Slashdot Mirror

N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway Into Computers

By david e. sanger and thom shanker = jan. 14, 2014

= URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
= Image: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.jpg
== Coverage #1: http://news.slashdot.org/story/14/01/15/1324216/nyt-nsa-put-100000-radio-pathway-backdoors-in-pcs
== Coverage #2: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
== Coverage #3: http://rt.com/usa/nsa-radio-wave-cyberattack-607/
== Coverage #4: http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/nsa-uses-covert-radio-transmissions-to-monitor-100000-bugged-computers/
=== Archive: http://web.archive.org/web/20140116010210/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html

"WASHINGTON - The National Security Agency has implanted software in nearly 100,000 computers around the world that allows the United States to conduct surveillance on those machines and can also create a digital highway for launching cyberattacks.

While most of the software is inserted by gaining access to computer networks, the N.S.A. has increasingly made use of a secret technology that enables it to enter and alter data in computers even if they are not connected to the Internet, according to N.S.A. documents, computer experts and American officials.

The technology, which the agency has used since at least 2008, relies on a covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted surreptitiously into the computers. In some cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size relay station that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target.

The radio frequency technology has helped solve one of the biggest problems facing American intelligence agencies for years: getting into computers that adversaries, and some American partners, have tried to make impervious to spying or cyberattack. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware must be physically inserted by a spy, a manufacturer or an unwitting user.

The N.S.A. calls its efforts more an act of "active defense" against foreign cyberattacks than a tool to go on the offensive. But when Chinese attackers place similar software on the computer systems of American companies or government agencies, American officials have protested, often at the presidential level.

Among the most frequent targets of the N.S.A. and its Pentagon partner, United States Cyber Command, have been units of the Chinese Army, which the United States has accused of launching regular digital probes and attacks on American industrial and military targets, usually to steal secrets or intellectual property. But the program, code-named Quantum, has also been successful in inserting software into Russian military networks and systems used by the Mexican police and drug cartels, trade institutions inside the European Union, and sometime partners against terrorism like Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, according to officials and an N.S.A. map that indicates sites of what the agency calls "computer network exploitation."

"What's new here is the scale and the sophistication of the intelligence agency's ability to get into computers and networks to which no one has ever had access before," said James Andrew Lewis, the cybersecur

N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway Into Computers

By david e. sanger and thom shanker = jan. 14, 2014

= URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
= Image: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.jpg
== Coverage #1: http://news.slashdot.org/story/14/01/15/1324216/nyt-nsa-put-100000-radio-pathway-backdoors-in-pcs
== Coverage #2: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
== Coverage #3: http://rt.com/usa/nsa-radio-wave-cyberattack-607/
== Coverage #4: http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/nsa-uses-covert-radio-transmissions-to-monitor-100000-bugged-computers/
=== Archive: http://web.archive.org/web/20140116010210/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html

"WASHINGTON - The National Security Agency has implanted software in nearly 100,000 computers around the world that allows the United States to conduct surveillance on those machines and can also create a digital highway for launching cyberattacks.

While most of the software is inserted by gaining access to computer networks, the N.S.A. has increasingly made use of a secret technology that enables it to enter and alter data in computers even if they are not connected to the Internet, according to N.S.A. documents, computer experts and American officials.

The technology, which the agency has used since at least 2008, relies on a covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted surreptitiously into the computers. In some cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size relay station that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target.

The radio frequency technology has helped solve one of the biggest problems facing American intelligence agencies for years: getting into computers that adversaries, and some American partners, have tried to make impervious to spying or cyberattack. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware must be physically inserted by a spy, a manufacturer or an unwitting user.

The N.S.A. calls its efforts more an act of "active defense" against foreign cyberattacks than a tool to go on the offensive. But when Chinese attackers place similar software on the computer systems of American companies or government agencies, American officials have protested, often at the presidential level.

Among the most frequent targets of the N.S.A. and its Pentagon partner, United States Cyber Command, have been units of the Chinese Army, which the United States has accused of launching regular digital probes and attacks on American industrial and military targets, usually to steal secrets or intellectual property. But the program, code-named Quantum, has also been successful in inserting software into Russian military networks and systems used by the Mexican police and drug cartels, trade institutions inside the European Union, and sometime partners against terrorism like Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, according to officials and an N.S.A. map that indicates sites of what the agency calls "computer network exploitation."

"What's new here is the scale and the sophistication of the intelligence agency's ability to get into computers and networks to which no one has ever had access before," said James Andrew Lewis, the cybersecur

N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway Into Computers

By david e. sanger and thom shanker = jan. 14, 2014

= URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
= Image: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.jpg
== Coverage #1: http://news.slashdot.org/story/14/01/15/1324216/nyt-nsa-put-100000-radio-pathway-backdoors-in-pcs
== Coverage #2: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
== Coverage #3: http://rt.com/usa/nsa-radio-wave-cyberattack-607/
== Coverage #4: http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/nsa-uses-covert-radio-transmissions-to-monitor-100000-bugged-computers/
=== Archive: http://web.archive.org/web/20140116010210/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html

"WASHINGTON - The National Security Agency has implanted software in nearly 100,000 computers around the world that allows the United States to conduct surveillance on those machines and can also create a digital highway for launching cyberattacks.

While most of the software is inserted by gaining access to computer networks, the N.S.A. has increasingly made use of a secret technology that enables it to enter and alter data in computers even if they are not connected to the Internet, according to N.S.A. documents, computer experts and American officials.

The technology, which the agency has used since at least 2008, relies on a covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted surreptitiously into the computers. In some cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size relay station that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target.

The radio frequency technology has helped solve one of the biggest problems facing American intelligence agencies for years: getting into computers that adversaries, and some American partners, have tried to make impervious to spying or cyberattack. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware must be physically inserted by a spy, a manufacturer or an unwitting user.

The N.S.A. calls its efforts more an act of "active defense" against foreign cyberattacks than a tool to go on the offensive. But when Chinese attackers place similar software on the computer systems of American companies or government agencies, American officials have protested, often at the presidential level.

Among the most frequent targets of the N.S.A. and its Pentagon partner, United States Cyber Command, have been units of the Chinese Army, which the United States has accused of launching regular digital probes and attacks on American industrial and military targets, usually to steal secrets or intellectual property. But the program, code-named Quantum, has also been successful in inserting software into Russian military networks and systems used by the Mexican police and drug cartels, trade institutions inside the European Union, and sometime partners against terrorism like Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, according to officials and an N.S.A. map that indicates sites of what the agency calls "computer network exploitation."

"What's new here is the scale and the sophistication of the intelligence agency's ability to get into computers and networks to which no one has ever had access before," said James Andrew Lewis, the cybersecur

N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway Into Computers

By david e. sanger and thom shanker = jan. 14, 2014

= URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
= Image: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.jpg
== Coverage #1: http://news.slashdot.org/story/14/01/15/1324216/nyt-nsa-put-100000-radio-pathway-backdoors-in-pcs
== Coverage #2: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
== Coverage #3: http://rt.com/usa/nsa-radio-wave-cyberattack-607/
== Coverage #4: http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/nsa-uses-covert-radio-transmissions-to-monitor-100000-bugged-computers/
=== Archive: http://web.archive.org/web/20140116010210/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html

"WASHINGTON - The National Security Agency has implanted software in nearly 100,000 computers around the world that allows the United States to conduct surveillance on those machines and can also create a digital highway for launching cyberattacks.

While most of the software is inserted by gaining access to computer networks, the N.S.A. has increasingly made use of a secret technology that enables it to enter and alter data in computers even if they are not connected to the Internet, according to N.S.A. documents, computer experts and American officials.

The technology, which the agency has used since at least 2008, relies on a covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted surreptitiously into the computers. In some cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size relay station that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target.

The radio frequency technology has helped solve one of the biggest problems facing American intelligence agencies for years: getting into computers that adversaries, and some American partners, have tried to make impervious to spying or cyberattack. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware must be physically inserted by a spy, a manufacturer or an unwitting user.

The N.S.A. calls its efforts more an act of "active defense" against foreign cyberattacks than a tool to go on the offensive. But when Chinese attackers place similar software on the computer systems of American companies or government agencies, American officials have protested, often at the presidential level.

Among the most frequent targets of the N.S.A. and its Pentagon partner, United States Cyber Command, have been units of the Chinese Army, which the United States has accused of launching regular digital probes and attacks on American industrial and military targets, usually to steal secrets or intellectual property. But the program, code-named Quantum, has also been successful in inserting software into Russian military networks and systems used by the Mexican police and drug cartels, trade institutions inside the European Union, and sometime partners against terrorism like Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, according to officials and an N.S.A. map that indicates sites of what the agency calls "computer network exploitation."

"What's new here is the scale and the sophistication of the intelligence agency's ability to get into computers and networks to which no one has ever had access before," said James Andrew Lewis, the cybersecur

N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway Into Computers

By david e. sanger and thom shanker = jan. 14, 2014

= URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
= Image: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.jpg
== Coverage #1: http://news.slashdot.org/story/14/01/15/1324216/nyt-nsa-put-100000-radio-pathway-backdoors-in-pcs
== Coverage #2: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
== Coverage #3: http://rt.com/usa/nsa-radio-wave-cyberattack-607/
=== Archive: http://web.archive.org/web/20140116010210/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html

"WASHINGTON - The National Security Agency has implanted software in nearly 100,000 computers around the world that allows the United States to conduct surveillance on those machines and can also create a digital highway for launching cyberattacks.

While most of the software is inserted by gaining access to computer networks, the N.S.A. has increasingly made use of a secret technology that enables it to enter and alter data in computers even if they are not connected to the Internet, according to N.S.A. documents, computer experts and American officials.

The technology, which the agency has used since at least 2008, relies on a covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted surreptitiously into the computers. In some cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size relay station that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target.

The radio frequency technology has helped solve one of the biggest problems facing American intelligence agencies for years: getting into computers that adversaries, and some American partners, have tried to make impervious to spying or cyberattack. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware must be physically inserted by a spy, a manufacturer or an unwitting user.

The N.S.A. calls its efforts more an act of "active defense" against foreign cyberattacks than a tool to go on the offensive. But when Chinese attackers place similar software on the computer systems of American companies or government agencies, American officials have protested, often at the presidential level.

Among the most frequent targets of the N.S.A. and its Pentagon partner, United States Cyber Command, have been units of the Chinese Army, which the United States has accused of launching regular digital probes and attacks on American industrial and military targets, usually to steal secrets or intellectual property. But the program, code-named Quantum, has also been successful in inserting software into Russian military networks and systems used by the Mexican police and drug cartels, trade institutions inside the European Union, and sometime partners against terrorism like Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, according to officials and an N.S.A. map that indicates sites of what the agency calls "computer network exploitation."

"What's new here is the scale and the sophistication of the intelligence agency's ability to get into computers and networks to which no one has ever had access before," said James Andrew Lewis, the cybersecurity expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "Some of these capabilities have been around for a while, but the combination of learning how to penetrate systems to insert software and learning how to do that using radio fre

N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway Into Computers

By david e. sanger and thom shanker = jan. 14, 2014

= URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
= Image: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.jpg
== Coverage #1: http://news.slashdot.org/story/14/01/15/1324216/nyt-nsa-put-100000-radio-pathway-backdoors-in-pcs
== Coverage #2: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
== Coverage #3: http://rt.com/usa/nsa-radio-wave-cyberattack-607/
=== Archive: http://web.archive.org/web/20140116010210/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html

"WASHINGTON - The National Security Agency has implanted software in nearly 100,000 computers around the world that allows the United States to conduct surveillance on those machines and can also create a digital highway for launching cyberattacks.

While most of the software is inserted by gaining access to computer networks, the N.S.A. has increasingly made use of a secret technology that enables it to enter and alter data in computers even if they are not connected to the Internet, according to N.S.A. documents, computer experts and American officials.

The technology, which the agency has used since at least 2008, relies on a covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted surreptitiously into the computers. In some cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size relay station that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target.

The radio frequency technology has helped solve one of the biggest problems facing American intelligence agencies for years: getting into computers that adversaries, and some American partners, have tried to make impervious to spying or cyberattack. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware must be physically inserted by a spy, a manufacturer or an unwitting user.

The N.S.A. calls its efforts more an act of "active defense" against foreign cyberattacks than a tool to go on the offensive. But when Chinese attackers place similar software on the computer systems of American companies or government agencies, American officials have protested, often at the presidential level.

Among the most frequent targets of the N.S.A. and its Pentagon partner, United States Cyber Command, have been units of the Chinese Army, which the United States has accused of launching regular digital probes and attacks on American industrial and military targets, usually to steal secrets or intellectual property. But the program, code-named Quantum, has also been successful in inserting software into Russian military networks and systems used by the Mexican police and drug cartels, trade institutions inside the European Union, and sometime partners against terrorism like Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, according to officials and an N.S.A. map that indicates sites of what the agency calls "computer network exploitation."

"What's new here is the scale and the sophistication of the intelligence agency's ability to get into computers and networks to which no one has ever had access before," said James Andrew Lewis, the cybersecurity expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "Some of these capabilities have been around for a while, but the combination of learning how to penetrate systems to insert software and learning how to do that using radio fre

N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway Into Computers

By david e. sanger and thom shanker = jan. 14, 2014

= URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
=Image: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.jpg
== Coverage #1: http://news.slashdot.org/story/14/01/15/1324216/nyt-nsa-put-100000-radio-pathway-backdoors-in-pcs
== Coverage #2: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
== Coverage #3: http://rt.com/usa/nsa-radio-wave-cyberattack-607/
=== Archive: http://web.archive.org/web/20140116010210/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html

"WASHINGTON - The National Security Agency has implanted software in nearly 100,000 computers around the world that allows the United States to conduct surveillance on those machines and can also create a digital highway for launching cyberattacks.

While most of the software is inserted by gaining access to computer networks, the N.S.A. has increasingly made use of a secret technology that enables it to enter and alter data in computers even if they are not connected to the Internet, according to N.S.A. documents, computer experts and American officials.

The technology, which the agency has used since at least 2008, relies on a covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted surreptitiously into the computers. In some cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size relay station that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target.

The radio frequency technology has helped solve one of the biggest problems facing American intelligence agencies for years: getting into computers that adversaries, and some American partners, have tried to make impervious to spying or cyberattack. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware must be physically inserted by a spy, a manufacturer or an unwitting user.

The N.S.A. calls its efforts more an act of "active defense" against foreign cyberattacks than a tool to go on the offensive. But when Chinese attackers place similar software on the computer systems of American companies or government agencies, American officials have protested, often at the presidential level.

Among the most frequent targets of the N.S.A. and its Pentagon partner, United States Cyber Command, have been units of the Chinese Army, which the United States has accused of launching regular digital probes and attacks on American industrial and military targets, usually to steal secrets or intellectual property. But the program, code-named Quantum, has also been successful in inserting software into Russian military networks and systems used by the Mexican police and drug cartels, trade institutions inside the European Union, and sometime partners against terrorism like Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, according to officials and an N.S.A. map that indicates sites of what the agency calls "computer network exploitation."

"Whatâ(TM)s new here is the scale and the sophistication of the intelligence agencyâ(TM)s ability to get into computers and networks to which no one has ever had access before," said James Andrew Lewis, the cybersecurity expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "Some of these capabilities have been around for a while, but the combination of learning how to penetrate systems to insert software and learning how to do tha

N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway Into Computers

By david e. sanger and thom shanker = jan. 14, 2014

= URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
=Image: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.jpg
== Coverage #1: http://news.slashdot.org/story/14/01/15/1324216/nyt-nsa-put-100000-radio-pathway-backdoors-in-pcs
== Coverage #2: http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
== Coverage #3: http://rt.com/usa/nsa-radio-wave-cyberattack-607/
=== Archive: http://web.archive.org/web/20140116010210/http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html

"WASHINGTON - The National Security Agency has implanted software in nearly 100,000 computers around the world that allows the United States to conduct surveillance on those machines and can also create a digital highway for launching cyberattacks.

While most of the software is inserted by gaining access to computer networks, the N.S.A. has increasingly made use of a secret technology that enables it to enter and alter data in computers even if they are not connected to the Internet, according to N.S.A. documents, computer experts and American officials.

The technology, which the agency has used since at least 2008, relies on a covert channel of radio waves that can be transmitted from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted surreptitiously into the computers. In some cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size relay station that intelligence agencies can set up miles away from the target.

The radio frequency technology has helped solve one of the biggest problems facing American intelligence agencies for years: getting into computers that adversaries, and some American partners, have tried to make impervious to spying or cyberattack. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware must be physically inserted by a spy, a manufacturer or an unwitting user.

The N.S.A. calls its efforts more an act of "active defense" against foreign cyberattacks than a tool to go on the offensive. But when Chinese attackers place similar software on the computer systems of American companies or government agencies, American officials have protested, often at the presidential level.

Among the most frequent targets of the N.S.A. and its Pentagon partner, United States Cyber Command, have been units of the Chinese Army, which the United States has accused of launching regular digital probes and attacks on American industrial and military targets, usually to steal secrets or intellectual property. But the program, code-named Quantum, has also been successful in inserting software into Russian military networks and systems used by the Mexican police and drug cartels, trade institutions inside the European Union, and sometime partners against terrorism like Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan, according to officials and an N.S.A. map that indicates sites of what the agency calls "computer network exploitation."

"Whatâ(TM)s new here is the scale and the sophistication of the intelligence agencyâ(TM)s ability to get into computers and networks to which no one has ever had access before," said James Andrew Lewis, the cybersecurity expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "Some of these capabilities have been around for a while, but the combination of learning how to penetrate systems to insert software and learning how to do tha

The NSA claims that it doesn't steal trade secrets from foreign companies in order to give US businesses a competitive edge. I suspect they are lying, given that it seems like they lie about everything, and that we already have reason to suspect they are lying about this in particular.

The NSA, like other intelligence agencies, prefers to say nothing. That isn't the same thing as lying. As to the rest ...

Why We Spy on Our Allies
Boeing Called A Target Of French Spy Effort

In my mind, we are trying to accomplish the same thing as the Chinese, just via a different means (or probably, via both means). Yet we criticize them as if we are somehow morally superior in the way we do it.

Suppose you are trying to improve your personal economics by increasing the amount of money you have in the bank. You could cut back on your spending, open a new business, or steal. Are some of those morally superior to another? Diplomacy is preferable to war, trade and exchange are preferable to espionage. Other countries are free to not accept US positions on trade and treaties, just as the US is in return. Countries don't really have a say about Chinese espionage.

I think you need to rethink some things.

Sorry, but you are misinformed about the facts.

Why We Spy on Our Allies
Boeing Called A Target Of French Spy Effort

The whistleblowing aspect is over, the press is now releasing the news at a rate they seem fit after sorting, clearing.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
As for Snowden what are the options - freedom in Russia beyond the ~ one year point.
Options:
Find another nations embassy in Russia and stay? Doing a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%B3zsef_Mindszenty for many years?
The US seemed to have hinted at its intent with the EU airspace issue so getting to another country will be interesting.
Try the Russian legal system and get long term papers?
The US needs to show what they will do to any whistleblowing but still seem to want to reduced the optics of any capture.

The whistleblowing aspect is over, the press is now releasing the news at a rate they seem fit after sorting, clearing.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
As for Snowden what are the options - freedom in Russia beyond the ~ one year point.
Options:
Find another nations embassy in Russia and stay? Doing a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%B3zsef_Mindszenty for many years?
The US seemed to have hinted at its intent with the EU airspace issue so getting to another country will be interesting.
Try the Russian legal system and get long term papers?
The US needs to show what they will do to any whistleblowing but still seem to want to reduced the optics of any capture.

The Ellsberg days are over, There is no open court for cleared material. You face the same people you are wanting the press to know about with your cleared lawyer... in a sealed court. Nothing will ever get out and you still face a US court.
Many good people in the US have tried the US court path, some with political protection. After the Ellsberg generation nothing much ever gets out to the tame press anymore.
http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/whistleblowing/whistleblowing.htm
Getting out was the only way to get to the press. Now the press is releasing the material in its own way and the wider public can understand what they are getting when they use crypto.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
Russia just has to wait and see if the info has been pre sorted, is bait, a trap or has unique internal errors to track Russian spies within the USA.
Russia would be very careful with any free press material vs a person they understand working for them deep with in the US gov over years.

The Ellsberg days are over, There is no open court for cleared material. You face the same people you are wanting the press to know about with your cleared lawyer... in a sealed court. Nothing will ever get out and you still face a US court.
Many good people in the US have tried the US court path, some with political protection. After the Ellsberg generation nothing much ever gets out to the tame press anymore.
http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/whistleblowing/whistleblowing.htm
Getting out was the only way to get to the press. Now the press is releasing the material in its own way and the wider public can understand what they are getting when they use crypto.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
Russia just has to wait and see if the info has been pre sorted, is bait, a trap or has unique internal errors to track Russian spies within the USA.
Russia would be very careful with any free press material vs a person they understand working for them deep with in the US gov over years.

The Ellsberg days are over, There is no open court for cleared material. You face the same people you are wanting the press to know about with your cleared lawyer... in a sealed court. Nothing will ever get out and you still face a US court.
Many good people in the US have tried the US court path, some with political protection. After the Ellsberg generation nothing much ever gets out to the tame press anymore.
http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/whistleblowing/whistleblowing.htm
Getting out was the only way to get to the press. Now the press is releasing the material in its own way and the wider public can understand what they are getting when they use crypto.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
Russia just has to wait and see if the info has been pre sorted, is bait, a trap or has unique internal errors to track Russian spies within the USA.
Russia would be very careful with any free press material vs a person they understand working for them deep with in the US gov over years.

Re 4. Searching for Prescient Search Queries
Would be fun for the http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm lists
2. Types of Sock puppets vs Time Travelers?

The physical access to the device has now been cleared up.
"The way that the NSA and GCHQ compromise devices with QUANTUMNATION does not require physical access - that is merely one way to compromise an iPhone." http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm

Where, how and who would this help?
You would need to get between then 'house' and the exchange or telco http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_loop_carrier
With this method you would be free of any skilled unique ethernet packet logging after the 'modem' in the home network.
The main win for this would be the speed offered locally. While your real packets are still finding that best effort or dedicated loop out of your state, country the "wiretap" has won the networking race.
A cheap version of MINERALIZE and RADON. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm

Hi, NSA, I hope you have a good day!

I can see variations of these being sold without informing the consumer of their real spying capabilities.

Power Pwn:

http://hardware.slashdot.org/story/12/07/22/0335223/the-darpa-funded-power-strip-that-will-hack-your-network
http://pwnieexpress.com/
http://pwnieexpress.com/blogs/news
http://www.zdnet.com/power-pwn-this-darpa-funded-power-strip-will-hack-your-network-7000001331/
(PDF) http://cryptome.org/2012/07/cbp072312.pdf

With advice on air gaps, help people find/write better code, cpu and networking http://yro.slashdot.org/story/13/06/28/0136202/richard-stallman-speaks-about-back-doors-after-nsa-documents-leak
That would help some physical sites. Get people thinking about crypto - the historical ways in during pre ww2, ww2, the cold war, 1990's and via the good news from Snowden.
Re conscientious objection - support mainstream and alternative media, legal rights groups and educators all over the political spectrum.
Learn from work done in US courts like: http://www.freedomwatchusa.org/court-declares-nsa-spying-program-unconstitutional-and-grant
Parallel construction https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/dea-and-nsa-team-intelligence-laundering
The domestic legal vision of a life long box for all your phone calls
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2013/06/surveillance_lockbox_why_can_the_nsa_search_your_phone_records_without_a.html
Start *any* discussion is the best thing you can do. Long worded emails to the press about material they covered with all the terms they used and your insights :)
Like in East Germany, standing in front of the Church with a sign, you will be *noted* by a powerful State but a lot of people will read your wise words.
Read all you can: http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/whistleblowing/whistleblowing.htm is not new :)

We all recall how DES ended up long term Cold: weakened http://cryptome.org/jya/cracking-des/cracking-des.htm

Nice talking points AC.
RE: 2. How much can you trust Snowden
Most of that would have been picked up on by http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/whistleblowing/whistleblowing.htm and many others with gov document/tech skills known/trusted by to the press around the world.
The press know they cannot publish 'junk' again and again.
The press goto people with document skills and get some background re the dates and content - too old, new, wrong format, layout, names, locations, style, fonts - something stands out if its spiked, sorted, faked, pre packaged as 'junk'.
Snowden like material has also passed an open US court thanks to the great work by http://www.freedomwatchusa.org/federal-judge-rules-against-nsa
Thats a lot of work done by the press, in court and by diverse US political/legal viewpoints.

Tempest started in for real in the early 1950's by the CIA. The UK discovered the same method via a cypher machine allowing plain text. The early use by the UK was against keyboard using a microphone - e.g. Egyptian Embassy in London under an ~1956 operation called "Engulf".
http://cryptome.org/tempest-time.htm
The US and UK later targeted the French embassy cypher machines in London and Washington until the early 1960's. France finally installed copper shielding in the early 1960's :)
The real trick with tempest was allowing US/UK and NATO allies to have a system safe from Soviet man in the middle attacks along a telco/radio like network but allow plain text to be totally captured as entered/printed by the NSA/GCHQ and others.
The range was a problem- acoustic, electromagnetic fields, type of power supply - a few hundred yards.
The use of microwave or laser beam systems could also be used to get some neat reverberations from a room of interest e.g. as the plain text message was typed on the keyboard.
In the 1960's the UK did their best to ensure that NATO was safe from tempest via Soviet efforts but always held back just enough information to ensure its own efforts where still usable :)
Sell junk kit to NATO allies, neutrals - get all the plain text - just like todays perfect "academic, gov and .com" passed internet junk crypto standards :)
As for the CPU and sound ?? Your US "OS", your US/UK encryption, malware all seems to be waiting for 'free' or on expensive systems :)

Cold the world is filled with NSA and GCHQ surveillance in the form of junk telco crypto.
"More and more countries are beefing up their" cryptographic "capabilities as a result of his revelations" that what the US and UK sold them was junk.
"Diplomatic relations among many nations are now strained" as the NSA, GCHQ and a few random "other" trusted nations, their staff, ex staff and contractors and ex contractors have the crypto keys to international and domestic telco networks.
That access is all for sale to the highest bidder over time. Not a good place for any gov to be in.
... "cooperation with allies and beefing up their own intelligence agencies" was basically trusted telco staff in other countries allowing all their nations data to flow to the NSA and GCHQ over decades. Banking, trade deals, political conversations, emerging science, export deals ... once thought to be secure where lost to a "few" other nations in real time.
Political leaders where handed "safe" phones by their own expert staff only to find the phone is a total crypto fail.
Can they trust their own top staff? If the top staff where happy to help the UK, USA, a few other countries and contractors over decades- who else are they helping?
As for the "Russian asset" talking point - all the whistleblowing data is in the hands of a few people in the "press".... Russia knows the info could be a trap and would be very careful about trusting any of it.
Over time more Snowden docs will be released. Readers can follow the interesting pace on sites like http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
Countries will rebuild their own domestic networks, political communications networks and their academics will hopefully be more creative and wise.
Remember cold if the NSA and GCHQ can get into any telco system - so any other 'group' over time. Communications security for all or plain text junk for all.

Lack of trust goes down the entire cryptography academic/testing/science/sales/code US/UK branding.
Few have faith in US or UK gov testing of US or UK cryptography and the list covers a few sections of US and UK exports:
US or UK academic teaching of US or UK cryptography?
US or UK press reporting on US or UK cryptography?
US or UK brands testing of US or UK export quality cryptography?
US or UK brands selling of US or UK export quality cryptography?
The NSA and GCHQ wanted into cheap junk global telco and networking cryptography - the NSA set the standards, tame US brands sold it cheap and the US gov spread telco deregulation on the US telco loop pricing.
Most govs know what weak junk telco encryption results in - telco and networking access for 'all' not just a few trusted US and UK gov NSA/GCHQ 'teams' and friendly nations.
All the hardware, software, codes and sales are now tainted as expensive junk open to 'any' gov or ex staff or commercial group or criminal or faith based interests at a price.
Then you have the legal questions in the USA facing a new round of court challenges and law reform or efforts.
As for "anybody saying that things" http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/whistleblowing/whistleblowing.htm
Thanks to Snowden, a lot of costly junk encryption can now be fixed and networks secured around the world :)

Yeah, right.

http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf

No spying on BT's part whatsoever.

CAPTCHA: tutoring

LOL cold, many NSA/US gov/mil whistleblowers have been in the US court system http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/whistleblowing/whistleblowing.htm
The US gov likes to try color of law, state secrets and really push the need for expensive cleared legal staff to keep the tame US press away.
The US Constitution covers all actions by the NSA domestically and no US "gov" granted US "immunity" laws can legally out pace that :)
In the end the staff are usually cleared and internal changes are 'made' just to make the cases fail to gain any more domestic traction and US press attention.
Then you had Snowden who did the smart thing and went to the press, escaping the 'internal' US gov legal trap that is domestic whistleblower protections.

http://cryptome.org/0001/gsm-a5-files.htm

A few links to further information and some history on this topic http://cryptome.org/0001/gsm-a5-files.htm

Many governments have warned industrialists not to discuss secrets when using a mobile phone near the country borders. Only the radio channels are encrypted in GSM, lawful interception happens on the wired network that interconnects the base stations so eavesdropping on A5/1 is mostly used when lawful interception is not an option, e.g. listening to the GSM traffic of other countries.

http://cryptome.org/jya/cg071599.htm

7 December 2013

http://cryptome.org/2013/12/tor-anon-access.htm

"I was thinking about whether anonymous access to the first server, however desirable, might or might not be attainable."

There's been proof before, just Snowden's expose AND the US Gov's reaction to it made it more obvious.
http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/2/2889/1.html
http://cryptome.org/jya/echelon-dc.htm
http://cryptome.org/echelon-baby.htm

There's been proof before, just Snowden's expose AND the US Gov's reaction to it made it more obvious.
http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/2/2889/1.html
http://cryptome.org/jya/echelon-dc.htm
http://cryptome.org/echelon-baby.htm

Is Anonymous Access to TOR Attainable?

7 December 2013

http://cryptome.org/2013/12/tor-anon-access.htm

"I was thinking about whether anonymous access to the first server, however desirable, might or might not be attainable."

This interesting item may help them understand. Nice to have mad NSA crypto skilz, but if you can count on telco's and ISP's to bug customers' routers for you, why go to all that trouble, much less seek warrants or observe due process?

Did you actually read "the presentation leaked @ cryptome"

4 September 2013

This document is claimed to be a hoax by Hacker News, the page follows.

The original document:

http://cryptome.org/2013/09/computer-forensics-2013-hoax.pdf

The authentic document upon which it is allegedly based:

http://cryptome.org/2013/09/computer-forensics-2012.pdf

For fuck's sake, didn't the presenters' names tip you off? "Detective Stu Pitt and Detective Laughlin Foo"

PS: Oh, and the presentation it was based on is linked from the last slide of the "super-sikret leak" itself, and is a pretty interesting read in itself.

Did you actually read "the presentation leaked @ cryptome"

4 September 2013

This document is claimed to be a hoax by Hacker News, the page follows.

The original document:

http://cryptome.org/2013/09/computer-forensics-2013-hoax.pdf

The authentic document upon which it is allegedly based:

http://cryptome.org/2013/09/computer-forensics-2012.pdf

For fuck's sake, didn't the presenters' names tip you off? "Detective Stu Pitt and Detective Laughlin Foo"

PS: Oh, and the presentation it was based on is linked from the last slide of the "super-sikret leak" itself, and is a pretty interesting read in itself.

Did you actually read "the presentation leaked @ cryptome"

4 September 2013

This document is claimed to be a hoax by Hacker News, the page follows.

The original document:

http://cryptome.org/2013/09/computer-forensics-2013-hoax.pdf

The authentic document upon which it is allegedly based:

http://cryptome.org/2013/09/computer-forensics-2012.pdf

For fuck's sake, didn't the presenters' names tip you off? "Detective Stu Pitt and Detective Laughlin Foo"

PS: Oh, and the presentation it was based on is linked from the last slide of the "super-sikret leak" itself, and is a pretty interesting read in itself.

[Citation Needed.]

Major data encryption software like TrueCrypt, Microsoft BitLocker, FileVault, BestCrypt etc have backdoors which allows access to data without the key.

This was disclosed as per a presentation leaked @ http://cryptome.org/ which was given by Detective Michael Smith. Computer Crimes & Computer Forensics, Linn County Sheriff’s Office.

Although NCMEC (National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) says that they use it for detecting child pornography but the discloser itself is sufficient to raise doubts on NSA-corporate bond again

http://hackingly.org/nsa/backdoor-in-truecrypt-bitlocker-filevault-281.html

Just that the 'abuse power' aspect has been noted in the EU over the past years. All that GCHQ/NSA encryption and hardware skill set has passed into a few EU tech staff hands too.
A few times it seems to make the press or is reflected back in the wider EU legal system.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SISMI-Telecom_scandal
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_wiretapping_case_2004–05
As for Snowden all the docs are in the hands of the press for the 'press' to sort, publish, keep, hold.. as they wish over time.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm the amount of data published so far and on what topics.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm

Just that the 'abuse power' aspect has been noted in the EU over the past years. All that GCHQ/NSA encryption and hardware skill set has passed into a few EU tech staff hands too.
A few times it seems to make the press or is reflected back in the wider EU legal system.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SISMI-Telecom_scandal
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_wiretapping_case_2004–05
As for Snowden all the docs are in the hands of the press for the 'press' to sort, publish, keep, hold.. as they wish over time.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm the amount of data published so far and on what topics.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm

False flag type or limited hangout? To speed up the domestic legal acceptance of a court usable all calls data into a national "lock box"?
Problems with the Snowden timeline? Getting from the CIA to a contractor with the NSA - who cleaned/reviewed the record and let the NSA/contractor continue with the hiring process?.
The gatekeeper/time frame for release on the documents?
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm "Tally now 548 pages (~1%) of reported 50,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.25% of that released)."
Re Queue the outrage as the Bruce Schneier interview at ~5.05 "technically is really a surprise" - this has all so far been hinted at in the open press for years.
The tame complicity of US brands, no legal protections, junk weakened gov standard encryption, no help for academia...
5.48 is an interesting point - the weak US encryption is for sale by contractors, ex staff and former staff to "anyone" with the cash.

Warning the US military about the start of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tet_Offensive in 1968 South Vietnam.
Listening to Soviet manned space missions and missile tests.
Tunnels under embassies and distant submarine missions.

Yes, from their genesis as a Black Chamber there has been some amazing derring-do

But I DO get the impression that something happened recently -- within in the past 20 years -- that has prepared the Agency to pull out all the stops and go whole-vacuum-cleaner on everyone.

Look at what remains in plain sight of UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 18 [27 July 1993] I liken this document to a 'Posse Comitatus Act' of domestic SIGINT. While some may be inclined to vivisect its language into a series of loopholes, each redaction leading down some great rabbit hole of collateral permissiveness... I am grateful that it has existed in some form.

Directive 18, and other post-Church apparatus is a clue that there were people within the Agency who were personally shocked to learn of the excesses of those SHAMROCK years. People who realized that if such things became hard-coded into the establishment, some day there may not be a 'home' worth coming home to. A paradise for future Stalins, a trove of cradle-to-grave intercepts. Where are those people today and what do they think?

The idea presented now seems to be of a past 10 year flood of contractors with 'self written clearances', linguists, the cloud and political requests that have re shaped the domestic missions.

The post-9/11 moron intelligentsia horde -- a flood of younger recruits who have signed away some of their own rights in the granting of Secret and above, what a rush that is, like taking the red pill -- may be privy to front ends like PRISM which sounds essentially like a value-added data portal.

I am not interested in them. Those agents are the 'secret consumers' whose access is supposed to be compartmentalized. They are the boy scouts on their best behavior.

I am interested in who started the program of backbone taps with dark-fiber shunts and assembl;ed the data for the back-end. The shadow-Google that had begun crawling fiber communications systematically and (in time) ever more completely, with complete and casual disregard to the almost wholly domestic nature of what was being tapped. I think alleged Level 3 compliance is the tip the iceberg, a few choice conduits of convenience. I also think there may be a few taps buried out there in the wind-swept American heartland, say where a road crew appeared one evening and did a mysteriously meticulous job of cleaning up afterward.

Here's my completely hypothetical timeline, I wonder how close it is to reality.

In the 1980s we have indications (Bamford, Puzzle Palace) that continental-yet border communications links were prime targets, just as they had always been out of country.

The 1990s would have been the time this scaled up quickly with no adherence to Charter or Directive 18 intended. Perhaps the Principals were sold on the idea that all communications were to be parsed but (magically) only jurisdictional traffic was to be forwarded. The bandwidth of dark fiber leading from these intercept points would yield a clue as to whether the architects believed this convenient fiction.

Post 9/11 all stops are removed, but a great deal of the back-end is already in place.

And now the Fizzle-Zap-Utah facility and it's brethren whose primary purpose may not merely be to process but to store un-parsed data whose retention violates the spirit (and possibly letter) of Directive 18. A trove for future despots

It seems that you are the one that either believes nonsense or is confused about the facts. Do you have any proof of that the NSA is giving business secrets to US companies? I don't recall that there has been any proof of that, only wild speculation. But maybe you are confusing these revelations with this? You probably have things backwards in more than one way.

GCHQ is based in a donut and work around tea.
NSA is based in a shiny box and work around coffee.

GCHQ has invented some good stuff (like PKI - but they didn't tell anyone about it until the papers were declassified) http://cryptome.org/ukpk-alt.htm

http://www.theregister.co.uk/1999/09/06/brit_net_agency_to_track/
http://cryptome.org/jya/uk-crackers.htm
Back in 1999 with hints back to 1996 and 'cracking a code in ... two weeks' :)

Luckily, our "Allies" are above that, but, what of the future with these people now?

Fact is the governments of the US ally countries don't care that the USA spies on them, they already know the US spies on them and their citizens, and some may have even helped to do it- it's been an open secret for at least a decade - UKUSA, Echelon and all that. The Australians even blabbed about it: http://web.archive.org/web/19990826082232/http://theage.com.au/daily/990523/news/news3.html
NZ too: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0105/S00104.htm
http://cryptome.org/echelon.htm
http://cryptome.org/echelon-baby.htm

Think about it - if they were really that pissed off they wouldn't have stopped the Bolivian ambassador's plane just because they thought Snowden was on it. Why for instance would France do that if France was so pissed off with the USA spying on them? Why wouldn't France instead give Snowden asylum? Heck they gave Roman Polanski asylum. So wouldn't Snowden be more deserving?

Therefore all the fuss they are making now is:
1) A show to placate the masses.
2) Haggling to get stuff/concessions/goodies from the USA

A note to the NSA cheerleaders. It should be obvious that you cannot allow your spy agency to freely spy on those who are supposed to regulate or rein in your spy agency. The NSA lying to Congress proves that they are out of control. And if the NSA gets away with lying to Congress and doing all that illegal stuff, that should make you ask who really is in control.

As for the NSA shills, you bunch are a despicable traitorous lot.

Luckily, our "Allies" are above that, but, what of the future with these people now?

Fact is the governments of the US ally countries don't care that the USA spies on them, they already know the US spies on them and their citizens, and some may have even helped to do it- it's been an open secret for at least a decade - UKUSA, Echelon and all that. The Australians even blabbed about it: http://web.archive.org/web/19990826082232/http://theage.com.au/daily/990523/news/news3.html
NZ too: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0105/S00104.htm
http://cryptome.org/echelon.htm
http://cryptome.org/echelon-baby.htm

Think about it - if they were really that pissed off they wouldn't have stopped the Bolivian ambassador's plane just because they thought Snowden was on it. Why for instance would France do that if France was so pissed off with the USA spying on them? Why wouldn't France instead give Snowden asylum? Heck they gave Roman Polanski asylum. So wouldn't Snowden be more deserving?

Therefore all the fuss they are making now is:
1) A show to placate the masses.
2) Haggling to get stuff/concessions/goodies from the USA

A note to the NSA cheerleaders. It should be obvious that you cannot allow your spy agency to freely spy on those who are supposed to regulate or rein in your spy agency. The NSA lying to Congress proves that they are out of control. And if the NSA gets away with lying to Congress and doing all that illegal stuff, that should make you ask who really is in control.

As for the NSA shills, you bunch are a despicable traitorous lot.

A good interview to ~spy "masters have won the game" http://cryptome.org/2013/11/cryptome-la-repubblica.htm
People are now aware of junk encryption, the gov standards groups that set it, the academics that taught it, the developers that promoted it, the brands that sold/rented it.
The trust in the US/UK is gone. Enjoy the products for fun. Staff will be looking to new domestic solutions where real quality is needed.
The sock puppets can no longer have equal standing with 'no surveillance", surveillance is not legal, domestic surveillance is never done, the stock market would correct surveillance, lawyers would notice surveillance, the press would write about surveillance, political leaders would expose surveillance by the other parties, surveillance hardware would never work at that scale...over generations..
So we have won against the sock puppets, the rest is with good people in many different govs to work out if they like junk encryption and their local staff that maintains it.