There is one problem with the CrowdStrike-provided images, which is that although no one questions CrowdStrike's competence or integrity, they did not maintain proper legal chain of custody documentation. This means that information obtained from the images would be easily challenged in any criminal or civil court proceeding.
Signed, forensic images of computer system have been accepted as legal evidence for over a decade.
Sure, if chain of custody was maintained and documented.
You see the problem is... I need 2FA (Two Factor Authentication) for a variety of things, several banks, work, access to some government services. Most people do. SMS is available to everyone and universally accepted, not to mention cheap.
And insecure. You argue that it could be made more secure, but I don't see any sign that that is going to happen.
I dont want to have to have a dongle for every single different bank nor can I believe that all these different services are going to get behind a single 2FA token
You may not believe it, but it's happening. So far, I use my FIDO U2F keys for logging into email (work and personal; though both are gmail), Github, Dropbox, Twitter, my Vanguard 401K account, my health savings account, and my health insurance account. There are still a lot of institutions that haven't yet adopted U2F, but it is the standard and obvious next step beyond SMS, so as organizations recognize the problems with SMS and TOTP, U2F is what they will move to.
If you want to check whether the organizations you use support U2F, there's a decent crowdsourced database at: https://www.dongleauth.info/
I have disabled SMS authentication on every bank account, etc., where they provide the option. If they don't support U2F, I use email 2FA, since my email is protected with U2F. This doesn't protect me against phishing, and it also means that if gmail were hacked my 2FA messages could be hijacked, but that's far less likely than an SMS hijack.
Hmm. The key by itself isn't useful, so this concern only applies if you can also be coerced into providing your password. In that case, I'm not sure having destroyed the security key is going to help you. Still, I suppose there are probably some situations in which this would be useful.
And yes, there are at least three copies of the forensically-imaged DNC server in the FBI's possession. We know this because the Trump Justice Department has told us so.
I can't find any evidence of the Trump Justice Department saying that.
What we do know is that back in 2016 the DNC hired the respected cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike to determine if their mail servers had been hacked, and how, and by whom -- and to make sure the attackers were booted out. CrowdStrike made forensic images of the servers for analysis and provided copies to the FBI. James Comey said during his January 2017 testimony before Congress that "We got the forensics from the pros that they hired which -- again, best practice is always to get access to the machines themselves, but this my folks tell me was an appropriate substitute."
There is one problem with the CrowdStrike-provided images, which is that although no one questions CrowdStrike's competence or integrity, they did not maintain proper legal chain of custody documentation. This means that information obtained from the images would be easily challenged in any criminal or civil court proceeding.
In any case, I'm sure the FBI still has copies of the CrowdStrike-created server images. I'm not sure why they'd want to keep three of them, in particular, though it would obviously make sense to have more than one and to store the copies in different locations to protect against loss.
I disagree. I think the security key is the most usable solution, especially if you get the nano-sized keys that fit almost entirely into the USB port so you can just leave them plugged in all the time. This does mean that if you lose your laptop you lose the security key as well, but (a) you can revoke the key, (b) the most important risks are from remote attackers and (c) if a sophisticated attacker gets your laptop you're probably SoL anyway.
In other words client certificates are sufficient and always plugged in hardware tokens unnecessary.
Absolutely not. There are crucial differences between U2F security keys and client side certs:
1. U2F keys only sign an auth request when touched. This means that purely remote attacks can't work; the attacker has to arrange for the user to prove that they're physically present.
2. U2F keys do not allow a remote attacker to obtain a copy of the private key material. At most the attacker can convince the user to touch the key to activate each authentication operation. With client side certificates, if the attacker can remotely exploit the machine, he can steal a copy of the private key material and have unlimited use of it and most likely the user will have no idea.
3. U2F keys are highly resistant to extraction of the key material even with physical access. An attacker with physical access can steal the key, but when the user notices it, it will be revoked.
The only real argument against U2F, IMO, is cost. You have to buy the security keys.
Or being stupid enough to allow let alone require use of USB ports in the first place.
That is a risk, but in most environments USB ports are essential and cannot be entirely disabled anyway. Plus, the primary goal is defense against remote attacks, not physical attacks. If the attacker has physical access to your machine, you're screwed, even if your machine has no USB ports. The one thing that USB blocking/disabling does do is to mitigate the "Thumb drive dropped in the parking lot" attack, and similar. But that attack vector is less common and easier to mitigate with education than remote vulnerability exploitation or (spear) phishing.
The only thing I worry about with U2F is that no one seems to make a key with an emergency erase feature.
All U2F security keys I've used can be erased... you just delete the U2F applet. But in an emergency I think it's more likely that what you need to do is to remove trust on the server side.
I think that for most people, the combination of relative usability and risk leads to the choice of using TOTP on your phone, not the extent of a hardware dongle / key.
I disagree. I think the security key is the most usable solution, especially if you get the nano-sized keys that fit almost entirely into the USB port so you can just leave them plugged in all the time. This does mean that if you lose your laptop you lose the security key as well, but (a) you can revoke the key, (b) the most important risks are from remote attackers and (c) if a sophisticated attacker gets your laptop you're probably SoL anyway.
The only real argument against U2F, IMO, is cost. You have to buy the security keys.
For some service where you have no other way to prove yourself, losing the hardware is just too risky. For me at least.
That problem is orthogonal to the question of what type of 2FA to use. If you only use TOTP on your phone, then losing your phone (or dropping it in the toilet, etc.) leaves you without a way to recover. With Google's services, you can use U2F *and* TOTP *and* SMS *and* backup codes if you want. Of course, the more you use the more opportunities you give an attacker, so there's a tradeoff.
IMO, the best solution is a nano U2F security key which you leave in a USB port of each computer you use, plus another (larger) U2F security key on your key ring and one more stored in a safe place, along with a printed list of backup codes. This is not the cheapest solution, however, since if you have a laptop and a desktop it means you need four U2F keys.
Using a TOTP solution like 1password or Google Authenticator is better than SMS, because unlike SMS it's very difficult to hijack. But it's still not as good as security keys (AKA FIDO U2F) as described in this article, because it can be phished. If you're certain that you could never, under any circumstances, be social-engineered into giving up your TOTP code then you're probably wrong about how gullible you are, because there are some really talented social engineers out there. But with U2F, you just can't do it.
Also, U2F is much more convenient. You have to buy a USB dongle (or three) and stick one in your USB port, but then when you have to authenticate all you have to do is touch it. So much more convenient than looking at a number and typing it in. I work for Google, and the various systems I use require me to authenticate about a dozen times every day -- but often the authentication required is U2F only (because I already authenticated recently with my password) so it's very low-effort. The same would not be true if TOTP were required.
Do keep in mind if you go U2F only, though, that losing or destroying your security key means you're locked out of your account and the only available recovery process will be intentionally tortuous and may fail. So use multiple security keys, and I'd suggest keeping a set of backup codes in a safe place that is also quite inconvenient for you to access (making it hard for anyone to social engineer you into giving them a code).
The problem with implementing this (without enough backups) for personal is that if you ever lose all of your key info or code generator, you are absolutely fucked because there is no way to prove who you are to Google and have them reset your password / security. So you've got to have multiple backups in different places should your house ever burn down, etc.
You can use multiple U2Fs, and store one (or more) offsite. I'd recommend a set of backup codes offsite as well, where you won't be tempted to use them (to make phishing you harder), but where you can get them if needed.
There are only 12 incomprehensible icons on the address bar line, to the right of the address bar.
You know those are user-installed add-ons, not part of the browser, right? You can add as many as required to achieve your desired level of "googaws, curios, gimcracks and oddities".
Really, without a requirement of Project Treble that one can always install Google's base Android OS it's nearly worthless.
That is a requirement. Though if the device's bootloader is locked it's only a theoretical capability. But Google does test devices (if the vendors choose to submit to testing) to validate that a plain AOSP build will flash and run on them.
We should be redefining things with some regularity as we learn more.
For example, we should stop calling the major bodies orbiting the sun "wanderers".
Actually, I don't really think we should choose a different word; "planet" is just fine, everyone knows what it is (roughly). But on the topic of redefining things as we learn more, I can't think of a better example than "wanderers". We still use that old name even though we learned many centuries ago that its literal meaning is completely wrong.
It's nearly the same, but it comes with an SD card slot. Not that it works like I expected, but it is a nice addition.
What do you mean here? How would you expect it to work, and in what way does it not?
I also love the double chop to turn on the flashlight and double twist to open the camera. I'm surprised no one else has picked those up yet.
A few devices use gestures for various things. Double-clicking the power button opens the camera on Pixels, for example.
Unfortunately, it has the fingerprint reader on the wrong side. In-screen fingerprint readers are a waste of time. They belong on the back.
Although it would increase cost, I'd like both. A reader on the back for most use, plus an in-screen reader for when the phone is resting on a desk or table.
Even if you never take selfies (like me) the extra screen would be nice for quick notifications when your phone is face down.
Why would your phone be face down? And putting notifications on a rear-facing screen would make it easier for the world to see them. The rear-facing screen would be another screen to break. I'd rather keep the selfie camera but move it under the screen; I understand there are some companies working on under-screen camera designs.
I can see them declining to try to set precedent on a pedophile case. In general, when you want to establish precedent you want to pick as appealing a defendant as possible, to maximize your chances.
I thought we weren't supposed to punish children for sins of the father, or the mother, or other family members. We were supposed to punish people for their own sins only.
That idea comes from Judeo-Christian theology. China does not have that tradition.
In this case, the guy is probably going to serve his time
Probably not now, since his case has gotten national exposure. ACLU, EFF, NAACP, possibly even SPLC will be ready to provide lawyers. Even without them, some enterprising local lawyer could hook up with him and then either represent him pro bono for the publicity, or set up a legal defense fund and accept donations. I'd throw in a few bucks, and so would tens of thousands of others.
Because Amazon is a growth stock, the business equivalent of a cancer cell.
That's ridiculous. Dividends and price growth are both completely legitimate ways of providing an ROI to investors, and growth is the right choice as long as the business still has good growth prospects. When it's reached saturation and can't really benefit from major capital investment, then profits are paid out as dividends. Paying dividends while simultaneously trying to fund growth from new stock issuance, or bond issuance, or bank borrowing is almost always stupid; if the company has use for money and has profits, it makes sense to just plow profits back in rather than trying to get other money.
When Amazon stops growing, for whatever reason, it'll change gears and start issuing dividends. For now it's doing what makes sense, nothing remotely "cancerous" about it.
We disagree on the impact of jail time. Especially given the green card offer, which would virtually guarantee they'd get caught. Oh, I suppose it might be possible to find some population of American ex-cons who really prefer to be in jail and would be willing to do it because their goal is to go back anyway. But it's not going to be a large population, and if the crime is a felony the three-strikes law would quickly remove them from the pool.
Also, I don't think you've thought through the question of large fines. With enough money, you can immigrate legally regardless of your skills or almost anything else. With, say, $50K you can hire a good immigration lawyer who will get you through the tortuous hoops. So, set the fines high enough that people with enough wealth will prefer to immigrate legally -- as they already do.
And even if I'm wrong on both of those, if your goal is to dramatically reduce illegal immigration, a few hundred -- or even a few thousand -- green cards per year for rats is well worth it, isn't it?
I addressed your concern, yet either you don't think I did, in which case you should say why not, or else you have some other concern, in which case you should express it. Or if you're not interested in the discussion, say so.
Eh, the biggest loss in my mind is still MagSafe... that was a truly useful connector.
I disagree. I love the idea of the MagSafe connector, it seems like a brilliantly simply design for an obvious problem... but it doesn't work as well as I would like, and the problem that it solves isn't a problem. Not for me, at least.
Taking the second point first, I got my first laptop in 1993 and I've had one ever since; a quarter century of experience. In all that time, I've never once had a laptop damaged by someone kicking a cord, and I'm anything but conscientious. I've had many cords kicked, and I've had many laptop cords break from wear, but no laptops or cords ever damaged in the way that MagSafe would protect. I'm not saying that my experience is universal, of course. If your pre-MagSafe life was littered with the remains of shattered laptops caused by kicked cords, then you might want to stick with MagSafe as long as possible. But for me, it doesn't seem to matter.
Indeed, I've had more problems with MagSafe cords breaking than I have with any other sort of laptop cord. They come apart right where the thin cable goes into the MagSafe connector.
The other problem with the MagSafe connectors is that they're too easy to disconnect when you don't want them to. Sitting on my bed, under the covers, with the laptop sitting on top of the blankets, for example, puffy blankets often exert just enough upward force on the connector and cord to angle the connector so that it didn't make contact. On countless occasions I've realized that my ostensibly plugged-in laptop is almost dead because it wasn't actually quite plugged in. Apple fixed this problem when they went to the right-angled connector... but then with MagSafe 2 they went right back to the straight-out version.
USB-C is a better solution, I think. Because you can use any of the USB-C ports to charge, you can plug in from either side. Because the connector inserts into the laptop, a little pressure on the cable doesn't disconnect it. Because it doesn't insert very far into the laptop, it pops out easily when someone kicks the cable. So far I haven't had any problems with cables breaking the way my old MagSafe Apple charger cables did, but if one does break, it's not a big deal. I can simply buy any old male-to-male USB-C cable of reasonable quality and replace the broken part. For that matter, I have already swapped the Apple-provided cable out for a much longer (and sturdier) one, extending the distance I can sit from an outlet.
Then there's also the fact that my phone and headphones are USB-C, so I can use my laptop charger to charge those devices as well. This means I now travel with only a single charger, and don't even carry any extra USB cables.
I thought I would miss the MagSafe connector, but I don't. At all. I do miss the better keyboard and real function keys, though.
Slashdot Mirror
Signed, forensic images of computer system have been accepted as legal evidence for over a decade.
Sure, if chain of custody was maintained and documented.
You see the problem is... I need 2FA (Two Factor Authentication) for a variety of things, several banks, work, access to some government services. Most people do. SMS is available to everyone and universally accepted, not to mention cheap.
And insecure. You argue that it could be made more secure, but I don't see any sign that that is going to happen.
I dont want to have to have a dongle for every single different bank nor can I believe that all these different services are going to get behind a single 2FA token
You may not believe it, but it's happening. So far, I use my FIDO U2F keys for logging into email (work and personal; though both are gmail), Github, Dropbox, Twitter, my Vanguard 401K account, my health savings account, and my health insurance account. There are still a lot of institutions that haven't yet adopted U2F, but it is the standard and obvious next step beyond SMS, so as organizations recognize the problems with SMS and TOTP, U2F is what they will move to.
If you want to check whether the organizations you use support U2F, there's a decent crowdsourced database at: https://www.dongleauth.info/
I have disabled SMS authentication on every bank account, etc., where they provide the option. If they don't support U2F, I use email 2FA, since my email is protected with U2F. This doesn't protect me against phishing, and it also means that if gmail were hacked my 2FA messages could be hijacked, but that's far less likely than an SMS hijack.
Hmm. The key by itself isn't useful, so this concern only applies if you can also be coerced into providing your password. In that case, I'm not sure having destroyed the security key is going to help you. Still, I suppose there are probably some situations in which this would be useful.
And yes, there are at least three copies of the forensically-imaged DNC server in the FBI's possession. We know this because the Trump Justice Department has told us so.
I can't find any evidence of the Trump Justice Department saying that.
What we do know is that back in 2016 the DNC hired the respected cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike to determine if their mail servers had been hacked, and how, and by whom -- and to make sure the attackers were booted out. CrowdStrike made forensic images of the servers for analysis and provided copies to the FBI. James Comey said during his January 2017 testimony before Congress that "We got the forensics from the pros that they hired which -- again, best practice is always to get access to the machines themselves, but this my folks tell me was an appropriate substitute."
There is one problem with the CrowdStrike-provided images, which is that although no one questions CrowdStrike's competence or integrity, they did not maintain proper legal chain of custody documentation. This means that information obtained from the images would be easily challenged in any criminal or civil court proceeding.
In any case, I'm sure the FBI still has copies of the CrowdStrike-created server images. I'm not sure why they'd want to keep three of them, in particular, though it would obviously make sense to have more than one and to store the copies in different locations to protect against loss.
I disagree. I think the security key is the most usable solution, especially if you get the nano-sized keys that fit almost entirely into the USB port so you can just leave them plugged in all the time. This does mean that if you lose your laptop you lose the security key as well, but (a) you can revoke the key, (b) the most important risks are from remote attackers and (c) if a sophisticated attacker gets your laptop you're probably SoL anyway.
In other words client certificates are sufficient and always plugged in hardware tokens unnecessary.
Absolutely not. There are crucial differences between U2F security keys and client side certs:
1. U2F keys only sign an auth request when touched. This means that purely remote attacks can't work; the attacker has to arrange for the user to prove that they're physically present.
2. U2F keys do not allow a remote attacker to obtain a copy of the private key material. At most the attacker can convince the user to touch the key to activate each authentication operation. With client side certificates, if the attacker can remotely exploit the machine, he can steal a copy of the private key material and have unlimited use of it and most likely the user will have no idea.
3. U2F keys are highly resistant to extraction of the key material even with physical access. An attacker with physical access can steal the key, but when the user notices it, it will be revoked.
The only real argument against U2F, IMO, is cost. You have to buy the security keys.
Or being stupid enough to allow let alone require use of USB ports in the first place.
That is a risk, but in most environments USB ports are essential and cannot be entirely disabled anyway. Plus, the primary goal is defense against remote attacks, not physical attacks. If the attacker has physical access to your machine, you're screwed, even if your machine has no USB ports. The one thing that USB blocking/disabling does do is to mitigate the "Thumb drive dropped in the parking lot" attack, and similar. But that attack vector is less common and easier to mitigate with education than remote vulnerability exploitation or (spear) phishing.
The only thing I worry about with U2F is that no one seems to make a key with an emergency erase feature.
All U2F security keys I've used can be erased... you just delete the U2F applet. But in an emergency I think it's more likely that what you need to do is to remove trust on the server side.
What threat are you trying to address?
I think that for most people, the combination of relative usability and risk leads to the choice of using TOTP on your phone, not the extent of a hardware dongle / key.
I disagree. I think the security key is the most usable solution, especially if you get the nano-sized keys that fit almost entirely into the USB port so you can just leave them plugged in all the time. This does mean that if you lose your laptop you lose the security key as well, but (a) you can revoke the key, (b) the most important risks are from remote attackers and (c) if a sophisticated attacker gets your laptop you're probably SoL anyway.
The only real argument against U2F, IMO, is cost. You have to buy the security keys.
For some service where you have no other way to prove yourself, losing the hardware is just too risky. For me at least.
That problem is orthogonal to the question of what type of 2FA to use. If you only use TOTP on your phone, then losing your phone (or dropping it in the toilet, etc.) leaves you without a way to recover. With Google's services, you can use U2F *and* TOTP *and* SMS *and* backup codes if you want. Of course, the more you use the more opportunities you give an attacker, so there's a tradeoff.
IMO, the best solution is a nano U2F security key which you leave in a USB port of each computer you use, plus another (larger) U2F security key on your key ring and one more stored in a safe place, along with a printed list of backup codes. This is not the cheapest solution, however, since if you have a laptop and a desktop it means you need four U2F keys.
JWZ had a writeup about SMS, Google Auth and OTP
https://www.jwz.org/blog/2018/...
Using a TOTP solution like 1password or Google Authenticator is better than SMS, because unlike SMS it's very difficult to hijack. But it's still not as good as security keys (AKA FIDO U2F) as described in this article, because it can be phished. If you're certain that you could never, under any circumstances, be social-engineered into giving up your TOTP code then you're probably wrong about how gullible you are, because there are some really talented social engineers out there. But with U2F, you just can't do it.
Also, U2F is much more convenient. You have to buy a USB dongle (or three) and stick one in your USB port, but then when you have to authenticate all you have to do is touch it. So much more convenient than looking at a number and typing it in. I work for Google, and the various systems I use require me to authenticate about a dozen times every day -- but often the authentication required is U2F only (because I already authenticated recently with my password) so it's very low-effort. The same would not be true if TOTP were required.
Do keep in mind if you go U2F only, though, that losing or destroying your security key means you're locked out of your account and the only available recovery process will be intentionally tortuous and may fail. So use multiple security keys, and I'd suggest keeping a set of backup codes in a safe place that is also quite inconvenient for you to access (making it hard for anyone to social engineer you into giving them a code).
The problem with implementing this (without enough backups) for personal is that if you ever lose all of your key info or code generator, you are absolutely fucked because there is no way to prove who you are to Google and have them reset your password / security. So you've got to have multiple backups in different places should your house ever burn down, etc.
You can use multiple U2Fs, and store one (or more) offsite. I'd recommend a set of backup codes offsite as well, where you won't be tempted to use them (to make phishing you harder), but where you can get them if needed.
There are only 12 incomprehensible icons on the address bar line, to the right of the address bar.
You know those are user-installed add-ons, not part of the browser, right? You can add as many as required to achieve your desired level of "googaws, curios, gimcracks and oddities".
Like I'm going to believe anyone who doesn't know the difference between "mute" and "moot".
Really, without a requirement of Project Treble that one can always install Google's base Android OS it's nearly worthless.
That is a requirement. Though if the device's bootloader is locked it's only a theoretical capability. But Google does test devices (if the vendors choose to submit to testing) to validate that a plain AOSP build will flash and run on them.
Maybe they could make a whole certification process then to guarantee that drivers work for some static hardware abstraction layer
This is the essence of Project Treble, which landed in Oreo.
We should be redefining things with some regularity as we learn more.
For example, we should stop calling the major bodies orbiting the sun "wanderers".
Actually, I don't really think we should choose a different word; "planet" is just fine, everyone knows what it is (roughly). But on the topic of redefining things as we learn more, I can't think of a better example than "wanderers". We still use that old name even though we learned many centuries ago that its literal meaning is completely wrong.
It's nearly the same, but it comes with an SD card slot. Not that it works like I expected, but it is a nice addition.
What do you mean here? How would you expect it to work, and in what way does it not?
I also love the double chop to turn on the flashlight and double twist to open the camera. I'm surprised no one else has picked those up yet.
A few devices use gestures for various things. Double-clicking the power button opens the camera on Pixels, for example.
Unfortunately, it has the fingerprint reader on the wrong side. In-screen fingerprint readers are a waste of time. They belong on the back.
Although it would increase cost, I'd like both. A reader on the back for most use, plus an in-screen reader for when the phone is resting on a desk or table.
Even if you never take selfies (like me) the extra screen would be nice for quick notifications when your phone is face down.
Why would your phone be face down? And putting notifications on a rear-facing screen would make it easier for the world to see them. The rear-facing screen would be another screen to break. I'd rather keep the selfie camera but move it under the screen; I understand there are some companies working on under-screen camera designs.
I can see them declining to try to set precedent on a pedophile case. In general, when you want to establish precedent you want to pick as appealing a defendant as possible, to maximize your chances.
I thought we weren't supposed to punish children for sins of the father, or the mother, or other family members. We were supposed to punish people for their own sins only.
That idea comes from Judeo-Christian theology. China does not have that tradition.
Wrecking authoritarian conservatism by example would actually be fun...
How would that wreck authoritarian conservatism by example?
In this case, the guy is probably going to serve his time
Probably not now, since his case has gotten national exposure. ACLU, EFF, NAACP, possibly even SPLC will be ready to provide lawyers. Even without them, some enterprising local lawyer could hook up with him and then either represent him pro bono for the publicity, or set up a legal defense fund and accept donations. I'd throw in a few bucks, and so would tens of thousands of others.
Because Amazon is a growth stock, the business equivalent of a cancer cell.
That's ridiculous. Dividends and price growth are both completely legitimate ways of providing an ROI to investors, and growth is the right choice as long as the business still has good growth prospects. When it's reached saturation and can't really benefit from major capital investment, then profits are paid out as dividends. Paying dividends while simultaneously trying to fund growth from new stock issuance, or bond issuance, or bank borrowing is almost always stupid; if the company has use for money and has profits, it makes sense to just plow profits back in rather than trying to get other money.
When Amazon stops growing, for whatever reason, it'll change gears and start issuing dividends. For now it's doing what makes sense, nothing remotely "cancerous" about it.
America has the largest % of people in jail, so it's doesn't seem that much of a deterrent for other crimes.
That's a result of our foolish war on drugs, not a general proof that punishment doesn't work.
If it's really so cheap and easy at 50k, why do people bother to do this [uscis.gov] for a million?
Because that million is invested, meaning unless they do it poorly it actually gets them a green card and grows their investment.
This was the original proposal, all can be quite a big number.
That wasn't my proposal, and I agree that it's excessive.
We disagree on the impact of jail time. Especially given the green card offer, which would virtually guarantee they'd get caught. Oh, I suppose it might be possible to find some population of American ex-cons who really prefer to be in jail and would be willing to do it because their goal is to go back anyway. But it's not going to be a large population, and if the crime is a felony the three-strikes law would quickly remove them from the pool.
Also, I don't think you've thought through the question of large fines. With enough money, you can immigrate legally regardless of your skills or almost anything else. With, say, $50K you can hire a good immigration lawyer who will get you through the tortuous hoops. So, set the fines high enough that people with enough wealth will prefer to immigrate legally -- as they already do.
And even if I'm wrong on both of those, if your goal is to dramatically reduce illegal immigration, a few hundred -- or even a few thousand -- green cards per year for rats is well worth it, isn't it?
I addressed your concern, yet either you don't think I did, in which case you should say why not, or else you have some other concern, in which case you should express it. Or if you're not interested in the discussion, say so.
I disagree, but in any case that's not really related to the topic at hand.
Eh, the biggest loss in my mind is still MagSafe... that was a truly useful connector.
I disagree. I love the idea of the MagSafe connector, it seems like a brilliantly simply design for an obvious problem... but it doesn't work as well as I would like, and the problem that it solves isn't a problem. Not for me, at least.
Taking the second point first, I got my first laptop in 1993 and I've had one ever since; a quarter century of experience. In all that time, I've never once had a laptop damaged by someone kicking a cord, and I'm anything but conscientious. I've had many cords kicked, and I've had many laptop cords break from wear, but no laptops or cords ever damaged in the way that MagSafe would protect. I'm not saying that my experience is universal, of course. If your pre-MagSafe life was littered with the remains of shattered laptops caused by kicked cords, then you might want to stick with MagSafe as long as possible. But for me, it doesn't seem to matter.
Indeed, I've had more problems with MagSafe cords breaking than I have with any other sort of laptop cord. They come apart right where the thin cable goes into the MagSafe connector.
The other problem with the MagSafe connectors is that they're too easy to disconnect when you don't want them to. Sitting on my bed, under the covers, with the laptop sitting on top of the blankets, for example, puffy blankets often exert just enough upward force on the connector and cord to angle the connector so that it didn't make contact. On countless occasions I've realized that my ostensibly plugged-in laptop is almost dead because it wasn't actually quite plugged in. Apple fixed this problem when they went to the right-angled connector... but then with MagSafe 2 they went right back to the straight-out version.
USB-C is a better solution, I think. Because you can use any of the USB-C ports to charge, you can plug in from either side. Because the connector inserts into the laptop, a little pressure on the cable doesn't disconnect it. Because it doesn't insert very far into the laptop, it pops out easily when someone kicks the cable. So far I haven't had any problems with cables breaking the way my old MagSafe Apple charger cables did, but if one does break, it's not a big deal. I can simply buy any old male-to-male USB-C cable of reasonable quality and replace the broken part. For that matter, I have already swapped the Apple-provided cable out for a much longer (and sturdier) one, extending the distance I can sit from an outlet.
Then there's also the fact that my phone and headphones are USB-C, so I can use my laptop charger to charge those devices as well. This means I now travel with only a single charger, and don't even carry any extra USB cables.
I thought I would miss the MagSafe connector, but I don't. At all. I do miss the better keyboard and real function keys, though.