The other is that - as the articles say - he named her in the very public tweet, and might have threatened to escalate further and encourage people to harass, threaten, or do worse to her.
So if he had named her in a tweet full of praise, it would be OK? Wouldn't she then feel threatened that wackos might want to propose to her because she's such a great person? He's not responsible for what other people might do in regards to a truthful but opinionated twitter post, regardless of whether that post is positive or negative.
I would be OK with your idea if she only requested that he remove her name from the post, and explained her personal discomfort. If she then also offered contact information for her supervisor so that he could complain about her personally if he wished, that would have been just about the perfect way to react. But, none of this should have involved pulling him off the plane. That was done solely as leverage to get her way.
That's not government authority, that's the authority of a privately owned company to refuse service to anyone.
As others have pointed out, "failing to follow the instructions of a airline/TSA/whatever employee" when at an airport is a felony in the US. Thus, if he refused to remove the tweet, he technically could have been arrested.
Whenever the government says "you can't do X" and "X" is exercising one of your inalienable rights, it's a Constitutional issue, which in this case is 1st Amendment.
I think he figured he didn't want to pay the extra money to upgrade his kids and that he could slip them into boarding with himself counting on the fact that either he felt entitled due to his frequent flying status, or that the gate person wouldn't call him out on it.
Actually, I suspect that he felt that instead of boarding first and then saving the seats for his kids (which the flight attendants will let you do), he felt that letting them board at the same time would have the same net effect on other passengers but allow him to keep his kids with him the whole time.
The gate agent was correct in telling him he could move back in the line to join his kids, but they couldn't cut in line and move up to join him. That's the policy and they tell you this when asking you to line up.
No, SW doesn't tell you this when you line up, and specifically allows "families" to board together first. In addition, for groups that don't qualify as a "family" that have different boarding assignments, the flight attendants have no problem with the first persons to board saving seats in the same rows for later people. They won't let you save random seats all over the aircraft, though.
There are dozens of solutions that the gate attendant could have chosen that would have resulted in the man feeling he had received good customer service and thus never posting a bad review. After the tweet was out there, the gate attendant then chose the very worst method to try to resolve the situation in her (but not Southwest Airlines) favor.
then send them an email tailored just for them: Hi Joe, we found another missile system using flight parameters that may be interesting for use in the Ramrod. Here is the website..., signed your coworker Frank.
Frank doesn't sign his e-mail that way, so something must be up. Or, I don't know Frank personally, why would he send this to me? Or, Frank always sticks his head in my office right after he sends and e-mail and asks "did you see my e-mail?", so this must be fake. If your investigations that allow you to "spear phish" are good enough to solve these sorts of problems, you don't need to phish for stuff, you've paid off the cleaning crew and they can just take the papers.
As for technological solutions (after all, this is/. ), we can assume that the e-mail was flagged as arriving at our e-mail server from an external server (i.e., not authenticated against our network), so it has a header added that causes it to be filtered by e-mail rules to not go directly into the inbox, but instead into the "external contacts" folder. Yes, I know most companies don't do this, but they should. My company adds headers, but doesn't automatically filter...that's up to the user.
How are spammers successful so often? Simple, companies don't train people.
Companies also don't often have the infrastructure set up to help their people do the right thing.
As an example, every company should provide users with unlimited e-mail addresses that end up in their real e-mail inbox but can be filtered using rules. Employees should then be instructed that they should never use their "real" e-mail address for anything that gets put into a database. This means that if they sign up at Cisco's support portal, they don't use "realaddress@example.com", but instead something like "cisco-realaddress@example.com". This means that if you get what seems to be an official-looking e-mail about paying an invoice from Cisco addressed to "amazon-realaddress@example.com", you know it's fake.
If ISPs provided the same feature, phishing success would be reduced dramatically. I get any number of e-mails that pretend to be from a bank (some actually from a bank I do business with), yet all come to the wrong e-mail address, so they are immediately trashed. With a little work, it could even be automated, especially if companies co-operated and documented keywords that would always appear in every e-mail from them. This would allow you to compare the keywords in the body to the recipient and see that they don't match as being from the same company.
And if the interview went like this, I would expect the candidate to be rejected.
Shooting the interviewer is generally considered to be a sign that the interview subject is hiding something, so, yes, rejection would be the appropriate decision.
Basically they're filtering out all applicants who are bad at taking polygraph tests.
Based on the massive number of lies the intelligence agencies have recently told and had pretty much everyone in Congress believe them, it looks like their hiring practices have paid off.
cgroups, kernel capabilities, boilerplate code when writing own system services, cgroups, cgroups, cgroups, did I mention cgroups?
So, one feature of systemd that is used only by a very small percentage of users and could have been broken out into its own code is worth making debugging startup issues almost impossible?
Since the poster who originally said "systemd makes system administration a joy" never replied, I'm gonna assume he was either being sarcastic or a troll.
from what I have read, they do not specify the person or things to be seized except "everything".
We don't know that, as nothing has reported what they can "seize", only what they can "search". They are permitted to search the entire account. My guess would be that prosecutors would then take everything they found which they believed was relevant and bring it before the judge, who would then give the yes/no for each piece, seeing as how that's how evidence works in every case.
Also, if the government has some sort of injunction to prevent the defendant from using the account (reasonable, since they could destroy or fabricate evidence), it has already been "seized", and would need to remain so until the trial was complete. Getting a snapshot of everything now could actually allow the defendant to resume using the account, so that the "seizure" period would be minimized.
Its not fair to just open up all of someones papers for their entire life for investigation.
OK, how about this physical example where you have a filing cabinet which contains papers that have written on them evidence of a crime. The police execute a warrant to search through the filing cabinet for those papers, and take only those papers concerning the crime.
But, but must read every paper to determine if that particular paper has the evidence they are looking for. So, your "entire life" has been exposed. Nothing except what concerns the exact crime on the warrant can ever be used against you in a criminal trial, but they might have learned any number of other things about you that you wanted to keep secret.
Also, any warrant asking to just search the entire house should be rejected, too.
I'm no police apologist, but what you're saying is downright silly.
If the police have enough evidence that shows you own a firearm of the same caliber as the murder weapon, and some other evidence indicates you might be guilty (e.g., motive), then they shouldn't need to know what room in your house you keep your gun in order to get a search warrant.
In this case, if the police have enough other evidence that you have evidence of your money laundering in your GMail account, I don't see it unreasonable that they can search all the e-mail. It really isn't any different from getting a warrant to search the entire contents of a specific filing cabinet in your home, and it really is an unreasonable burden to require the police to also know the color of the paper the evidence is printed on, as well as which file folder contains the paper.
The general principle is that the search should be as narrowly focused on particular evidence as can practically be managed. Is that the case here? It doesn't seem to be, but I'm not the judge, I don't know the details.
I suspect the issue might be that a list of keywords (and synonyms) that would be reasonable in a money laundering case might be so large as to make a global retrieval seem reasonable. And, paring back the list of words might miss something important.
I see no harm whatsoever allowing a search through all the GMail of that one person for evidence concerning money laundering, with evidence of any unrelated crimes (e.g., admission to a murder of a spouse because they were sleeping with someone else) not being admissible.
My boss complains all day and night about the bugs on his LG G2
I haven't found any "bug" on the G2. There's bloatware (Verizon and LG) which mostly can be disabled, but that's something every phone has these days.
My only real usability issue is that the on-screen keyboard isn't as easy as previous phones as far as entering symbols. I've never needed a special keyboard app before because I'm not that heavy a user, so I always use the built-in keyboard.
What's funny is his complaints are mostly about apps. On an Android. Where you can mostly replace the functionality without fanfare.
Unless, of course, you have one of the lower end phones (which is exactly the kind he is referring to) and it doesn't have enough internal storage for you to replace all the built-in apps (which can't be removed without root).
You are seriously confused. Subpoenas cannot force anyone to perform illegal acts. I have no authority to remove items from the purse of a stranger, regardless of the piece of paper a judge has filled out.
The most annoying part about the Lending Library is that you can only swap out books once per month.
No, the most annoying part is that you have to have a Kindle device.
I have lots of devices that support the Kindle reading app, so why should I have to buy an actual Kindle to use the Lending Library? I know my Kindle apps support reading books loaned from other people, and those books disappear once the loan period is up, so there is no technical reason behind the limitation.
"Overseas records must be disclosed domestically when a valid subpoena, order, or warrant compels their production" That was the claim literally word for word.
That, indeed, was the claim, and it is the hope of the administration that conflating them will cause their desired outcome. The problem is that those three terms do not refer to documents with the same legal scope, and Microsoft has lawyers who know this.
Subpoenas cannot be used to force production of data you do not own. The data in question is not owned by Microsoft, so a subpoena can't force them to disclose it. A warrant can force production of data you do not own, but must be issued by a court with jurisdiction over the physical location of the data. No US court has jurisdiction within Ireland, so a warrant issued by a US court cannot force anyone to produce data stored in Ireland. An "order" is just a generic term for anything a court issues that might compel someone to do something.
If I walked into your office with a subpoena for Betsy in the next cube's car and you know she keeps her keys in her purse you are obligated to get the keys from her purse even though you don't own the car nor the purse. Ownership or "the right" to the data doesn't matter. What matters is do you have access.
This is completely bogus, as I no more have legal access to my office-mate's purse than I do to my neighbor's house. Likewise, your statement implies that you could hand me a subpoena when I am sitting in Starbucks and force me to take keys out of the purse of the stranger sitting next to me, just because I saw her put them in her purse.
Even more important, you might have a subpoena for house keys, and although I know that Betsy keeps keys in her purse, I do not know she keeps house keys there, and even if I did, I doubt I could pick them out.
As an 18th birthday present, yes. Until then, the kid can't make a contract with a bank.
You must not be in the US. Many kids under 18 have bank accounts in their own names, with their own debit cards. It's been that way long before debit cards, too.
Slashdot Mirror
The other is that - as the articles say - he named her in the very public tweet, and might have threatened to escalate further and encourage people to harass, threaten, or do worse to her.
So if he had named her in a tweet full of praise, it would be OK? Wouldn't she then feel threatened that wackos might want to propose to her because she's such a great person? He's not responsible for what other people might do in regards to a truthful but opinionated twitter post, regardless of whether that post is positive or negative.
I would be OK with your idea if she only requested that he remove her name from the post, and explained her personal discomfort. If she then also offered contact information for her supervisor so that he could complain about her personally if he wished, that would have been just about the perfect way to react. But, none of this should have involved pulling him off the plane. That was done solely as leverage to get her way.
That's not government authority, that's the authority of a privately owned company to refuse service to anyone.
As others have pointed out, "failing to follow the instructions of a airline/TSA/whatever employee" when at an airport is a felony in the US. Thus, if he refused to remove the tweet, he technically could have been arrested.
Whenever the government says "you can't do X" and "X" is exercising one of your inalienable rights, it's a Constitutional issue, which in this case is 1st Amendment.
low cost carriers charge extra for any checked luggage, incentivizing those bulging Texans.
Surprisingly, Southwest has some of the lowest prices and still allows you to check up to two bags (up to 50 lbs. each) for free.
I think he figured he didn't want to pay the extra money to upgrade his kids and that he could slip them into boarding with himself counting on the fact that either he felt entitled due to his frequent flying status, or that the gate person wouldn't call him out on it.
Actually, I suspect that he felt that instead of boarding first and then saving the seats for his kids (which the flight attendants will let you do), he felt that letting them board at the same time would have the same net effect on other passengers but allow him to keep his kids with him the whole time.
The gate agent was correct in telling him he could move back in the line to join his kids, but they couldn't cut in line and move up to join him. That's the policy and they tell you this when asking you to line up.
No, SW doesn't tell you this when you line up, and specifically allows "families" to board together first. In addition, for groups that don't qualify as a "family" that have different boarding assignments, the flight attendants have no problem with the first persons to board saving seats in the same rows for later people. They won't let you save random seats all over the aircraft, though.
There are dozens of solutions that the gate attendant could have chosen that would have resulted in the man feeling he had received good customer service and thus never posting a bad review. After the tweet was out there, the gate attendant then chose the very worst method to try to resolve the situation in her (but not Southwest Airlines) favor.
then send them an email tailored just for them: Hi Joe, we found another missile system using flight parameters that may be interesting for use in the Ramrod. Here is the website..., signed your coworker Frank.
Frank doesn't sign his e-mail that way, so something must be up. Or, I don't know Frank personally, why would he send this to me? Or, Frank always sticks his head in my office right after he sends and e-mail and asks "did you see my e-mail?", so this must be fake. If your investigations that allow you to "spear phish" are good enough to solve these sorts of problems, you don't need to phish for stuff, you've paid off the cleaning crew and they can just take the papers.
As for technological solutions (after all, this is /. ), we can assume that the e-mail was flagged as arriving at our e-mail server from an external server (i.e., not authenticated against our network), so it has a header added that causes it to be filtered by e-mail rules to not go directly into the inbox, but instead into the "external contacts" folder. Yes, I know most companies don't do this, but they should. My company adds headers, but doesn't automatically filter...that's up to the user.
How are spammers successful so often? Simple, companies don't train people.
Companies also don't often have the infrastructure set up to help their people do the right thing.
As an example, every company should provide users with unlimited e-mail addresses that end up in their real e-mail inbox but can be filtered using rules. Employees should then be instructed that they should never use their "real" e-mail address for anything that gets put into a database. This means that if they sign up at Cisco's support portal, they don't use "realaddress@example.com", but instead something like "cisco-realaddress@example.com". This means that if you get what seems to be an official-looking e-mail about paying an invoice from Cisco addressed to "amazon-realaddress@example.com", you know it's fake.
If ISPs provided the same feature, phishing success would be reduced dramatically. I get any number of e-mails that pretend to be from a bank (some actually from a bank I do business with), yet all come to the wrong e-mail address, so they are immediately trashed. With a little work, it could even be automated, especially if companies co-operated and documented keywords that would always appear in every e-mail from them. This would allow you to compare the keywords in the body to the recipient and see that they don't match as being from the same company.
And if the interview went like this, I would expect the candidate to be rejected.
Shooting the interviewer is generally considered to be a sign that the interview subject is hiding something, so, yes, rejection would be the appropriate decision.
Basically they're filtering out all applicants who are bad at taking polygraph tests.
Based on the massive number of lies the intelligence agencies have recently told and had pretty much everyone in Congress believe them, it looks like their hiring practices have paid off.
cgroups, kernel capabilities, boilerplate code when writing own system services, cgroups, cgroups, cgroups, did I mention cgroups?
So, one feature of systemd that is used only by a very small percentage of users and could have been broken out into its own code is worth making debugging startup issues almost impossible?
Since the poster who originally said "systemd makes system administration a joy" never replied, I'm gonna assume he was either being sarcastic or a troll.
I will say this, though, to actually contribute to the conversation about minivans... I had no problem driving one, and felt no stigma about it.
For all the reasons you stated, I have no problem with a minivan.
As soon as I can get one that has some get-up-and-go (probably through a turbo), I'll buy it.
from what I have read, they do not specify the person or things to be seized except "everything".
We don't know that, as nothing has reported what they can "seize", only what they can "search". They are permitted to search the entire account. My guess would be that prosecutors would then take everything they found which they believed was relevant and bring it before the judge, who would then give the yes/no for each piece, seeing as how that's how evidence works in every case.
Also, if the government has some sort of injunction to prevent the defendant from using the account (reasonable, since they could destroy or fabricate evidence), it has already been "seized", and would need to remain so until the trial was complete. Getting a snapshot of everything now could actually allow the defendant to resume using the account, so that the "seizure" period would be minimized.
Its not fair to just open up all of someones papers for their entire life for investigation.
OK, how about this physical example where you have a filing cabinet which contains papers that have written on them evidence of a crime. The police execute a warrant to search through the filing cabinet for those papers, and take only those papers concerning the crime.
But, but must read every paper to determine if that particular paper has the evidence they are looking for. So, your "entire life" has been exposed. Nothing except what concerns the exact crime on the warrant can ever be used against you in a criminal trial, but they might have learned any number of other things about you that you wanted to keep secret.
Also, any warrant asking to just search the entire house should be rejected, too.
I'm no police apologist, but what you're saying is downright silly.
If the police have enough evidence that shows you own a firearm of the same caliber as the murder weapon, and some other evidence indicates you might be guilty (e.g., motive), then they shouldn't need to know what room in your house you keep your gun in order to get a search warrant.
In this case, if the police have enough other evidence that you have evidence of your money laundering in your GMail account, I don't see it unreasonable that they can search all the e-mail. It really isn't any different from getting a warrant to search the entire contents of a specific filing cabinet in your home, and it really is an unreasonable burden to require the police to also know the color of the paper the evidence is printed on, as well as which file folder contains the paper.
The general principle is that the search should be as narrowly focused on particular evidence as can practically be managed. Is that the case here? It doesn't seem to be, but I'm not the judge, I don't know the details.
I suspect the issue might be that a list of keywords (and synonyms) that would be reasonable in a money laundering case might be so large as to make a global retrieval seem reasonable. And, paring back the list of words might miss something important.
I see no harm whatsoever allowing a search through all the GMail of that one person for evidence concerning money laundering, with evidence of any unrelated crimes (e.g., admission to a murder of a spouse because they were sleeping with someone else) not being admissible.
My boss complains all day and night about the bugs on his LG G2
I haven't found any "bug" on the G2. There's bloatware (Verizon and LG) which mostly can be disabled, but that's something every phone has these days.
My only real usability issue is that the on-screen keyboard isn't as easy as previous phones as far as entering symbols. I've never needed a special keyboard app before because I'm not that heavy a user, so I always use the built-in keyboard.
What's funny is his complaints are mostly about apps. On an Android. Where you can mostly replace the functionality without fanfare.
Unless, of course, you have one of the lower end phones (which is exactly the kind he is referring to) and it doesn't have enough internal storage for you to replace all the built-in apps (which can't be removed without root).
You guys are stuck with a stupid two-party system, all you can do is vote for the lesser of two evils.
The solution is obvious: vote Cthulhu
The idea is that when you want a product like what they're advertising, you'll think of the one that was advertised.
I'm more likely to remember that I've seen dozens of annoying ads for their brand and intentionally avoid it.
systemd makes system administration a joy.
Please explain, in detail, what was so difficult before that is now much better because of systemd.
You are seriously confused. Subpoenas cannot force anyone to perform illegal acts. I have no authority to remove items from the purse of a stranger, regardless of the piece of paper a judge has filled out.
The most annoying part about the Lending Library is that you can only swap out books once per month.
No, the most annoying part is that you have to have a Kindle device.
I have lots of devices that support the Kindle reading app, so why should I have to buy an actual Kindle to use the Lending Library? I know my Kindle apps support reading books loaned from other people, and those books disappear once the loan period is up, so there is no technical reason behind the limitation.
"Overseas records must be disclosed domestically when a valid subpoena, order, or warrant compels their production" That was the claim literally word for word.
That, indeed, was the claim, and it is the hope of the administration that conflating them will cause their desired outcome. The problem is that those three terms do not refer to documents with the same legal scope, and Microsoft has lawyers who know this.
Subpoenas cannot be used to force production of data you do not own. The data in question is not owned by Microsoft, so a subpoena can't force them to disclose it. A warrant can force production of data you do not own, but must be issued by a court with jurisdiction over the physical location of the data. No US court has jurisdiction within Ireland, so a warrant issued by a US court cannot force anyone to produce data stored in Ireland. An "order" is just a generic term for anything a court issues that might compel someone to do something.
If I walked into your office with a subpoena for Betsy in the next cube's car and you know she keeps her keys in her purse you are obligated to get the keys from her purse even though you don't own the car nor the purse. Ownership or "the right" to the data doesn't matter. What matters is do you have access.
This is completely bogus, as I no more have legal access to my office-mate's purse than I do to my neighbor's house. Likewise, your statement implies that you could hand me a subpoena when I am sitting in Starbucks and force me to take keys out of the purse of the stranger sitting next to me, just because I saw her put them in her purse.
Even more important, you might have a subpoena for house keys, and although I know that Betsy keeps keys in her purse, I do not know she keeps house keys there, and even if I did, I doubt I could pick them out.
As an 18th birthday present, yes. Until then, the kid can't make a contract with a bank.
You must not be in the US. Many kids under 18 have bank accounts in their own names, with their own debit cards. It's been that way long before debit cards, too.