As long as it's the victim that's at fault it makes sense.
But modern cars requires less and less attention to drive which forces the driver to keep the mind occupied on other things to not fall into a vegetative state.
And cars today also have a lot of touch screens, which also requires the driver to look away from the traffic.
I try my best to filter out FB and Snapchat and a few others to at least lower my exposure to the data miners.
For users of Firefox there are a few useful plugins; "Ghostery", "Self-destructing cookies", "Privacy Badger", "Lightbeam" and of course "uBlock". It's hard to avoid complete exposure but minimizing the exposure is necessary these days.
You may think that the US is a low tax country, but you have to pay tax on private sales of used items in many states, something that you don't have to do in a high tax country like Sweden.
Those manning that machine will get full battle dress and no useful identification combined with being part of a black force nobody will know of - like Area 51.
No, you don't understand that - if you have three involved in a certificate management you have a higher risk than if you have two involved where you have exchanged the certificate validation only between those two parts. A certificate created where one of the parts is a private CA is what you need for best security, and that's essentially what a self-signed certificate is.
But if you don't validate the certificate at either end to ensure that the signer is a valid signer you have a MITM attack possibility, and if the CA is a third part you have a higher risk of a MITM situation - like the Symantec CA.
The reasoning that self-signed certificates are less secure is based on that they aren't validated, but if they are properly validated at both ends they are more secure. But that's not something the popular CAs want to inform you about since that would be bad for their business.
And how many really validates the certificates of a https connection anyway?
The difference now is that many hackers have developed tools for MITM attacks on https.
And it still doesn't validate that sites running https are seen as more trustworthy and allows the browser to do more.
In addition to that - realize that with increased number of parties involved the security issues increases. I would prefer that my bank signed their own certificates and sent a keycard to me with the certificate that I should use combined with the CA certificate for the bank. That way only two parts are involved in the channel and the certificates can be validated both ways. At least as long as neither of the end systems are compromised.
More important is that this further highlights that the "trust" system as it is designed today is broken.
The trust system is based on that you get a default trust of a few CAs in the top, and if one is compromised the house of card suffers severely. And what happens if a CA is ordered by a government to provide false certificates? We can't know if that's the case or not because it will look identical to a real certificate unless it's inspected on a very low level and compared with the certificates assigned to the company using them.
After enough time in jail the hard disk may be corrupt and the mind of the jailed may be corrupted to the level best described in this picture: https://s-media-cache-ak0.pini...
I agree, I want something that can absorb abuse. So no bezel means no sale to me. I recently got a Cat S60 because it's rugged and has dual SIM cards. The FLIR camera is a nice feature but the ordinary camera is the only bad thing with it - it's like going back 15 years.
Since the certificate of the original site is very hard to re-create then the recipient would be able to detect a man in the middle attack, but on company computers it may be a lot harder since the company also controls the clients.
So don't do your private banking in a company environment.
Slashdot Mirror
As long as it's the victim that's at fault it makes sense.
But modern cars requires less and less attention to drive which forces the driver to keep the mind occupied on other things to not fall into a vegetative state.
And cars today also have a lot of touch screens, which also requires the driver to look away from the traffic.
Why either as long as eBay exists?
The fine should have been £10 per mail sent.
I try my best to filter out FB and Snapchat and a few others to at least lower my exposure to the data miners.
For users of Firefox there are a few useful plugins; "Ghostery", "Self-destructing cookies", "Privacy Badger", "Lightbeam" and of course "uBlock". It's hard to avoid complete exposure but minimizing the exposure is necessary these days.
"This has to be configurable".
And if you have multiple screens a vm isn't working well in all cases either. And I have figured out that three displays are ideal.
Virtualization is good for test environments but running development shall be in a non- virtualized computer.
I have never seen any advantage with a virtual machine for development since there are too many snags and performance penalties involved.
Given the right suspension the bumps are less noticeable at higher speeds.
OpenVMS for anyone that want a really stable OS.
And there are people around running Multics too.
Why not AROS?
If the computer even had a dvd drive.
You may think that the US is a low tax country, but you have to pay tax on private sales of used items in many states, something that you don't have to do in a high tax country like Sweden.
Those manning that machine will get full battle dress and no useful identification combined with being part of a black force nobody will know of - like Area 51.
And they should give it the designation ED-209.
At least something that makes sense compared to the general troll-postings by ACs.
Which never was uttered in TOS.
Just a lot of variations on the theme.
Article found here: https://www.nasa.gov/feature/g...
No, you don't understand that - if you have three involved in a certificate management you have a higher risk than if you have two involved where you have exchanged the certificate validation only between those two parts. A certificate created where one of the parts is a private CA is what you need for best security, and that's essentially what a self-signed certificate is.
But if you don't validate the certificate at either end to ensure that the signer is a valid signer you have a MITM attack possibility, and if the CA is a third part you have a higher risk of a MITM situation - like the Symantec CA.
The reasoning that self-signed certificates are less secure is based on that they aren't validated, but if they are properly validated at both ends they are more secure. But that's not something the popular CAs want to inform you about since that would be bad for their business.
And how many really validates the certificates of a https connection anyway?
The difference now is that many hackers have developed tools for MITM attacks on https.
And it still doesn't validate that sites running https are seen as more trustworthy and allows the browser to do more.
In addition to that - realize that with increased number of parties involved the security issues increases. I would prefer that my bank signed their own certificates and sent a keycard to me with the certificate that I should use combined with the CA certificate for the bank. That way only two parts are involved in the channel and the certificates can be validated both ways. At least as long as neither of the end systems are compromised.
More important is that this further highlights that the "trust" system as it is designed today is broken.
The trust system is based on that you get a default trust of a few CAs in the top, and if one is compromised the house of card suffers severely. And what happens if a CA is ordered by a government to provide false certificates? We can't know if that's the case or not because it will look identical to a real certificate unless it's inspected on a very low level and compared with the certificates assigned to the company using them.
Just make sure you have plausible stuff on the plausible deniability partition as well.
The decryption key isn't a password, it's a key file stored on a RAM disk that was wiped when you turned off the computer.
After enough time in jail the hard disk may be corrupt and the mind of the jailed may be corrupted to the level best described in this picture:
https://s-media-cache-ak0.pini...
I agree, I want something that can absorb abuse. So no bezel means no sale to me. I recently got a Cat S60 because it's rugged and has dual SIM cards. The FLIR camera is a nice feature but the ordinary camera is the only bad thing with it - it's like going back 15 years.
Since the certificate of the original site is very hard to re-create then the recipient would be able to detect a man in the middle attack, but on company computers it may be a lot harder since the company also controls the clients.
So don't do your private banking in a company environment.