Well, maybe. The issue is password protection. If "they" have access to your computer early on, and they almost certainly would, they can put in a keyboard sniffer to snatch your password -- and there goes the safety afforded by your encryption, no matter how robust the algorithm itself may be. There are ways around this, but I've rarely seen them discussed, much less implemented.
Messages sent _before_ transmitting the temporary session key are presumed to be authentic, while messages sent _after_ the temporary session key could have been forged. Not insurmountabe, but something to think about.
I have to believe that -- if strong accounting controls are built in -- the proposal would be a step in the right direction. A DOS attack slows transfers, which pretty much puts us back to where we are now. The bigger risk is someone illegally diverting funds to an account -- and spending the money before they are caught. Preventing that from happening is the point of maintaining strict access standards and a clear audit trail.
It seems that the proof hasn't been reviewed yet. He may have it -- but lots of good folks have tried, without success.
This from Science Daily:
http://www.math.purdue.edu/~branges/ . While mathematicians ordinarily announce their work at formal conferences or in scientific journals, the spirited competition to prove the hypothesis - which carries a $1 million prize for whomever accomplishes it first - has encouraged de Branges to announce his work as soon as it was completed.
"I invite other mathematicians to examine my efforts," said de Branges, who is the Edward C. Elliott Distinguished Professor of Mathematics in Purdue's School of Science. "While I will eventually submit my proof for formal publication, due to the circumstances I felt it necessary to post the work on the Internet immediately."
The weakness in current encryption/communications systems isn't in the encrypting algorithms, which have withstood the serious efforts of some top-flight mathematicians to bust them.
Nor is it necessarily in traffic analysis; keep a line open and transmitting bits 24/7. Isn't hard to design the system so the intended recipient can tell when the "random" bits start a message.
Nor is the weakness in key transmission, at least for governments: lots and lots of really long keys
can be transported on CDs well in advance of need.
The weakness remains where it has been in recent years, with the people using the system, and with keeping their computers out of unauthorized hands.
Going to quantum methods doesn't change get around this weakness. From what I see, the benefit of quantum crypto is the ability to make message tampering evident.
Finding a very thin layer of irridium in the rocks laid down at the very end of the Permian would be compelling evidence.
A layer of irridium, together with the crater in the Gulf of Mexico off the Mexican coast, made a good argument of what caused the dinosaurs to go at the end of the Cretaceous period.
Interesting to note that folks [like Martha] are being bagged these days for lying to federal officers, rather than for some primary crime. In short, if someone with a badge shows up, you can keep silent [not often a good option] or tell the truth. What you can't do -- without risking a trip to the slammer -- is lie, even if you are completely innocent of any other crime. And don't think your lies are protected by the Fifth Amendment; they aren't.
.... but do we have any idea what sort of range might be possible down the road? I ask because I suspect that a stream of photons would have to be amplified somewhere along the way, fine under almost any other circumstances -- but here the original photons _must_ make it to the recipient, or the message will show that it's been tampered with.
Unless we are talking about distances significantly greater than a few hundred meters, the old-fashioned sneaker net might be a cost-effective alternative.
.... so do lots of other things. What happens when someone flushes a pint of paint thinner or weed killer or heavy metal organic compound down the old toilet?
Doesn't it strike anyone as odd that the powers that be would release this much detail to one of the world's top newspapers?
Even if the technique no longer works on Al Queda, surely there are lots of other folks who still have [misguided] faith in the security of cell phones.
I smell disinformation here.
Slashdot Mirror
Well, maybe. The issue is password protection. If "they" have access to your computer early on, and they almost certainly would, they can put in a keyboard sniffer to snatch your password -- and there goes the safety afforded by your encryption, no matter how robust the algorithm itself may be. There are ways around this, but I've rarely seen them discussed, much less implemented.
Messages sent _before_ transmitting the temporary session key are presumed to be authentic, while messages sent _after_ the temporary session key could have been forged. Not insurmountabe, but something to think about.
I have to believe that -- if strong accounting controls are built in -- the proposal would be a step in the right direction. A DOS attack slows transfers, which pretty much puts us back to where we are now. The bigger risk is someone illegally diverting funds to an account -- and spending the money before they are caught. Preventing that from happening is the point of maintaining strict access standards and a clear audit trail.
Check Amazon for the book mentioned in the article: Origami Design Secrets: Mathematical Methods There are some related titles that also look good.
It seems that the proof hasn't been reviewed yet. He may have it -- but lots of good folks have tried, without success. This from Science Daily: http://www.math.purdue.edu/~branges/ . While mathematicians ordinarily announce their work at formal conferences or in scientific journals, the spirited competition to prove the hypothesis - which carries a $1 million prize for whomever accomplishes it first - has encouraged de Branges to announce his work as soon as it was completed. "I invite other mathematicians to examine my efforts," said de Branges, who is the Edward C. Elliott Distinguished Professor of Mathematics in Purdue's School of Science. "While I will eventually submit my proof for formal publication, due to the circumstances I felt it necessary to post the work on the Internet immediately."
.... caffeine is one of the four basic food groups.
The weakness in current encryption/communications systems isn't in the encrypting algorithms, which have withstood the serious efforts of some top-flight mathematicians to bust them. Nor is it necessarily in traffic analysis; keep a line open and transmitting bits 24/7. Isn't hard to design the system so the intended recipient can tell when the "random" bits start a message. Nor is the weakness in key transmission, at least for governments: lots and lots of really long keys can be transported on CDs well in advance of need. The weakness remains where it has been in recent years, with the people using the system, and with keeping their computers out of unauthorized hands. Going to quantum methods doesn't change get around this weakness. From what I see, the benefit of quantum crypto is the ability to make message tampering evident.
Finding a very thin layer of irridium in the rocks laid down at the very end of the Permian would be compelling evidence. A layer of irridium, together with the crater in the Gulf of Mexico off the Mexican coast, made a good argument of what caused the dinosaurs to go at the end of the Cretaceous period.
Interesting to note that folks [like Martha] are being bagged these days for lying to federal officers, rather than for some primary crime. In short, if someone with a badge shows up, you can keep silent [not often a good option] or tell the truth. What you can't do -- without risking a trip to the slammer -- is lie, even if you are completely innocent of any other crime. And don't think your lies are protected by the Fifth Amendment; they aren't.
.... but do we have any idea what sort of range might be possible down the road? I ask because I suspect that a stream of photons would have to be amplified somewhere along the way, fine under almost any other circumstances -- but here the original photons _must_ make it to the recipient, or the message will show that it's been tampered with. Unless we are talking about distances significantly greater than a few hundred meters, the old-fashioned sneaker net might be a cost-effective alternative.
Lots of folks besides the USG will have their ears perked right up. Israel, China, and the Soviets come to mind.
.... so do lots of other things. What happens when someone flushes a pint of paint thinner or weed killer or heavy metal organic compound down the old toilet?
Doesn't it strike anyone as odd that the powers that be would release this much detail to one of the world's top newspapers? Even if the technique no longer works on Al Queda, surely there are lots of other folks who still have [misguided] faith in the security of cell phones. I smell disinformation here.