What he "wants", when US-based companies hold data that still can technically be accessed for legitimate foreign intelligence purposes supported by our system of law, is that a legal framework should allow for it. When it can't be, it's up to NSA to determine other mechanisms to access that data.
If you actually care about our system of government, or that of any Western governments, then you would support that, too.
If, on the other hand, you live in a world where simply crying "Encryption!" is some kind of barrier that magically sanctifies the underlying data, and that it then cannot and should not ever be accessed by anyone other than the data owner...well, then I would ask what you think about the German and Japanese codes in WWII?
Oops...now the the fact is that US adversaries no longer are using their own custom software/hardware/encryption/etc. and now share the same technologies that Americans and the rest of the world use does not magically place these technologies off-limits for exploitation or targeting. It would turn modern intelligence gathering -- yes, of even free nations -- on its head.
The law and Constitution (as interpreted and implemented by our system of government) are the constraints -- not specific technological capability. That these constraints are erroneously believed to not be effective, or that the press and public willfully misunderstand the legal landscape alongside the big picture of SIGINT in the digital age, does not mean the constraints don't exist. The level of constraint on our activities, even activities conducted with respect to non-US Persons exclusively outside the US, rises to a level that I can only compare to a bad joke. An even worse joke is when people believe NSA is operating rouge, with virtually no constraints or oversight (at least any meaningful oversight), juxtaposed with the reality we work in every day.
If we're essentially saying that it was only okay for the US and our allies to, for example, break the German or Japanese codes during WWII simply because Americans weren't also using the same codes, and therefore that is the only reason that the government could be "trusted" to not misbehave or abuse its powers, then we have a serious problem on our hands.
So, take your message content and apply that to yourself. Thanks!
First of all, you say, "North Korea didn't hack Sony," as if it is an indisputable, known fact. It is not -- by any stretch of the imagination.
The fact is, it cannot be proven either way in a public forum, or without having independent access to evidence which proves -- from a social, not technical, standpoint -- how the attack originated. Since neither of those are possible, the MOST that can be accurate stated is that no one, in a public context, can definitively demonstrate for certain who hacked Sony.
Blameless in your scenario is the only entity actually responsible, which is that entity that attacked Sony in the first place.
Whether that is the DPRK, someone directed by the DPRK, someone else entirely, or a combination of the above, your larger point appears to be that somehow the US is to blame for a US subsidiary of a Japanese corporation getting hacked -- or perhaps simply for existing.
As a bonus, you could blame Sony for saying its security controls weren't strong enough, while still reserving enough blame for the US as the only "jackass".
Many of the same slashdotters who accept "experts" who claim NK didn't hack Sony will readily accept as truth that it was "obviously" the US that attacked NK, even though there is even less objective proof of that, and could just as easily be some Anonymous offshoot, or any number of other organizations, or even North Korea itself.
See the logical disconnect, here?
For those now jumping on the "North Korea didn't hack Sony" bandwagon that some security "experts" are leading for their own political or ideological reasons, including using rationales as puzzling and pedestrian as source IP addresses of the attacks being elsewhere, some comments:
Attribution in cyber is hard, and the general public is never going to know the classified intelligence that went into making an attribution determination, and experts -- actual and self-appointed -- will make claims about what they think occurred.
With cyber, you could have nation-states, terrorists organizations, or even activist hacking groups attacking other nation-states, companies, or organizations, for any number of motives, and making it appear, from a social and technical standpoint, that the attack originated from and/or was ordered by another entity entirely.
That's a HUGE problem, but there are ways to mitigate it. A Sony "insider" may indeed -- wittingly or unwittingly -- have been key in pulling off this hack. That doesn't mean that DPRK wasn't involved. I am not making a formal statement one way or the other; just saying that the public won't be privy to the specific attribution rationale.
Also, any offensive cyber action that isn't totally worthless is going to attempt to mask or completely divert attention from its true origins (unless part of the strategic intent is to make it clear who did it), or at a minimum maintain some semblance of deniability.
At some point you have to apply Occam's razor and ask who benefits.
And for those riding the kooky "This is all a big marketing scam by Sony" train:
So, you're saying that Sony leaked thousands of extremely embarrassing and in some cases damaging internal documents and emails that will probably result in the CEO of Sony Pictures Entertainment being ousted, including private and statutorily-protected personal health information of employees, and issued terroristic messages threatening 9/11-style attacks at US movie theaters, committing dozens to hundreds of federal felonies, while derailing any hopes for a mass release and instead having it end up on YouTube for rental, all to promote one of hundreds of second-rate movies?
No, it didn't. It was "some sort" of droplet transmission by monkeys in adjacent cages.
That is NOT -- repeat, NOT -- "airborne" transmission.
And no, it didn't go through the ventilation system; it was later learned that sick monkeys sneezing while they were being transported past well monkeys did indeed transmit the virus in this case.
It was also a completely different strain than the one we are talking about.
Airborne transmission occurs when an infectious agent is able to cling to particulates in the air and ride air currents for significant amounts of time, over significant distances, through ventilation systems, etc., long after the infected person who expelled the virus is no longer in the area.
Droplet transmission is NOT "airborne" transmission. It is projecting bodily fluids directly onto a well person in close quarters...usually less than 3 feet, but under optimal conditions, perhaps further. That is still not airborne transmission.
Furthermore, coughing/sneezing is probably one of the least effective ways to spread Ebola, even via droplets. Blood, feces, and vomit are the primary ways this will be spread. Yes, virus "could" be in saliva, mucous, semen, etc. But that's not the primary way Ebola spreads.
Airborne transmission would be very bad, but the Ebola virus is too large to spread this way. It would have to shed about 75% of its genome to be small enough for airborne transmission in sub-5um droplet nuclei that could ride on particulates. And if it did that, it wouldn't be "Ebola" anymore -- it would be something very different; perhaps still deadly, perhaps not, and so much different from what we are talking about right now that it is next to meaningless to discuss.
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Adverse effects of chronic cannabis use - Regular cannabis users can develop a dependence syndrome, the risks of which are around 1 in 10 of all cannabis users and 1 in 6 among those who start in adolescence. - Regular cannabis users double their risks of experiencing psychotic symptoms and disorders, especially if they have a personal or family history of psychotic disorders, and if they start using cannabis in their mid-teens. - Regular adolescent cannabis users have lower educational attainment than non-using peers but we donâ(TM)t know whether the link is causal. - Regular adolescent cannabis users are more likely to use other illicit drugs, but we donâ(TM)t know whether the link is causal. - Regular cannabis use that begins in adolescence and continues throughout young adulthood appears to produce intellectual impairment, but the mechanism and reversibility of the impairment is unclear. - Regular cannabis use in adolescence approximately doubles the risk of being diagnosed with schizophrenia or reporting psychotic symptoms in adulthood. - Regular cannabis smokers have a higher risk of developing chronic bronchitis. - Cannabis smoking by middle aged adults probably increases the risk of myocardial infarction.
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Wrong. Different strain, VERY bad source, did not happen through ventilation system. It happened to monkeys in adjacent cages without direct contact, through "some sort" of aerosolized transmission in very close quarters. I.e., droplets.
Fearmongers or people who think "the government" is "lying to stem panic" always trot out this story. It does NOT mean "Ebola is airborne".
It took Africa, with some of the worst healthcare, sanitation, and infrastructure in the world, 10 MONTHS to get to the ~7400 cases there are now. If it were airborne, it would be much, much worse. Ebola is not airborne; stop spreading your bullshit.
Airborne transmission occurs when an droplet nuclei containing a virus (or bacteria) is small enough (under 5 um) to travel on dust particles, and can invisibly hang in the air or travel on air currents in large spaces long after someone has sneezed or coughed, and travel great distances, and can infect when breathed in.
There is NO EVIDENCE that Ebola is, or has been, spread in this way. In fact, the evidence is that Ebola is almost exclusively spread via direct contact with bodily fluids.
Droplet transmission (over 10 um) occurs when droplets of saliva or mucous (or even blood) containing the virus are projected during a sneeze or cough and and projected directly onto someone's eyes, mouth, or mucous membranes. This kind of transmission is usually within 3', and is NOT considered "airborne" transmission.
"Droplet" transmission can certainly occur with Ebola -- or any disease that spreads via bodily fluids and is present in saliva or mucous. VHFs are not airborne diseases, and a study of one strain where monkeys in adjacent cages sneezed on each other and passed the disease does not make it "airborne".
Being able to get something from having someone sneeze or cough droplets onto you and airborne transmission are very different things.
Whether he lied or not, some accounts say that he believed the woman he aided had malaria, not Ebola. And the woman's family themselves may have lied to the people aiding them.
Ultimately, the biggest breakdown occured with the hospital, which was told twice that he had just traveled from Liberia on the first visit, and has since admitted this information was available to all providers. This has caused the tilt to the other extreme, with even the most innocuous cases of fever, adominal distress, and similar, with no travel or other history that would point to Ebola, being handled as such "out of an abundance of caution".
Keep in mind that viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) are nothing new in the US. what happens in the United States with other fatal VHFs, that, like Ebola, are only spread via direct contact with bodily fluids and can be easily addressed in first world nations:
Hanta is especially on point, as the US typically has dozens of cases -- and dozens of deaths -- each year, all of which are rapidly contained. The cases of "imported" VHFs, like has occurred with Marburg and Lassa, result in identification, isolation, and either the recovery or death of that person -- and that's the end of it.
Also, Ebola is NOT airborne. Ebola researchers will AT MOST say things like:
Peters, whose CDC team studied cases from 27 households that emerged during a 1995 Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo, said that while most could be attributed to contact with infected late-stage patients or their bodily fluids, "some" infections may have occurred via "aerosol transmission."
"Those monkeys were dying in a pattern that was certainly suggestive of coughing and sneezing â" some sort of aerosol movement."
"May". "Suggestive". "Some sort".
Even if we change all of these statements to absolute certainty, it still does not translate to, "Ebola is airborne," in the meaning of "airborne" in the context of disease transmission.
Airborne transmission occurs when a droplet nuclei containing a virus (or bacteria) is small enough (10 μm) occurs when droplets of saliva or mucous (or even blood) containing the virus are projected during a sneeze or cough and and projected directly onto someone's eyes, mouth, or mucous membranes. This kind of transmission is usually within 3', and is NOT considered "airborne" transmission.
"Droplet" transmission can certainly occur with Ebola -- or any disease that spreads via bodily fluids and is present in saliva or mucous. VHFs are not airborne diseases, and a study of one strain where monkeys in adjacent cages sneezed on each other and passed the disease does not make it "airborne".
Being able to get something from having someone sneeze or cough droplets onto you and airborne transmission are very different things.
The quickest way to have a threat of possible airborne transmission of Ebola via mutation would be to not aid Africa in this fight, and let Africa fend for itself, creating an environment where the cases could skyrocket into the millions (due to Africa's infrastructure and inability to deal with the onslaught), thereby increasing the statistical likelihood of the feared airborne mutation -- which, if a foothold were to be gotten in the West as an airborne disease, would truly be a catastrophe worthy of fear and panic.
In reading much of the news coverage, online commentary, and this thread, this article struck me as very relevant:
Every official query. Agents are allowed to search through that data at their whim. This was detailed by Snowden.
False. That is categorically, 100% false. That was people interpreted Snowden's claim to be, and that's not how it works. If you look at the nuance of Snowden's claims, even he himself has made various statements to the effect of, "Even if it's not being abused today, it could be in the future." Wow, no shit, Captain Obvious: ANY government power "could" be abused. And? I mean, really? That's why in a democracy we sort of have this thing called the "rule of law". And yes, we're imperfect, in all manner of ways. Again: And?
In the case of the phone call metadata, it has been approved and reauthorized every 90 days by all three branches of government -- the intelligence committees of both houses of Congress, two different presidential administrations (which you could only believe are "the same" if you're one of those crazy libertarian types), and a total of 17 different federal judges, who have variously sat on the court whose single purpose and reason for being is to protect the rights of Americans under the law and the Constitution in the context of FOREIGN intelligence collection. (I know all the protests: no, FISC is not a "rubber stamp" court; it is simply not an adversarial court, and armies of lawyers IC agencies don't even waste their time bringing forward requests that are likely to be denied.)
Only 22 people, in total, even have query access to the database, and this data has only been queried around 300 times. Each of those queries requires its own FISA order (to demonstrate the target is not a US Person, or if it is a US Person, that an individualized warrant exists for a legitimate foreign intelligence purpose), and EVERY query of any kind of SIGINT collection, of any kind, has a layer of daily audits. Every query. Ironically, the only people who had theoretical access to data without oversight -- if they wanted to violate their oath, their trust, the law, and the Constitution -- was system administrators. And now, because of Snowden, sysadmins can only conduct sensitive duties (such as entering datacenters or having physical access to anything beyond normal workstations) with another sysadmin (two-person integrity).
Yes, the capability they want against the terrorists is a complete panopticon of all activity. And the simple response is that no, they are not allowed to have that capability when it comes to US citizens. As per the constitution.
There is no way to have technical (or any) capabilities to collect against "only" the foreign targets without having the capability to collect against any target that is using the same systems, networks, and tools. The only distinction now is the US Person-status. That is the fundamental issue in the digital world, and the source of the fundamental misunderstanding of the United States' foreign SIGINT capabilities.
You're vastly oversimplifying the situation, beyond the fact you don't understand anything about SIGINT law, governance, or policy. Where, in the Constitution, does it say the government cannot have a CAPABILITY that COULD be used against Americans? (Hint: ANY government power "could" be used against Americans.) What is the difference, from a Constitutional perspective, of a foreign counterterrorism target using Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, Facebook, WhatsApp, Skype, etc. (which they do), and an American using those same tools? Do you see the problem, here? It's the PERSON, not the TOOL.
Your "solutions" -- which you don't even need to enumerate for me to guess -- would basically mean that all a foreign target has to do to subject himself to the same Constitutional and warrant protections that are reserved only for US Persons is to ENSURE his communications enter, touch, or traverse a US system or network. Right now that happens incidentally, or because US adversaries still find them to be the easiest methods to communicate, even if their comms might be using a US service, or a US-designed or -ow
...and so do kids, passengers, arguments, the radio, the A/C controls, and anything else that takes your visual or mental attention away from the road in front of you.
This is surprising, how, exactly? Siri and similar are a hell of a lot better than texting and otherwise using your smart device in the normal, "non voice controlled" way.
Dude, do you know who Steven Aftergood is? You might want to look into his background. He's the Director of the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy and the last person who is going to inappropriately defend government for trying to keep something secret. And yes, Sen. Wyden was trying to get the DNI to reveal currently and properly classified information in open session.*
The fact of the matter is that for at least the last 35 years, phone call records, as a "business record" provided to a third party, do NOT have an expectation of privacy and are NOT covered by the Fourth Amendment. Unless and until the Supreme Court reverses Smith, that is the standing, factual law of the land.
Furthermore, the entire purpose of the BR FISA metadata collection isn't to "spy on Americans" -- it is to "collect the haystack", so to speak, that may LAWFULLY be collected, in order to have access to it when searching for bad foreign actors who may be physically operating within the US on US wireless carriers. And every query against that data requires a reasonable, articulable, and specific foreign intelligence nexus, with its own separate FISA order.
It's not NSA's job to second guess the law or its authorities. Its entire purpose is FOREIGN signals intelligence, and the fact that some people simply can't accept that won't be changed by any amount of commentary in forums like this. Foreign targets now exist in the same sea of global digital communications as you and everyone else â" there is no way to have the technical capability to target the one without having the same capability to target them all.
Which is why, again, in a democratic society based on the rule of law, it is what the LAW says that is paramount.
* For what it's worth, my own personal view is that Clapper wasn't even thinking of the phone metadata program when asked that question. He was thinking more broadly in terms of the foreign intelligence collection missions of 17 IC agencies, which can, do, and always will sometimes encounter the communications content of Americans during the execution of their duties. And the fact is, no matter how many little pissant isolated examples of someone intentionally abusing something, there is no systemic, policy, or enabling environment to illegally spy on Americans. If you want to believe there is, then there won't be any useful discussion between us. Is there room for improvement and transparency on some fronts? Sure. But intelligence requires secrecy in order to be effective, even in free and open societies.
But you can never "know" the discovery was incidental, under any construct, because you can always assume the government is lying -- with or without the Snowden disclosures. And we didn't learn from Snowden how collection is defined in a SIGINT context; electronic collection has been defined that way since at least 1982. I agree that the FBI (or any government agency) cannot engage another agency/country/etc. in order to skirt US laws...and I didn't say they should be able to, nor do I believe they did.
Furthermore, metadata is not content -- and even that data is only queried for specifically articulated counterterrorism purposes, which means it would have nothing to do with this case. Even now, no one has ANY idea whether NSA or any other agency was involved...the FBI could be hiding its own sources and methods, or could have even omitted information or made a mistake.
And the program has been challenged, and may ultimately make its way to the Supreme Court, which may decide that technology has changed so much since 1979 that this interpretation of the Smith v Maryland ruling is no longer a valid interpretation in the context of the Fourth Amendment. But unless and until that happens, it is factual to say that phone call records, as a "business record" provided to a third party, do not have an expectation of privacy and are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. That's not a value judgment, or an opinion, it is a legal fact.
And it's not NSA's job to second guess its own legal authorities (even though it extensively does that); its job is to conduct its missions, in what I would hope would be the most aggressive way possible within the law. Its mission isn't to figure out ways around the law, or the Constitution, or to spy on Americans without warrants. Its mission is to conduct FOREIGN SIGINT against US adversaries, nearly all of whom are non-US Persons outside the US, and the reality is that these targets coexist with innocent Americans and everyone else in the global web of digital communications. There is no way to avoid this reality.
Parallel construction isn't only about the NSA...it is any alternative construction of evidence to conceal a sensitive source or method that may have led to and/or assisted in the investigation. It's very old, and the only thing some legal experts say about it is that it MAY -- key word being may -- run afoul of evidentiary rules and discovery procedures. It's a very old concept, and as long as the alternate chain of evidence is completely supportable and nothing illegal occurred* to initiate the investigation in the first place, there is nothing at all wrong with it.
* Even IF it was NSA collection that led to the FBI tip, the incidental discovery of international narcotics trafficking, when discovered, is exempt. Furthermore, it doesn't necessarily need to be an NSA "tip"; it could be that they also brought an NSA (or other IC/DOD agency) resource to bear on the issue, and don't want to reveal that because it would reveal a sensitive intelligence capability, technique, source, or method. That, too, is not illegal. So while it's an interesting story, it is just that.
So-called "parallel construction" isn't illegal or unconstitutional, and even IF -- and that's a very big if -- the initial tip came from "NSA", keep in mind that there has been a decades-old exemption for things like international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking when discovered during the course of legitimate foreign signals intelligence collection.
So, while you may not like it, nothing that is illegal or unconstitutional occurred here, and it is not the result of post-9/11 laws, or "new ways of interpreting the law", or anything else.
The simple fact is that legitimate foreign intelligence targets, to include terrorists and US adversaries who are mostly non-US Persons physically outside the US, share and use the same systems, networks, services, devices, software, tools, operating systems, encryption standards, and so on, as Americans and much of the rest of the world.
This is a simple, undeniable truth, and the only thing differentiating such traffic in the digital world is the status of the person(s) in communication -- i.e., whether they are or are not a US Person. That's it.
And guess what? The communications of US Persons WILL be encountered, and always have been, and we have a legal construct for how to deal with that, and that legal construct factually includes exemptions, again, for things like international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking.
And all of this is even IF it was "NSA" that tipped off anyone; it still could just be FBI somewhat clumsily protecting its own sources and methods...it doesn't have to be "spooks". In a free society governed by the rule of law, it is the LAW, not the capability, that is paramount.
And speaking of the law, the only person doing anything illegal here -- under our system and body of law, whether anyone agrees with it or not -- was Ulbricht.
But even here, again, when you look at a typical OS X desktop system, now many people:
1. Have apache enabled AND exposed to the public internet (i.e., not behind a NAT router, firewall, etc)?
2. Even have apache or any other services enabled at all?
...both of which would be required for this exploit. The answer? Vanishingly small to be almost zero.
So, in the context of OS X, it's yet another theoretical exploit; "theoretical" in the sense that it effects essentially zero conventional OS X desktop users. Could there have been a worm or other attack vector which then exploited the bash vulnerability on OS X? Sure, I suppose. But there wasn't, and it's a moot point since a patch is now available within days of the disclosure.
And people running OS X as web servers exposed to the public internet, with the demise of the standalone Mac OS X Server products as of 10.6, is almost a thing of yesteryear itself.
Nothing has changed since that era: all OSes have always been vulnerable to attacks, both via local and remote by various means, and there have been any number of vulnerabilities that have only impacted UN*X systems, Linux and OS X included, and not Windows, over very many years. So yeah, nothing has changed, and OS X (and iOS) is still a very secure OS, by any definition or viewpoint of the definition of "secure", when viewed alongside Windows (and Android).
I presume you wouldn't say it was "wrong" of the United States to crack the German and Japanese codes in WWII...
...so when US adversaries (and lets just caveat this by saying people YOU, personally, agree are legitimate US adversaries) don't use their own "codes", but instead share the same systems, networks, services, devices, cloud providers, operating systems, encryption schemes, and so on, that Americans and much of the rest of the world uses, would you suggest that they should be off limits?
This isn't so much a law enforcement question as a question of how to do SIGINT in the modern digital world, but given the above, and given that intelligence requires secrecy in order to be effective, how would you suggest the United States go after legitimate targets? Or should we not be able to, because that power "might" be able to be abused -- as can any/all government powers, by definition?
This simplistic view that the only purpose of the government in a free and democratic society must be to somehow subjugate, spy on, and violate the rights of its citizens is insane, while actual totalitarian and non-free states, to say nothing of myriad terrorist and other groups, press their advantage. And why wouldn't they? The US and its ever-imperfect system of law is not the great villain in the world.
Take a step back and get some perspective. And this is not a rhetorical question: if someone can tell me their solution for how we should be able to target technologies that are fundamentally shared with innocent Americans and foreigners everywhere while still keeping such sources, methods, capabilities, and techniques secret, I'm all ears. And if you believe the second a technology is shared it should become magically off-limits because power might be abused, you are insane -- or, more to the point, you believe you have some moral high ground which, ironically, would actually result in severe disadvantages for the system of free society you would claim to support.
One of NSA's chief missions is breaking encryption. So (for the US folks among us) it's okay when it's the German or Japanese codes in WWII, but somehow sinister when the reality is that much of the world now shares the same tools, systems, services, networks, encryption standards, etc.?
In a free society governed by the rule of law, it is not the capability, but the law, that is paramount. And for all of the carping and hand-wringing about what NSA is doing because its capabilities continue to be laid bare, where is the worry about what states like China and Russia are doing?
The whole idea is that the chemical weapons are destroyed FIRST...they are being destroyed AT SEA, not "destroyed" by simply dumping them into the ocean.
The fact that the other blog entries hosted at the same site as TFA include:
- Rihanna Displays Illuminati Hand Gesture at Latest Music Award Performance
- SSDI Death Index: Sandy Hook 'Shooter' Adam Lanza Died One Day Before School Massacre?
- 15 Citizens Petition to Secede from the United States
- Will U.S. Troops Fire On American Citizens?
- Illuminati Figurehead Prince William Takes the Stage with Jon Bon Jovi and Taylor Swift
- Has the Earth Shifted â" Or Is It Just Me?
- Mexican Government Releases Proof of E.T.'s and Ancient Space Travel...should give you a hint as to the veracity of the content. (And yes, I realize it's simply a blog site with a variety of authors and content.)
As should the first comment, from "LibertyTreeBud", saying:
"Why not add it to some new vaccine? Or, perhaps add it to the drinking water and feed it to the live stock? These creatures will do anything for profits. Lowest bidder mentality rules."
What "creatures", exactly? The international organization explicitly charged with the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons? What alternatives are people suggesting, exactly?
Slashdot Mirror
What he "wants", when US-based companies hold data that still can technically be accessed for legitimate foreign intelligence purposes supported by our system of law, is that a legal framework should allow for it. When it can't be, it's up to NSA to determine other mechanisms to access that data.
If you actually care about our system of government, or that of any Western governments, then you would support that, too.
If, on the other hand, you live in a world where simply crying "Encryption!" is some kind of barrier that magically sanctifies the underlying data, and that it then cannot and should not ever be accessed by anyone other than the data owner...well, then I would ask what you think about the German and Japanese codes in WWII?
Oops...now the the fact is that US adversaries no longer are using their own custom software/hardware/encryption/etc. and now share the same technologies that Americans and the rest of the world use does not magically place these technologies off-limits for exploitation or targeting. It would turn modern intelligence gathering -- yes, of even free nations -- on its head.
The law and Constitution (as interpreted and implemented by our system of government) are the constraints -- not specific technological capability. That these constraints are erroneously believed to not be effective, or that the press and public willfully misunderstand the legal landscape alongside the big picture of SIGINT in the digital age, does not mean the constraints don't exist. The level of constraint on our activities, even activities conducted with respect to non-US Persons exclusively outside the US, rises to a level that I can only compare to a bad joke. An even worse joke is when people believe NSA is operating rouge, with virtually no constraints or oversight (at least any meaningful oversight), juxtaposed with the reality we work in every day.
If we're essentially saying that it was only okay for the US and our allies to, for example, break the German or Japanese codes during WWII simply because Americans weren't also using the same codes, and therefore that is the only reason that the government could be "trusted" to not misbehave or abuse its powers, then we have a serious problem on our hands.
So, take your message content and apply that to yourself. Thanks!
The Westgate mall attack wasn't a bomb. It was armed gunmen, and 67 people ended up dead with over 175 wounded.
First of all, you say, "North Korea didn't hack Sony," as if it is an indisputable, known fact. It is not -- by any stretch of the imagination.
The fact is, it cannot be proven either way in a public forum, or without having independent access to evidence which proves -- from a social, not technical, standpoint -- how the attack originated. Since neither of those are possible, the MOST that can be accurate stated is that no one, in a public context, can definitively demonstrate for certain who hacked Sony.
Blameless in your scenario is the only entity actually responsible, which is that entity that attacked Sony in the first place.
Whether that is the DPRK, someone directed by the DPRK, someone else entirely, or a combination of the above, your larger point appears to be that somehow the US is to blame for a US subsidiary of a Japanese corporation getting hacked -- or perhaps simply for existing.
As a bonus, you could blame Sony for saying its security controls weren't strong enough, while still reserving enough blame for the US as the only "jackass".
Bravo.
Many of the same slashdotters who accept "experts" who claim NK didn't hack Sony will readily accept as truth that it was "obviously" the US that attacked NK, even though there is even less objective proof of that, and could just as easily be some Anonymous offshoot, or any number of other organizations, or even North Korea itself.
See the logical disconnect, here?
For those now jumping on the "North Korea didn't hack Sony" bandwagon that some security "experts" are leading for their own political or ideological reasons, including using rationales as puzzling and pedestrian as source IP addresses of the attacks being elsewhere, some comments:
Attribution in cyber is hard, and the general public is never going to know the classified intelligence that went into making an attribution determination, and experts -- actual and self-appointed -- will make claims about what they think occurred.
With cyber, you could have nation-states, terrorists organizations, or even activist hacking groups attacking other nation-states, companies, or organizations, for any number of motives, and making it appear, from a social and technical standpoint, that the attack originated from and/or was ordered by another entity entirely.
That's a HUGE problem, but there are ways to mitigate it. A Sony "insider" may indeed -- wittingly or unwittingly -- have been key in pulling off this hack. That doesn't mean that DPRK wasn't involved. I am not making a formal statement one way or the other; just saying that the public won't be privy to the specific attribution rationale.
Also, any offensive cyber action that isn't totally worthless is going to attempt to mask or completely divert attention from its true origins (unless part of the strategic intent is to make it clear who did it), or at a minimum maintain some semblance of deniability.
At some point you have to apply Occam's razor and ask who benefits.
And for those riding the kooky "This is all a big marketing scam by Sony" train:
So, you're saying that Sony leaked thousands of extremely embarrassing and in some cases damaging internal documents and emails that will probably result in the CEO of Sony Pictures Entertainment being ousted, including private and statutorily-protected personal health information of employees, and issued terroristic messages threatening 9/11-style attacks at US movie theaters, committing dozens to hundreds of federal felonies, while derailing any hopes for a mass release and instead having it end up on YouTube for rental, all to promote one of hundreds of second-rate movies?
Yeah...no.
...than the $65 you already stated you are willing to spend to get her internet in her room.
Enough said.
No, it didn't. It was "some sort" of droplet transmission by monkeys in adjacent cages.
That is NOT -- repeat, NOT -- "airborne" transmission.
And no, it didn't go through the ventilation system; it was later learned that sick monkeys sneezing while they were being transported past well monkeys did indeed transmit the virus in this case.
It was also a completely different strain than the one we are talking about.
Airborne transmission occurs when an infectious agent is able to cling to particulates in the air and ride air currents for significant amounts of time, over significant distances, through ventilation systems, etc., long after the infected person who expelled the virus is no longer in the area.
Droplet transmission is NOT "airborne" transmission. It is projecting bodily fluids directly onto a well person in close quarters...usually less than 3 feet, but under optimal conditions, perhaps further. That is still not airborne transmission.
Furthermore, coughing/sneezing is probably one of the least effective ways to spread Ebola, even via droplets. Blood, feces, and vomit are the primary ways this will be spread. Yes, virus "could" be in saliva, mucous, semen, etc. But that's not the primary way Ebola spreads.
Airborne transmission would be very bad, but the Ebola virus is too large to spread this way. It would have to shed about 75% of its genome to be small enough for airborne transmission in sub-5um droplet nuclei that could ride on particulates. And if it did that, it wouldn't be "Ebola" anymore -- it would be something very different; perhaps still deadly, perhaps not, and so much different from what we are talking about right now that it is next to meaningless to discuss.
So, in closing: no, Ebola is not airborne.
I think you're confusing the US with China, the latter of which did increase its defense budget by 12% (and has for about the last 12 years), and is on track to exceed US defense spending by 2020-2025.
Why don't you read the study for yourself, or look into the veracity and quality of the journal.
What twenty years of research on cannabis use has taught us
Read the full study in the journal Addiction
What twenty years of research on cannabis use has taught us
In the past 20 years recreational cannabis use has grown tremendously, becoming almost as common as tobacco use among adolescents and young adults, and so has the research evidence. A major new review in the scientific journal Addiction sets out the latest information on the effects of cannabis use on mental and physical health.
The key conclusions are:
Adverse effects of acute cannabis use
- Cannabis does not produce fatal overdoses.
- Driving while cannabis-intoxicated doubles the risk of a car crash; this risk increases substantially if users are also alcohol-intoxicated.
- Cannabis use during pregnancy slightly reduces birth weight of the baby.
Adverse effects of chronic cannabis use
- Regular cannabis users can develop a dependence syndrome, the risks of which are around 1 in 10 of all cannabis users and 1 in 6 among those who start in adolescence.
- Regular cannabis users double their risks of experiencing psychotic symptoms and disorders, especially if they have a personal or family history of psychotic disorders, and if they start using cannabis in their mid-teens.
- Regular adolescent cannabis users have lower educational attainment than non-using peers but we donâ(TM)t know whether the link is causal.
- Regular adolescent cannabis users are more likely to use other illicit drugs, but we donâ(TM)t know whether the link is causal.
- Regular cannabis use that begins in adolescence and continues throughout young adulthood appears to produce intellectual impairment, but the mechanism and reversibility of the impairment is unclear.
- Regular cannabis use in adolescence approximately doubles the risk of being diagnosed with schizophrenia or reporting psychotic symptoms in adulthood.
- Regular cannabis smokers have a higher risk of developing chronic bronchitis.
- Cannabis smoking by middle aged adults probably increases the risk of myocardial infarction.
Professor Hallâ(TM)s report is published online today in the scientific journal Addition.
Wrong. Different strain, VERY bad source, did not happen through ventilation system. It happened to monkeys in adjacent cages without direct contact, through "some sort" of aerosolized transmission in very close quarters. I.e., droplets.
Fearmongers or people who think "the government" is "lying to stem panic" always trot out this story. It does NOT mean "Ebola is airborne".
It took Africa, with some of the worst healthcare, sanitation, and infrastructure in the world, 10 MONTHS to get to the ~7400 cases there are now. If it were airborne, it would be much, much worse. Ebola is not airborne; stop spreading your bullshit.
Thank you.
...when trying to use the carat symbol. Fix here:
Airborne transmission occurs when an droplet nuclei containing a virus (or bacteria) is small enough (under 5 um) to travel on dust particles, and can invisibly hang in the air or travel on air currents in large spaces long after someone has sneezed or coughed, and travel great distances, and can infect when breathed in.
There is NO EVIDENCE that Ebola is, or has been, spread in this way. In fact, the evidence is that Ebola is almost exclusively spread via direct contact with bodily fluids.
Droplet transmission (over 10 um) occurs when droplets of saliva or mucous (or even blood) containing the virus are projected during a sneeze or cough and and projected directly onto someone's eyes, mouth, or mucous membranes. This kind of transmission is usually within 3', and is NOT considered "airborne" transmission.
"Droplet" transmission can certainly occur with Ebola -- or any disease that spreads via bodily fluids and is present in saliva or mucous. VHFs are not airborne diseases, and a study of one strain where monkeys in adjacent cages sneezed on each other and passed the disease does not make it "airborne".
Being able to get something from having someone sneeze or cough droplets onto you and airborne transmission are very different things.
Whether he lied or not, some accounts say that he believed the woman he aided had malaria, not Ebola. And the woman's family themselves may have lied to the people aiding them.
Ultimately, the biggest breakdown occured with the hospital, which was told twice that he had just traveled from Liberia on the first visit, and has since admitted this information was available to all providers. This has caused the tilt to the other extreme, with even the most innocuous cases of fever, adominal distress, and similar, with no travel or other history that would point to Ebola, being handled as such "out of an abundance of caution".
Keep in mind that viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) are nothing new in the US. what happens in the United States with other fatal VHFs, that, like Ebola, are only spread via direct contact with bodily fluids and can be easily addressed in first world nations:
Hanta: http://www.cdc.gov/hantavirus/...
Marburg: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/previe...
Lassa: http://www.cdc.gov/media/relea...
Hanta is especially on point, as the US typically has dozens of cases -- and dozens of deaths -- each year, all of which are rapidly contained. The cases of "imported" VHFs, like has occurred with Marburg and Lassa, result in identification, isolation, and either the recovery or death of that person -- and that's the end of it.
Also, Ebola is NOT airborne. Ebola researchers will AT MOST say things like:
Peters, whose CDC team studied cases from 27 households that emerged during a 1995 Ebola outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo, said that while most could be attributed to contact with infected late-stage patients or their bodily fluids, "some" infections may have occurred via "aerosol transmission."
"Those monkeys were dying in a pattern that was certainly suggestive of coughing and sneezing â" some sort of aerosol movement."
"May". "Suggestive". "Some sort".
Even if we change all of these statements to absolute certainty, it still does not translate to, "Ebola is airborne," in the meaning of "airborne" in the context of disease transmission.
Airborne transmission occurs when a droplet nuclei containing a virus (or bacteria) is small enough (10 μm) occurs when droplets of saliva or mucous (or even blood) containing the virus are projected during a sneeze or cough and and projected directly onto someone's eyes, mouth, or mucous membranes. This kind of transmission is usually within 3', and is NOT considered "airborne" transmission.
"Droplet" transmission can certainly occur with Ebola -- or any disease that spreads via bodily fluids and is present in saliva or mucous. VHFs are not airborne diseases, and a study of one strain where monkeys in adjacent cages sneezed on each other and passed the disease does not make it "airborne".
Being able to get something from having someone sneeze or cough droplets onto you and airborne transmission are very different things.
The quickest way to have a threat of possible airborne transmission of Ebola via mutation would be to not aid Africa in this fight, and let Africa fend for itself, creating an environment where the cases could skyrocket into the millions (due to Africa's infrastructure and inability to deal with the onslaught), thereby increasing the statistical likelihood of the feared airborne mutation -- which, if a foothold were to be gotten in the West as an airborne disease, would truly be a catastrophe worthy of fear and panic.
In reading much of the news coverage, online commentary, and this thread, this article struck me as very relevant:
http://www.nationaljournal
Every official query. Agents are allowed to search through that data at their whim. This was detailed by Snowden.
False. That is categorically, 100% false. That was people interpreted Snowden's claim to be, and that's not how it works. If you look at the nuance of Snowden's claims, even he himself has made various statements to the effect of, "Even if it's not being abused today, it could be in the future." Wow, no shit, Captain Obvious: ANY government power "could" be abused. And? I mean, really? That's why in a democracy we sort of have this thing called the "rule of law". And yes, we're imperfect, in all manner of ways. Again: And?
In the case of the phone call metadata, it has been approved and reauthorized every 90 days by all three branches of government -- the intelligence committees of both houses of Congress, two different presidential administrations (which you could only believe are "the same" if you're one of those crazy libertarian types), and a total of 17 different federal judges, who have variously sat on the court whose single purpose and reason for being is to protect the rights of Americans under the law and the Constitution in the context of FOREIGN intelligence collection. (I know all the protests: no, FISC is not a "rubber stamp" court; it is simply not an adversarial court, and armies of lawyers IC agencies don't even waste their time bringing forward requests that are likely to be denied.)
Only 22 people, in total, even have query access to the database, and this data has only been queried around 300 times. Each of those queries requires its own FISA order (to demonstrate the target is not a US Person, or if it is a US Person, that an individualized warrant exists for a legitimate foreign intelligence purpose), and EVERY query of any kind of SIGINT collection, of any kind, has a layer of daily audits. Every query. Ironically, the only people who had theoretical access to data without oversight -- if they wanted to violate their oath, their trust, the law, and the Constitution -- was system administrators. And now, because of Snowden, sysadmins can only conduct sensitive duties (such as entering datacenters or having physical access to anything beyond normal workstations) with another sysadmin (two-person integrity).
Yes, the capability they want against the terrorists is a complete panopticon of all activity. And the simple response is that no, they are not allowed to have that capability when it comes to US citizens. As per the constitution.
There is no way to have technical (or any) capabilities to collect against "only" the foreign targets without having the capability to collect against any target that is using the same systems, networks, and tools. The only distinction now is the US Person-status. That is the fundamental issue in the digital world, and the source of the fundamental misunderstanding of the United States' foreign SIGINT capabilities.
You're vastly oversimplifying the situation, beyond the fact you don't understand anything about SIGINT law, governance, or policy. Where, in the Constitution, does it say the government cannot have a CAPABILITY that COULD be used against Americans? (Hint: ANY government power "could" be used against Americans.) What is the difference, from a Constitutional perspective, of a foreign counterterrorism target using Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, Facebook, WhatsApp, Skype, etc. (which they do), and an American using those same tools? Do you see the problem, here? It's the PERSON, not the TOOL.
Your "solutions" -- which you don't even need to enumerate for me to guess -- would basically mean that all a foreign target has to do to subject himself to the same Constitutional and warrant protections that are reserved only for US Persons is to ENSURE his communications enter, touch, or traverse a US system or network. Right now that happens incidentally, or because US adversaries still find them to be the easiest methods to communicate, even if their comms might be using a US service, or a US-designed or -ow
...and so do kids, passengers, arguments, the radio, the A/C controls, and anything else that takes your visual or mental attention away from the road in front of you.
This is surprising, how, exactly? Siri and similar are a hell of a lot better than texting and otherwise using your smart device in the normal, "non voice controlled" way.
Dude, do you know who Steven Aftergood is? You might want to look into his background. He's the Director of the Federation of American Scientists Project on Government Secrecy and the last person who is going to inappropriately defend government for trying to keep something secret. And yes, Sen. Wyden was trying to get the DNI to reveal currently and properly classified information in open session.*
The fact of the matter is that for at least the last 35 years, phone call records, as a "business record" provided to a third party, do NOT have an expectation of privacy and are NOT covered by the Fourth Amendment. Unless and until the Supreme Court reverses Smith, that is the standing, factual law of the land.
Furthermore, the entire purpose of the BR FISA metadata collection isn't to "spy on Americans" -- it is to "collect the haystack", so to speak, that may LAWFULLY be collected, in order to have access to it when searching for bad foreign actors who may be physically operating within the US on US wireless carriers. And every query against that data requires a reasonable, articulable, and specific foreign intelligence nexus, with its own separate FISA order.
It's not NSA's job to second guess the law or its authorities. Its entire purpose is FOREIGN signals intelligence, and the fact that some people simply can't accept that won't be changed by any amount of commentary in forums like this. Foreign targets now exist in the same sea of global digital communications as you and everyone else â" there is no way to have the technical capability to target the one without having the same capability to target them all.
Which is why, again, in a democratic society based on the rule of law, it is what the LAW says that is paramount.
* For what it's worth, my own personal view is that Clapper wasn't even thinking of the phone metadata program when asked that question. He was thinking more broadly in terms of the foreign intelligence collection missions of 17 IC agencies, which can, do, and always will sometimes encounter the communications content of Americans during the execution of their duties. And the fact is, no matter how many little pissant isolated examples of someone intentionally abusing something, there is no systemic, policy, or enabling environment to illegally spy on Americans. If you want to believe there is, then there won't be any useful discussion between us. Is there room for improvement and transparency on some fronts? Sure. But intelligence requires secrecy in order to be effective, even in free and open societies.
If you think we live under the rule of law then why the fuck hasn't James Clapper being charged with perjury yet?
Because it's not as simple as you appear to wish it to be. And this is from a longtime crusader against government secrecy who is on "your side".
But you can never "know" the discovery was incidental, under any construct, because you can always assume the government is lying -- with or without the Snowden disclosures. And we didn't learn from Snowden how collection is defined in a SIGINT context; electronic collection has been defined that way since at least 1982. I agree that the FBI (or any government agency) cannot engage another agency/country/etc. in order to skirt US laws...and I didn't say they should be able to, nor do I believe they did.
Furthermore, metadata is not content -- and even that data is only queried for specifically articulated counterterrorism purposes, which means it would have nothing to do with this case. Even now, no one has ANY idea whether NSA or any other agency was involved...the FBI could be hiding its own sources and methods, or could have even omitted information or made a mistake.
And the program has been challenged, and may ultimately make its way to the Supreme Court, which may decide that technology has changed so much since 1979 that this interpretation of the Smith v Maryland ruling is no longer a valid interpretation in the context of the Fourth Amendment. But unless and until that happens, it is factual to say that phone call records, as a "business record" provided to a third party, do not have an expectation of privacy and are not protected by the Fourth Amendment. That's not a value judgment, or an opinion, it is a legal fact.
And it's not NSA's job to second guess its own legal authorities (even though it extensively does that); its job is to conduct its missions, in what I would hope would be the most aggressive way possible within the law. Its mission isn't to figure out ways around the law, or the Constitution, or to spy on Americans without warrants. Its mission is to conduct FOREIGN SIGINT against US adversaries, nearly all of whom are non-US Persons outside the US, and the reality is that these targets coexist with innocent Americans and everyone else in the global web of digital communications. There is no way to avoid this reality.
Parallel construction isn't only about the NSA...it is any alternative construction of evidence to conceal a sensitive source or method that may have led to and/or assisted in the investigation. It's very old, and the only thing some legal experts say about it is that it MAY -- key word being may -- run afoul of evidentiary rules and discovery procedures. It's a very old concept, and as long as the alternate chain of evidence is completely supportable and nothing illegal occurred* to initiate the investigation in the first place, there is nothing at all wrong with it.
* Even IF it was NSA collection that led to the FBI tip, the incidental discovery of international narcotics trafficking, when discovered, is exempt. Furthermore, it doesn't necessarily need to be an NSA "tip"; it could be that they also brought an NSA (or other IC/DOD agency) resource to bear on the issue, and don't want to reveal that because it would reveal a sensitive intelligence capability, technique, source, or method. That, too, is not illegal. So while it's an interesting story, it is just that.
So-called "parallel construction" isn't illegal or unconstitutional, and even IF -- and that's a very big if -- the initial tip came from "NSA", keep in mind that there has been a decades-old exemption for things like international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking when discovered during the course of legitimate foreign signals intelligence collection.
So, while you may not like it, nothing that is illegal or unconstitutional occurred here, and it is not the result of post-9/11 laws, or "new ways of interpreting the law", or anything else.
The simple fact is that legitimate foreign intelligence targets, to include terrorists and US adversaries who are mostly non-US Persons physically outside the US, share and use the same systems, networks, services, devices, software, tools, operating systems, encryption standards, and so on, as Americans and much of the rest of the world.
This is a simple, undeniable truth, and the only thing differentiating such traffic in the digital world is the status of the person(s) in communication -- i.e., whether they are or are not a US Person. That's it.
And guess what? The communications of US Persons WILL be encountered, and always have been, and we have a legal construct for how to deal with that, and that legal construct factually includes exemptions, again, for things like international terrorism and international narcotics trafficking.
And all of this is even IF it was "NSA" that tipped off anyone; it still could just be FBI somewhat clumsily protecting its own sources and methods...it doesn't have to be "spooks". In a free society governed by the rule of law, it is the LAW, not the capability, that is paramount.
And speaking of the law, the only person doing anything illegal here -- under our system and body of law, whether anyone agrees with it or not -- was Ulbricht.
But even here, again, when you look at a typical OS X desktop system, now many people:
1. Have apache enabled AND exposed to the public internet (i.e., not behind a NAT router, firewall, etc)?
2. Even have apache or any other services enabled at all?
So, in the context of OS X, it's yet another theoretical exploit; "theoretical" in the sense that it effects essentially zero conventional OS X desktop users. Could there have been a worm or other attack vector which then exploited the bash vulnerability on OS X? Sure, I suppose. But there wasn't, and it's a moot point since a patch is now available within days of the disclosure.
And people running OS X as web servers exposed to the public internet, with the demise of the standalone Mac OS X Server products as of 10.6, is almost a thing of yesteryear itself.
Nothing has changed since that era: all OSes have always been vulnerable to attacks, both via local and remote by various means, and there have been any number of vulnerabilities that have only impacted UN*X systems, Linux and OS X included, and not Windows, over very many years. So yeah, nothing has changed, and OS X (and iOS) is still a very secure OS, by any definition or viewpoint of the definition of "secure", when viewed alongside Windows (and Android).
An oversimplification. The US, UK, and allies variously broke many cipher systems throughout WWII. Still the US benefitted from this.
What if the Germans were using, say, Windows, Android phones, SSL, Gmail, Yahoo, and Skype, instead of Enigma machines?
I presume you wouldn't say it was "wrong" of the United States to crack the German and Japanese codes in WWII...
This isn't so much a law enforcement question as a question of how to do SIGINT in the modern digital world, but given the above, and given that intelligence requires secrecy in order to be effective, how would you suggest the United States go after legitimate targets? Or should we not be able to, because that power "might" be able to be abused -- as can any/all government powers, by definition?
This simplistic view that the only purpose of the government in a free and democratic society must be to somehow subjugate, spy on, and violate the rights of its citizens is insane, while actual totalitarian and non-free states, to say nothing of myriad terrorist and other groups, press their advantage. And why wouldn't they? The US and its ever-imperfect system of law is not the great villain in the world.
Take a step back and get some perspective. And this is not a rhetorical question: if someone can tell me their solution for how we should be able to target technologies that are fundamentally shared with innocent Americans and foreigners everywhere while still keeping such sources, methods, capabilities, and techniques secret, I'm all ears. And if you believe the second a technology is shared it should become magically off-limits because power might be abused, you are insane -- or, more to the point, you believe you have some moral high ground which, ironically, would actually result in severe disadvantages for the system of free society you would claim to support.
One of NSA's chief missions is breaking encryption. So (for the US folks among us) it's okay when it's the German or Japanese codes in WWII, but somehow sinister when the reality is that much of the world now shares the same tools, systems, services, networks, encryption standards, etc.?
In a free society governed by the rule of law, it is not the capability, but the law, that is paramount. And for all of the carping and hand-wringing about what NSA is doing because its capabilities continue to be laid bare, where is the worry about what states like China and Russia are doing?
The whole idea is that the chemical weapons are destroyed FIRST...they are being destroyed AT SEA, not "destroyed" by simply dumping them into the ocean.
The fact that the other blog entries hosted at the same site as TFA include:
- Rihanna Displays Illuminati Hand Gesture at Latest Music Award Performance
- SSDI Death Index: Sandy Hook 'Shooter' Adam Lanza Died One Day Before School Massacre?
- 15 Citizens Petition to Secede from the United States
- Will U.S. Troops Fire On American Citizens?
- Illuminati Figurehead Prince William Takes the Stage with Jon Bon Jovi and Taylor Swift
- Has the Earth Shifted â" Or Is It Just Me?
- Mexican Government Releases Proof of E.T.'s and Ancient Space Travel ...should give you a hint as to the veracity of the content. (And yes, I realize it's simply a blog site with a variety of authors and content.)
As should the first comment, from "LibertyTreeBud", saying:
"Why not add it to some new vaccine? Or, perhaps add it to the drinking water and feed it to the live stock? These creatures will do anything for profits. Lowest bidder mentality rules."
What "creatures", exactly? The international organization explicitly charged with the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons? What alternatives are people suggesting, exactly?
If you want a real article discussing this situation factually, not the tripe linked in the summary, see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25146980
...he's Canadian.
And stop being so cynical. Sometimes stuff can be cool without being "viral marketing".