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Boeing Unveils 737 Max Software Fixes (cnbc.com)
hcs_$reboot shares a report from CNBC: Boeing previewed its software fix, cockpit alerts and additional pilot training for its 737 Max planes on Wednesday, saying the changes improve the safety of the aircraft which has been involved in two deadly crashes since October. By the end of this week, Boeing plans to send the software updates and plan for enhanced pilot training to the FAA for certification approval. After the FAA approves the fix, Boeing said it will send the software update to customers.
Among the notable changes to the MAX flight controls:
- The plane's Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, automated flight control system, will now receive data from both "angle of attack" sensors, instead of just one.
- If those disagree by more than 5.5 degrees, the MCAS system will be disabled and will not push the nose of the plane lower.
- Boeing will be adding an indicator to the flight control display so pilots are aware of when the angle of attack sensors disagree.
- There will also be enhanced training required for all 737 pilots so they are more fully aware of how the MCAS system works and how to disable it if they encounter an issue.
so.. a youtube link?
also these are workarounds, why not fix the actual problem of sensor reading incorrectly?
It will crash again.
if (crashing() && uncrashFeatureEnabled()) {
uncrash();
}
Before engaging MCAS the control software will display an animated dialog:
Clippy: It looks like you're plane may stall. Would you like help?
It must have been something you assimilated. . . .
Q. Why did the chicken cross the road?
A. It was very frightened
c6gunner: see, it was pullet terror!
Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
Why wasn't this done in the first place!? It is an industry standard to use redundancy for life critical applications. They have redundancy already, why didn't they use it?
Because the sensors are physical devices, and are this subject to all physical device problems. They can break, corrode, be bent by a physical impact, etc...
They're regularly inspected, which is about the best you can do.
I don't read AC A human right
"I dream of a world where a chicken can cross the road without having its motives questioned."
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
So, the FAA previously left the MCAS certification (along with other systems) to Boeing engineers. Is this how the "fix" is going to go through again? Normally they should go back and have FAA engineers redo the certification of every 737 Max system that might affect safety. ;)
But that would take years and FAA/Boeing wouldn't like that, would they
And all the above is without talking about what is the major cause of concern: software trying to compensate for the hardware design shortcomings an airplane... We could put these new engines on that 50+ year old frame that safely, but, don't worry, some software will take care of it... Only that software will have to turn off if there are issues with the sensors... What do you mean "how is turning off a safety feature safe"? Are you a commie or something?
Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent. Polar Scope Align for iOS
Oh, wait. It turns out it WAS completely and 100% Boeing's fault! It bought its FAA regulator, neglected adequate testing, and killed hundreds of people to avoid the cost of the only thing that could keep the MAX 8 from killing hundreds more. More pilot training. Scrap the damn plane!
While I applaud Boeing for taking steps to address the obvious flaws in their flight control systems for this aircraft, I still feel that it's more of a band-aid than a true fix. The reason for all of the heightened software monitoring and overrides in the first place is to paper over the fact that the aircraft has an inherently unbalanced design in the first place (due to having to place the engines more forward than they otherwise would have been in a standard 747). This was a case of a business decision trumping the best possible design for aerodynamic stability (IMHO).
I'm not sure yet that I'd fly in one of these even with the improvements. I think I would look to see what Pilots say of the improvements, if it is even possible to find one that can speak off the record.
That new software needs to be audited, source code and all, by outside experts. The first thing that was drilled into me in basic instrument flight training was never to fixate on one gauge. Boeing seems to have committed a transport category aircraft to just that.
The only software fix I want to see is the one that puts the pilot back in control of the airplane.
Work ass designed, bitches!
Big problem is their trying to fix a design flaw with a software fix in the first place.
I'm not an aerospace engineer, but the "fix" is what any sane and responsible programmer or engineer would implement.
Professional Engineers are bound by an ethics code and a understanding that they are legally responsible for their actions.
There may be other people that need to go to jail for this, but the Professional Engineer at Boeing who signed off on this *must* be criminally charged.
Boeing saves their triple redundant failure-proof systems for
really important systems. No sense wasting this stuff on passengers who have already paid for a ticket.
the PHB is not an Professional Engineer! also an H1B can take your job if you don't ship now.
Done.
Will $CURRENT_YEAR be the year of the Linux Desktop?
The problem isn't implementation bugs, it's the basic design that gives the autopilot control authority over the pilot. This exact sort of accident has been with us since the introduction of the first A320 (the first fly-by-wire aircraft where the autopilot could overrule the pilot's control inputs). The fix is in 2 parts:
One potential update to MCAS:
if ($altitude = 2000) { // let pilot do their job
return;
}
Quick patch. Another plane please. Boeing and the airline industry will bounce back better but an expensive lesson.
Boeing employees along with their family and friends all fly on these airplanes every day. We are just as interested in safety as everyone else.
Boeing screwed up ROYALLY and they'll pay for this, likely to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars.
This was an egregious engineering fuckup that was completely 100% avoidable. So many mistakes, it's horrendous and shameful for a company like Boeing to implement these insane design choices.
Basic SOL and mission-critical applications are always always ALWAYS supposed to use a minimum of two sensors and in most cases they should use three (with an arbitrated voting system).
In addition there was very little in the manual on it plus virtually no pilot training and consequently no pilot awareness, leading to two completely avoidable accidents.
So Boeing says that now they'll add a "plane-is-trying-to-kill-you" lamp, as well as a "please-stop-trying-to-kill-us" switch that turns off the MCAS.
That's nice, but it's a little late for 360+ people.
Just cruising through this digital world at 33 1/3 rpm...
If
{Audio.conv.facebook.newposts == "Oh my god, we're gonna die!!!" >120
}
then
{
Push.stick.omg.enable==1
Set NOCRASH=1
Reset OMG mode
}
endif
*note for the pedantic: this is not code. :)
Truth isn't Truth - Guliani
Slashdot's moderation system worked well when there were only a few trolls.
But now with racist shitbags like you posting so much, the system has been overwhelmed.
Posts like this shouldn't simply be moderated down. They should be eliminated. Garbage like you is destroying this site.
Please consider eliminating yourself from Slashdot and from the population. Racism has no place in this world.
"If those disagree by more than 5.5 degrees, the MCAS system will be disabled and will not push the nose of the plane lower." Why did someone think that was a good idea? Isn't the Pilots job to you know... PILOT the plane?
If the sensors fail simultaneously (volcanic dust or such), then they never disagree, MCAS isn't disengaged, but the readings are false and people could die. Sure this _seems_ unlikely, but do we really want to see another crash before handling this situation comprehensively?
Passengers will keep debugging.
A little too late for several hundreds victims, don't you think Mr. Boeing?
get good then you won't worry
Great. How do you determine whether the vote has a correct outcome?
Well, I'd start with reading my whole post before replying, because this is only like one of three questions you ask that are answered later in the same post. In some cases by the very next line.
Why ask when the question is already answered?
As for design flaw - that is a whacked sensor. I did mention firing people out of a cannon at that point...
The idea is that crash tendency is noticed.
Well, I said "hope" for a reason. It is a very scary situation to be minimized if possible.
About the only defense against defective sensors that are all returning the same nonsense, short of turning the aircraft into a mess of redundant sensors, would be to include a wider variety of sensor sanity checking. For your example at Balotesi, it sounds like the copilot wasn't paying attention to his attitude indicator. I also can't help but think that GPS might help in some cases as well, as acting like a lawn dart isn't good. While you really need airspeed data for good flight, which is different than ground speed, but if we're talking sanity checking.... It doesnt have to substitute, merely indicate fault, and that you're heading for rapid unscheduled disassembly with the ground.
I don't read AC A human right
The cost would be pretty high though :|
[($)]
Anyone who has done embedded development (or avionics for that matter) of any kind knows you need 3 sensor at each location with algorithms that compensate for failed or misfiring sensors both in integrating their readings and the final result. Did they drink the poison that is silicon valley and build out a crack dev team composed solely of cucks?
- add missing sensor
- no longer crash into the ground if sensor input mismatches
- update UI
- update docs
...but they will not be able to fix the fact that I will never fly on a 737 max again.
Proof of concept, Pay me bitch :P
[($)]
Can anybody imagine a 737 MAX pilot being anything less than viscerally aware of the problem and what must be done to fix it? Anything else being done is gilding the lily. Of course, turning off MCAS with an AoA sensor mismatch simply makes the job easier for the pilots. Now, why do they disagree? Are they really AoA indicators or something else entirely? Why aren't there three if you're going to use them in a flight safety critical manner?
{^_^}
The depressing (or incriminating?) part here is that the fix didn't require any hardware modifications, as I would have expected. I assumed that there was some cost/weight issue to having the MCAS have access to the left and right sensors. But nope, it could have compared both.
If it can be fixed with a software fix, then it could have been done right from the start without any extra hardware costs of production.
Very damning.
I get so tired of the reports calling clear software/algorithm bugs "computer glitches."
It's akin to blaming every pilot error situation on the plane.
Just as with hardware design flaws, software design flaws should have repercussions for the manufacturer, and not written off as "oh, one of those computer glitches!" If your computers are glitchy, don't put them on my plane, thanks.
Love many, trust a few, do harm to none.
Always check your flight itinerary. If the flight you are purchasing is on this flight, try another airline!
The plane should have been a white board redesign
I'm with you on this. Everything I read about the MCAS system sounds like a fudge to save costs; safety took second place to profit.
It surprises me that I haven't seen any comments about the BOAC Comet. Back in the early days of jet flight, the country leading the world in aviation was Britain. Unfortunately, we didn't realise that square windows meant airframe weakness, and sadly it took two crashes to learn that lesson. Despite fixing that problem, most airlines cancelled their orders of the Comet, and America overtook Britain as the jet airliner manufacturer of choice.
I don't fly very often, but when I do, I make sure that I am NEVER flying on a Boeing aircraft. To answer why, let my introduce you to the Boeing 707, the model on which all your wonderful Boeing aircraft today are based.
Let me ask you this. Just over one thousand Boeing 707s were built. How many of them do you think ended up as flaming wrecks on the ground, or in an accident so bad that even the most optimistic shyster wouldn't want to repair them and get them flying again - or, in aviation parlance "Total Hull Loss".
10?
20?
50?
No. 173. Almost ONE IN FIVE. Don't believe me?
So here's a question. Would YOU willingly fly on an aircraft knowing that there's a 1 in 5 chance that it will end its life not in sunny retirement, but smashed into little pieces on the ground? Would you fly on an aircraft that borrowed heavily from the design of an aircraft that had a 1 in 5 chance of ending its life killing everyone on board?
Are you going to fly on a Boeing aircraft again?
Shit like this is why AOC knows that in TEH FUTAR, everybody's going to be going by train. /snrk!
nobody tell her that trains are just as dependent on software.
the preceding comment is my own and in no way reflects the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
How many people does Boeing have to (get to) kill before it actually admits and tries to fix its shitty new planes?
As @ Firethorn said above, you might have 2 sensors giving wrong but the "same" data (for one was already proved).
We speak here for SECURITY of a plane with hundred passengers on board, it is not a demo-simulation flight's game.
So I belive that BOEING should consider an HEALTH's status of the plane, based by other sensors as giroscopes, thrust, speed, operation (taking off - landing - cruise) and so on and should inform pilots of it too.
It is easy to say that something is wrong and disengage all systems helping you, but you should also know that even a system has something wrong as sensors..., the status of the plane is "normal" for that operation (take off, landing, cruise...).
And then, I hear that BOEING give TWO... security's solutions, one as a flashing light but FREE for everybody, and other one as a system trying to asses the status and keep the plane in "normal" flight but this one just for EXTRA MONEY. It seems that BOEING consider SECURITY this "manual (for human eyes only) flashing info", and the real security is optional only.
Practically, BOEING intend to sell its planes without a real security, something we have knowledge is already doing.
Never thought I'd ever write this, but yeah.
"It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
After installation of Windows on Boeing it got capability to hang in the mid air.
...when we have assholes like Boeing doing it to us anyway?
Debate is a form of harassment. Do not question my truth.
In my opinion, this will never be properly fixed with software. The problem is with the mounting of the engines. I know we like to compare things with cars here on /.
If your car was designed such that it always pulled to the left, and the companies fix was to install software that notices it pulling to the left and nudging it back to the right... would you accept that as a proper fix?
How about they fix the ^$%# engine mounts so that they don't make the plane want to nose up? It might call for smaller engines (like they had previously) and them dropping the "MAX" from their name, but that seems like a better fix to me.
The system should be disabled by pulling back on the stick hard. Having a system designed to nose dive into the ground and completely override the pilot unless a complicated procedure is follow to disable it is asinine. Boeing has the blood of 300+ on its hands.
U get the plane :)
[($)]
The more I read about this completely preventable engineering cluster-fùk, the more I lose confidence in Boeing management as an aircraft company.
When two airplanes crash within 6 months the CEO should be fired for cause. Boeing should do a thorough audit questioning the engineers and managers who signed off critical design decision failures, publicly publish the results of the audit and fire the individuals responsible for the failures in this program. Both the 787 and 737 airplanes were grounded demonstrates there are serious engineering process deficiencies within Boeing. Boeing should require ALL management have engineering degrees if they are even tangentially involved in aircraft design. Even HR should be investigated and held accountable for the inadequate personnel they brought into the company.