probably take a tragedy and loss of life before people pay attention to the science behind this.
Is that a bet? GPS is pretty much baked into every piece of American military hardware large enough to house it, either as a near-necessity or a substantial convenience, and teams GLONASS and GALILEO(along with whatever the Indians and Chinese are calling their proposed regional systems these days) aren't exactly hobby projects, and has also crept into lots of expensive, long-term plans for air traffic control, decomissioning of certain older transponder location systems, etc. You've also got the definitely-not-officially-up-there; but highly valued, spy stuff that the NRO and NGA would be very sad about.
Sure, if a few esoteric scientific payloads were toasted, we'd probably fail to muster a yawn(breathing that deeply takes effort), and something like the ISS would muster a bit more publicity, but no real plans to do anything about it, since it's something of a white elephant. Even things like satellite phone, internet, and TV services might be ultimately considered disposable(the economics of just laying the cable and putting up the towers for terrestrial wireless aren't good enough now; but if the satellite attrition rate increased enough...), though they might hang on because of their utility in high-value sectors like petroleum and mineral extraction and military communications.
Satellite capabilities are baked sufficiently closely into more-or-less-sacred military budgets that it would be an extreme surprise to see lack of attention given to protecting at least individual satellites. It isn't clear that anybody would actually stump up for 'keep space open for the betterment of all mankind, etc.'; but much of the hardware in space has substantially more influential friends.
I don't know whether it qualifies as a fallacy, or has a name if it does; but arguments of this particular style always annoy me:
It's a selective application of an assertion that(while probably true where you are applying it) is true of so many other situations where you do not and would not apply it as to be completely meaningless.
Are opponents of Glass 'afraid of change'? In some sense, arguably, there is often a tinge of fear motivating a visceral dislike of some novelty. However, is there any new something for which this could not be said? Opponents of virtually anything except the status quo are 'afraid of change' in that weak sense, despite changes being available in every conceivable flavor.
It may not be 'false' in a strict sense; but it isn't usefully true in any meaningful way.
Will all these stupid new TLDs even be used? Right now, how often do you go to a legitimate website (non-spam, non-scam, non-malware) that doesn't use.com,.net,.org,.gov or.edu ? I'll bet it's pretty rare.
Creating all of these new TLDs is nothing but a money making scam for ICANN.
Oh, not to worry, with the number of sneaky URL-lookalikes that a combination of gTLDs and unicode support will allow, it won't just be ICANN pulling off money making scams...
Yeah, I didn't think this was even a valid question. The display from 2008 was a static backlit affair. The hotspot allows you to connect a slew of devices to the Internet for a while.
The 2008 display was neither static nor backlit(it was electrophoretic and reflective); but it was effectively useless because it wasn't bitmapped. Unlike the (much more expensive) e-ink screens used in kindles and their ilk, this one had 14 segments, all fixed shape. They didn't do anything to block you from reprogramming it; but all you could do was blink the segments in different patterns(and, unlike the classic '7-segment' LED and LCD displays, these segments were whole letters and chunks of background, not designed for even crude rendering of characters). More or less useless.
A provider of network certification exams experiencing a service outage.
Though, I have to ask, what exactly is the issue here? When I took a Cisco exam, everything seemed local, can't they simply say "thanks for taking the exam, we'll email/mail/call you with the results when they become available"?
In a sense, some of the same perverse incentives that drive fiascos like the EA/SimCity server-meltdown launch are probably at work with a testing company:
The greater the local storage of exams and answer keys, the easier it would be for them to leak, and the easier it would be for local employees/franchised locations to provide off-the-book 'services', for their own personal gain. The more you tie to HQ(eg. certainly don't have scoring capabilities onsite, ideally have only thin clients that dial in to HQ) the more control you have. Of course, this means going from a fairly robust system(all the tests Pearson administers would amount to what? a few tens of gigabytes, if there is any multimedia component, with relatively infrequent changes? You could probably keep the testing centers in step with rsync over dialup...) to a brittle one; but that never seems to stop anybody...
"at least writing the DRM in Javascript means it should run multiplatform"
The proposed standard allows the CDM to be implemented in Javascript(and provides one trivial version as an example); but explicitly provides for CDMs that are wholly opaque and platform specific, so long as they can be given a few specific parameters from javascript on the page.
Since anybody who actually cares about DRM isn't going to use the javascript-implemented system(since that leaves the key trivially exposed, any actual implementation will be a platform specific binary blackbox, as always, leaving you pretty much exactly where you were with Flash and Silverlight.
Right back to "Best Viewed With...", is what you're saying.
Oh, but much better: "Best Viewed With" was optional, in the sense that browser makers were free to attempt to duplicate one another's quirks and features. The results were often imperfect; but also often good enough.
The CDM, by contrast, is explicitly a DRM system, so any unathorized-but-interoperable clone of a given CDM would fall afoul of the DMCA or analogous laws(Think 'about as legal as libdecss', only potentially much less available because at least some of the CDMs won't be as shitty and non-upgradable as CSS was).
Plus, unlike browser 'quirks' modes, which often achieved somewhat broken but still usable results, a decryption module pretty much works or doesn't. Either you get the plaintext, or you get garbage indistinguishable from noise.
If it weren't relatively common to find some flavor of modem(POTS or cellular) slapped on to the serial port, that might be slightly more comforting...
That's the great thing about serial ports. Thanks to standardization since the 80s sometime, you can make them vulnerable to the outside for under $100, and in way likely to strike users as 'convenient'!
The question isn't whether they can require something; but whether they are showing good taste by doing so.
Given that nation states exist largely in a state of nature unless they piss off enough members of the security council, what they can do is a very broad category indeed. That, however, makes judging them on what they do choose to do rather easier...
Perhaps the management could be used to mitigate the risks to innocent construction workers in the creation of a suitable sarcophagus... I wouldn't trust their competence; but I'd be willing to let them keep working, without dosimeters, until they drop...
Requirements vary by jurisdiction; but something like the 'Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act'(for the limeys among us) explicitly covers key handling. In jurisdictions with less recently updated laws, some ad-hoc analogy to historical physical security measures will probably be applied.
It doesn't specify anything of the sort. It specifies the interface, but not any specific CDM.
Not quite true, it does specify one, totally chickenshit, "'Simple Decryption' scheme, with the key provided in plaintext, and absolutely zero protection against even the most trivial of attacks(you wouldn't even need to modify the browser, since the decryption key is in the clear.) but it remains rather fuzzy who exactly would use this, since it's totally pointless if you aren't worried about 'piracy', and it's equally pointless if you are.
It is provided as a token example of how a 'OMG, totally open source compatible!!!' CDM could be implemented; but it achieves none of the goals of any DRM proponent, while being a nuisance to non-DRM users, so it's largely cosmetic. Any actual DRM will be in a binary CDM, possibly a hardware-dependent one(eg. 'Protected media path', etc.), and anybody who would be satisfied with the 'simple decryption' nonsense will just stream in the clear for simplicity's sake.
If you look at the proposed standard, it quite specifically doesn't end that. It just replaces the world 'plugin' with "Content Decryption Module" wherever it appears...
I've always assumed the name "Silverlight" was chosen precisely because it was a platform designed primarily to allow you to watch movies.
DRM means I get to watch Netflix, so I'm all for DRM in HTML5.
Have you read the proposed standard? All it provides for are some javascript bits and pieces for interacting with the 'CDM', a totally unspecified piece of software and/or hardware that handles decryption and optionally on-screen rendering.
They don't call it this, of course; but it's a plugin, albeit one that is invoked in the 'video' tag rather than the 'object' tag.
No CDM for your platform? No playback. That's the thing, this isn't even some 'well, pragmatic compromise to gain greater functionality' thing: it constitutes absolutely no improvement over the current 'proprietary plugin required to playback DRMed movies' situation, it just changes 'plugin' to 'Content Decryption Module' and slightly changes the mechanism for talking to it.
Platform independent? Absolutely nothing in the spec about that(indeed, 'CDM may use or defer to platform capabilities', so it's explicitly OK for CDMs to have design features that require certain platform specific features).
An improvement in the integration of video into the page, DOM access, etc? Well, requesting the encrypted video is handled in javascript and HTML; but the CDM blackboxes everything from decryption to (optionally, probably mandatory if anybody is worried about the browser just grabbing decrypted frames) painting onscreen. Totally opaque blob embedded in the page, just like a plugin.
Other than giving the "HTML5!" stamp of approval to absolutely whatever CDMs people wish to use, the proposal really isn't "in" HTML5 at all. The CDM, the only important part of the game, is 'HTML5' in the sense that Java Applets, or flash objects, or ActiveX controls, are HTML: they can be embedded in web pages using HTML tags. That's it.
What games are you playing that don't support multi-GPU and multi-CPU? Most newer games that I've played support both.
There are a few exceptions that outright keel over and die(Looking at you, Fallout 3, why would a game ever have to not hard-lock every few minutes on machines with more than two cores?); but the real issue is not 'support' in the strict 'is compatible, won't crash horribly' sense; but the 'actually achieves meaningful speedup if you throw more cores at the problem' sense.
Most anything gets a small boost from the second core; because that at least leaves room for everything that isn't the game to stop contending for the same core that the game is hammering on; but the list of games that continue to gain as you add cores(and the degree of performance increase per additional core) is shorter and less exciting.
Multi GPU, similarly, has mostly outgrown the bad old days where it was substantially more likely to crash to desktop if the driver didn't have special shims for the exact game you were playing; but the linearity of the performance scaling as you add GPUs often leaves something to be desired.
Does the 5th amendment right to avoid self-incrimination apply only to the particular charges being brough in a given case, or does it cover any statement that could be incriminating, even if it were in a different proceeding, or if the record from Case A were to be used as evidence in Case B?
Say, in the case of an encrypted HDD, it's reasonably plausible that a broad spectrum of the suspect's electronic activities will be there. Common software tends to be a bit 'leaky' in terms of recording what it does(temp files, caches, search indexes, etc.) and most people don't have entirely separate computers for each flavor of crime they are engaged in.
If somebody were being charged for one crime that probably left evidence on the HDD(kiddie porn, say); would the fact that they know that there is evidence of CC-skimming(but, unlike the kiddie porn, the feds have no circumstantial evidence or other grounds for belief) justify a 5th-amendment refusal to decrypt the volume? Would the other potentially-incriminating stuff be irrelevant because it isn't among the charges(even if the court record could be used as evidence to bring future charges)? Would the suspect be compelled to divulge the key; but the prosecution only have access to material relevant to the charges being filed, with some 3rd party forensics person 'firewalling' to exclude all irrelevant material?
Slashdot Mirror
Check this one out...
(More broadly, though, the point is largely valid. Reel-to-reel deserved to die, technologically; but damn did it look 'high tech' churning away in the background, now that everything fits in standard 72u racks, it's mostly just a 'Should we go for 'basic black, or spring for custom powdercoat and a cool cutout design for the doors?' game.
Of course, seeing as the CM-2 won 'coolest-looking computer of all time', with the CM-5 playing 'solid; but ever-so-slightly-disappointing-sequel', perhaps it's only fair for everyone else to just stop trying.
Cray is still kicking around??
I don't think they've kicked out an original processor design in ages; but they are still(among) those you talk to if you want something a little more tightly coupled, and/or a bit more 'turnkey' than "10,000 of whatever dell is selling, and some 10GbE switches".
There are arguably use cases where DRM would be convenient(eg. media rentals, which are a relatively uncontroversial and popular service in physical media, pretty much need to time-out to work, 'snapchat' and its ilk are designed explicitly, if not effectively, to enforce transience, again only doable with DRM).
The problem is architectural, though. In order for DRM to work, the root of control for a device cannot be its user/owner. It has to be the DRM-enforcing entity, or else the 'DRM' is simply some obfuscation. There just isn't a way around that. Further, to deal with analog hole/leaks from compromised devices or the production chain/etc. there is a strong incentive to make devices 'default-deny' rather than 'default-allow'(compare a PC, which will execute more or less any program that isn't explicitly self-destructive, with an iDevice or console, that will reject otherwise well-formed applications that aren't signed correctly).
And the trouble continues: in order to prevent 'leaky-by-design' hardware from being produced(eg. cheapy DVD players that are... lax about region coding and macrovision), the DRM mechanism essentially has to be legally encumbered in some way('hook IP', DMCA-style laws, etc.) to prevent the easy manufacture of HDCP strippers, region-free DVD players, and other 'claims to be DRM-compliant; but with a backdoor by design' circumvention tools.
This places extraordinary power in the hands of whatever licensing entity controls the DRM scheme: at a bare minimum, it's a steady stream of licensing revenue(even for hilariously broken systems like CSS, they still get their cut per DVD player). It may also include power over who is and isn't allowed to enter a market or exist on a given platform, and substantial control over the activities of everything going on within systems that include a given DRM scheme.
That's the real problem, ultimately. It isn't that there are zero uses for DRM, it's that (by necessity) you have to make some pretty radical changes to get DRM working at all, and once you make them, the uses that you don't want are every bit as available as the uses that you do want, and there is no way of allowing only the former and preventing the latter.
It also doesn't help, of course, that a system sufficiently-robust to be a DRM system is almost certainly sufficiently capable to be extremely useful for fun censorship and surveillance purposes.
"Their direct costs and the costs of losing them will by far exceed the cost of remedial activities."
Unfortunately, logic like that doesn't work on elected officials. It will probably take a tragedy and loss of life before people pay attention to the science behind this.
Is that a bet? GPS is pretty much baked into every piece of American military hardware large enough to house it, either as a near-necessity or a substantial convenience, and teams GLONASS and GALILEO(along with whatever the Indians and Chinese are calling their proposed regional systems these days) aren't exactly hobby projects, and has also crept into lots of expensive, long-term plans for air traffic control, decomissioning of certain older transponder location systems, etc. You've also got the definitely-not-officially-up-there; but highly valued, spy stuff that the NRO and NGA would be very sad about.
Sure, if a few esoteric scientific payloads were toasted, we'd probably fail to muster a yawn(breathing that deeply takes effort), and something like the ISS would muster a bit more publicity, but no real plans to do anything about it, since it's something of a white elephant. Even things like satellite phone, internet, and TV services might be ultimately considered disposable(the economics of just laying the cable and putting up the towers for terrestrial wireless aren't good enough now; but if the satellite attrition rate increased enough...), though they might hang on because of their utility in high-value sectors like petroleum and mineral extraction and military communications.
Satellite capabilities are baked sufficiently closely into more-or-less-sacred military budgets that it would be an extreme surprise to see lack of attention given to protecting at least individual satellites. It isn't clear that anybody would actually stump up for 'keep space open for the betterment of all mankind, etc.'; but much of the hardware in space has substantially more influential friends.
I don't know whether it qualifies as a fallacy, or has a name if it does; but arguments of this particular style always annoy me:
It's a selective application of an assertion that(while probably true where you are applying it) is true of so many other situations where you do not and would not apply it as to be completely meaningless.
Are opponents of Glass 'afraid of change'? In some sense, arguably, there is often a tinge of fear motivating a visceral dislike of some novelty. However, is there any new something for which this could not be said? Opponents of virtually anything except the status quo are 'afraid of change' in that weak sense, despite changes being available in every conceivable flavor.
It may not be 'false' in a strict sense; but it isn't usefully true in any meaningful way.
Ah, but if you have something that you don't want anyone to fly a drone over, well, there just may have to be some regulations of drones...
You better call Captain Planet, South America.
Because little Jeff Bezos ain't giving that up without a serious fight.
Hey, both Amazons are leading distributors of dead trees, I think we've got a serious trademark issue here.
Will all these stupid new TLDs even be used? Right now, how often do you go to a legitimate website (non-spam, non-scam, non-malware) that doesn't use .com, .net, .org, .gov or .edu ? I'll bet it's pretty rare.
Creating all of these new TLDs is nothing but a money making scam for ICANN.
Oh, not to worry, with the number of sneaky URL-lookalikes that a combination of gTLDs and unicode support will allow, it won't just be ICANN pulling off money making scams...
Yeah, I didn't think this was even a valid question. The display from 2008 was a static backlit affair. The hotspot allows you to connect a slew of devices to the Internet for a while.
The 2008 display was neither static nor backlit(it was electrophoretic and reflective); but it was effectively useless because it wasn't bitmapped. Unlike the (much more expensive) e-ink screens used in kindles and their ilk, this one had 14 segments, all fixed shape. They didn't do anything to block you from reprogramming it; but all you could do was blink the segments in different patterns(and, unlike the classic '7-segment' LED and LCD displays, these segments were whole letters and chunks of background, not designed for even crude rendering of characters). More or less useless.
Let me go get my Marshmallows. Good riddance to bad rubbish.
You may not want to eat anything cooked over flaming toxic waste.
Eh, don't worry so much. Do you really think that EA would resort to firing their supply of awful people before they run out of alternatives?
A provider of network certification exams experiencing a service outage.
Though, I have to ask, what exactly is the issue here? When I took a Cisco exam, everything seemed local, can't they simply say "thanks for taking the exam, we'll email/mail/call you with the results when they become available"?
In a sense, some of the same perverse incentives that drive fiascos like the EA/SimCity server-meltdown launch are probably at work with a testing company:
The greater the local storage of exams and answer keys, the easier it would be for them to leak, and the easier it would be for local employees/franchised locations to provide off-the-book 'services', for their own personal gain. The more you tie to HQ(eg. certainly don't have scoring capabilities onsite, ideally have only thin clients that dial in to HQ) the more control you have. Of course, this means going from a fairly robust system(all the tests Pearson administers would amount to what? a few tens of gigabytes, if there is any multimedia component, with relatively infrequent changes? You could probably keep the testing centers in step with rsync over dialup...) to a brittle one; but that never seems to stop anybody...
"at least writing the DRM in Javascript means it should run multiplatform"
The proposed standard allows the CDM to be implemented in Javascript(and provides one trivial version as an example); but explicitly provides for CDMs that are wholly opaque and platform specific, so long as they can be given a few specific parameters from javascript on the page.
Since anybody who actually cares about DRM isn't going to use the javascript-implemented system(since that leaves the key trivially exposed, any actual implementation will be a platform specific binary blackbox, as always, leaving you pretty much exactly where you were with Flash and Silverlight.
Right back to "Best Viewed With...", is what you're saying.
Oh, but much better: "Best Viewed With" was optional, in the sense that browser makers were free to attempt to duplicate one another's quirks and features. The results were often imperfect; but also often good enough.
The CDM, by contrast, is explicitly a DRM system, so any unathorized-but-interoperable clone of a given CDM would fall afoul of the DMCA or analogous laws(Think 'about as legal as libdecss', only potentially much less available because at least some of the CDMs won't be as shitty and non-upgradable as CSS was).
Plus, unlike browser 'quirks' modes, which often achieved somewhat broken but still usable results, a decryption module pretty much works or doesn't. Either you get the plaintext, or you get garbage indistinguishable from noise.
"If you have something that you don't want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place."
E. Schmidt, CEO Google, inc.
Clearly, if you have something that you don't want anyone to fly a drone over, maybe you shouldn't have it in the first place...
If it weren't relatively common to find some flavor of modem(POTS or cellular) slapped on to the serial port, that might be slightly more comforting...
That's the great thing about serial ports. Thanks to standardization since the 80s sometime, you can make them vulnerable to the outside for under $100, and in way likely to strike users as 'convenient'!
The question isn't whether they can require something; but whether they are showing good taste by doing so.
Given that nation states exist largely in a state of nature unless they piss off enough members of the security council, what they can do is a very broad category indeed. That, however, makes judging them on what they do choose to do rather easier...
Perhaps the management could be used to mitigate the risks to innocent construction workers in the creation of a suitable sarcophagus... I wouldn't trust their competence; but I'd be willing to let them keep working, without dosimeters, until they drop...
Requirements vary by jurisdiction; but something like the 'Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act'(for the limeys among us) explicitly covers key handling. In jurisdictions with less recently updated laws, some ad-hoc analogy to historical physical security measures will probably be applied.
It doesn't specify anything of the sort. It specifies the interface, but not any specific CDM.
Not quite true, it does specify one, totally chickenshit, "'Simple Decryption' scheme, with the key provided in plaintext, and absolutely zero protection against even the most trivial of attacks(you wouldn't even need to modify the browser, since the decryption key is in the clear.) but it remains rather fuzzy who exactly would use this, since it's totally pointless if you aren't worried about 'piracy', and it's equally pointless if you are.
It is provided as a token example of how a 'OMG, totally open source compatible!!!' CDM could be implemented; but it achieves none of the goals of any DRM proponent, while being a nuisance to non-DRM users, so it's largely cosmetic. Any actual DRM will be in a binary CDM, possibly a hardware-dependent one(eg. 'Protected media path', etc.), and anybody who would be satisfied with the 'simple decryption' nonsense will just stream in the clear for simplicity's sake.
If you look at the proposed standard, it quite specifically doesn't end that. It just replaces the world 'plugin' with "Content Decryption Module" wherever it appears...
I've always assumed the name "Silverlight" was chosen precisely because it was a platform designed primarily to allow you to watch movies.
DRM means I get to watch Netflix, so I'm all for DRM in HTML5.
Have you read the proposed standard? All it provides for are some javascript bits and pieces for interacting with the 'CDM', a totally unspecified piece of software and/or hardware that handles decryption and optionally on-screen rendering.
They don't call it this, of course; but it's a plugin, albeit one that is invoked in the 'video' tag rather than the 'object' tag.
No CDM for your platform? No playback. That's the thing, this isn't even some 'well, pragmatic compromise to gain greater functionality' thing: it constitutes absolutely no improvement over the current 'proprietary plugin required to playback DRMed movies' situation, it just changes 'plugin' to 'Content Decryption Module' and slightly changes the mechanism for talking to it.
Platform independent? Absolutely nothing in the spec about that(indeed, 'CDM may use or defer to platform capabilities', so it's explicitly OK for CDMs to have design features that require certain platform specific features).
An improvement in the integration of video into the page, DOM access, etc? Well, requesting the encrypted video is handled in javascript and HTML; but the CDM blackboxes everything from decryption to (optionally, probably mandatory if anybody is worried about the browser just grabbing decrypted frames) painting onscreen. Totally opaque blob embedded in the page, just like a plugin.
Other than giving the "HTML5!" stamp of approval to absolutely whatever CDMs people wish to use, the proposal really isn't "in" HTML5 at all. The CDM, the only important part of the game, is 'HTML5' in the sense that Java Applets, or flash objects, or ActiveX controls, are HTML: they can be embedded in web pages using HTML tags. That's it.
Hey, an X-by-Y 'table' object populated entirely with 1-pixel images is just waiting to be turned into a javascript-controlled framebuffer!
Because it takes a special company to provide 'family size' bandwidth in Utah!
What games are you playing that don't support multi-GPU and multi-CPU? Most newer games that I've played support both.
There are a few exceptions that outright keel over and die(Looking at you, Fallout 3, why would a game ever have to not hard-lock every few minutes on machines with more than two cores?); but the real issue is not 'support' in the strict 'is compatible, won't crash horribly' sense; but the 'actually achieves meaningful speedup if you throw more cores at the problem' sense.
Most anything gets a small boost from the second core; because that at least leaves room for everything that isn't the game to stop contending for the same core that the game is hammering on; but the list of games that continue to gain as you add cores(and the degree of performance increase per additional core) is shorter and less exciting.
Multi GPU, similarly, has mostly outgrown the bad old days where it was substantially more likely to crash to desktop if the driver didn't have special shims for the exact game you were playing; but the linearity of the performance scaling as you add GPUs often leaves something to be desired.
Does the 5th amendment right to avoid self-incrimination apply only to the particular charges being brough in a given case, or does it cover any statement that could be incriminating, even if it were in a different proceeding, or if the record from Case A were to be used as evidence in Case B?
Say, in the case of an encrypted HDD, it's reasonably plausible that a broad spectrum of the suspect's electronic activities will be there. Common software tends to be a bit 'leaky' in terms of recording what it does(temp files, caches, search indexes, etc.) and most people don't have entirely separate computers for each flavor of crime they are engaged in.
If somebody were being charged for one crime that probably left evidence on the HDD(kiddie porn, say); would the fact that they know that there is evidence of CC-skimming(but, unlike the kiddie porn, the feds have no circumstantial evidence or other grounds for belief) justify a 5th-amendment refusal to decrypt the volume? Would the other potentially-incriminating stuff be irrelevant because it isn't among the charges(even if the court record could be used as evidence to bring future charges)? Would the suspect be compelled to divulge the key; but the prosecution only have access to material relevant to the charges being filed, with some 3rd party forensics person 'firewalling' to exclude all irrelevant material?