"Dec 18 (Reuters) - Fairfield Greenwich Group, the fund whose clients stand to lose $7.5 billion in Bernard Madoff's alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme, is considering suing its accountants, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), for failing to detect the fraud, the Financial Times reported on its website."
Shocking news! Senior executives who rely for their lavish compensation on the wealth generated by software engineering labor do not want labor to organize! Film at 11!
I'm not saying software engineering labor unionization would be a good thing for the economy, or even for software engineers (frankly, I think the UAW paints a dire picture of what unionization would do to our industry). But the fact that software engineering management wants to prevent software engineering labor from organizing should come as no surprise.
Here's a better idea though - stop the freight train of lowering the taxes above and below the income range of software engineers, while increasing the taxes on the income range of software engineers. The 90th to 95th percentile of income (the range most senior software engineers occupy) has seen its effective taxation increase by 16% since 1970 while the two party system has pandered by turns, lowering taxes on the 0th to 70th percentile, and the 99th to 100th percentile.
You want to derail this train? Stop the government interference in our ability to share in the wealth we create. You claim to believe that the beauty of the free market is that those who create wealth are rewarded with income. Fine - put your money where your mouth is. Our income range has seen a massive explosion in productivity, but has seen its wages sit flat relative to GDP (11% of GDP net, same since 1970). Meanwhile senior executive compensation has risen by a factor of 6. That is not because of a free market in labor optimizing, it is because tax policy has been screwing my income range for my entire life. You want to derail this train? Let us participate in the GDP growth in our sector.
Here's my hypothesis: It is not that individual discovery is harder than it once was, it is that collective discovery is easier. As such, the number of people toiling in isolation has declined. Toss in a few other economic realities (eg: young individuals who used to go into research now go into business - cuz that's where the money is), and it looks like individual discovery is harder.
A more interesting perspective, I think, is the collective discovery angle. Here's a traditional piece of wisdom; "The laborer can only get paid based on the output of a single laborer, the manager can get paid a percentage of many laborers' output - therefore management can get paid more." Ignoring for the moment the shoddy math that is often implied by that sentiment (managers should get paid more, without regard to what the appropriate percentage is), collective discovery implies a new truth: "The knowledge worker is a member of a collective. The ability to enhance wealth creation by labor was once the sole prerogative of management. Now the ability to enhance wealth creation by labor is similarly, and often more greatly, affected by interaction with peer laborers. If one believes that income should be directly proportional to wealth creation (the objective of free market economics), this implies a new truth for income distribution among knowledge worker labor and management. The income associated with the enhancement of the ability of labor to create wealth, income traditionally reserved to management, should shift toward peer laborers, in recognition of their collective augmentation of each other, to maximize the efficiency of the economy."
Of course, it will take a long time for that to supplant the dogma of those steeped in traditional business models of labor.
Much of the question of civil liberties in cybersecurity seems to be related to enforcement after the fact. The ability to find out who did what after the event occurs. That seems like a principle indication that there is a problem in our approach. Once an event happens, it cannot be undone. This is particularly true when considering information assets, which once lost cannot be recovered in the same sense in which a painting or automobile can be recovered.
Given these facts, is the direction of hardening and prevention being given sufficient weight when considering cybersecurity? Being able to put a criminal in jail is a fine objective, and perhaps there is some amount of freedom that is worth sacrificing to support that objective. Of course, it would be better to prevent the harm from occurring in the first place.
Do you you place higher priority on hardening our information infrastructure, or on enhancing our ability to find out who did it after a breach occurs?
Hockenberry is a former developer turned business owner.
His complaints seem to stem from three things: 1. Developers are selling cheap straight to the customer. 2. Developers charge too much for him to be guaranteed a profit from their labor. 3. These cheap apps don't reflect his ideals of a good application.
Could this be a microcosmic view of a sea change that is at our doorstep? Software engineers, labor, can now sell directly to the customer - and the product reflects "scratching an itch" simplicity. Corporations like Hockenberry's take a share of the income and add a certain level of quality control and interface polish. The customer has the power of the purse - and is choosing the discount route buying directly from the developer.
There is an advantage to being the low-price competitor, but such is the free market. It seems a more fundamental question is being raised by this market demonstration: Is the corporation adding sufficient value to the products that software engineers create to justify its piece of the action?
Over the past 30 years, the wealth-creation potential of knowledge workers has exploded. No longer the single-buyer creations of the factory worker, 21st century labor creates infinitely reproducible information products. The products themselves have seen an unprecedented rate of advance from the black and white blobs and monospace text of 20 years ago to the fledgling storefront websites 10 years ago to today's globally connected life utilities.
During the same period, wealth has been concentrating with executive management (see income distribution, 1970 to present). The 90th to 95th percentile of income, largely the range software engineers occupy, has seen its income remain flat relative to GDP. Meanwhile, the top 0.1% has seen its share of GDP increase by about 6x (see Piketty Saez 2007).
Another point to consider is advertising. The corporation, which uses advertising to create a perception of value (sometimes justified, sometimes not), has not yet figured out this new market. The market is acting without the benefit of the siren song (for better and for worse).
Interesting data points, those: 1. Over the past 30 years, the wealth creation potential of knowledge workers has been on a meteoric climb. 2. In that same time, the income of the pay bracket those knowledge workers occupy has stagnated - while that of corporate senior officials has risen by a factor of 6. 3. The distorting effect of advertising has not yet reached this particular market. 4. Customers are foregoing corporate products in favor of buying direct from the software engineer at a discount price. 5. A representative of the corporation, the traditional bearer of risk in ventures, is complaining that he cannot be guaranteed a profit.
Seems to me there may be a force other than foolhardy consumers at play here.
Here's an email I sent recently to a geek list I'm on, regarding the FCC transition chiefs: (note: kudos to NYCountryLawyer for pointing these people out in response to one of my earlier posts on another story)
Here's a take on new tech I rather like:
Access providers want to track what everyone is doing online and use it for their commercial advantage. They're developing prioritization technology that will be like a cellphone layer on the internet - able to bill differently for different uses. They're working closely with law enforcement and Hollywood in ways that will make internet use unpredictable and heavily-surveilled. The greatest engine of free speech and democratic outreach the world has ever seen is being co-opted by telephone companies. This isn't good for our future.
Who said it?
Susan Crawford, a professor at the University of Michigan Law School. (and founder of OneWebDay)
So what?
She has a new job; she'll be working with Kevin Werbach.
Who's he?
Kevin Werbach, assistant professor of legal studies and business ethics at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School and organizer of the annual Supernova technology conference.
Yeah - but what's he got to say?
I put together the first Supernova conference six years ago because, to paraphrase Bob Dylan, we all knew something was happening here, but we didn't know what it was. My conviction was that underneath all the changes - business becoming increasingly distributed, users becoming more knowledgeable, old industry models collapsing, and everything and everybody becoming networked - is one fundamental phenomenon: decentralization.
At Supernova, we bring together business, government, and technology thought leaders to understand how decentralization and pervasive connectivity are changing our world.
Alright, that sounds fine - so these two are working together. What are they working on?
They'll lead the Obama FCC transition team with the responsibility of advising the incoming administration on policy, budget and personnel matters.
Ideally the ostrichness of the current administration will soon be a thing of the past.
So, Apple apparently believes that somebody else is behind Psystar,
Apple also initially believed Psystar did not exist. Apple has a bit of a blind spot to the capabilities of a garage startup. That may seem surprising, since they were a garage startup. But then, it's been three decades of anti-competitive lawmaking and sanctification of the megacorp since then.
which might help to explain why a major law firm would take on what seems like a fly-by-night's case;
Yes. 'cuz god forbid a decent law firm would represent a pissant. If we can't rely on the legal system to prejudicially inhibit the growth of disruptive startups, we'll be throwing the doors open to unrestrained justice, treating small firms as though they have the same rights as our most honored entrenched divas.
also why Psystar has been so bold in continuing to sell its products.
Indeed - how dare they continue running a business which they believe to be both legal and profitable, despite the fact that they have so clearly upset The Steve?!?
I knew this thing felt funny.
Which thing? Your wild editorializing and doe-eyed acceptance of Apple's press-release-by-court-filing?
I'm not saying that what Psystar is doing is necessarily in compliance with the law, but come on - this is a conspiracy theory. If Psystar was backed by some shadowy CABAL, their first address wouldn't have been a house (which lead to Apple's hypothesis that the whole company was a hoax).
Here's my question: What is going to happen when Psystar can't produce these back-room ne'er-do-wells? Will Apple press discovery and demand that Psystar prove a negative, that the conspiracy is not?
I'm curious - how do infected computers survive on the Internet?
We have legions of honeypots for the detection of infected hosts (not to mention the likes of GMail). ISPs have been qqing about bandwidth - surely bandwidth consumed by infection is the most loathsome waste.
Why don't ISPs have a takedown system? They could restrict who they trust - perhaps only Symantec and McAffee, maybe hotmail, yahoo, and GMail as well. The could do a limited takedown of outbound email only, adding a message to the customer's email account. Perhaps have an HTTP interceptor display a page with links to tools for system cleaning, maybe commercial products if they feel the defense of their corner of the net is not sufficient recompense.
OK, I can dig the risk of inappropriate takedowns - but we run that risk non-stop with the DMCA for a heckuva lot less tangible benefit.
Expense? I'm sure we could get a few dozen folks together to write the software.
Customer experience? Really now - if my Mom's computer was infected and her ISP told her, and gave her links to fix it, she'd love it.
Inability to trust the router droppings? Half the Internet connections in the world are probably covered by a couple dozen ISPs - start with trusting only those router entries.
ISPs, the gateways to the Internet, are doing bandwidth management at the TCP layer and above. Since bandwidth on an IP network is properly measured at the IP layer (duh), obviously the ISPs are not actually doing bandwidth management. They are doing something, but it is not bandwidth management.
Some software operates on not-TCP. If that software is high bandwidth, the ISP's "bandwidth management" (which is not really bandwidth management at all) fails. And that is the fault of the software?!?
"We built a toll road, and in order to eliminate traffic jams, we strictly regulate the number of blue cars entering the road. But people are driving cars that are not blue, and causing traffic jams. Those people driving not-blue cars are flooding our road!"
The RIAA lawyers have been asking for adjournments a lot lately, asking for an adjournment in UMG v. Lindor the other day because they were so busy preparing for the Tenenbaum December 1st trial... I guess when you're running on hot air, you sometimes run out of steam
I'd restate that as, "I guess when congress sells you a few new laws every year, delaying is a pretty smart business tactic."
the kind that people decades from now will remember and ask each other "Do you remember where you were when Obama was elected?"
I was sitting on my couch, pecking away at my laptop. While watching the polls, I wrote an Android app that displays The Bill of Rights. I'll be adding The Declaration, The Constitution, and the remaining amendments. It's under apps/reference, called "We The People", and it will always be free.
It felt really good. I don't think I've ever been happier with such a tiny bit of code.:)
>> "Sure, this stuff probably does have an effect on children's psychological development - what doesn't?"
> The problem is, as far as everything I've ever seen, there is no evidence that strongly supports this. Everything is hearsay and garbage studies.
OK, but equally there is no evidence that contradicts. Frankly, I think it would be very hard to do a proper scientific study of this. And even to the extent that one can come up with a good hypothetical study, it will never be done well. And even if done well, it could not be done unassailably well. So the "this stuff is bad for kids" meme is unlikely to go away, even if it is wrong.
Also, consider this: Suppose you knew that in five years a study would be completed which would give a definitive answer, but we don't know what that answer will be. Would you be willing to establish a position right now that says that we will censor the entertainment industry if the results show that it does affect children negatively?
Why take the assailable position, "this does not hurt children", when you can take the higher ground, "this is not the government's prerogative"?
I believe that those who would censor media are attempting to frame the conversation in the context of whether or not it hurts children because that is a position they can win (at least in the popular consciousness, if not in scientific fact). Fighting them in that territory is a losing battle. Take the high ground:
Government should not censor art because the government does not hold your values. If you grant them the authority to censor art you do not like today, they will use that authority to censor art you do like tomorrow.
I saw this story this weekend, and am concerned with how it is being framed. I think that one side is saying, "This stuff is hazardous to children and must be controlled by the government." The other side often says, "This stuff is not necessarily hazardous to children, correlation is not causation, etc."
I think both sides are wrong. I think the correct answer is, "This stuff probably is hazardous to children, and parents should be just as careful about this stuff as they are about movies or playing in the street."
The right answer is not to make streets without full-length railings illegal. The right answer is to facilitate parents in understanding the issue and making the right decisions for their children. Sure, this stuff probably does have an effect on children's psychological development - what doesn't?
That doesn't mean this stuff is bad. It is art, like music and paintings. Some of it, like Dostoevsky or some of the creepy sections of The Bible, can have a negative impact on a child's world view. So good parents have to be involved in their children's consumption of it. But it will never be an appropriate place for the government to interfere. The government is too general and clumsy a tool to decide what specific instances of art are good or bad.
The Department of Justice this week said it has placed criminal charges or convictions against more than 255 defendants in the past two fiscal years -- 145 in 2008 and 110 in 2007. That 255 number represents more than a six-fold increase from fiscal year 2005, when the DOJ said about 40 individuals or companies were convicted of over 100 criminal violations of export control laws.
Apparently they went to the "baffle them with bullshit" school of math - if the above is an accurate depiction.
In 2005, 40 individuals were convicted. In 2007 and 2008 combined, 255 were indicted.
In 2005, enforcement effort was ??? In 2005, indictment count was ??? In 2007 and 2008 combined, conviction count was ??? In 2007 and 2008, enforcement effort was ???
From the above, we can conclude: very little. The only thing we can say for sure about those numbers is that "six-fold increase" is bullshit. If every single one of those 255 individuals indicted is convicted on at least one count (extremely unlikely), the annual rate is only 127.5, which is only 3x. Even that would only speak of conviction rates, not attempt rates. Enforcement has almost certainly increased given the general increase in federal participation in intellectual property and trade secret law.
I'm not saying it has not grown, nor whether it should be a greater or lesser focus at the federal level. But the above statement, if accurately portrayed, is disingenuous at best, and deceitful at worst.
The first step in having a serious discourse about federal policy is to present the issue honestly.
Many people are arguing that this is not a problem because it is only mentioned, so far, in the Android Marketplace terms of service. That is not the problem.
I am not just bashing the device. I am on the pre-order list, and I am very happy to be getting a G1 on the first day of release. I am very much in favor of the phone, and think it is the most open device that is readily available in the US.
But that does not mean that this specific feature is not a problem. The problem is that the device is capable of remote kills.
The device should not allow remote kills without the authority of the owner of the device. That is a fundamental flaw in the device, and in the operating system, and in the perception of ownership that it implies. A remote kill is an attack on my property. It should not have that capability at all, regardless of the origin of the attack or their perception of authority. The network should deny my attempts to connect if it wishes, but the device itself should not be beholden to anyone other than me, under any condition, for what I do with it.
We should not allow this idea to spread in this form. It is being steered toward the question of whether we currently believe that we will be able to circumvent the problem. The issue is whether we should meekly accept this supposed "feature" without expressing our displeasure as customers.
if you had read the article you would notice that in fact you can install any software you want without worrying about the kill switch.
Here's what the referenced article in the original article says:
(As far as I can tell, Google's power to revoke apps off your phone only applies to stuff in the App Market. The much-vaunted "kill switch" comes from the Android Market terms of service, so if the developer is outside the Android Market, it probably doesn't apply.)
That is to say, the article references another article which states an unfounded opinion. What evidence do we have? You have to sign every app. Why would developers be required to sign apps that are not killable? All we know is that there is a kill switch, and that every app must be signed. The supposition that non-market apps will not be killable (either by Google or by T-Mobile) is pure conjecture, and conjecture which is at odds with the evidence.
But it's a mistake to lump Google's implementation and Apple's together -- the Google version is a smart, pro-consumer move that avoids all the things that make Apple's version a bad idea.
Hunh? Since when is it a good idea for anyone other than the owner of a piece of hardware to decide, without the right of the owner to override, to uninstall software?
Before I go on, let me say this - I am on the preorder list for the G1, I have already developed my first app for the Android Marketplace, and I am absolutely busting at the seams to get my hands on it. Even despite the kill switch I am thrilled about this phone, it is the most open yet (I believe), and I would not discourage anyone from getting one. Now, back to the specific question of the kill switch itself:
If it were an optional service that I could enable, or were on by default but with an easy off switch, it would be pro-consumer. Mandatory with no off-switch until somebody fixes (cracks) it? That is not pro-consumer. It is authoritarian bullshit.
If Microsoft added a kill switch to windows, with exactly the same characteristics as the kill switch on the G1, would it be a good thing? Consider that Microsoft's operating system is, by a huge margin, the number one source of spam through bot-nets. Even so, while an optional service would be nice, a service which cannot be disabled is absolutely evil.
I understand that it may have been a requirement imposed by the cellular providers. I understand that it may be the right business decision for Google. And again, I still think the G1 is far and away the best phone on the market for me, and may be for you as well. But pro-consumer? You're out of your flipping mind.
So I suspect it's not that the wireless is interfering with the fly-by-wire control mechanism, but making the navigation system think that the altitude is significantly off. Assuming that is, in fact, the cause.
Hmmm, I think there lies a flaw in your implied supposition.
Your response to the OP may be precise, and accurate, but like the engineer talking to the guy in the hot air balloon, it is also unhelpful.
The system we are concerned with is not the schematic-defined fly-by-wire control mechanism, but the entire system that takes inputs and converts them to control surface movements. If the input interfaces are susceptible to EMF from cell phones or laptops, then one of three things should be the case: 1. Software downstream from the susceptible input device should be made to ignore erroneous input (by checking with interference-shielded systems, or by checking multiple inputs and doing error correction, or whatever). 2. Those input interfaces should be disconnected from the system which moves the control surfaces. 3. EMF generators should not be in the passenger compartment (not just disallowed by rule, but effectively denied entry).
Hmmm, but then, I guess, there's also a risk factor to be considered - what is the risk of a particular EMF causing such an event? Is it reliable enough to be susceptible to intentional subversion? If not, perhaps the right answer is to just make it against the rules and hope it doesn't happen too often. There is a cost-benefit balance to be struck. I guess that if Qantas really did have two events in a month it warrants some serious consideration -- but then I think there is probably some intense pressure on Qantas to blame something that costs everyone instead of just Qantas.
Off-topic Aside: Sorry - didn't mean to start this post in one direction then jink another way. I was just checking my assumptions and noticed a contrary bit of analysis changed my position from concrete to tentative. Figured I ought to leave the whole train of thought intact. I guess I like it because it demonstrates that it is better to check my assumptions than to be afraid that someone might notice I am not always right.
"Certainly in our discussions with passengers that is exactly the sort of question we will be asking - 'Were you using a computer?'," The Courier Mail quoted an Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) spokesman as saying.
The ATSB said the pilots received messages about "some irregularity with the aircraft's elevator control system", before the plane climbed 300 feet and then nosedived.
"The aircraft is then reported to have abruptly pitched nose down," the director of aviation safety investigation Julian Walsh said.
Say, here's a thought: Suppose we believe that the terrorists want to eat our babies, hate our freedom, and are otherwise evil just for kicks. Or suppose we're just reasonably security conscious, and aware that there are a few nutjobs with money out there. Shouldn't we be more concerned with the susceptibility of flight control systems to intentional EMF than we are about who might be causing incidental EMF?
If this really is a risk, consider what a nutjob could do on final approach, when the plane is only a few hundred feet above rooftops and skipping between wind-sheer eddies.
Now I completely understand that using hydraulic linkages or adding shielding to electronic control systems would add weight and reduce effective hauling capacity. But wouldn't that be a reasonable tradeoff if unintentional EMF can cause the elevator to jump wildly?
I am quite content with that as their license includes out-of-band support, hot fixes, etc... Their license is not like a normal end-user license. it is a contract that includes support that your average person doesn't have available.
There is no reason for us to upgrade at this point...
I'm a fan of any OS or software that does the job right for you.
Well, yeah - that's what I'm asking about in the second question. They're tying the Vista license purchase to the service contract for XP, 2000, Office, Visio, and to the licensing for Office and Visio (assuming you installed upgrades of those).
So let us take it for granted that Visio, Office, XP, 2000, and their service contracts are all good value purchases. You're still not installing Vista, but you paid for it.
That is tying, which is generally illegal, and is costing you money. So the question is not whether the other products you have purchased are good value. It is whether there is some reason that this is not tying, and if not, whether there is some other reason that it is OK.
A commenter on the article makes the point that Maine's signing an enterprise software license with Microsoft means that Redmond doesn't really lose out on this deal; it simply allows the state to upgrade its equipment and software on its own time.
And Maine is the story here?
How about the tying under license terms, service conditions, and through undocumented APIs and document formats that this implies? Would Maine have an enterprise license for Vista, an operating system they will never install, if there was not tying abuse going on?
(In case you can't tell, I'm a happy Maine citizen.)
How do ya feel about Maine's enterprise license, using your tax money to pay for OS licenses they will never use?
Or about Microsoft, tying their software together under an enterprise license and through undocumented APIs and formats, abusing their monopoly, to make it seem like a good deal to your state?
(though I'm happy for your state's stand against the drive-by-lawyering of the RIAA)
Slashdot Mirror
Where did you read PwC?
Reuters:
http://www.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idUSBNG7477320081218
"Dec 18 (Reuters) - Fairfield Greenwich Group, the fund whose clients
stand to lose $7.5 billion in Bernard Madoff's alleged $50 billion Ponzi
scheme, is considering suing its accountants, PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC), for failing to detect the fraud, the Financial Times reported on
its website."
Price Waterhouse Cooper - one of the biggest SOX auditors - are also the brilliant investigators who audited Madoff.
If you can't find billions of dollars worth of fraud - the largest Ponzi scheme in history - I must question the purpose of audits.
Shocking news! Senior executives who rely for their lavish compensation on the wealth generated by software engineering labor do not want labor to organize! Film at 11!
I'm not saying software engineering labor unionization would be a good thing for the economy, or even for software engineers (frankly, I think the UAW paints a dire picture of what unionization would do to our industry). But the fact that software engineering management wants to prevent software engineering labor from organizing should come as no surprise.
Here's a better idea though - stop the freight train of lowering the taxes above and below the income range of software engineers, while increasing the taxes on the income range of software engineers. The 90th to 95th percentile of income (the range most senior software engineers occupy) has seen its effective taxation increase by 16% since 1970 while the two party system has pandered by turns, lowering taxes on the 0th to 70th percentile, and the 99th to 100th percentile.
You want to derail this train? Stop the government interference in our ability to share in the wealth we create. You claim to believe that the beauty of the free market is that those who create wealth are rewarded with income. Fine - put your money where your mouth is. Our income range has seen a massive explosion in productivity, but has seen its wages sit flat relative to GDP (11% of GDP net, same since 1970). Meanwhile senior executive compensation has risen by a factor of 6. That is not because of a free market in labor optimizing, it is because tax policy has been screwing my income range for my entire life. You want to derail this train? Let us participate in the GDP growth in our sector.
Here's my hypothesis: It is not that individual discovery is harder than it once was, it is that collective discovery is easier. As such, the number of people toiling in isolation has declined. Toss in a few other economic realities (eg: young individuals who used to go into research now go into business - cuz that's where the money is), and it looks like individual discovery is harder.
A more interesting perspective, I think, is the collective discovery angle. Here's a traditional piece of wisdom; "The laborer can only get paid based on the output of a single laborer, the manager can get paid a percentage of many laborers' output - therefore management can get paid more." Ignoring for the moment the shoddy math that is often implied by that sentiment (managers should get paid more, without regard to what the appropriate percentage is), collective discovery implies a new truth: "The knowledge worker is a member of a collective. The ability to enhance wealth creation by labor was once the sole prerogative of management. Now the ability to enhance wealth creation by labor is similarly, and often more greatly, affected by interaction with peer laborers. If one believes that income should be directly proportional to wealth creation (the objective of free market economics), this implies a new truth for income distribution among knowledge worker labor and management. The income associated with the enhancement of the ability of labor to create wealth, income traditionally reserved to management, should shift toward peer laborers, in recognition of their collective augmentation of each other, to maximize the efficiency of the economy."
Of course, it will take a long time for that to supplant the dogma of those steeped in traditional business models of labor.
Much of the question of civil liberties in cybersecurity seems to be related to enforcement after the fact. The ability to find out who did what after the event occurs. That seems like a principle indication that there is a problem in our approach. Once an event happens, it cannot be undone. This is particularly true when considering information assets, which once lost cannot be recovered in the same sense in which a painting or automobile can be recovered.
Given these facts, is the direction of hardening and prevention being given sufficient weight when considering cybersecurity? Being able to put a criminal in jail is a fine objective, and perhaps there is some amount of freedom that is worth sacrificing to support that objective. Of course, it would be better to prevent the harm from occurring in the first place.
Do you you place higher priority on hardening our information infrastructure, or on enhancing our ability to find out who did it after a breach occurs?
Hockenberry is a former developer turned business owner.
His complaints seem to stem from three things:
1. Developers are selling cheap straight to the customer.
2. Developers charge too much for him to be guaranteed a profit from their labor.
3. These cheap apps don't reflect his ideals of a good application.
Could this be a microcosmic view of a sea change that is at our doorstep? Software engineers, labor, can now sell directly to the customer - and the product reflects "scratching an itch" simplicity. Corporations like Hockenberry's take a share of the income and add a certain level of quality control and interface polish. The customer has the power of the purse - and is choosing the discount route buying directly from the developer.
There is an advantage to being the low-price competitor, but such is the free market. It seems a more fundamental question is being raised by this market demonstration: Is the corporation adding sufficient value to the products that software engineers create to justify its piece of the action?
Over the past 30 years, the wealth-creation potential of knowledge workers has exploded. No longer the single-buyer creations of the factory worker, 21st century labor creates infinitely reproducible information products. The products themselves have seen an unprecedented rate of advance from the black and white blobs and monospace text of 20 years ago to the fledgling storefront websites 10 years ago to today's globally connected life utilities.
During the same period, wealth has been concentrating with executive management (see income distribution, 1970 to present). The 90th to 95th percentile of income, largely the range software engineers occupy, has seen its income remain flat relative to GDP. Meanwhile, the top 0.1% has seen its share of GDP increase by about 6x (see Piketty Saez 2007).
Another point to consider is advertising. The corporation, which uses advertising to create a perception of value (sometimes justified, sometimes not), has not yet figured out this new market. The market is acting without the benefit of the siren song (for better and for worse).
Interesting data points, those:
1. Over the past 30 years, the wealth creation potential of knowledge workers has been on a meteoric climb.
2. In that same time, the income of the pay bracket those knowledge workers occupy has stagnated - while that of corporate senior officials has risen by a factor of 6.
3. The distorting effect of advertising has not yet reached this particular market.
4. Customers are foregoing corporate products in favor of buying direct from the software engineer at a discount price.
5. A representative of the corporation, the traditional bearer of risk in ventures, is complaining that he cannot be guaranteed a profit.
Seems to me there may be a force other than foolhardy consumers at play here.
Here's an email I sent recently to a geek list I'm on, regarding the FCC transition chiefs:
(note: kudos to NYCountryLawyer for pointing these people out in response to one of my earlier posts on another story)
Here's a take on new tech I rather like:
Access providers want to track what everyone is doing online and use it for their commercial advantage. They're developing prioritization technology that will be like a cellphone layer on the internet - able to bill differently for different uses. They're working closely with law enforcement and Hollywood in ways that will make internet use unpredictable and heavily-surveilled. The greatest engine of free speech and democratic outreach the world has ever seen is being co-opted by telephone companies. This isn't good for our future.
Who said it?
Susan Crawford, a professor at the University of Michigan Law School. (and founder of OneWebDay)
So what?
She has a new job; she'll be working with Kevin Werbach.
Who's he?
Kevin Werbach, assistant professor of legal studies and business ethics at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School and organizer of the annual Supernova technology conference.
Yeah - but what's he got to say?
I put together the first Supernova conference six years ago because, to paraphrase Bob Dylan, we all knew something was happening here, but we didn't know what it was. My conviction was that underneath all the changes - business becoming increasingly distributed, users becoming more knowledgeable, old industry models collapsing, and everything and everybody becoming networked - is one fundamental phenomenon: decentralization.
At Supernova, we bring together business, government, and technology thought leaders to understand how decentralization and pervasive connectivity are changing our world.
Alright, that sounds fine - so these two are working together. What are they working on?
They'll lead the Obama FCC transition team with the responsibility of advising the incoming administration on policy, budget and personnel matters.
Ideally the ostrichness of the current administration will soon be a thing of the past.
So, Apple apparently believes that somebody else is behind Psystar,
Apple also initially believed Psystar did not exist. Apple has a bit of a blind spot to the capabilities of a garage startup. That may seem surprising, since they were a garage startup. But then, it's been three decades of anti-competitive lawmaking and sanctification of the megacorp since then.
which might help to explain why a major law firm would take on what seems like a fly-by-night's case;
Yes. 'cuz god forbid a decent law firm would represent a pissant. If we can't rely on the legal system to prejudicially inhibit the growth of disruptive startups, we'll be throwing the doors open to unrestrained justice, treating small firms as though they have the same rights as our most honored entrenched divas.
also why Psystar has been so bold in continuing to sell its products.
Indeed - how dare they continue running a business which they believe to be both legal and profitable, despite the fact that they have so clearly upset The Steve?!?
I knew this thing felt funny.
Which thing? Your wild editorializing and doe-eyed acceptance of Apple's press-release-by-court-filing?
I'm not saying that what Psystar is doing is necessarily in compliance with the law, but come on - this is a conspiracy theory. If Psystar was backed by some shadowy CABAL, their first address wouldn't have been a house (which lead to Apple's hypothesis that the whole company was a hoax).
Here's my question: What is going to happen when Psystar can't produce these back-room ne'er-do-wells? Will Apple press discovery and demand that Psystar prove a negative, that the conspiracy is not?
hehe - damn - you were way ahead of me. :)
However, a majority of them were like "why? this will all be gone by the beginning of 2000 anyway. They will get it all under control".
So sad. How could they not understand? Ummm, "they"?!? Who is "they"? Hey, ISP - you are "they". Now let's get to work.
Alas. Thanks for trying!
I'm curious - how do infected computers survive on the Internet?
We have legions of honeypots for the detection of infected hosts (not to mention the likes of GMail). ISPs have been qqing about bandwidth - surely bandwidth consumed by infection is the most loathsome waste.
Why don't ISPs have a takedown system? They could restrict who they trust - perhaps only Symantec and McAffee, maybe hotmail, yahoo, and GMail as well. The could do a limited takedown of outbound email only, adding a message to the customer's email account. Perhaps have an HTTP interceptor display a page with links to tools for system cleaning, maybe commercial products if they feel the defense of their corner of the net is not sufficient recompense.
OK, I can dig the risk of inappropriate takedowns - but we run that risk non-stop with the DMCA for a heckuva lot less tangible benefit.
Expense? I'm sure we could get a few dozen folks together to write the software.
Customer experience? Really now - if my Mom's computer was infected and her ISP told her, and gave her links to fix it, she'd love it.
Inability to trust the router droppings? Half the Internet connections in the world are probably covered by a couple dozen ISPs - start with trusting only those router entries.
So - what am I missing?
Wait - let me see if I get this straight...
ISPs, the gateways to the Internet, are doing bandwidth management at the TCP layer and above. Since bandwidth on an IP network is properly measured at the IP layer (duh), obviously the ISPs are not actually doing bandwidth management. They are doing something, but it is not bandwidth management.
Some software operates on not-TCP. If that software is high bandwidth, the ISP's "bandwidth management" (which is not really bandwidth management at all) fails. And that is the fault of the software?!?
"We built a toll road, and in order to eliminate traffic jams, we strictly regulate the number of blue cars entering the road. But people are driving cars that are not blue, and causing traffic jams. Those people driving not-blue cars are flooding our road!"
The RIAA lawyers have been asking for adjournments a lot lately, asking for an adjournment in UMG v. Lindor the other day because they were so busy preparing for the Tenenbaum December 1st trial ... I guess when you're running on hot air, you sometimes run out of steam
I'd restate that as, "I guess when congress sells you a few new laws every year, delaying is a pretty smart business tactic."
the kind that people decades from now will remember and ask each other "Do you remember where you were when Obama was elected?"
I was sitting on my couch, pecking away at my laptop. While watching the polls, I wrote an Android app that displays The Bill of Rights. I'll be adding The Declaration, The Constitution, and the remaining amendments. It's under apps/reference, called "We The People", and it will always be free.
It felt really good. I don't think I've ever been happier with such a tiny bit of code. :)
I like the way you think. Thank you for helping me to look at it in another way.
Love the post - very good stuff.
>> "Sure, this stuff probably does have an effect on children's psychological development - what doesn't?"
> The problem is, as far as everything I've ever seen, there is no evidence that strongly supports this. Everything is hearsay and garbage studies.
OK, but equally there is no evidence that contradicts. Frankly, I think it would be very hard to do a proper scientific study of this. And even to the extent that one can come up with a good hypothetical study, it will never be done well. And even if done well, it could not be done unassailably well. So the "this stuff is bad for kids" meme is unlikely to go away, even if it is wrong.
Also, consider this: Suppose you knew that in five years a study would be completed which would give a definitive answer, but we don't know what that answer will be. Would you be willing to establish a position right now that says that we will censor the entertainment industry if the results show that it does affect children negatively?
Why take the assailable position, "this does not hurt children", when you can take the higher ground, "this is not the government's prerogative"?
I believe that those who would censor media are attempting to frame the conversation in the context of whether or not it hurts children because that is a position they can win (at least in the popular consciousness, if not in scientific fact). Fighting them in that territory is a losing battle. Take the high ground:
Government should not censor art because the government does not hold your values. If you grant them the authority to censor art you do not like today, they will use that authority to censor art you do like tomorrow.
I saw this story this weekend, and am concerned with how it is being framed. I think that one side is saying, "This stuff is hazardous to children and must be controlled by the government." The other side often says, "This stuff is not necessarily hazardous to children, correlation is not causation, etc."
I think both sides are wrong. I think the correct answer is, "This stuff probably is hazardous to children, and parents should be just as careful about this stuff as they are about movies or playing in the street."
The right answer is not to make streets without full-length railings illegal. The right answer is to facilitate parents in understanding the issue and making the right decisions for their children. Sure, this stuff probably does have an effect on children's psychological development - what doesn't?
That doesn't mean this stuff is bad. It is art, like music and paintings. Some of it, like Dostoevsky or some of the creepy sections of The Bible, can have a negative impact on a child's world view. So good parents have to be involved in their children's consumption of it. But it will never be an appropriate place for the government to interfere. The government is too general and clumsy a tool to decide what specific instances of art are good or bad.
The Department of Justice this week said it has placed criminal charges or convictions against more than 255 defendants in the past two fiscal years -- 145 in 2008 and 110 in 2007. That 255 number represents more than a six-fold increase from fiscal year 2005, when the DOJ said about 40 individuals or companies were convicted of over 100 criminal violations of export control laws.
Apparently they went to the "baffle them with bullshit" school of math - if the above is an accurate depiction.
In 2005, 40 individuals were convicted.
In 2007 and 2008 combined, 255 were indicted.
In 2005, enforcement effort was ???
In 2005, indictment count was ???
In 2007 and 2008 combined, conviction count was ???
In 2007 and 2008, enforcement effort was ???
From the above, we can conclude: very little. The only thing we can say for sure about those numbers is that "six-fold increase" is bullshit. If every single one of those 255 individuals indicted is convicted on at least one count (extremely unlikely), the annual rate is only 127.5, which is only 3x. Even that would only speak of conviction rates, not attempt rates. Enforcement has almost certainly increased given the general increase in federal participation in intellectual property and trade secret law.
I'm not saying it has not grown, nor whether it should be a greater or lesser focus at the federal level. But the above statement, if accurately portrayed, is disingenuous at best, and deceitful at worst.
The first step in having a serious discourse about federal policy is to present the issue honestly.
Many people are arguing that this is not a problem because it is only mentioned, so far, in the Android Marketplace terms of service. That is not the problem.
I am not just bashing the device. I am on the pre-order list, and I am very happy to be getting a G1 on the first day of release. I am very much in favor of the phone, and think it is the most open device that is readily available in the US.
But that does not mean that this specific feature is not a problem. The problem is that the device is capable of remote kills.
The device should not allow remote kills without the authority of the owner of the device. That is a fundamental flaw in the device, and in the operating system, and in the perception of ownership that it implies. A remote kill is an attack on my property. It should not have that capability at all, regardless of the origin of the attack or their perception of authority. The network should deny my attempts to connect if it wishes, but the device itself should not be beholden to anyone other than me, under any condition, for what I do with it.
We should not allow this idea to spread in this form. It is being steered toward the question of whether we currently believe that we will be able to circumvent the problem. The issue is whether we should meekly accept this supposed "feature" without expressing our displeasure as customers.
if you had read the article you would notice that in fact you can install any software you want without worrying about the kill switch.
Here's what the referenced article in the original article says:
(As far as I can tell, Google's power to revoke apps off your phone only applies to stuff in the App Market. The much-vaunted "kill switch" comes from the Android Market terms of service, so if the developer is outside the Android Market, it probably doesn't apply.)
That is to say, the article references another article which states an unfounded opinion. What evidence do we have? You have to sign every app. Why would developers be required to sign apps that are not killable? All we know is that there is a kill switch, and that every app must be signed. The supposition that non-market apps will not be killable (either by Google or by T-Mobile) is pure conjecture, and conjecture which is at odds with the evidence.
But it's a mistake to lump Google's implementation and Apple's together -- the Google version is a smart, pro-consumer move that avoids all the things that make Apple's version a bad idea.
Hunh? Since when is it a good idea for anyone other than the owner of a piece of hardware to decide, without the right of the owner to override, to uninstall software?
Before I go on, let me say this - I am on the preorder list for the G1, I have already developed my first app for the Android Marketplace, and I am absolutely busting at the seams to get my hands on it. Even despite the kill switch I am thrilled about this phone, it is the most open yet (I believe), and I would not discourage anyone from getting one. Now, back to the specific question of the kill switch itself:
If it were an optional service that I could enable, or were on by default but with an easy off switch, it would be pro-consumer. Mandatory with no off-switch until somebody fixes (cracks) it? That is not pro-consumer. It is authoritarian bullshit.
If Microsoft added a kill switch to windows, with exactly the same characteristics as the kill switch on the G1, would it be a good thing? Consider that Microsoft's operating system is, by a huge margin, the number one source of spam through bot-nets. Even so, while an optional service would be nice, a service which cannot be disabled is absolutely evil.
I understand that it may have been a requirement imposed by the cellular providers. I understand that it may be the right business decision for Google. And again, I still think the G1 is far and away the best phone on the market for me, and may be for you as well. But pro-consumer? You're out of your flipping mind.
So I suspect it's not that the wireless is interfering with the fly-by-wire control mechanism, but making the navigation system think that the altitude is significantly off. Assuming that is, in fact, the cause.
Hmmm, I think there lies a flaw in your implied supposition.
Your response to the OP may be precise, and accurate, but like the engineer talking to the guy in the hot air balloon, it is also unhelpful.
The system we are concerned with is not the schematic-defined fly-by-wire control mechanism, but the entire system that takes inputs and converts them to control surface movements. If the input interfaces are susceptible to EMF from cell phones or laptops, then one of three things should be the case:
1. Software downstream from the susceptible input device should be made to ignore erroneous input (by checking with interference-shielded systems, or by checking multiple inputs and doing error correction, or whatever).
2. Those input interfaces should be disconnected from the system which moves the control surfaces.
3. EMF generators should not be in the passenger compartment (not just disallowed by rule, but effectively denied entry).
Hmmm, but then, I guess, there's also a risk factor to be considered - what is the risk of a particular EMF causing such an event? Is it reliable enough to be susceptible to intentional subversion? If not, perhaps the right answer is to just make it against the rules and hope it doesn't happen too often. There is a cost-benefit balance to be struck. I guess that if Qantas really did have two events in a month it warrants some serious consideration -- but then I think there is probably some intense pressure on Qantas to blame something that costs everyone instead of just Qantas.
Off-topic Aside:
Sorry - didn't mean to start this post in one direction then jink another way. I was just checking my assumptions and noticed a contrary bit of analysis changed my position from concrete to tentative. Figured I ought to leave the whole train of thought intact. I guess I like it because it demonstrates that it is better to check my assumptions than to be afraid that someone might notice I am not always right.
"Certainly in our discussions with passengers that is exactly the sort of question we will be asking - 'Were you using a computer?'," The Courier Mail quoted an Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) spokesman as saying.
The ATSB said the pilots received messages about "some irregularity with the aircraft's elevator control system", before the plane climbed 300 feet and then nosedived.
"The aircraft is then reported to have abruptly pitched nose down," the director of aviation safety investigation Julian Walsh said.
Say, here's a thought: Suppose we believe that the terrorists want to eat our babies, hate our freedom, and are otherwise evil just for kicks. Or suppose we're just reasonably security conscious, and aware that there are a few nutjobs with money out there. Shouldn't we be more concerned with the susceptibility of flight control systems to intentional EMF than we are about who might be causing incidental EMF?
If this really is a risk, consider what a nutjob could do on final approach, when the plane is only a few hundred feet above rooftops and skipping between wind-sheer eddies.
Now I completely understand that using hydraulic linkages or adding shielding to electronic control systems would add weight and reduce effective hauling capacity. But wouldn't that be a reasonable tradeoff if unintentional EMF can cause the elevator to jump wildly?
I am quite content with that as their license includes out-of-band support, hot fixes, etc... Their license is not like a normal end-user license. it is a contract that includes support that your average person doesn't have available.
There is no reason for us to upgrade at this point...
I'm a fan of any OS or software that does the job right for you.
Well, yeah - that's what I'm asking about in the second question. They're tying the Vista license purchase to the service contract for XP, 2000, Office, Visio, and to the licensing for Office and Visio (assuming you installed upgrades of those).
So let us take it for granted that Visio, Office, XP, 2000, and their service contracts are all good value purchases. You're still not installing Vista, but you paid for it.
That is tying, which is generally illegal, and is costing you money. So the question is not whether the other products you have purchased are good value. It is whether there is some reason that this is not tying, and if not, whether there is some other reason that it is OK.
A commenter on the article makes the point that Maine's signing an enterprise software license with Microsoft means that Redmond doesn't really lose out on this deal; it simply allows the state to upgrade its equipment and software on its own time.
And Maine is the story here?
How about the tying under license terms, service conditions, and through undocumented APIs and document formats that this implies? Would Maine have an enterprise license for Vista, an operating system they will never install, if there was not tying abuse going on?
(In case you can't tell, I'm a happy Maine citizen.)
How do ya feel about Maine's enterprise license, using your tax money to pay for OS licenses they will never use?
Or about Microsoft, tying their software together under an enterprise license and through undocumented APIs and formats, abusing their monopoly, to make it seem like a good deal to your state?
(though I'm happy for your state's stand against the drive-by-lawyering of the RIAA)