Yes, and strikes within the pad perimeter are fairly frequent during the summer months. Central Florida is the lightning capital of the country and space center gets its fair share of ground strikes.
The last few strikes have not resulted in any major damage. One in 2006 resulted in a delay of an Atlantis launch.
The panel cannot withstand the stress of rotation while the tear exists. The spacewalk will repair the panel to the point where it can be fully extended. Once fully extended, the tension on the panel helps it withstand the stresses of rotation.
The damage to the joint affects the opposite panel.
Not every story is about doom and gloom because of the tile damage. There has been EXTENSIVE media coverage of the fact that Barbara Morgan is a mission specialist on this mission. It was a no-brainer PR bonus since she was the backup to Christ McAuliffe. Her orbital classroom lesson was highlighted not two days ago.
It is a resource issue. This mission is 14 days with some additional days in reserve for bad weather issues with landing. That limitation is mostly a crew environment issue (need to generate water and oxygen, have food on hand, etc.)
The vehicle could stay up longer in an unmanned configuration, but still has limited fuel resources to run the OMS. The shuttle just isn't designed to go anywhere but orbit and back.
Spaceflightnow.com (http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts117/0706 14computers/index7.html) is reporting that bypassing a suspect power supply (does not indicate what the power supply is/if it's related to the new panels or not) resulted in 4 of the 6 computers coming back up and restoration of 2 of the 3 guidance lanes.
In case of abandonment, the shuttle would only return 7. The other three members would return on the Soyuz that is always docked for the purpose of evacuation should it ever be necessary.
The station has gyroscopes that keep it aligned. Thrusters on the station or shuttle are only required to keep the gyros from getting completely overwhelmed.
Re:For once, I read the article, and I see...
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ISS Goes Solar
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· Score: 4, Informative
The blanket doesn't pose a risk of catastrophic failure to the vehicle (i.e. no repeat of Columbia), but the Mission Management Team is trying to minimize any damage to the OMS pod that would delay processing for the next mission. If they leave the blanket as is (without stapling it back in place, which is what they plan to do), there is a risk of doing damage to the pod that would delay processing for Atlantis's next mission in December.
1. RTLS (return to launch site). This is an abort directly back to KSC. It is definately survivable and has always been a contingency option.
2. Trans-atlantic abort. Land in Spain or France where our new TAL sites are at (moved there since we're primarily chasing ISS and they line up better with the trajectories). This also has always been a contingency option.
3. Abort once around. Make one orbit and return to KSC. Not a likely scenario if there is damage to the tile system. This is also a standard abort option.
Which option is used depends one when during ascent the call to abort is made. There is a switch next to the commander that is flipped at each time milestone to indicate the abort option (I apologize for not having the times available).
The bail and ditch is the abort option available for landing.
One of the three "unmet" requirements is a usable repair kit. This has been the most technically challenging requirements to meet. NASA has done everything they can to come up with a method/materials to repair on orbit. You can't validate a zero-g repair option in a gravity environment, though. There's a kit in the payload bay which will support repair tests on orbit.
The other two deal with ice/foam falling off the tank and hardening the orbiter from impacts. The tank bipod area has been redesigned entirely (this is where the foam came from on the Columbia mission). During the first tanking test, ice was noted to be forming on the O2 return line. Discovery was rolled back to the Vehicle Assembly Building, de-stacked and put on a tank/booster stack where the tank had a heater installed to prevent icing on the line (all future tanks will have this modification). The foam application process has been altered and the chances of a large piece of foam falling off are significantly reduced from where they were 2.5 years ago. NASA has maintained all along that foam debris could not be 100% eliminated.
Hardeining of the Reinforced Carbon Carbon wing leading edge tiles was the last item. Since Bush has mandated the shuttle be retired by 2010, NASA doesn't have a long term plan in place for addressing this. What they do have is 66 accelerometers lining the inside of each wing to detect if something does hit the wing. High resolution imaging on orbit is in place. High resolution cameras will be watching everything during launch. Each orbiter is outfitted with a boom that is essentially an extension to the Canada arm and allows for inspection of the wing leading edges.
NASA and its contractors have done just about everything they can to meet the last requirements without actually meeting them. There are a LOT of improvements over where things were in 2003. Those that make the decisions feel that the risk is minimal enough and that the plans to address anything that happens are sufficient to justify returning to flight.
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Yes, and strikes within the pad perimeter are fairly frequent during the summer months. Central Florida is the lightning capital of the country and space center gets its fair share of ground strikes.
The last few strikes have not resulted in any major damage. One in 2006 resulted in a delay of an Atlantis launch.
The panel cannot withstand the stress of rotation while the tear exists. The spacewalk will repair the panel to the point where it can be fully extended. Once fully extended, the tension on the panel helps it withstand the stresses of rotation.
The damage to the joint affects the opposite panel.
Not every story is about doom and gloom because of the tile damage. There has been EXTENSIVE media coverage of the fact that Barbara Morgan is a mission specialist on this mission. It was a no-brainer PR bonus since she was the backup to Christ McAuliffe. Her orbital classroom lesson was highlighted not two days ago.
It is a resource issue. This mission is 14 days with some additional days in reserve for bad weather issues with landing. That limitation is mostly a crew environment issue (need to generate water and oxygen, have food on hand, etc.)
The vehicle could stay up longer in an unmanned configuration, but still has limited fuel resources to run the OMS. The shuttle just isn't designed to go anywhere but orbit and back.
Spaceflightnow.com (http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts117/0706 14computers/index7.html) is reporting that bypassing a suspect power supply (does not indicate what the power supply is/if it's related to the new panels or not) resulted in 4 of the 6 computers coming back up and restoration of 2 of the 3 guidance lanes.
In case of abandonment, the shuttle would only return 7. The other three members would return on the Soyuz that is always docked for the purpose of evacuation should it ever be necessary.
The station has gyroscopes that keep it aligned. Thrusters on the station or shuttle are only required to keep the gyros from getting completely overwhelmed.
The blanket doesn't pose a risk of catastrophic failure to the vehicle (i.e. no repeat of Columbia), but the Mission Management Team is trying to minimize any damage to the OMS pod that would delay processing for the next mission. If they leave the blanket as is (without stapling it back in place, which is what they plan to do), there is a risk of doing damage to the pod that would delay processing for Atlantis's next mission in December.
Universal Studios and Sea World plan to do the same according to the local news. It's monkey see, monkey do with the three of them.
Actually, the order of options are:
1. RTLS (return to launch site). This is an abort directly back to KSC. It is definately survivable and has always been a contingency option.
2. Trans-atlantic abort. Land in Spain or France where our new TAL sites are at (moved there since we're primarily chasing ISS and they line up better with the trajectories). This also has always been a contingency option.
3. Abort once around. Make one orbit and return to KSC. Not a likely scenario if there is damage to the tile system. This is also a standard abort option.
Which option is used depends one when during ascent the call to abort is made. There is a switch next to the commander that is flipped at each time milestone to indicate the abort option (I apologize for not having the times available).
The bail and ditch is the abort option available for landing.
One of the three "unmet" requirements is a usable repair kit. This has been the most technically challenging requirements to meet. NASA has done everything they can to come up with a method/materials to repair on orbit. You can't validate a zero-g repair option in a gravity environment, though. There's a kit in the payload bay which will support repair tests on orbit. The other two deal with ice/foam falling off the tank and hardening the orbiter from impacts. The tank bipod area has been redesigned entirely (this is where the foam came from on the Columbia mission). During the first tanking test, ice was noted to be forming on the O2 return line. Discovery was rolled back to the Vehicle Assembly Building, de-stacked and put on a tank/booster stack where the tank had a heater installed to prevent icing on the line (all future tanks will have this modification). The foam application process has been altered and the chances of a large piece of foam falling off are significantly reduced from where they were 2.5 years ago. NASA has maintained all along that foam debris could not be 100% eliminated. Hardeining of the Reinforced Carbon Carbon wing leading edge tiles was the last item. Since Bush has mandated the shuttle be retired by 2010, NASA doesn't have a long term plan in place for addressing this. What they do have is 66 accelerometers lining the inside of each wing to detect if something does hit the wing. High resolution imaging on orbit is in place. High resolution cameras will be watching everything during launch. Each orbiter is outfitted with a boom that is essentially an extension to the Canada arm and allows for inspection of the wing leading edges. NASA and its contractors have done just about everything they can to meet the last requirements without actually meeting them. There are a LOT of improvements over where things were in 2003. Those that make the decisions feel that the risk is minimal enough and that the plans to address anything that happens are sufficient to justify returning to flight.