Stop trying to make a profit by tricking people into buying stuff they don't need; it only breeds ill-will when they discover the truth. As a short term strategy it works, but if you're not an itinerant conman, then you're shooting yourself in the foot.
Re:'MY' computer accessible to the public?
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IT Calls of Shame
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Only if they set up printers via AD. Not everyone does that. In fact, I've only worked at one place that does that.
IRDA modem in her cell phone? I used to do that back in the day.
Re:'MY' computer accessible to the public?
on
IT Calls of Shame
·
· Score: 2
Windows 95/98.
Or, like many large systems, any user could probably log in to their own profile on his physical computer via active directory accounts.
To further elaborate, the only reason I'm not still using (al)pine is because of enigmail for thunderbird. Now that no one I know uses pgp/gpg anymore, I may go back to pine, encrypting stuff manually when absolutely needed. Sometimes it's nice to have programs that do more than one thing, even if they do them half-arsed.
Do one thing, do it well. If you do things the UNIX way, you can easily beat the features and convenience of Gmail.
If you're only doing one thing, you get one feature, and no conjunction. The other features and any convenience will have to be done by separate projects that the user can pipe together if they want.
That's only useful if there's one attacker IP. TFA is talking about a botnet doing the attacking. Hundreds, if not thousands of IPs per minute. The only way to "protect" against that with iptables is to have iptables block all incoming on port 22 from any address. But then you're left with a DDoS where your ssh port is down nearly all the time. Same deal with locking accounts; if hundreds of attempts occur per minute, a lot of accounts can be locked out as a DDoS, intentionally or not.
"We &@$%ing own the executive branch! And we've already bribed Congress. Only nine more people to buy; five if we're not interested in a unanimous decision."
I'm rather disappointed to report that every major distro has let me down on updates and patches over the years. I really have to question the value of a "maintenance service" if the maintenance introduces bugs instead of fixing them. (RedHat, Mandrake, SuSe, and now Ubuntu have all done this at one time or other.)
Luciano Bello discovered that the random number generator in Debian's openssl package is predictable. This is caused by an incorrect Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166). As a result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
So could Martin grab a gun and shoot Zimmerman? After all, Zimmerman was clearly a threat.
If Zimmerman punched him and started banging Martin's head into the ground, sure. Asking "What are you doing here?" is not threatening. Martin probably took it the wrong way due to some persecution complex, but a brawl isn't an appropriate response even then.
If it's a nice sunny day, I can imagine a lot of people wandering aimlessly, enjoying the weather. When it's raining, people tend to walk with purpose (to get out of the rain ASAP). If someone is lazily sauntering in the rain and looking around everywhere, it's more likely that something's wrong.
Plus, this company has just missed the ongoing paradigm shift (hate that phrase - someone have a better one?). End users should have full control over their (untrusted) endpoints, becuase we won't be storing anything important there, and any incoming files will be handled with appropriate suspicion.
End user endpoints simply need to be outside the "zone of trust" in the modern world, partly because anything a user touches should be assumed to be infected, and partly because it's time to stop caring what device the user likes - traditional PC, thin client, iPad, phone, whatever they like as long as it has a browser for the web-based software and a desktop virtualization client for all the rest.
End users should not have full control over their desktops, just like they aren't allowed to bring a cameraphone into the secure-information areas (that's not just a paranoid military rule, lots of companies follow it). If hackers own the end user's workstation because he/she was running a vulnerable browser as admin/root, then they can keylog the user's passwords to get to the data in the "zone of trust". If they've got sensible authentication and are using two-factor, then the bad guys could still watch the screen in real time or take screen shots.
Bottom line is that if "anything a user touches should be assumed to be infected" then that means anything a user touches shouldn't be allowed to connect.
Walking around aimlessly? Really? thats why you called 911? Because a guy is walking around aimlessly?
"It's raining and he's just walking around, looking about."
Walking around aimlessly in the rain is unusual behavior unless you're a little kid splashing in puddles or a duck.
It's not a piece of paper until any one side views it that way. Once someone in government sees it as mere paper you need to use fear of populace to keep that government official in line.
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Stop trying to make a profit by tricking people into buying stuff they don't need; it only breeds ill-will when they discover the truth. As a short term strategy it works, but if you're not an itinerant conman, then you're shooting yourself in the foot.
Only if they set up printers via AD. Not everyone does that. In fact, I've only worked at one place that does that.
IRDA modem in her cell phone? I used to do that back in the day.
Windows 95/98.
Or, like many large systems, any user could probably log in to their own profile on his physical computer via active directory accounts.
If it happens again call the police.
Police won't do anything. Call the FBI.
A stopped clock is right twice a day.
They have 2 years to figure out what they want to switch to (when XP runs out of support). Best get crackin.
To further elaborate, the only reason I'm not still using (al)pine is because of enigmail for thunderbird. Now that no one I know uses pgp/gpg anymore, I may go back to pine, encrypting stuff manually when absolutely needed. Sometimes it's nice to have programs that do more than one thing, even if they do them half-arsed.
Do one thing, do it well. If you do things the UNIX way, you can easily beat the features and convenience of Gmail.
If you're only doing one thing, you get one feature, and no conjunction. The other features and any convenience will have to be done by separate projects that the user can pipe together if they want.
Did they have the rest of the world wide web sign the terms of service so that their copyrighted works could be modified and used for profit?
The bees can tell the difference!
They attributed quakes to Zeus and Hera fracking.
That's only useful if there's one attacker IP. TFA is talking about a botnet doing the attacking. Hundreds, if not thousands of IPs per minute. The only way to "protect" against that with iptables is to have iptables block all incoming on port 22 from any address. But then you're left with a DDoS where your ssh port is down nearly all the time. Same deal with locking accounts; if hundreds of attempts occur per minute, a lot of accounts can be locked out as a DDoS, intentionally or not.
That's 6 attempts per minute.
per zombie in the botnet. Each zombie IP gets banned individually, and the slow attack attempts prevents a DDoS.
"We &@$%ing own the executive branch! And we've already bribed Congress. Only nine more people to buy; five if we're not interested in a unanimous decision."
I'm seeing a marked increase in SMS spam, which is far more annoying due to its immediateness.
I'm rather disappointed to report that every major distro has let me down on updates and patches over the years. I really have to question the value of a "maintenance service" if the maintenance introduces bugs instead of fixing them. (RedHat, Mandrake, SuSe, and now Ubuntu have all done this at one time or other.)
Debian did it too with openssl.
http://www.debian.org/security/2008/dsa-1571
Luciano Bello discovered that the random number generator in Debian's openssl package is predictable. This is caused by an incorrect Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166). As a result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
Yeah, just imagine the flavors of wine that could be mashed out with our feet.
So could Martin grab a gun and shoot Zimmerman? After all, Zimmerman was clearly a threat.
If Zimmerman punched him and started banging Martin's head into the ground, sure. Asking "What are you doing here?" is not threatening. Martin probably took it the wrong way due to some persecution complex, but a brawl isn't an appropriate response even then.
How is the rain relevant?
If it's a nice sunny day, I can imagine a lot of people wandering aimlessly, enjoying the weather. When it's raining, people tend to walk with purpose (to get out of the rain ASAP). If someone is lazily sauntering in the rain and looking around everywhere, it's more likely that something's wrong.
Plus, this company has just missed the ongoing paradigm shift (hate that phrase - someone have a better one?). End users should have full control over their (untrusted) endpoints, becuase we won't be storing anything important there, and any incoming files will be handled with appropriate suspicion.
End user endpoints simply need to be outside the "zone of trust" in the modern world, partly because anything a user touches should be assumed to be infected, and partly because it's time to stop caring what device the user likes - traditional PC, thin client, iPad, phone, whatever they like as long as it has a browser for the web-based software and a desktop virtualization client for all the rest.
End users should not have full control over their desktops, just like they aren't allowed to bring a cameraphone into the secure-information areas (that's not just a paranoid military rule, lots of companies follow it). If hackers own the end user's workstation because he/she was running a vulnerable browser as admin/root, then they can keylog the user's passwords to get to the data in the "zone of trust". If they've got sensible authentication and are using two-factor, then the bad guys could still watch the screen in real time or take screen shots.
Bottom line is that if "anything a user touches should be assumed to be infected" then that means anything a user touches shouldn't be allowed to connect.
Walking around aimlessly? Really? thats why you called 911? Because a guy is walking around aimlessly?
"It's raining and he's just walking around, looking about."
Walking around aimlessly in the rain is unusual behavior unless you're a little kid splashing in puddles or a duck.
If it got on the plane, someone checked it somewhere and gave it a thumbs-up. That makes it more likely to be a toy, just like it looked.
It's not a piece of paper until any one side views it that way. Once someone in government sees it as mere paper you need to use fear of populace to keep that government official in line.
A majority of teachers are technophobes, and this extends even to college professors. Blame the teachers.