Not to mention I'm sure they're tracking this approaching storm using the national weather service, relying on local emergency response services, using publicly-funded roads, hosting the event in a taxpayer-funded stadium, etc.
Having now read the opinion, here's how the judge came out:
1. The jury found this guy guilty of infringement. 2. The guy had 8 years of known infringing activities 3. The guy destroyed evidence 4. The guy lied repeatedly 5. It wasn't just a matter of him downloading songs, he was uploading them too 6. The jury got to see all the evidence 7. Congress set the bounds for copyright infringement's statutory damages 8. The jury pick something on the arguably low end of the range 9. When looking at the common law rules the judge did not feel the case was inequitable under the circumstances.
I would wager good money that had 2-5 been different, the judge WOULD have found the award inequitable.
That said, I have some questions about why 2 and 5 were even in evidence at all. They seem irrelevant to copyright infringement of the songs at issue here. I haven't kept pace with this case, but I should think those are irrelevant unless they were themselves proved to be infringements.
This distinction is actually quite blurry for most municipal fines and citations. A number of states, for example, allow you to pay your speeding ticket fines directly at the time of the citation via credit card. How you'd distinguish this case from that case, I'm not sure.
Obama said, Pelosi said costs would go down, we could keep our existing plans and our doctors.
Clearly you can't afford your meds, so I'm certain the new system will help you. Nevertheless, I feel compelled to take on your crazy.
First, the economics of the system aren't that controversial. More people paying into the system means more money, fewer "takers" per capita, and, thus, lower premiums. The whole point of the mandate/tax was to make those without insurance, typically, the young and/or healthy, enter into the insurance system. And just to clarify, this part of Obamacare is the clearly Republican part of the scheme.
There is another factor that works to lower overall costs: more insured means less reliance on the more expensive ED system. Because under the prior system, hospitals were obligated to treat everyone, there was an overuse of the most expensive, least efficient health care delivery vehicle: the emergency department. Since those people also can't afford to pay, those costs were passed along to everyone else. Now, in theory, if fewer people have to use the ED for basic healthcare and there is better access to non-emergent care, you will lower everyone's costs.
Second, I'm pretty sure the last clause of your sentence is not even accurate. There are whole categories of "insurance" that are going away. In particular, those include insurance plans that put people in the "under-insured" category. Perhaps, put another way, you can certainly try to buy such insurance packages, but you will not escape the individual mandate.
Third, whether you can keep your doctors is still up to your insurance company, not the government. This really has nothing to do with Obamacare. What's more, there was no guarantee -- even under the old system -- that an insurance plan would allow you to keep your doctor. Of course, when the government is the insurance company, they are in the same spot as an insurance provider (think the VA).
You realize that your insurance company does the same thing, right? Or your insurance company's pharmacy benefits manager (PBM) or some other entity even further divorced from the doctor patient relationship. If you want something other than by formulary under almost any health insurance plan, you pay out of pocket. There is almost no other way to control expenses: you negotiate until you get a good deal and in exchange for the good, you lose exclusivity.
Moreover, you're trolling isn't really helping your cause here. First, most of the United States won't get government sponsored health insurance. Nope, that's reserved for politicians, soldiers, and the very poor. Everything else is going to be by the same commercial insurance companies that already dictate healthcare. Good try though.
Second, control over individual medicaid expenses is something that the RIGHT wants, not the left. It allows states to prioritize their healthcare expenses and make decisions at a state level. You know, the whole "laboratory of states" thing.
I'm a patent geek. Patent attorney, undergrad in Comp Sci, and working in-house at a software company. Of course my view somewhat differs from the vitriolic responses of most commenters on here.
So, the real question is: Our government is imposing an illegal tax on the people in direct violation of the Constitution; what do we do now?
That's not a real question that comes out of this ruling. In fact this ruling said the opposite: the "tax" is constitutional.
Moreover, the basic premise of your argument is wrong.
As the mandate is to give money to private insurers, and not the government itself, it does not fall under the Constitutional definition of a legal tax.
The mandate/tax is paid to the government, not directly to private insurers. The only direct payment to an insurer is for those people that ACQUIRE insurance.
An outside firm has to worry about their jobs, so of course prolong cases to increase revenue when possible
There are a few mitigating factors here. First, outside law firms don't usually drive business decisions. Management still needs to be convinced of the value of a course of action. And, outside counsel is not free to do whatever they want. They are typically on a short leash. General Counsel's office gets every bill and is involved in the strategy. To say that "outside counsel does the litigation" is more of a they-handle-the-day-to-day operations of a case, they acquire the experts, they do the filings, they prepare witnesses, they write the briefs, etc. But none of this is without review. None of this would go on without the business teams.
Second, you're making an assumption about how outside counsel is paid. Sure, with some unsophisticated companies, those companies might be paying straight through the nose on an hourly basis. But sophisticated companies understand the dynamics and have payment schemes that avoid the worst abuses: incentive payments for getting things done early, fee structures that create incentives for lower costs / settlements, plaintiffs attorneys might be contingent fee, etc.
Common billing strategies, by the way, are to: give a bonus based on when you get out of a case (earlier better); set a fee sharing arrangement that if a firm can get the job done before x, they keep some of the savings; etc.
It's not quite a prisoner's dilemma because the choice by one actor is typically countered by the other. In the PD, the dilemma is whether to act first, i.e., whether to rat out the other, because if you act first, then the punishment is small relative to the other person acting first. Both parties are good if neither acts.
In this case, if one patent holder sues another the other just counter sues.
If you wanted to make a PD case, it would be for whether industry participants seek patents at all. If no one patents, everyone is free to compete. If only one party patents, or gets a huge patent headstart, the non-patenting entity is going to be defenseless. If both parties patent, both will have patent expenses, but a tool to prevent the other from suing them (mostly in the form of "mutual assured destruction").
Examined from that perspective, you might also see that the parties have another reason to both patent: market exclusion or increasing the barriers to new market participants.
This is more about the legal department making decisions
This is usually very much NOT the case. Legal departments in major corporations don't usually make these sorts of decisions. Or, when they do make the decisions, they're usually very conscious of the fact that lawsuits (and legal fees generally) are not viewed as revenue centers, but cost centers. Wins in any litigation are usually windfalls, not strategic investments.
There are exceptions, of course. Companies do exist with litigation as their business model. However, you might be surprised about how much strategic planning goes into that as well.
Are they going to decide "Let's not do any litigation!"? Of course not. They will always pick a choice that keeps them employed.
In-house lawyers don't view litigation as job security. Few companies staff litigation lawyers. That work is almost always moved to outside counsel. Those with litigators on staff don't usually do patent litigation. Litigation tends to detract from scarce corporate resources for legal services that are usually necessary to keep a business running.
For most companies, in-house counsel are concerned more about avoiding litigation and the expense of that litigation than they are with prolonging that litigation.
All of that said, it may come as a surprise to you that BUSINESS teams are usually more litigation happy than the lawyers especially if they see a competitive reason. In fact, at Apple, Steve Jobs famously said that he's willing to go "to thermonuclear war" with Google over Android: http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/06/04/steve-jobs-quotes-allowed-in-apple-google-patent-t
In addition, business teams tend to be less calculating about their litigation risks than the lawyers they have on staff.
I've said before, in other threads, that I'm a patent attorney. I have my undergrad degree in CS. I have an ill view of many patents that are litigated. That's not to say there's no innovation happening in the software world, or that there's nothing worthy of protection.
Nevertheless, I generally think that the EFF's proposals here are misguided. Taking them one by one:
1. A patent covering software should be shorter: no more than five years from the application date.
Part of the problem in the first place is that it some times takes longer than 5 years to even get a patent. Most of the term of a patent (under this scheme) would be consumed with prosecution. It doesn't account for the Patent Office.
If the patent is invalid or there's no infringement, the trolls should have to pay the legal fees.
On board with this one, but it doesn't go far enough.
We really should be talking about fee shifting more generally in the case of a patent owner that fails to do their own diligence, but rather is seeking to extract nuisance money or impede lawful commercial activity.
Patent applicants should be required to provide an example of running software code for each claim in the patent.
This doesn't address the real problem. The real problem is when old claims are read to cover future technologies that they didn't not have possession of at the time the application is filed.
In a non-software example, it would be like a patent claim that covers something no larger than "a micrometer" before "nanometer" manipulation was available.
Infringers should avoid liability if they independently arrive at the patented invention.
There is already a prior user defense baked into the most recent patent reform bill.
Patents and licenses should be public right away. Patent owners should be required to keep their public records up-to-date.
Patents are. Most patent applications are public within 18 months of filing too.
I'm not sure why a license must be public. That's just a contract between two people.
I'm also not sure what public records they're referring to. It could be that patent assignment records aren't "up to date." (http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat). I could get on board with requiring those be up to date.
The law should limit damages so that a patent owner can't collect millions if the patent represented only a tiny fraction of a defendant's product.
That's all relative. Besides, plaintiffs still need to prove damages. Defendants still have an opportunity to rebut those damages.
Congress should commission a study and hold hearings to examine whether software patents actually benefit our economy at all.
I bet you can predict how that'll turn out. In any case, doesn't move the needle much.
Tongue mostly implanted in cheek with this response.// I will probably get modded a troll, but I should note that people regularly propose ideas like the parent failing to recognize that it doesn't really move the needle on this issue.
I think what might be interesting is to develop a database of prior art/ideas
It's called the patent office. They have a huge searchable database of this stuff. They're called patents and patent applications.
With thousands of people submitting everything they can think of every conceviable obvious aggregation of technologies any patent application
These are called patents and published patent applications.// Includes the joke that even issued patents are obvious aggregations of technologies.
Also, pretty much any publication can serve this purpose.
The database would be run by the patent office or it would incorporate cryptographic and distributed features allowing timestamps and content to stand up to any challenge.
Almost any publication system would survive a legal challenge. Few people fight over publication date if it's apparent from it's face. The only real issue is determining whether the publication was to be public and readily accessible.
Companies not wishing to pay the patent tax might seek to use it in a bid to prevent others from filing first and locking up the same blatently obvious ideas for the next 20 years. This doesn't add much. You can already publish and have that happen.
Also, there used to be something called the Statutory Invention Registration that the patent office provided that allowed inventions to publish just for the record of it: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Statutory_Invention_Registration . Almost no one did it. And since about 1999 when most applications filed published anyway, it served little purpose.
It's totally different.// Doesn't actually know if it's different/// Is really, really impressed with Dwonis' memory.//// Is general Slashdot commentter with know knowledge of the things upon which he comments.
essentialy useless for defence against patent trolls which are essentially invulnterable to counter claims.
True, in a sense. Their acquisition model is the "defense". Under their model, let's say they have all the major players in a targeted market (cell phones) in as their clients and they're all the same people also targeted by a patent troll. It might be cheaper/easier to simply sell out to RPX than to sue them all.
RPX also can act to acquire, prospectively, patents that are also likely targets of patent trolls: patent assets being sold at fire sale prices in bankruptcy.
So, to my earlier posts, the "RPX pooling" model brings one more club to the game rather than merely getting like-minded, defensive patent owners to agree not to sue each other [again, something they weren't, by definition going to do].
What if we did a reverse-troll, so either companies join DPL or DPL files troll lawsuits until they join. It's like MPEG LA but not just for video.
That's basically RPX Corporation, which I mentioned and replied to an AC.
But the DPL doesn't have the mechanisms to do that. It will be afflicted by collective action problems. It doesn't have "resources" to enforce such behavior. And on and on...
There are plenty of other style of patent pools -- like standards-based patent pools -- in which members all contribute their "essential patents [or claims]" and then make them available on a "reasonable and non-discriminatory basis" to everyone wanting to use the technology embodied by those patents. Of course, the problem with that is that the pool has to be able to license and enforce the patents and do so aggressively.
If you have license to patents that cover the same thing you are being sued for, you have a much stronger defense.
What defense is that? I'll note that even "practicing the prior art" is not a defense to patent infringement. Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 10-1502 (Fed. Cir., Sept. 23, 2011) (Linn, J.).
Joining a pool sounds better than not having that defense, and costs less than having to get my own patents
Which is great if the patent owners don't mind free-riders. However, if all you have is a bunch of people without patents or a shallow patent pool, that's not much of a license (or defense?).
You are thinking from the point-of-view of a litigating patent lawyer, who doesn't make money unless companies are suing and counter-suing each other.
I'm actually an in-house lawyer at a software company. My whole job is about making sure we're not spending resources on "litigating patent lawyers".
I did put "better" in scare quotes. RPX has a great many flaws. Nevertheless, the idea isn't that much different than this one, but has the advantages of being able to act and make decisions that affect the collective. On the latter, it might mean "acquiring" troll's patents which in effect might be like a massive, joint settlement.
Now of course, there's no promise from RPX that the patents in its arsenal will never be used. They are quite clear that part of their strategy is to eventually sell patents from their portfolio to others. Those others are only going to buy if there's some way to license/enforce them.
I also qualified that it costs money to participate. Of course, it also costs RPX money to operate and to acquire patents.
Unless I'm fundamentally misunderstanding the purpose, there's no legal judo here. It can't protect you against non-participants. It certainly can't protect you against trolls. It only seems to protect you against people/entities already inclined not to use their patents aggressively.
What would be more useful is if it worked this way (it doesn't):
Non-participating entity A sues participating entity B. Entity B has no useful patents with which to sue Entity A. Some other participating Entity C does have a useful patent to sue Entity A. Entity B can use Entity C's patents against Entity A.
But, this scheme doesn't make that happen. In fact, there's basically no way to make Entity C actually use its patents against Entity A on behalf of Entity B. Neither the patent law nor this license could make Entity C's patents a weapon against A.
Even if there were a way, no one with any patents of value would sign up for the DPL since: (1) the cost of enforcing the patent is going to be expensive; (2) turning over the right to enforce the patent to Entity B would be like handing the keys to your car to someone you don't know and assuming responsibility for any damage to your car (e.g., patent is held invalid, found not infringed, etc.); and (3) a priori knowledge of the value of the patent might mean that you'd be in a better defensive position not having granted "free" licenses to every participant (something that inevitably will come up in a damage calculation).
The DPL is a solution searching for a problem. And a foolish solution at that.
A company called RPX has created a much "better" solution for those that can afford to be part of the membership. Of course, in that case, RPX is the point person and has an ability to make things happen and has their own patents that they've acquired.
That's not the way things work, usually. If he cultivated his followers and created content using company resources (time, equipment, etc.) then the company probably has some right to it. But, it may partially depend on his employment agreement. His employment agreement probably says what it is they own in the context of content he created on the job.
This is the reason that smart people don't use company resources to do creative things lest they be owned by their employer.
I came here for this. TMBG is great, but the stuff they are doing for Kids music is beyond compare. My three year old son loves Here Comes Science (Meet the Elements!), Here Come the 123s and Here Come the ABCs (Alphabet of Nations!). He also likes "No!" but that's slightly different.
Question(s): Do you (John & John) have any plans to continue making educational songs? If so, what subjects are you thinking about tackling?
$1200/hr is quite steep no matter who you are. In the US, few lawyers bill more than $1000/hr. That said, it's common to see senior partners in things like IP litigation haul in 600-700/hr at the high end.
A junior partner, senior associate at a decent sized law firm might charge between $400 and 500/hr.
These rates are then blended with lower cost paralegals and associates for a lower overall cost. No one wants the senior partner review documents or sitting second chair at a deposition.
As a result, most places though, when computing "reasonable attorneys' fees" charge lodestar rates at the same number of hours. Those rates tend to be lower than the actual rates.
Frankly, no one should go into litigation assuming that an atty's fee award will cover the entire cost of fees.
It's also not really a choice NOT to participate in modern, American healthcare.
One of the proposed "fixes" originally was only to "require" insurance of people that partake of the healthcare system which is, at some level, everyone born in the United States. In other words, if you've never or will never use any healthcare, you'd be freed of the obligation. There are lots of practical problems with this, including, what to do with "free riders" or protestors that show up to a hospital, clinic, etc. when they're already sick or in need of healthcare.
The fact is, everyone participates in the current healthcare system even if they don't want to. Even those that affirmatively try to avoid the system could wind up there nevertheless via an ambulance and a 911 call. Allowing certain people to NOT participate is highly inequitable and without any rationale basis.
All of that said, this result of the ACA is largely the Republicans' and insurance companies' fault. The more sweeping, Democratic vision would not have had the same problems and would not be unconstitutional on these grounds.
Perhaps this goes without saying, but the title is misleading. The Grand Jury did not indict Mr. Swartz on any copyright infringement or acts of piracy on the high seas. There are really only four indictments: wire fraud, computer fraud, unlawfully obtaining information form a protected computer, and recklessly damaging a protected computer.
Work at a different school or negotiate a better contract, if you can. At many universities, the inventors (typically the grad. student or principal investigator) are the owners of their own works, in the first instance, but they can always choose to let the invention be prosecuted and maintained by their TTO. The exception is for research done with Federal funds which is subject Bayh-Dole and, frankly, the terms of the sponsor agreement with the government.
Look: copyright has nothing to do with it. If you don't want the publication locked up, don't publish in journals that make you give up all your rights or negotiate a different deal. The fact is, on this point, copyright isn't necessary because the terms of the contract would just take over. If the publisher didn't want you to publish outside its pay wall it could ask you via your contract regardless of the copyright in the work.
This reflects more on the economic and business incentives of scientific journals than on copyright. The journals don't care about the copyright so much as they value the exclusivity and the first publication rights. Copyright is just a placeholder for a very simple non-publication clause and associated penalties (or liquidated damages).
Slashdot Mirror
Not to mention I'm sure they're tracking this approaching storm using the national weather service, relying on local emergency response services, using publicly-funded roads, hosting the event in a taxpayer-funded stadium, etc.
Let the spin, begin.
Having now read the opinion, here's how the judge came out:
1. The jury found this guy guilty of infringement.
2. The guy had 8 years of known infringing activities
3. The guy destroyed evidence
4. The guy lied repeatedly
5. It wasn't just a matter of him downloading songs, he was uploading them too
6. The jury got to see all the evidence
7. Congress set the bounds for copyright infringement's statutory damages
8. The jury pick something on the arguably low end of the range
9. When looking at the common law rules the judge did not feel the case was inequitable under the circumstances.
I would wager good money that had 2-5 been different, the judge WOULD have found the award inequitable.
That said, I have some questions about why 2 and 5 were even in evidence at all. They seem irrelevant to copyright infringement of the songs at issue here. I haven't kept pace with this case, but I should think those are irrelevant unless they were themselves proved to be infringements.
Also, it helps not to destroy evidence or lie.
This distinction is actually quite blurry for most municipal fines and citations. A number of states, for example, allow you to pay your speeding ticket fines directly at the time of the citation via credit card. How you'd distinguish this case from that case, I'm not sure.
Clearly you can't afford your meds, so I'm certain the new system will help you. Nevertheless, I feel compelled to take on your crazy.
First, the economics of the system aren't that controversial. More people paying into the system means more money, fewer "takers" per capita, and, thus, lower premiums. The whole point of the mandate/tax was to make those without insurance, typically, the young and/or healthy, enter into the insurance system. And just to clarify, this part of Obamacare is the clearly Republican part of the scheme.
There is another factor that works to lower overall costs: more insured means less reliance on the more expensive ED system. Because under the prior system, hospitals were obligated to treat everyone, there was an overuse of the most expensive, least efficient health care delivery vehicle: the emergency department. Since those people also can't afford to pay, those costs were passed along to everyone else. Now, in theory, if fewer people have to use the ED for basic healthcare and there is better access to non-emergent care, you will lower everyone's costs.
Second, I'm pretty sure the last clause of your sentence is not even accurate. There are whole categories of "insurance" that are going away. In particular, those include insurance plans that put people in the "under-insured" category. Perhaps, put another way, you can certainly try to buy such insurance packages, but you will not escape the individual mandate.
Third, whether you can keep your doctors is still up to your insurance company, not the government. This really has nothing to do with Obamacare. What's more, there was no guarantee -- even under the old system -- that an insurance plan would allow you to keep your doctor. Of course, when the government is the insurance company, they are in the same spot as an insurance provider (think the VA).
You realize that your insurance company does the same thing, right? Or your insurance company's pharmacy benefits manager (PBM) or some other entity even further divorced from the doctor patient relationship. If you want something other than by formulary under almost any health insurance plan, you pay out of pocket. There is almost no other way to control expenses: you negotiate until you get a good deal and in exchange for the good, you lose exclusivity.
Moreover, you're trolling isn't really helping your cause here. First, most of the United States won't get government sponsored health insurance. Nope, that's reserved for politicians, soldiers, and the very poor. Everything else is going to be by the same commercial insurance companies that already dictate healthcare. Good try though.
Second, control over individual medicaid expenses is something that the RIGHT wants, not the left. It allows states to prioritize their healthcare expenses and make decisions at a state level. You know, the whole "laboratory of states" thing.
I'm a patent geek. Patent attorney, undergrad in Comp Sci, and working in-house at a software company. Of course my view somewhat differs from the vitriolic responses of most commenters on here.
Nevertheless, I enjoy the patent stories.
That's not a real question that comes out of this ruling. In fact this ruling said the opposite: the "tax" is constitutional.
Moreover, the basic premise of your argument is wrong.
The mandate/tax is paid to the government, not directly to private insurers. The only direct payment to an insurer is for those people that ACQUIRE insurance.
There are a few mitigating factors here. First, outside law firms don't usually drive business decisions. Management still needs to be convinced of the value of a course of action. And, outside counsel is not free to do whatever they want. They are typically on a short leash. General Counsel's office gets every bill and is involved in the strategy. To say that "outside counsel does the litigation" is more of a they-handle-the-day-to-day operations of a case, they acquire the experts, they do the filings, they prepare witnesses, they write the briefs, etc. But none of this is without review. None of this would go on without the business teams.
Second, you're making an assumption about how outside counsel is paid. Sure, with some unsophisticated companies, those companies might be paying straight through the nose on an hourly basis. But sophisticated companies understand the dynamics and have payment schemes that avoid the worst abuses: incentive payments for getting things done early, fee structures that create incentives for lower costs / settlements, plaintiffs attorneys might be contingent fee, etc.
Common billing strategies, by the way, are to: give a bonus based on when you get out of a case (earlier better); set a fee sharing arrangement that if a firm can get the job done before x, they keep some of the savings; etc.
It's not quite a prisoner's dilemma because the choice by one actor is typically countered by the other. In the PD, the dilemma is whether to act first, i.e., whether to rat out the other, because if you act first, then the punishment is small relative to the other person acting first. Both parties are good if neither acts.
In this case, if one patent holder sues another the other just counter sues.
If you wanted to make a PD case, it would be for whether industry participants seek patents at all. If no one patents, everyone is free to compete. If only one party patents, or gets a huge patent headstart, the non-patenting entity is going to be defenseless. If both parties patent, both will have patent expenses, but a tool to prevent the other from suing them (mostly in the form of "mutual assured destruction").
Examined from that perspective, you might also see that the parties have another reason to both patent: market exclusion or increasing the barriers to new market participants.
This is usually very much NOT the case. Legal departments in major corporations don't usually make these sorts of decisions. Or, when they do make the decisions, they're usually very conscious of the fact that lawsuits (and legal fees generally) are not viewed as revenue centers, but cost centers. Wins in any litigation are usually windfalls, not strategic investments.
There are exceptions, of course. Companies do exist with litigation as their business model. However, you might be surprised about how much strategic planning goes into that as well.
In-house lawyers don't view litigation as job security. Few companies staff litigation lawyers. That work is almost always moved to outside counsel. Those with litigators on staff don't usually do patent litigation. Litigation tends to detract from scarce corporate resources for legal services that are usually necessary to keep a business running.
For most companies, in-house counsel are concerned more about avoiding litigation and the expense of that litigation than they are with prolonging that litigation.
All of that said, it may come as a surprise to you that BUSINESS teams are usually more litigation happy than the lawyers especially if they see a competitive reason. In fact, at Apple, Steve Jobs famously said that he's willing to go "to thermonuclear war" with Google over Android: http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/06/04/steve-jobs-quotes-allowed-in-apple-google-patent-t
In addition, business teams tend to be less calculating about their litigation risks than the lawyers they have on staff.
I've said before, in other threads, that I'm a patent attorney. I have my undergrad degree in CS. I have an ill view of many patents that are litigated. That's not to say there's no innovation happening in the software world, or that there's nothing worthy of protection.
Nevertheless, I generally think that the EFF's proposals here are misguided. Taking them one by one:
Part of the problem in the first place is that it some times takes longer than 5 years to even get a patent. Most of the term of a patent (under this scheme) would be consumed with prosecution. It doesn't account for the Patent Office.
On board with this one, but it doesn't go far enough.
We really should be talking about fee shifting more generally in the case of a patent owner that fails to do their own diligence, but rather is seeking to extract nuisance money or impede lawful commercial activity.
This doesn't address the real problem. The real problem is when old claims are read to cover future technologies that they didn't not have possession of at the time the application is filed.
In a non-software example, it would be like a patent claim that covers something no larger than "a micrometer" before "nanometer" manipulation was available.
There is already a prior user defense baked into the most recent patent reform bill.
Patents are. Most patent applications are public within 18 months of filing too.
I'm not sure why a license must be public. That's just a contract between two people.
I'm also not sure what public records they're referring to. It could be that patent assignment records aren't "up to date." (http://assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/?db=pat). I could get on board with requiring those be up to date.
That's all relative. Besides, plaintiffs still need to prove damages. Defendants still have an opportunity to rebut those damages.
I bet you can predict how that'll turn out. In any case, doesn't move the needle much.
Tongue mostly implanted in cheek with this response. // I will probably get modded a troll, but I should note that people regularly propose ideas like the parent failing to recognize that it doesn't really move the needle on this issue.
It's called the patent office. They have a huge searchable database of this stuff. They're called patents and patent applications.
These are called patents and published patent applications. // Includes the joke that even issued patents are obvious aggregations of technologies.
Also, pretty much any publication can serve this purpose.
Almost any publication system would survive a legal challenge. Few people fight over publication date if it's apparent from it's face. The only real issue is determining whether the publication was to be public and readily accessible.
It's not a dupe, that one was based on Kichoffs's Law. This one is based on Johnson-Nyquist noise.
It's totally different. // Doesn't actually know if it's different /// Is really, really impressed with Dwonis' memory. //// Is general Slashdot commentter with know knowledge of the things upon which he comments.
True, in a sense. Their acquisition model is the "defense". Under their model, let's say they have all the major players in a targeted market (cell phones) in as their clients and they're all the same people also targeted by a patent troll. It might be cheaper/easier to simply sell out to RPX than to sue them all.
RPX also can act to acquire, prospectively, patents that are also likely targets of patent trolls: patent assets being sold at fire sale prices in bankruptcy.
So, to my earlier posts, the "RPX pooling" model brings one more club to the game rather than merely getting like-minded, defensive patent owners to agree not to sue each other [again, something they weren't, by definition going to do].
What if we did a reverse-troll, so either companies join DPL or DPL files troll lawsuits until they join. It's like MPEG LA but not just for video.
That's basically RPX Corporation, which I mentioned and replied to an AC.
But the DPL doesn't have the mechanisms to do that. It will be afflicted by collective action problems. It doesn't have "resources" to enforce such behavior. And on and on...
There are plenty of other style of patent pools -- like standards-based patent pools -- in which members all contribute their "essential patents [or claims]" and then make them available on a "reasonable and non-discriminatory basis" to everyone wanting to use the technology embodied by those patents. Of course, the problem with that is that the pool has to be able to license and enforce the patents and do so aggressively.
What defense is that? I'll note that even "practicing the prior art" is not a defense to patent infringement. Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 10-1502 (Fed. Cir., Sept. 23, 2011) (Linn, J.).
Which is great if the patent owners don't mind free-riders. However, if all you have is a bunch of people without patents or a shallow patent pool, that's not much of a license (or defense?).
I'm actually an in-house lawyer at a software company. My whole job is about making sure we're not spending resources on "litigating patent lawyers".
I did put "better" in scare quotes. RPX has a great many flaws. Nevertheless, the idea isn't that much different than this one, but has the advantages of being able to act and make decisions that affect the collective. On the latter, it might mean "acquiring" troll's patents which in effect might be like a massive, joint settlement.
Now of course, there's no promise from RPX that the patents in its arsenal will never be used. They are quite clear that part of their strategy is to eventually sell patents from their portfolio to others. Those others are only going to buy if there's some way to license/enforce them.
I also qualified that it costs money to participate. Of course, it also costs RPX money to operate and to acquire patents.
I'm a patent attorney and I agree.
Unless I'm fundamentally misunderstanding the purpose, there's no legal judo here. It can't protect you against non-participants. It certainly can't protect you against trolls. It only seems to protect you against people/entities already inclined not to use their patents aggressively.
What would be more useful is if it worked this way (it doesn't):
Non-participating entity A sues participating entity B.
Entity B has no useful patents with which to sue Entity A.
Some other participating Entity C does have a useful patent to sue Entity A.
Entity B can use Entity C's patents against Entity A.
But, this scheme doesn't make that happen. In fact, there's basically no way to make Entity C actually use its patents against Entity A on behalf of Entity B. Neither the patent law nor this license could make Entity C's patents a weapon against A.
Even if there were a way, no one with any patents of value would sign up for the DPL since: (1) the cost of enforcing the patent is going to be expensive; (2) turning over the right to enforce the patent to Entity B would be like handing the keys to your car to someone you don't know and assuming responsibility for any damage to your car (e.g., patent is held invalid, found not infringed, etc.); and (3) a priori knowledge of the value of the patent might mean that you'd be in a better defensive position not having granted "free" licenses to every participant (something that inevitably will come up in a damage calculation).
The DPL is a solution searching for a problem. And a foolish solution at that.
A company called RPX has created a much "better" solution for those that can afford to be part of the membership. Of course, in that case, RPX is the point person and has an ability to make things happen and has their own patents that they've acquired.
That's not the way things work, usually. If he cultivated his followers and created content using company resources (time, equipment, etc.) then the company probably has some right to it. But, it may partially depend on his employment agreement. His employment agreement probably says what it is they own in the context of content he created on the job.
This is the reason that smart people don't use company resources to do creative things lest they be owned by their employer.
I came here for this. TMBG is great, but the stuff they are doing for Kids music is beyond compare. My three year old son loves Here Comes Science (Meet the Elements!), Here Come the 123s and Here Come the ABCs (Alphabet of Nations!). He also likes "No!" but that's slightly different.
Question(s): Do you (John & John) have any plans to continue making educational songs? If so, what subjects are you thinking about tackling?
$1200/hr is quite steep no matter who you are. In the US, few lawyers bill more than $1000/hr. That said, it's common to see senior partners in things like IP litigation haul in 600-700/hr at the high end.
A junior partner, senior associate at a decent sized law firm might charge between $400 and 500/hr.
These rates are then blended with lower cost paralegals and associates for a lower overall cost. No one wants the senior partner review documents or sitting second chair at a deposition.
As a result, most places though, when computing "reasonable attorneys' fees" charge lodestar rates at the same number of hours. Those rates tend to be lower than the actual rates.
Frankly, no one should go into litigation assuming that an atty's fee award will cover the entire cost of fees.
It's also not really a choice NOT to participate in modern, American healthcare.
One of the proposed "fixes" originally was only to "require" insurance of people that partake of the healthcare system which is, at some level, everyone born in the United States. In other words, if you've never or will never use any healthcare, you'd be freed of the obligation. There are lots of practical problems with this, including, what to do with "free riders" or protestors that show up to a hospital, clinic, etc. when they're already sick or in need of healthcare.
And when people tried to posit scenarios of someone who would never need U.S. healthcare, you get politicians like Rep. Steve King citing babies discarded in dumpsters. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOrBpTdZ2tc&feature=player_embedded
The fact is, everyone participates in the current healthcare system even if they don't want to. Even those that affirmatively try to avoid the system could wind up there nevertheless via an ambulance and a 911 call. Allowing certain people to NOT participate is highly inequitable and without any rationale basis.
All of that said, this result of the ACA is largely the Republicans' and insurance companies' fault. The more sweeping, Democratic vision would not have had the same problems and would not be unconstitutional on these grounds.
Perhaps this goes without saying, but the title is misleading. The Grand Jury did not indict Mr. Swartz on any copyright infringement or acts of piracy on the high seas. There are really only four indictments: wire fraud, computer fraud, unlawfully obtaining information form a protected computer, and recklessly damaging a protected computer.
You can read the whole indictment here: http://ia700504.us.archive.org/29/items/gov.uscourts.mad.137971/gov.uscourts.mad.137971.2.0.pdf
Criminal copyright infringement is not one of the charges.
Work at a different school or negotiate a better contract, if you can. At many universities, the inventors (typically the grad. student or principal investigator) are the owners of their own works, in the first instance, but they can always choose to let the invention be prosecuted and maintained by their TTO. The exception is for research done with Federal funds which is subject Bayh-Dole and, frankly, the terms of the sponsor agreement with the government.
Look: copyright has nothing to do with it. If you don't want the publication locked up, don't publish in journals that make you give up all your rights or negotiate a different deal. The fact is, on this point, copyright isn't necessary because the terms of the contract would just take over. If the publisher didn't want you to publish outside its pay wall it could ask you via your contract regardless of the copyright in the work.
This reflects more on the economic and business incentives of scientific journals than on copyright. The journals don't care about the copyright so much as they value the exclusivity and the first publication rights. Copyright is just a placeholder for a very simple non-publication clause and associated penalties (or liquidated damages).