It would be totally inappropriate for a
goverment agency to blacklist a specific
vendor without going through extensive
hearings. That does not mean that they
should not consider the vendor's history
when evaluating each purchase. For the
anti-MS crowd that means that they should
reject each MS product individually.
More seriously, they need to evaluate
what their software requirements are.
I strongly suspect that they need software
which will:
Not expire: We are going to reach
a point where terrorism is not a "hot button"
item, and the spending will slack off. Eventually
there will be another attack. The software purchased now has to work four years from now,
even if the individual participating agencies
have upgraded their hardware in the meantime.
Platform independent: The federal government should not be telling local police
departments what type of equipment they need.
If they do, we'll end up with some equivalent
of having to keep an old 286 running in the corner to deal with Homeland Security. Or on
the flip side, some police department that
relies on donated leftovers won't be able
to run the latest software.
Auditable: The code used for this
software must be reviewable, preferably by the
widest audience possible. Escrow is the absolute
minimum for all source code involved. Open Source
certainly qualifies, but technically the department does not need to have the
right to modify the software itself. And in
fact might need to keep any modifications that
it keeps confidential. (Not that I really think
that the GPL would deter anyone in the Bush
Administration from doing something for
"national security" -- I mean the Constitution
doesn't.)
My experience has been that making your software package flexible and extensible by the user themselves is the best way to say "no".
Rather than arguing with users about whether a given report should be added to the feature list, simply allow users to write their own reports. That way, when they
propose a crazy idea that would waste a ton of time and
be of no benefit to anyone else, simply tell them that it
is a wonderful idea and here is how they could
implement it.
When that isn't an option, I've found the best way to
scare off internal clients is to be eager to
take on the project, because it presents "unique
challenges" unlike the "boring simple stuff" that is already
behind schedule.
Blacklisting an entire ISP is essentially a secondary boycott.
The anti-spam zealots should be honest about this, and differentiate their lists between primary targets (this address is a source of SPAM) and secondary ones (this ISP supports SPAM).
But more importantly, a secondary boycott is of no use
unless you let consumers use the information. Generally,
the only way you find out that someone thinks your ISP is a spam-collaborator is when some email that you sent fails to get there and you actually find out about it.
Silently discarding emails from a secondary blacklist is a very stupid idea. It defeats the entire
purpose, but that's exactly how most servers are
configured to use blacklists.
You also need to have clear standards that an ISP can
follow. Some of those that I have seen are absurd.
SPEWS, for example, will blacklist an ISP even if their
mail server never sends a single piece of bulk email.
All that is required is that they host a spam related
web-site.
So the reasonable standard proposed here seems to
be that ISPs are responsible for conducting background
checks on everyone that they set up a web-site for,
and routinely monitoring the content of every page.
So much for $7.95/month web sites.
You might argue that they should remove such sites
once they are identified. But you have a very tricky
problem if you expect hosters to remove content
that is not per se violating the law.
You can't expect ISPs to respond to anti-spam
complaints with one set of rules and then use
a different set of rules when the RIAA complains.
What is reasonable is for ISPs to limit the outbound
email capacity for accounts that they have not verified
an actual address for. This should not be a problem for
a legitimate commercial account. And people setting
up economy accounts have no need to send 1000s
of pieces a mail with forged headers every day.
ISPs should be expected to control use of their networks
for outbound SMTP. All abusive email must be traceable
back to a legal address. Forged headers originating on
the network should result in immediate account termination, perhaps with an automatic penalty.
But it is not reaonsable to expect ISPs to shut down
the supporting web-sites. They can't do that without
blocking the ability of legitimate small business and
hobbyists to easily and quickly set up their own sites.
Almost any automated detection scheme is
going to trigger a false alarm when a machine
is re-configured and/or rebuilt.
The frequency that a company reconfigures
its hardware is not anybody else's business.
Worse, such software will quickly take the next
logical step of assuming that if it cannot "phone
home" that it is being prevented from doing so
by a pirate, when in fact it may merely be running
on a machine that is isolated from the Internet
for reasons of project security.
If I have a project that is isolated from the
Internet for secrecy, I do not want to have
to call each vendor for software that I am
running to explain why their software
cannot "phone home".
So an undisclosed company has bought thier license because SCO claims an undisclosed segment of the linux kernel source is their IP. This sounds like crap to me, for reasons I won't disclose.
You forgot to mention that it was for an undisclosed price.
Possession of an illegal copy of something does
not encourage its production. Just ask the RIAA.;-)
Seriously, though. If enforcement eliminated
the sources of revenue for child porn
(actually paying for it and placing ads with it)
then there wouldn't be money to exploit the
childen with.
The problem with trying to enforce on the
basis of possession is that a typical
desktop owner can easily be shown to be unaware
of vast portions of their hard drives. I'm sure expert
testimony can be found on this, hard drive manufacturers
look forward to it to sell more and bigger drvies.
Intentional lawbreakers will quickly learn to leave all
of their questionable material encrypted. Lacking the
password, law enforcement will be unable to press
charges. Are you going to convict everyone who
has an encrypted archive with a forgotten password?
Intentional lawbreakers are also fully capable of
deliberately planting evidence on others' computers.
They don't even have to have directed malice, just
the knowledge that enough innocent victims will
provide them cover.
Placing ads and using credits cards are still
intentional acts that a person is
responsible for. Enforcement should concentrate
there, and forget about searching hard drives.
Having a "filter fight back" is a polite
way of saying that you have trained
attack software.
Software has bugs. If you have trained
attack software, it will have bugs. Which
means eventually it will attack an innocent
site.
Ultimately this is a bad idea for the same
reasons that automated home defenses
are a bad idea. It's very easy to say that
the intruder has earned the automated
response, but then you get the nitty
gritty issue of whether your automated
system can distinquish between a burglar
and a fireman.
The same issues apply in identifying
Spam. How will your software, which
will make mistakes, distinquish between
the real source of Spam and a clever header
that is making it look like someone else is
the source? I don't care how good your
algorithm is. It's coded by humans, so
it will make mistakes. Unlike a human
making a mistake manually, however,
it will pounce at very high speeds.
The companies have complimentary
product lines. Of course you would
have to figure out who would run
a merged company in a way that
took advantage of the strengths
of each.
1. a. The rescue of a ship, its crew, or its cargo from fire or
shipwreck. b. The ship, crew, or cargo so rescued. c. Compensation given to those who voluntarily aid in
such a rescue. 2. a. The act of saving imperiled property from loss. b. The property so saved. 3. Something saved from destruction or waste and put to
further use.
The concept of salvage is a long established part of maritime law, because it was recognized that there was no benefit to protecting ownership rights of property that the rightful "owners" could not secure. Allowing somebody else to rescue the property would be a benefit to society as a whole that outweighed the theoretical loss to the "rightful" property owner.
Some definition of "abandoned" software really needs to be developed. The only thing that is different about this type of "shipwreck" is that the losses are less visible.
Creditors should have first claim, but when they have no capacity or desire to do anything with the code then there really should be a mechanism to allow it to fall into the public domain.
KDE is much simpler than either Windows XP
or MacOS X. If you do not need a powerful desktop
then it might seem more "usable". There are a lot
of users that this is true for. But, ultimately, I agree
that comparing KDE to the "high powered" desktops
is comparing Apples and Oranges.
Anyone who is serious about comparing user interfaces
would never claim that one is "better" than another,
only which one is better suited for what type of user.
They would not create a new database with the intent of
giving up on students. The faculty can give up on students
quite easily based upon crude unautomated data collection.
If anything, this might be a tool to fight stereotyping
of non-conforming and/or minority students.
Provided that this data is given the same care as all
other school records, there is nothing of concern here.
If any school records can easily be used for purposes
other than educating the student, then there is a problem.
But it has nothing to do with this specific database application.
A legal expectation is not the same thing as a reasonable expectation.
If I leave my front door unlocked and leave on a two-week vacation, I am legally entitled to the presumption
that nobody has the right to enter.
My insurance company might be able to argue that I was
negligent and that they aren't liable. But the thieves will
not be allowed to argue that I had no reasonable expectation that my property would not be stolen.
A valid distinction can still be made between Internet
communications that are intended to be
private communications and those that are offered
to the public at large. There is nothing improper
about searching web sites for download links.
Searching private communications on the other
hand is improper and illegal, no matter how easy
it is to do.
The distinction made in almost none of the press
coverage is how the RIAA is obtaining
the IP addresses that are being subpoenad.
There is a world of difference between the
possible methods:
They may have acted as any common downloader,
and simply searched for links or directories of available
"free" music. Having found these public announcments,
they could simply download the material and confirm
that it was copyrighted material that they represented.
Nobody has the right to "privately" do something in public.
They could be intercepting Kazaa communications, and
then presuming that the material is illegal copies based
solely upon the title. That is an illegal search. Unlike
a web site, a peer-to-peer communication is entitled
to a presumption of privacy. Intercepting it without
legal authority to do so would itself be piracy. Under
the very laws that RIAA has championed,the fact that
something is technologically simple does not make it legal.
Just as the fact that a DRM is easy to override
does not give you the right to do so, the fact
that email or p2p messages are easy to intercept
does not give a third party the right to do so. They are
intended as private communications. Nobody would
tolerate the RIAA rifling through FedEX packages to
check for counterfiet CDs. We should not tolerate
filtering of p2p communications.
Lastly, the moderator needs some heavy meta-modding down. The expectation of privacy is a critical issue on
whether evidence was properly gathered. Therefore,
the post raised a valid point. It wasn't with sufficient
clarity to win "Insightful" points, but labeling any
unpopular opinion as "flaimbait" is an abuse of
moderation.
And typical users can offer sites on their machines.
The cases cited dealt with songs being available
for download. That sounds like a site of one type or
another. Not an incidental DCC transfer that arose
as part of an actual conversation.
Intercepting private communications to look for copyrighted material would be an illegal search
and/or a violation of privacy. I would be just as outraged.
So now they're going after people who share as few as eight songs
As near as can be determined from the article, all subpoena's are related to sites that are publically offering
songs for download. There is nothing about targeting
those who download, or intercepting of private file
transfers between two people sharing.
This is about people who are re-distributing works
that they do not have rights to. The number of distinct
titles is irrelevant to the legality, moralilty and actual
damages of the act.
These actions are not "sharing". They are about
publishing material without permission of the owner.
If you want to defend that practice, fine. You have the
right to do so. But the wording strikes me as deliberately
trying to confuse this act with minor infringements.
I generally assume that those that need to confuse
the issue have a weak case.
My read of the story shows no signs of snaring legal
behavior and/or truly minor infringements in some
sort of rabid enforcement move. I only wish the
Federal Government showed this much restraint
and targeting when going after "terrorists".
Just in case there's anyone reading the comments who also read the article...
The DoD's policy seems amazingly correct here. They
allowed a suspect's DNA to be searched when there
was already reasonable grounds to suspect a specific
person. They did not allow a mass search of their
database for anyone who might match.
Use of DNA to prove innocence is always valid. Use to
increase the probability of guild after you have
evidence on a specific suspect is equally as valid.
The issue of concern remains preventing searching
for a "1 in a million match" (something certain to
convince any jury) against a large database repeatedly.
If that is ever allowed, false positives are predictable.
In this case, the use of DNA was proper. The DoD should
be applauded for limiting the use of DNA data. Stating
that the records should never be disclosed is absurd.
Nobody has ever objected to the use of dental records
*after* a suspect is identified.
Meanwhile, having implied that the DoD did something
reasonable, I better go find a thread where I can lump M$
or I will lose all credibility on/,
I've used BitTorrent once or twice myself, and found
it to be a good system. That's only once or twice,
because there just isn't that much legally
distributable material that can reach the required
"critical mass" for BitTorrent to be effective and
necessary.
Nevertheless, the fact that there are proven legitimate
uses of the code should be enough to prevent the code
from disappearing. That, and all the copies that are
already downloaded.
The real question is whether people will feel safe to
post BitTorrent links even when they are distributing
something that is 100% legit.
BitTorrent has one major advantage/disadvantage
relative to Freenet. You can control what material
you are involved in the re-distribution of to match
whatever your defintion of "fair use" is. With Freenet
you distribute everything or you distribute nothing
because you don't know what anything is.
Personally, I prefer the BitTorrent approach. It would
be a shame if the RIAA dogs force everyone to the
"know nothing" approach.
Source IPs are too easy to forge on the current networks, especially with the way to loose routing rules that are used. The IP addresses recorded from packages received during a Dos attack are pretty much useless..
The source network can be expected to track the IP
addresses it originates.
Of course this does lead to a strong argument that
failure to inspect Source IPs for packets originating
within your own network is legally negligent.
We've all known that it is technically negligent
for some time.
As has been pointed out in numerous replies, this practice
has existed for decades if not centuries. The earliest version I am aware of was done by Almanacs and Encyclopedia's. Unindexed
and uncross-referenced articles would be inserted on
the theory that nobody except a copier would find them.
So all veteran/. readers should be awaiting a story on the issuance of a patent covering the technique.
DirectTV does not have exclusive rights to deploy
systems using SmartCards.
Therefore, others have the right to purchase
equipment required to prototype SmartCard
systems.
By seeking to brand anyone who uses such equipment
as a pirate of DirectTV service, DirectTV is acting in
restraint of trade in that it is hindering development
of other uses of Smart Card technology. At least
some of which might deploy products competitive
with DirectTV or one of its parent companies.
Payphones that are consistently used for illegal purposes
have been successfully eliminated by law enforcement.
It's been going on for years. The fact that many payphones
no longer accept incoming calls is directly related to the
fact that this enabled their use in illegal activities.
Yes, they had no incentive to allow for incoming calls.
But actually suppressing the number took extra work.
Slashdot Mirror
It would be totally inappropriate for a goverment agency to blacklist a specific vendor without going through extensive hearings. That does not mean that they should not consider the vendor's history when evaluating each purchase. For the anti-MS crowd that means that they should reject each MS product individually.
More seriously, they need to evaluate what their software requirements are. I strongly suspect that they need software which will:
My experience has been that making your software package flexible and extensible by the user themselves is the best way to say "no".
Rather than arguing with users about whether a given report should be added to the feature list, simply allow users to write their own reports. That way, when they propose a crazy idea that would waste a ton of time and be of no benefit to anyone else, simply tell them that it is a wonderful idea and here is how they could implement it.
When that isn't an option, I've found the best way to scare off internal clients is to be eager to take on the project, because it presents "unique challenges" unlike the "boring simple stuff" that is already behind schedule.
Blacklisting an entire ISP is essentially a secondary boycott. The anti-spam zealots should be honest about this, and differentiate their lists between primary targets (this address is a source of SPAM) and secondary ones (this ISP supports SPAM).
But more importantly, a secondary boycott is of no use unless you let consumers use the information. Generally, the only way you find out that someone thinks your ISP is a spam-collaborator is when some email that you sent fails to get there and you actually find out about it.
Silently discarding emails from a secondary blacklist is a very stupid idea. It defeats the entire purpose, but that's exactly how most servers are configured to use blacklists.
You also need to have clear standards that an ISP can follow. Some of those that I have seen are absurd. SPEWS, for example, will blacklist an ISP even if their mail server never sends a single piece of bulk email. All that is required is that they host a spam related web-site.
So the reasonable standard proposed here seems to be that ISPs are responsible for conducting background checks on everyone that they set up a web-site for, and routinely monitoring the content of every page.
So much for $7.95/month web sites.
You might argue that they should remove such sites once they are identified. But you have a very tricky problem if you expect hosters to remove content that is not per se violating the law.
You can't expect ISPs to respond to anti-spam complaints with one set of rules and then use a different set of rules when the RIAA complains.
What is reasonable is for ISPs to limit the outbound email capacity for accounts that they have not verified an actual address for. This should not be a problem for a legitimate commercial account. And people setting up economy accounts have no need to send 1000s of pieces a mail with forged headers every day.
ISPs should be expected to control use of their networks for outbound SMTP. All abusive email must be traceable back to a legal address. Forged headers originating on the network should result in immediate account termination, perhaps with an automatic penalty.
But it is not reaonsable to expect ISPs to shut down the supporting web-sites. They can't do that without blocking the ability of legitimate small business and hobbyists to easily and quickly set up their own sites.
Almost any automated detection scheme is going to trigger a false alarm when a machine is re-configured and/or rebuilt.
The frequency that a company reconfigures its hardware is not anybody else's business.
Worse, such software will quickly take the next logical step of assuming that if it cannot "phone home" that it is being prevented from doing so by a pirate, when in fact it may merely be running on a machine that is isolated from the Internet for reasons of project security.
If I have a project that is isolated from the Internet for secrecy, I do not want to have to call each vendor for software that I am running to explain why their software cannot "phone home".
You forgot to mention that it was for an undisclosed price.
I pretty much agree.
Possession of an illegal copy of something does not encourage its production. Just ask the RIAA. ;-)
Seriously, though. If enforcement eliminated the sources of revenue for child porn (actually paying for it and placing ads with it) then there wouldn't be money to exploit the childen with.
The problem with trying to enforce on the basis of possession is that a typical desktop owner can easily be shown to be unaware of vast portions of their hard drives. I'm sure expert testimony can be found on this, hard drive manufacturers look forward to it to sell more and bigger drvies.
Intentional lawbreakers will quickly learn to leave all of their questionable material encrypted. Lacking the password, law enforcement will be unable to press charges. Are you going to convict everyone who has an encrypted archive with a forgotten password?
Intentional lawbreakers are also fully capable of deliberately planting evidence on others' computers. They don't even have to have directed malice, just the knowledge that enough innocent victims will provide them cover.
Placing ads and using credits cards are still intentional acts that a person is responsible for. Enforcement should concentrate there, and forget about searching hard drives.
Having a "filter fight back" is a polite way of saying that you have trained attack software.
Software has bugs. If you have trained attack software, it will have bugs. Which means eventually it will attack an innocent site.
Ultimately this is a bad idea for the same reasons that automated home defenses are a bad idea. It's very easy to say that the intruder has earned the automated response, but then you get the nitty gritty issue of whether your automated system can distinquish between a burglar and a fireman.
The same issues apply in identifying Spam. How will your software, which will make mistakes, distinquish between the real source of Spam and a clever header that is making it look like someone else is the source? I don't care how good your algorithm is. It's coded by humans, so it will make mistakes. Unlike a human making a mistake manually, however, it will pounce at very high speeds.
The companies have complimentary product lines. Of course you would have to figure out who would run a merged company in a way that took advantage of the strengths of each.
That isn't a trivial issue.
salvage (s?l?v?j)Pronunciation Key
n.
1.
a. The rescue of a ship, its crew, or its cargo from fire or
shipwreck.
b. The ship, crew, or cargo so rescued.
c. Compensation given to those who voluntarily aid in
such a rescue.
2.
a. The act of saving imperiled property from loss.
b. The property so saved.
3. Something saved from destruction or waste and put to
further use.
The concept of salvage is a long established part of
maritime law, because it was recognized that there
was no benefit to protecting ownership rights of
property that the rightful "owners" could not secure.
Allowing somebody else to rescue the property would
be a benefit to society as a whole that outweighed the
theoretical loss to the "rightful" property owner.
Some definition of "abandoned" software really needs
to be developed. The only thing that is different about
this type of "shipwreck" is that the losses are less
visible.
Creditors should have first claim, but when they have
no capacity or desire to do anything with the code
then there really should be a mechanism to allow
it to fall into the public domain.
KDE is much simpler than either Windows XP or MacOS X. If you do not need a powerful desktop then it might seem more "usable". There are a lot of users that this is true for. But, ultimately, I agree that comparing KDE to the "high powered" desktops is comparing Apples and Oranges.
Anyone who is serious about comparing user interfaces would never claim that one is "better" than another, only which one is better suited for what type of user.
The only rare I've needed on two iBooks have been to the powercord.
They would not create a new database with the intent of giving up on students. The faculty can give up on students quite easily based upon crude unautomated data collection.
If anything, this might be a tool to fight stereotyping of non-conforming and/or minority students.
Provided that this data is given the same care as all other school records, there is nothing of concern here. If any school records can easily be used for purposes other than educating the student, then there is a problem. But it has nothing to do with this specific database application.
A legal expectation is not the same thing as a reasonable expectation.
If I leave my front door unlocked and leave on a two-week vacation, I am legally entitled to the presumption that nobody has the right to enter.
My insurance company might be able to argue that I was negligent and that they aren't liable. But the thieves will not be allowed to argue that I had no reasonable expectation that my property would not be stolen.
A valid distinction can still be made between Internet communications that are intended to be private communications and those that are offered to the public at large. There is nothing improper about searching web sites for download links. Searching private communications on the other hand is improper and illegal, no matter how easy it is to do.
The distinction made in almost none of the press coverage is how the RIAA is obtaining the IP addresses that are being subpoenad. There is a world of difference between the possible methods:
Lastly, the moderator needs some heavy meta-modding down. The expectation of privacy is a critical issue on whether evidence was properly gathered. Therefore, the post raised a valid point. It wasn't with sufficient clarity to win "Insightful" points, but labeling any unpopular opinion as "flaimbait" is an abuse of moderation.
The "technical benefit" of using an IPv6 relay is that it can be combined with IPv4/IPv6 relays to make a path more difficult to trace.
I'm actually relived that the first use of this appears to be merely stealing music as opposed to sending spam.
And typical users can offer sites on their machines.
The cases cited dealt with songs being available for download. That sounds like a site of one type or another. Not an incidental DCC transfer that arose as part of an actual conversation.
Intercepting private communications to look for copyrighted material would be an illegal search and/or a violation of privacy. I would be just as outraged.
Exactly. There is no need for the RIAA to go scanning DCC logs, even if the existed.
If people can find you mp fserv, so can the RIAA. They can go there and download a song. They have their proof.
As near as can be determined from the article, all subpoena's are related to sites that are publically offering songs for download. There is nothing about targeting those who download, or intercepting of private file transfers between two people sharing.
This is about people who are re-distributing works that they do not have rights to. The number of distinct titles is irrelevant to the legality, moralilty and actual damages of the act.
These actions are not "sharing". They are about publishing material without permission of the owner. If you want to defend that practice, fine. You have the right to do so. But the wording strikes me as deliberately trying to confuse this act with minor infringements.
I generally assume that those that need to confuse the issue have a weak case.
My read of the story shows no signs of snaring legal behavior and/or truly minor infringements in some sort of rabid enforcement move. I only wish the Federal Government showed this much restraint and targeting when going after "terrorists".
Just in case there's anyone reading the comments who also read the article...
The DoD's policy seems amazingly correct here. They allowed a suspect's DNA to be searched when there was already reasonable grounds to suspect a specific person. They did not allow a mass search of their database for anyone who might match.
Use of DNA to prove innocence is always valid. Use to increase the probability of guild after you have evidence on a specific suspect is equally as valid. The issue of concern remains preventing searching for a "1 in a million match" (something certain to convince any jury) against a large database repeatedly. If that is ever allowed, false positives are predictable.
In this case, the use of DNA was proper. The DoD should be applauded for limiting the use of DNA data. Stating that the records should never be disclosed is absurd. Nobody has ever objected to the use of dental records *after* a suspect is identified.
Meanwhile, having implied that the DoD did something reasonable, I better go find a thread where I can lump M$ or I will lose all credibility on /,
I've used BitTorrent once or twice myself, and found it to be a good system. That's only once or twice, because there just isn't that much legally distributable material that can reach the required "critical mass" for BitTorrent to be effective and necessary.
Nevertheless, the fact that there are proven legitimate uses of the code should be enough to prevent the code from disappearing. That, and all the copies that are already downloaded.
The real question is whether people will feel safe to post BitTorrent links even when they are distributing something that is 100% legit.
BitTorrent has one major advantage/disadvantage relative to Freenet. You can control what material you are involved in the re-distribution of to match whatever your defintion of "fair use" is. With Freenet you distribute everything or you distribute nothing because you don't know what anything is.
Personally, I prefer the BitTorrent approach. It would be a shame if the RIAA dogs force everyone to the "know nothing" approach.
The article cites one developer who used the smart card programmer on a prototype project. Smart cards have many uses. See www.datacard.com.
The source network can be expected to track the IP addresses it originates.
Of course this does lead to a strong argument that failure to inspect Source IPs for packets originating within your own network is legally negligent. We've all known that it is technically negligent for some time.
As has been pointed out in numerous replies, this practice has existed for decades if not centuries. The earliest version I am aware of was done by Almanacs and Encyclopedia's. Unindexed and uncross-referenced articles would be inserted on the theory that nobody except a copier would find them.
So all veteran /. readers should be awaiting a story on the issuance of a patent covering the technique.
DirectTV does not have exclusive rights to deploy systems using SmartCards.
Therefore, others have the right to purchase equipment required to prototype SmartCard systems.
By seeking to brand anyone who uses such equipment as a pirate of DirectTV service, DirectTV is acting in restraint of trade in that it is hindering development of other uses of Smart Card technology. At least some of which might deploy products competitive with DirectTV or one of its parent companies.
Payphones that are consistently used for illegal purposes have been successfully eliminated by law enforcement. It's been going on for years. The fact that many payphones no longer accept incoming calls is directly related to the fact that this enabled their use in illegal activities. Yes, they had no incentive to allow for incoming calls. But actually suppressing the number took extra work.