Australian WCs are mainly washdown, not syphonic. They're noisy as hell, but unconditionally immune to blockage -- the exit hole is full-bore, all the way to the sewer.
The problem, as I understand it, basically is that the Australian government is worried about children seeing inappropriate material whilst online.
This concern is legitimate, and there are two solutions. One, which is what they propose, is to attempt to restrict non-family-friendly content to people who explicitly ask for it {and therefore presumably either have no children, or are taking steps of their own to prevent their children from viewing inappropriate material}. Unfortunately, this flies in the face of reality. The internet was designed on purpose to withstand damage by taking advantage of multiple paths -- and censorship of this kind is absolutely indistinguible from damage.
The second solution, and it's much simpler, is to ban children from using the internet altogether. This is primarily an adult world, after all. Children will grow up eventually; and then they can have rights, when and not until they have learned the responsibilities that spring directly from those rights.
It is Microsoft's fault. Not for allowing people to develop for Windows, but for creating closed-source software. Until the early 1970s, almost all software came in source code form {every computer was different enough that it had to} and vendors actually listened to suggestions from customers.
In 1974, or maybe it was '76 -- anyway, it was while Linus was still a nipper -- Bill Gates got a bit annoyed because people were sharing a program he had written. He thought they were stealing from him {a lot of people would say that failure to share is a form of stealing} and wrote a rather well-known open letter. Unfortunately for everyone else, nobody took Gates seriously and he was not given the DGK he so richly deserved.
If there was no closed-source software there would be much, much less malware. It really is that simple. Closed-source benefits only a few and disadvantages almost everybody. More good than harm would be done by outlawing it.
You, my friend, have hit the nail squarely on the head. That is everything that is wrong with the Western world, in a nutshell.
As that talking Malibu Stacy doll said in an episode of The Simpsons, "Don't ask me -- I'm just a girl! *lol*" Ignorance has become fashionable.
Stupid people don't need protecting from themselves. Smart people just need protecting from stupid people. Let the idiots die; and the more horrible the manner in which they go, the better to serve as an example to anyone thinking that deliberate ignorance might be a viable option.
No, the blame lies with the idiots who choose Microsoft, knowing full well that there are superior alternatives available, and then go back for more of the same shafting. Not that it's in Microsoft's interest to release an even half-secure OS anyway, what with the entire secondary industry that has developed around tidying up Microsoft's shite. In no other industry would anyone ever get away with it..... you get someone in to install central heating, they don't leave till the boiler is running fine, the radiators are fixed sound and level and the pipes are leak-free. You buy a car, it already has seat belts and stop lights fitted {and you can buy the Haynes manual.....}. Why the fuck does anybody think it's even remotely acceptable that when you buy a brand new computer, some little runt on the other side of the world can take over it within a quarter of an hour from when you plug it in, unless you spend even more money on protection software?
Most computer users just want to surf the web, do e-mail, messaging, word processing -- they even get this wrong and use rows of spaces for formatting -- look at their digital photos and possibly tinker with spreadsheets, most likely to use as though it were a database. All of this can be done with 95% Open Source software -- the only closed stuff you really need is Flash {which will soon have an Open Source equivalent} and Java {which will become Open Source soon enough}.
If you need Windows for games, then set up a dual-boot -- and don't install any of the networking subsystem on the Windows side. That's nearly as secure as getting a dedicated games console.
You have just given me a shit-hot idea. I knew there had to be something else I could do with all those pr0n stories I have been writing since people stopped reading proper magazines and switched to the internet.....
There's a powerful incantation specially designed to deal with shopkeepers:
Sale of Goods Act 1979, as amended.
The mere mention of the phrase is enough to send a shiver down the spine of even the hardest retailer; junior sales assistants have been reduced to gibbering wrecks by a particularly powerful rendition. Goods must be of merchantable quality and fit for the purpose described. If you explicitly mentioned at the time of sale that you intended to transfer it to an iPod and were not advised that this would not be easy, then the album is not fit for purpose and you are entitled to a refund. Even if not, if you were given reason to expect that this would be easy, then you might have a case.
But in any case, you can rip DRM-protected "CDs" to an iPod. You might need Slax if you aren't already a penguin-shagger. Even if your PC is infected by the Sony rootkit, Linux has its own set of drivers and will see the audio tracks just fine.
This practice is legal as long as you don't get caught. If you are unlucky enough to get arrested, insist to go to Crown Court. As long as there are two people on the jury who have ever taped an album, you'll walk free -- and establish a precedent. The case is most likely to collapse before it gets to trial, so don't bother booking the day off work.
Just go to the website and sign up with some bullshit information. When asked a question to which the correct response is "none of your bl**dy business" yet not presented with that option, it is perfectly acceptable to lie.
You would get paid the same way musicians always got paid for years before the invention of the gramophone: by charging admission whenever you perform live.
It's a bacterium, a life form. Hence, by virtue of being alive, it owns any IP rights that may subsist in its DNA. You would need its informed consent to patent it {in a country where such rights were even transferrable; internationally, the rights may still be construed as belonging to the bacterium}. In the event of a dispute, it ought not to be too difficult to demonstrate that the bacterium's consent was not informed {since it has only one cell and therefore is barely capable to understand anythig} and therefore its IP was illegally misappropriated; therefore you will end up owing posthumous backdated royalties to a microbe.
If somebody is bothered enough to be running GNU/Linux or a BSD variant, they probably are already smarter than to go running unknown programs without at least checking what they do. Of course, there are plenty of Windows users who know that already. But they aren't the ones you hear about.
Windows has made it possible for computer users to be ignorant and proud of it, and ignorant people have created all manner of problems for them and the rest of us. A computer is not a single-purpose appliance like a washing machine or a hoover. It is a highly general-purpose device; and that very generality of purpose is a double-edged sword which cuts both ways.
Running lilo, as you do from within the installation chroot just before you boot into your new kernel, does overwrite the master boot record.
GUI installers still do all this behind the scenes, they just hide it from you. I am guessing Windows must do something similar with its own bootstrap loader.
What is new about it is that the security companies have a new product to hawk. Windows already requires firewall, anti-virus and anti-spam software to be usable; anti-phishing software is a new market. There are other operating systems, with privilege separation designed in from the ground up, which only run necessary services; won't execute arbitrary code without a user's say-so and definitely not in privileged mode; and allow for mail filtering at several levels, privileged and non-privileged. With some of them, you can even conduct your own independent audit of the source code {or pay somebody you really trust to do it for you} so you need not take anyone's word for it how secure your system is or is not.
However, people don't actually want their computer systems to be secure. Security is boring and having a secure system is evidence that you have been thinking about things. They just want the latest versions of Windows and Office and hacks to play pirated games, and if this computer breaks they'll just throw it away and buy another one. Thinking about things like security, stability and integrity is evidence that you have goals beyond immediate gratification and are therefore a bore who sits in a rocking chair wearing a knitted cardigan.
In TeX, the up-arrow indicates a superscript {as in ax^2+bx+c}; I'll give you half a point on that one. However, in languages which support bitwise operations {some people do still use them}, 7 ^ 2 means 5 and not 49.
People run an operating system known to be vulnerable to Trojan Horse infections. They haven't had the source code independently audited and verified. They believe the headers in e-mail messages. And then they get infected by a Trojan horse.
The only surprise is it's taken this long for it to get noticed.
As long as people have had weaknesses, there have been other people out there seeking to exploit those weaknesses. That's just human nature; and if you fail to account for it, you might just as well have failed to account for gravity. The moment you put someone in front of a computer, they panic and lose all semblance of common sense. That also is human nature.
I believe Microsoft are complicit in all this, because it was Microsoft's deliberate design decision that the users of those computers did not have to give consent for a process to run as root. But whoever picked Microsoft must share some of the blame, since they basically decided that the integrity of their computer systems was less important than a pretty user interface.
Yes, that idea certainly has legs. While you were at it, you could store some information on the Special Font Card that only a proper laser printer could read, but that hackers would not be able to read. This way you could prevent hackers from copying the Special Font Card.
The problem with what you describe is that the voter's identity would be known by the recording machine, and the voter cannot be sure that their vote is not somehow linked with their identity. That is exactly the kind of audit trail we don't want to create.
The "perfect" system would work like this. Every voter receives a unique token. Just before voting, the unique token is spoiled {not completely destroyed: the voter may retain it as their receipt} and another token issued to its holder, before the voter has indicated a preference. All these second tokens are identical and the occupants of the polling station may verify this informally by comparison. The second token is the one which is required to cast a vote, and is spoiled -- in a different manner per candidate -- in the course of casting the vote, and retained for counting.
In the UK, everyone receives an invitation to vote {token 1} by post. The name and address are crossed off a list with a single line through by the presiding officer {token 1 spoiled -- you can keep the card to prove you voted, but no-one can use it again} when your ballot paper {token 2} is issued. The presiding officer does not know who you are going to vote for. The ballot papers are in a book, and you can ask for one torn out from anywhere in case you think they are all different. The paper is validated by punching it with a special pattern punch -- it would take longer to forge the pattern accurately than the polls remain open for. Usually there are two officials, one crossing off addresses and another handing out ballot papers. The actual ballot papers themselves are marked with a chinagraph pencil {token 2 spoiled} and placed in a box {token 2 retained}. The voter leaves with nothing about their person that can identify for whom they voted.
Smaller organisations with democratic procedures, such as student unions, often have membership cards with rows of numbered boxes, which are used as the "unique token" in elections -- the membership card is punched or marked with a waterproof pen {it takes longer to get this off completely than the polls are open for, and in any case the officials would recognise anybody attempting to vote twice} at the appropriate point when a ballot paper is issued.
The only potential cheat is that you could obtain an "I have voted" receipt without actually casting a vote. Then there will be fewer votes than voters. This also leaves a single ballot paper "in the wild" and unaccounted for. The paper is only valid in one polling station {they all have different official marks} for a limited time, and probably represents a fairly low overall risk.
If anybody is interested, I have designed a direct-recording electromechanical {therefore, no software or firmware to audit} voting system which I believe is no more susceptible to fraud than the present UK system; yet vote-counting is almost as easy as the US lever machines {you need to do some mental arithmetic, since it uses non-resettable solenoid counters for simplicity}. It consists of two units, one in the voting booth and one at the presiding officer's desk, linked by a multi-core cable. There is no paper trail as such; but it's absolutely open to scrutiny on every level. It's totally KISS, relying on the facts that (1) a capacitor can be used temporarily to store an electrical charge, (2) a current flowing through two electromagnets and a lamp connected in series will polarise both of them and illuminate the lamp and (3) it takes some small but finite amount of time for a mechanical switch to move. All O-level stuff, and easier to understand than the politics.
I recently had to fix a Windows machine {beancounters run some legacy app for compatibility with group HO, we've not hacked its protocols yet} that had been hit by a virus. Post-disinfection, the network hardware was undetected. I knew {from past experience with mucking up Linux boxes in various interesting ways -- let's just say, don't ever run out of space on/usr} that all I really needed to do was reinstall the networking stack -- just extract some files from an archive and overwrite the corrupt ones. The trouble was, I didn't know where to begin looking for what files I needed to do that with! So I ended up having to reinstall all of Windows. What a waste! That's like having a whole new fitted kitchen installed, just because the sink waste pipe is blocked!
The thing is, I seriously doubt there are many Windows people who could tell me just what files I would have needed to replace. There are no doubt one or two gurus out there, but I'd stake money that they also know a little bit about at least one other non-Windows OS too. You could just about train a monkey to reboot a Windows machine, which is always the first line of attack and works just too often. I've seen people reboot Linux boxes and get surprised / disappointed / angry when the problem did not go away -- well, why should it? What did you change? In fact, I would say that if rebooting a poorly Windows machine is enough to cure it, then that indicates that Windows must be losing track of its own state somehow somewhere; and doing it in enough different ways never to be really sure which is the dominant one. In any case, with the Windows box, there probably would be only one service which would need restarting; if you could even do them separately, that is.
But I don't think closed-source software vendors particularly like the idea of low-level field maintenance tools. It's like electronics manufacturers who would rather have you replace a whole PCB just because one fusible resistor has gone open circuit {like it was designed to, but it costs a few pence to unsolder it, solder in a new one and see if it was caused by a real fault or just unlucky}. These people want us to have to install a whole new kitchen for a blocked pipe, and maybe they'll try and sting us extra for their fancy KlogPruf(TM) technology while they're about it. But not too clog-proof for the plumbers and the manufacturers of drain-cleaning products {evil bodges though they be} still to turn a profit on the deal, obviously.
I would say it's definitely possible -- it's certainly my preferred technique. I write web apps, and I have my desktop set up with its own httpd and database servers. Once I've tested my stuff thoroughly and made sure it handles all the corner cases I can think of, then I get someone else to test it, and {if it's for the internet and not the intranet} make sure it renders in IE. It's much easier to iron out the kinks that way.
Before that, I had a friend build me a Linux based modem sharer out of an old '486. When my ISP started offering a cgi-bin directory, I installed Apache on the modem sharer and did local pre-deployment testing. It just seemed a sensible thing to do. Eventually, the Windows machines hanging off the modem sharer were replaced by Linux ones..... I never finished the dual-boot I was planning to build.
If I find something that I think might be a useful application, I'll always build it on my desktop first, and scrutinise the messages for warnings. I don't want to risk causing segmentation faults on a running server.
When we moved over from Apache 1.3 to 2.0 {now with separate configuration files, and what I was already using on my workstation}, I ran the 2.0 server on a non-standard port for a day, and then migrated it to a second non-standard port {a non-trivial task involving editing many files, but that's what we have sed for} just to prove that changing ports worked. The interruption to HTTP service lasted a few seconds while Apache 1.3 stopped and 2.0 started; I suspect any active PHP sessions might have been killed.
I could have been even more careful and built an almost perfect replica of the target machine with exactly the same environment for testing; but we're using Debian and that does make a difference. I can trust the package maintainers that a package will just work when installed with apt-get; and things are pretty consistent even between 64-bit Sid on my workstation and 32-bit Sarge on the servers. Of course, if there's a serious version discrepancy, I can always build the Sarge version from source on my Sid box to make sure it has the necessary features.
What about in countries where there are no such things as software patents? Then there is no need to pay anything at all to the "MPEG licensing authority". Indeed, by asking for money in a country without software patents but with strong fraud laws, the MPEG-LA might well be subject to the same kinds of penalties that get handed down to the scammers who send out warnings, imitating local NICs, about domain names about to expire and demanding money; generally the same as the penalties formerly handed out to scammers who demanded money for listings in bogus business directories.
Is there a "Pet names registry" in the USA, to whom you have to pay money if you want to call your pet a certain name? And if not, can I start one?
It would be entirely legal to distribute "patented" codecs from a jurisdiction where the patents on the aforementioned codecs are legally invalid.
This is why I'm surprised that Mandriva, being a joint French-Brazilian concern {i.e. both countries that don't recognise software patents}, don't include patent-encumbered source code in their distribution by default anyway.
Kindly explain what is being from stolen, and from whom, by the use of a bought-and-paid-for {but out-of-region} DVD in bought-and-paid-for equipment.
We are awaiting with bated breath. If no response {or an unsatisfactory response} is forthcoming, then we may simply have to continue with our assumption that you have an arse where your brain should be.
Slashdot Mirror
Every child has already seen a nipple. Several times.
Australian WCs are mainly washdown, not syphonic. They're noisy as hell, but unconditionally immune to blockage -- the exit hole is full-bore, all the way to the sewer.
I have an idea for a better solution.
The problem, as I understand it, basically is that the Australian government is worried about children seeing inappropriate material whilst online.
This concern is legitimate, and there are two solutions. One, which is what they propose, is to attempt to restrict non-family-friendly content to people who explicitly ask for it {and therefore presumably either have no children, or are taking steps of their own to prevent their children from viewing inappropriate material}. Unfortunately, this flies in the face of reality. The internet was designed on purpose to withstand damage by taking advantage of multiple paths -- and censorship of this kind is absolutely indistinguible from damage.
The second solution, and it's much simpler, is to ban children from using the internet altogether. This is primarily an adult world, after all. Children will grow up eventually; and then they can have rights, when and not until they have learned the responsibilities that spring directly from those rights.
It is Microsoft's fault. Not for allowing people to develop for Windows, but for creating closed-source software. Until the early 1970s, almost all software came in source code form {every computer was different enough that it had to} and vendors actually listened to suggestions from customers.
In 1974, or maybe it was '76 -- anyway, it was while Linus was still a nipper -- Bill Gates got a bit annoyed because people were sharing a program he had written. He thought they were stealing from him {a lot of people would say that failure to share is a form of stealing} and wrote a rather well-known open letter. Unfortunately for everyone else, nobody took Gates seriously and he was not given the DGK he so richly deserved.
If there was no closed-source software there would be much, much less malware. It really is that simple. Closed-source benefits only a few and disadvantages almost everybody. More good than harm would be done by outlawing it.
You, my friend, have hit the nail squarely on the head. That is everything that is wrong with the Western world, in a nutshell.
As that talking Malibu Stacy doll said in an episode of The Simpsons, "Don't ask me -- I'm just a girl! *lol*" Ignorance has become fashionable.
Stupid people don't need protecting from themselves. Smart people just need protecting from stupid people. Let the idiots die; and the more horrible the manner in which they go, the better to serve as an example to anyone thinking that deliberate ignorance might be a viable option.
No, the blame lies with the idiots who choose Microsoft, knowing full well that there are superior alternatives available, and then go back for more of the same shafting. Not that it's in Microsoft's interest to release an even half-secure OS anyway, what with the entire secondary industry that has developed around tidying up Microsoft's shite. In no other industry would anyone ever get away with it ..... you get someone in to install central heating, they don't leave till the boiler is running fine, the radiators are fixed sound and level and the pipes are leak-free. You buy a car, it already has seat belts and stop lights fitted {and you can buy the Haynes manual .....}. Why the fuck does anybody think it's even remotely acceptable that when you buy a brand new computer, some little runt on the other side of the world can take over it within a quarter of an hour from when you plug it in, unless you spend even more money on protection software?
Most computer users just want to surf the web, do e-mail, messaging, word processing -- they even get this wrong and use rows of spaces for formatting -- look at their digital photos and possibly tinker with spreadsheets, most likely to use as though it were a database. All of this can be done with 95% Open Source software -- the only closed stuff you really need is Flash {which will soon have an Open Source equivalent} and Java {which will become Open Source soon enough}.
If you need Windows for games, then set up a dual-boot -- and don't install any of the networking subsystem on the Windows side. That's nearly as secure as getting a dedicated games console.
You have just given me a shit-hot idea. I knew there had to be something else I could do with all those pr0n stories I have been writing since people stopped reading proper magazines and switched to the internet .....
Execute bit in the Windows filesystem?
I think that's filed in with C.V. joints for BMWs and distributor caps for Citroën 2CVs.
There's a powerful incantation specially designed to deal with shopkeepers:
Sale of Goods Act 1979, as amended.
The mere mention of the phrase is enough to send a shiver down the spine of even the hardest retailer; junior sales assistants have been reduced to gibbering wrecks by a particularly powerful rendition. Goods must be of merchantable quality and fit for the purpose described. If you explicitly mentioned at the time of sale that you intended to transfer it to an iPod and were not advised that this would not be easy, then the album is not fit for purpose and you are entitled to a refund. Even if not, if you were given reason to expect that this would be easy, then you might have a case.
But in any case, you can rip DRM-protected "CDs" to an iPod. You might need Slax if you aren't already a penguin-shagger. Even if your PC is infected by the Sony rootkit, Linux has its own set of drivers and will see the audio tracks just fine.
This practice is legal as long as you don't get caught. If you are unlucky enough to get arrested, insist to go to Crown Court. As long as there are two people on the jury who have ever taped an album, you'll walk free -- and establish a precedent. The case is most likely to collapse before it gets to trial, so don't bother booking the day off work.
Just go to the website and sign up with some bullshit information. When asked a question to which the correct response is "none of your bl**dy business" yet not presented with that option, it is perfectly acceptable to lie.
You would get paid the same way musicians always got paid for years before the invention of the gramophone: by charging admission whenever you perform live.
It's a bacterium, a life form. Hence, by virtue of being alive, it owns any IP rights that may subsist in its DNA. You would need its informed consent to patent it {in a country where such rights were even transferrable; internationally, the rights may still be construed as belonging to the bacterium}. In the event of a dispute, it ought not to be too difficult to demonstrate that the bacterium's consent was not informed {since it has only one cell and therefore is barely capable to understand anythig} and therefore its IP was illegally misappropriated; therefore you will end up owing posthumous backdated royalties to a microbe.
You're forgetting the rather obvious.
If somebody is bothered enough to be running GNU/Linux or a BSD variant, they probably are already smarter than to go running unknown programs without at least checking what they do. Of course, there are plenty of Windows users who know that already. But they aren't the ones you hear about.
Windows has made it possible for computer users to be ignorant and proud of it, and ignorant people have created all manner of problems for them and the rest of us. A computer is not a single-purpose appliance like a washing machine or a hoover. It is a highly general-purpose device; and that very generality of purpose is a double-edged sword which cuts both ways.
Running lilo, as you do from within the installation chroot just before you boot into your new kernel, does overwrite the master boot record.
GUI installers still do all this behind the scenes, they just hide it from you. I am guessing Windows must do something similar with its own bootstrap loader.
What is new about it is that the security companies have a new product to hawk. Windows already requires firewall, anti-virus and anti-spam software to be usable; anti-phishing software is a new market. There are other operating systems, with privilege separation designed in from the ground up, which only run necessary services; won't execute arbitrary code without a user's say-so and definitely not in privileged mode; and allow for mail filtering at several levels, privileged and non-privileged. With some of them, you can even conduct your own independent audit of the source code {or pay somebody you really trust to do it for you} so you need not take anyone's word for it how secure your system is or is not.
However, people don't actually want their computer systems to be secure. Security is boring and having a secure system is evidence that you have been thinking about things. They just want the latest versions of Windows and Office and hacks to play pirated games, and if this computer breaks they'll just throw it away and buy another one. Thinking about things like security, stability and integrity is evidence that you have goals beyond immediate gratification and are therefore a bore who sits in a rocking chair wearing a knitted cardigan.
In TeX, the up-arrow indicates a superscript {as in ax^2+bx+c}; I'll give you half a point on that one. However, in languages which support bitwise operations {some people do still use them}, 7 ^ 2 means 5 and not 49.
People run an operating system known to be vulnerable to Trojan Horse infections. They haven't had the source code independently audited and verified. They believe the headers in e-mail messages. And then they get infected by a Trojan horse.
The only surprise is it's taken this long for it to get noticed.
As long as people have had weaknesses, there have been other people out there seeking to exploit those weaknesses. That's just human nature; and if you fail to account for it, you might just as well have failed to account for gravity. The moment you put someone in front of a computer, they panic and lose all semblance of common sense. That also is human nature.
I believe Microsoft are complicit in all this, because it was Microsoft's deliberate design decision that the users of those computers did not have to give consent for a process to run as root. But whoever picked Microsoft must share some of the blame, since they basically decided that the integrity of their computer systems was less important than a pretty user interface.
Yes, that idea certainly has legs. While you were at it, you could store some information on the Special Font Card that only a proper laser printer could read, but that hackers would not be able to read. This way you could prevent hackers from copying the Special Font Card.
The problem with what you describe is that the voter's identity would be known by the recording machine, and the voter cannot be sure that their vote is not somehow linked with their identity. That is exactly the kind of audit trail we don't want to create.
The "perfect" system would work like this. Every voter receives a unique token. Just before voting, the unique token is spoiled {not completely destroyed: the voter may retain it as their receipt} and another token issued to its holder, before the voter has indicated a preference. All these second tokens are identical and the occupants of the polling station may verify this informally by comparison. The second token is the one which is required to cast a vote, and is spoiled -- in a different manner per candidate -- in the course of casting the vote, and retained for counting.
In the UK, everyone receives an invitation to vote {token 1} by post. The name and address are crossed off a list with a single line through by the presiding officer {token 1 spoiled -- you can keep the card to prove you voted, but no-one can use it again} when your ballot paper {token 2} is issued. The presiding officer does not know who you are going to vote for. The ballot papers are in a book, and you can ask for one torn out from anywhere in case you think they are all different. The paper is validated by punching it with a special pattern punch -- it would take longer to forge the pattern accurately than the polls remain open for. Usually there are two officials, one crossing off addresses and another handing out ballot papers. The actual ballot papers themselves are marked with a chinagraph pencil {token 2 spoiled} and placed in a box {token 2 retained}. The voter leaves with nothing about their person that can identify for whom they voted.
Smaller organisations with democratic procedures, such as student unions, often have membership cards with rows of numbered boxes, which are used as the "unique token" in elections -- the membership card is punched or marked with a waterproof pen {it takes longer to get this off completely than the polls are open for, and in any case the officials would recognise anybody attempting to vote twice} at the appropriate point when a ballot paper is issued.
The only potential cheat is that you could obtain an "I have voted" receipt without actually casting a vote. Then there will be fewer votes than voters. This also leaves a single ballot paper "in the wild" and unaccounted for. The paper is only valid in one polling station {they all have different official marks} for a limited time, and probably represents a fairly low overall risk.
If anybody is interested, I have designed a direct-recording electromechanical {therefore, no software or firmware to audit} voting system which I believe is no more susceptible to fraud than the present UK system; yet vote-counting is almost as easy as the US lever machines {you need to do some mental arithmetic, since it uses non-resettable solenoid counters for simplicity}. It consists of two units, one in the voting booth and one at the presiding officer's desk, linked by a multi-core cable. There is no paper trail as such; but it's absolutely open to scrutiny on every level. It's totally KISS, relying on the facts that (1) a capacitor can be used temporarily to store an electrical charge, (2) a current flowing through two electromagnets and a lamp connected in series will polarise both of them and illuminate the lamp and (3) it takes some small but finite amount of time for a mechanical switch to move. All O-level stuff, and easier to understand than the politics.
You've hit the nail on the head.
/usr} that all I really needed to do was reinstall the networking stack -- just extract some files from an archive and overwrite the corrupt ones. The trouble was, I didn't know where to begin looking for what files I needed to do that with! So I ended up having to reinstall all of Windows. What a waste! That's like having a whole new fitted kitchen installed, just because the sink waste pipe is blocked!
I recently had to fix a Windows machine {beancounters run some legacy app for compatibility with group HO, we've not hacked its protocols yet} that had been hit by a virus. Post-disinfection, the network hardware was undetected. I knew {from past experience with mucking up Linux boxes in various interesting ways -- let's just say, don't ever run out of space on
The thing is, I seriously doubt there are many Windows people who could tell me just what files I would have needed to replace. There are no doubt one or two gurus out there, but I'd stake money that they also know a little bit about at least one other non-Windows OS too. You could just about train a monkey to reboot a Windows machine, which is always the first line of attack and works just too often. I've seen people reboot Linux boxes and get surprised / disappointed / angry when the problem did not go away -- well, why should it? What did you change? In fact, I would say that if rebooting a poorly Windows machine is enough to cure it, then that indicates that Windows must be losing track of its own state somehow somewhere; and doing it in enough different ways never to be really sure which is the dominant one. In any case, with the Windows box, there probably would be only one service which would need restarting; if you could even do them separately, that is.
But I don't think closed-source software vendors particularly like the idea of low-level field maintenance tools. It's like electronics manufacturers who would rather have you replace a whole PCB just because one fusible resistor has gone open circuit {like it was designed to, but it costs a few pence to unsolder it, solder in a new one and see if it was caused by a real fault or just unlucky}. These people want us to have to install a whole new kitchen for a blocked pipe, and maybe they'll try and sting us extra for their fancy KlogPruf(TM) technology while they're about it. But not too clog-proof for the plumbers and the manufacturers of drain-cleaning products {evil bodges though they be} still to turn a profit on the deal, obviously.
I would say it's definitely possible -- it's certainly my preferred technique. I write web apps, and I have my desktop set up with its own httpd and database servers. Once I've tested my stuff thoroughly and made sure it handles all the corner cases I can think of, then I get someone else to test it, and {if it's for the internet and not the intranet} make sure it renders in IE. It's much easier to iron out the kinks that way.
..... I never finished the dual-boot I was planning to build.
Before that, I had a friend build me a Linux based modem sharer out of an old '486. When my ISP started offering a cgi-bin directory, I installed Apache on the modem sharer and did local pre-deployment testing. It just seemed a sensible thing to do. Eventually, the Windows machines hanging off the modem sharer were replaced by Linux ones
If I find something that I think might be a useful application, I'll always build it on my desktop first, and scrutinise the messages for warnings. I don't want to risk causing segmentation faults on a running server.
When we moved over from Apache 1.3 to 2.0 {now with separate configuration files, and what I was already using on my workstation}, I ran the 2.0 server on a non-standard port for a day, and then migrated it to a second non-standard port {a non-trivial task involving editing many files, but that's what we have sed for} just to prove that changing ports worked. The interruption to HTTP service lasted a few seconds while Apache 1.3 stopped and 2.0 started; I suspect any active PHP sessions might have been killed.
I could have been even more careful and built an almost perfect replica of the target machine with exactly the same environment for testing; but we're using Debian and that does make a difference. I can trust the package maintainers that a package will just work when installed with apt-get; and things are pretty consistent even between 64-bit Sid on my workstation and 32-bit Sarge on the servers. Of course, if there's a serious version discrepancy, I can always build the Sarge version from source on my Sid box to make sure it has the necessary features.
What about in countries where there are no such things as software patents? Then there is no need to pay anything at all to the "MPEG licensing authority". Indeed, by asking for money in a country without software patents but with strong fraud laws, the MPEG-LA might well be subject to the same kinds of penalties that get handed down to the scammers who send out warnings, imitating local NICs, about domain names about to expire and demanding money; generally the same as the penalties formerly handed out to scammers who demanded money for listings in bogus business directories.
Is there a "Pet names registry" in the USA, to whom you have to pay money if you want to call your pet a certain name? And if not, can I start one?
It would be entirely legal to distribute "patented" codecs from a jurisdiction where the patents on the aforementioned codecs are legally invalid.
This is why I'm surprised that Mandriva, being a joint French-Brazilian concern {i.e. both countries that don't recognise software patents}, don't include patent-encumbered source code in their distribution by default anyway.
Kindly explain what is being from stolen, and from whom, by the use of a bought-and-paid-for {but out-of-region} DVD in bought-and-paid-for equipment.
We are awaiting with bated breath. If no response {or an unsatisfactory response} is forthcoming, then we may simply have to continue with our assumption that you have an arse where your brain should be.