Slashdot Mirror

Heh-heh. The N.Y. Times posted copies of the court's opinion and Apple's '91 Trademark Agreement with the Beatles.

Heh-heh. The N.Y. Times posted copies of the court's opinion and Apple's '91 Trademark Agreement with the Beatles.

>WMD actually have been found in Iraq as well as the intent to manufacture them.

After a huge effort with teams of experts and complete freedom to inspect sites and empty out filing cabinets, this is what we found:
The Duelfer Report

>Iraq harbored terrorists and in fact supported the 9/11 attacks.

President Bush says differently. On September 18 2003 he told reports in DC "We have no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the 11 September attacks" . Do you disbelieve the President?

If you disbelieve the President, that has interesting implications. Remember that President Bush has informed us that "God speaks through me". If you don't believe in what the President says, you don't believe in God.

The senior President Bush had this to say about people who don't believe in God: "No, I don't know that atheists should be considered as citizens, nor should they be considered as patriots. This is one nation under God. ".

If you're not a citizen, you don't have the rights of a citizen. There's a court ruling that you don't even have habeas corpus.

Being Anonymous Coward won't help you. The government can subpoena Slashdot or show them a National Security Letter demanding their logs. USAPATRIOT second 215 says they don't even need a court order.

Here's the indictment(pdf warning) with some more details on what he did. What I find most shocking is that it took them a WHOLE YEAR to figure out something was going on(like accounts missing, people talking to ghostwriters through WordPad, etc).

The 6th Amendment

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Note that this text lacks any requirement that the accused be a US citizen (not that that matters in the case of Jose Padilla). Note that the text lacks a clause of "but not if the accused is a really, really bad person." Nor is there a limit on borders within the US government must behave. Now, what part of locking up prisoners indefinitely in Guantanimo Bay without charges, without access to lawyers, without access to a jury trial, and without access to all witnesses against them is not in violation of the text above?

This government wanted to go even further than that. They actually argued unsuccessfully before the 9th Federal Circuit Court of Appeals that prisoners in Guantanimo have no standing to challenge their detention and treatment even if they were being tortured and summarily executed!

Regardless of what you think about the guilt or innocence of terrorist suspects, there is a truly frightening aspect to the idea that this government has asserted its right to "war powers" in an indefinite length conflict against terrorism to abduct people worldwide (including US citizens like Jose Padilla) and hold them indefinitely in overseas prisons where they assert the right to torture and execute them with no judicial oversight. The only qualifications to fall into this legal black hole is that the government says that you're an "enemy combatant" or a "terrorist suspect" and to be successfully seized and flown out of country. After that, they would argue that you essentially have no rights. There is a reason we have rule of law and protections for the accused -- to prevent people from being disappeared, Soviet-style.

Wake me up if/when impeachment proceedings start. Otherwise, stop spreading FUD.

Impeachment means nothing. It's a partisan political tool now. Clinton was impeached and threatened with removal from office for lying under Oath about an act of sexual infidelity. Bush has essentially wiped his rear end with the Constitution, defied Congress repeatedly, and blatantly broken laws meant to restrain Presidential power, and because the Congress is controlled by his own party, nothing will happen to him.

Saying that he's innocent of crimes because his own buddies won't hold him accountable displays a cowardly and contemptable disregard for reality and standards of law.

One's reading habits furnish telltale clues to those who are bent on bending us to one point of view. What one buys at the hardware and retail stores may furnish clues to potential uses of wires, soap powders, and the like used by criminals. A mandatory recording of all telephone conversations would be better than the recording of checks under the Bank Secrecy Act, if Big Brother is to have his way. The records of checks - now available to the investigators - are highly useful. In a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examining them the agents get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections, religious affiliation, educational interests, the papers and magazines he reads, and so on ad infinitum. These are all tied to one's social security number; and now that we have the data banks, these other items will enrich that storehouse and make it possible for a bureaucrat - by pushing one button - to get in an instant the names of the 190 million Americans who are subversives or potential and likely candidates.

The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32 (ie the Armed Services), under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard. - U.S. Code : Title 10 : Section 311(a)

The miltia is (and always has been) that portion of the population able (and hence expected) to take up arms and defend their country.

"Whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it." -- Declaration of Independence

"America is at that awkward stage. It's too late to work within the system, but too early to shoot the bastards." -- Claire Wolfe 101 Things to Do 'Til the Revolution

This hasn't happened yet, so there's no case law. I suspect that, if a sitting President remained 'in office' past January 20, someone would file a lawsuit that gets fast-tracked to the Supreme Court. (If a State filed the lawsuit, the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction, and sit as a trial court. 28 U.S.C. 1251.) Since the 20th Amendment plainly states that the President's term ends on January 20th at noon, I believe the Court would rule that the person inhabiting the White House is, as a matter of law, not the President. The ex-President would be subject to a bench warrant for arrest (for a raft of crimes, the least of which is probably impersonating the President), and any action taken by anyone in support of that person could then be construed as conspiracy to commit sedition against the legitimate government. If the former President had substantial support in the military, then there might be a fracturing of the Armed Forces, and a civil war, with the losing side subject to summary execution for treason. I seriously doubt it would come to that, though. There are (still, thankfully) far too many sane people in this country.

I'd like whatever authority that the administration *imagines* gives them the power to do warantless wiretaps specifically removed.

You mean, the authority to provide for the common defense? That authority? Constitutional law is a tricky area when the policies specifically endorsed by the document come into conflict. Here's a choice quote from Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 389-390 (2004):

Executive privilege is an extraordinary assertion of power "not to be lightly invoked." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). Once executive privilege is asserted, coequal branches of the Government are set on a collision course. The Judiciary is forced into the difficult task of balancing the need for information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive's Article II prerogatives. This inquiry places courts in the awkward position of evaluating the Executive's claims of confidentiality and autonomy, and pushes to the fore difficult questions of separation of powers and checks and balances. These "occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches" should be avoided whenever possible. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692 (1974).

NSA wiretaps of communications between citizens located domestically and others abroad fall under the 'privacy versus defense' rubric, and they may or may not be constitutional. On the one side, you have the authority to provide for the common defense, and on the other, the privacy protections of the 4th and 14th Amendments (and maybe a few others besides). It depends on how the Supreme Court thinks the particular policies behind the laws play against each other, in light of the real facts of the case (as opposed to the media's take), and, shockingly enough, how well the lawyers write briefs and argue. I'm not going to dismissively cl

This hasn't happened yet, so there's no case law. I suspect that, if a sitting President remained 'in office' past January 20, someone would file a lawsuit that gets fast-tracked to the Supreme Court. (If a State filed the lawsuit, the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction, and sit as a trial court. 28 U.S.C. 1251.) Since the 20th Amendment plainly states that the President's term ends on January 20th at noon, I believe the Court would rule that the person inhabiting the White House is, as a matter of law, not the President. The ex-President would be subject to a bench warrant for arrest (for a raft of crimes, the least of which is probably impersonating the President), and any action taken by anyone in support of that person could then be construed as conspiracy to commit sedition against the legitimate government. If the former President had substantial support in the military, then there might be a fracturing of the Armed Forces, and a civil war, with the losing side subject to summary execution for treason. I seriously doubt it would come to that, though. There are (still, thankfully) far too many sane people in this country.

I'd like whatever authority that the administration *imagines* gives them the power to do warantless wiretaps specifically removed.

You mean, the authority to provide for the common defense? That authority? Constitutional law is a tricky area when the policies specifically endorsed by the document come into conflict. Here's a choice quote from Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 389-390 (2004):

Executive privilege is an extraordinary assertion of power "not to be lightly invoked." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). Once executive privilege is asserted, coequal branches of the Government are set on a collision course. The Judiciary is forced into the difficult task of balancing the need for information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive's Article II prerogatives. This inquiry places courts in the awkward position of evaluating the Executive's claims of confidentiality and autonomy, and pushes to the fore difficult questions of separation of powers and checks and balances. These "occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches" should be avoided whenever possible. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692 (1974).

NSA wiretaps of communications between citizens located domestically and others abroad fall under the 'privacy versus defense' rubric, and they may or may not be constitutional. On the one side, you have the authority to provide for the common defense, and on the other, the privacy protections of the 4th and 14th Amendments (and maybe a few others besides). It depends on how the Supreme Court thinks the particular policies behind the laws play against each other, in light of the real facts of the case (as opposed to the media's take), and, shockingly enough, how well the lawyers write briefs and argue. I'm not going to dismissively cl

This hasn't happened yet, so there's no case law. I suspect that, if a sitting President remained 'in office' past January 20, someone would file a lawsuit that gets fast-tracked to the Supreme Court. (If a State filed the lawsuit, the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction, and sit as a trial court. 28 U.S.C. 1251.) Since the 20th Amendment plainly states that the President's term ends on January 20th at noon, I believe the Court would rule that the person inhabiting the White House is, as a matter of law, not the President. The ex-President would be subject to a bench warrant for arrest (for a raft of crimes, the least of which is probably impersonating the President), and any action taken by anyone in support of that person could then be construed as conspiracy to commit sedition against the legitimate government. If the former President had substantial support in the military, then there might be a fracturing of the Armed Forces, and a civil war, with the losing side subject to summary execution for treason. I seriously doubt it would come to that, though. There are (still, thankfully) far too many sane people in this country.

I'd like whatever authority that the administration *imagines* gives them the power to do warantless wiretaps specifically removed.

You mean, the authority to provide for the common defense? That authority? Constitutional law is a tricky area when the policies specifically endorsed by the document come into conflict. Here's a choice quote from Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 389-390 (2004):

Executive privilege is an extraordinary assertion of power "not to be lightly invoked." United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953). Once executive privilege is asserted, coequal branches of the Government are set on a collision course. The Judiciary is forced into the difficult task of balancing the need for information in a judicial proceeding and the Executive's Article II prerogatives. This inquiry places courts in the awkward position of evaluating the Executive's claims of confidentiality and autonomy, and pushes to the fore difficult questions of separation of powers and checks and balances. These "occasion[s] for constitutional confrontation between the two branches" should be avoided whenever possible. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692 (1974).

NSA wiretaps of communications between citizens located domestically and others abroad fall under the 'privacy versus defense' rubric, and they may or may not be constitutional. On the one side, you have the authority to provide for the common defense, and on the other, the privacy protections of the 4th and 14th Amendments (and maybe a few others besides). It depends on how the Supreme Court thinks the particular policies behind the laws play against each other, in light of the real facts of the case (as opposed to the media's take), and, shockingly enough, how well the lawyers write briefs and argue. I'm not going to dismissively cl

I couldn't find anything in Article 2 about special war powers granted to the president. I remember that only the congress can declare war (which hasn't happened against Iraq), and that this bullshit 'war on terror' is really a 'control the population thru terror'.

In this case, the EFF has given the government an opportunity to use a new legal theory, that they are immune from lawsuits to prevent illegal violations of the Fourth Amendment (i.e. illegal search and seizure) merely by invoking Executive Privilege with a National Security Letter.

This is by no means a new legal theory. The State Secrets Privilege was first recognised by a judge in United States v. Reynolds, 1953 , and he drew on existing English case law to make that judgement. The precedent was set over fifty years ago, it's hardly being set by the EFF.

Global NAPs' VNXX System

Under the traditional system for rating calls, whether a call is "local" or "interexchange" depends on geographically defined local calling areas. The DTE established the existing geographic local calling area structure for Massachusetts after a generic proceeding "in which all interested Parties had the opportunity to comment." Verizon implements this system by comparing the "NXX" numbers (the "NXX" is the middle three digits of a ten-digit phone number) of the caller and the recipient. The "NXX" has generally been associated with a particular "switch" (that is, the equipment that routes phone calls to their destination) physically located within a local calling area; NXXs have thus served as proxies for geographic location. This means that if the NXX numbers of the caller and the recipient were within the same local calling area, one could assume that the caller and recipient were actually physically within the same calling area and bill the call as a local call.

Global NAPs has the ability to assign its customers "virtual" NXXs (VNXX), so that a Global NAPs customer can be given VNXX numbers that are different than those that would normally be assigned to him based on his physical location. This allows a party to call what appears to be a "local" number, although behind the scenes that call is actually routed to a different local calling area. When the party making such a call is a Verizon customer, the call is transmitted outside the local calling area by Verizon.

Many of Global NAPs' ISP customers use VNXX arrangements, and many of these ISPs' end-user customers use Verizon for local phone service. To access the Internet, the end-user dials in to a VNXX number assigned to his or her own local calling area. Then, Verizon transports the call across local calling areas to Global NAPs' point of interconnection with the Verizon network. Global NAPs and Verizon agree that "[u]nder VNXX arrangements, the Verizon end user's call to the ISP's server is toll-free [to the end user] whether or not the ISP's server is located in the same local exchange area in which the end-user originates the call." (emphasis added)

if you are like me, and found that reading the article didn't really help explain the situation, i found that this legal document really helped. i didn't follow every bit of it, but it does present a surprisingly readable history of the case and the issues.

Second, you're talking about banning all DRM-free analog-to-digital hardware. This is extremely cheap and common technology. Maybe you could try banning it, but if it were possible to legislate that kind of thing, the 18th Amendment would never have been repealed!

And therefore rigorous science

"Until science _disproves_ something, that thing should not be discounted as a possibility. That includes God, goblins, and pink dinosaurs under the ocean floor."

The existance of god and the supernatural is not falsifiable, and therefore must be discounted as possibilities when conducting rigorous science.

Check the wiki for more:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability

See also: proving a negative, division by zero, perpetual motion and the recent Intelligent design trial.

Judge John E. Jones III states the case nicely:

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/educate/ktzmllr dvr122005opn.pdf

1462 and 1466A lie within the general obscenity chapter, not within the child exploitation chapter, and the congressional findings and policies for regulating each differ. The point was that Whorley was convicted of receiving obscene materials. The fact that they were cartoons, or wholly the products of the human imagination, was likely not ultimately determinative.

Presuming Whorley was using computers to transport obscene comics, convicting him for public distribution and/or viewing is a legal contortion at best.

That's very similar to how the court came out in Orito . In Orito, the defendant was convicted of transporting 83 reels of film containing obscene materials on a public airline from San Fransisco to Milwaukee. The statute forbidding that behavior didn't rely on the government's direct interest in preventing obscenity, but rather the (indirect) interest in preventing obscene materials from entering interstate commerce. In other words, they relied on the Interstate Commerce Clause, similar to the Lottery Case .

The issues are slightly different here. The big issue is that the district court found 1466A was not overly broad, and fell within the umbrella of Miller, which would mean that you'd have to be pretty creative to get it overturned. Granted, 1466A hasn't been tested in an appellate court yet, but the prospects don't look good.

Whorley did use a channel of interstate commerce (his ISP) to transport obscene material, so the ICC argument could be made to defend the constitutionality of 1466A. There's an argument to be made that ISPs are different from airlines, in terms of their inspection requirements. There are serious Fourth Amendment objections to ISPs inspecting the bits they push, similar to the USPS opening your mail at each mail hop. If the transaction in the materials was totally private between consenting adults, using the ISPs as "secure, ignorant intermediaries", one could argue that the Stanley protections apply.

1462 and 1466A lie within the general obscenity chapter, not within the child exploitation chapter, and the congressional findings and policies for regulating each differ. The point was that Whorley was convicted of receiving obscene materials. The fact that they were cartoons, or wholly the products of the human imagination, was likely not ultimately determinative.

Presuming Whorley was using computers to transport obscene comics, convicting him for public distribution and/or viewing is a legal contortion at best.

That's very similar to how the court came out in Orito . In Orito, the defendant was convicted of transporting 83 reels of film containing obscene materials on a public airline from San Fransisco to Milwaukee. The statute forbidding that behavior didn't rely on the government's direct interest in preventing obscenity, but rather the (indirect) interest in preventing obscene materials from entering interstate commerce. In other words, they relied on the Interstate Commerce Clause, similar to the Lottery Case .

The issues are slightly different here. The big issue is that the district court found 1466A was not overly broad, and fell within the umbrella of Miller, which would mean that you'd have to be pretty creative to get it overturned. Granted, 1466A hasn't been tested in an appellate court yet, but the prospects don't look good.

Whorley did use a channel of interstate commerce (his ISP) to transport obscene material, so the ICC argument could be made to defend the constitutionality of 1466A. There's an argument to be made that ISPs are different from airlines, in terms of their inspection requirements. There are serious Fourth Amendment objections to ISPs inspecting the bits they push, similar to the USPS opening your mail at each mail hop. If the transaction in the materials was totally private between consenting adults, using the ISPs as "secure, ignorant intermediaries", one could argue that the Stanley protections apply.

Quoting from the case:

The universe of child pornography is comprised of materials in two broad categories, those involving depictions of an actual child, and the others portraying simulated representations. The former class of materials need not satisfy the legal definition of obscene to be banned. This category enjoys no First Amendment protection because the underlying production necessary involves the sexual exploitation of children. The latter class of materials, involving simulated images of children engaged in a sexually explicit conduct, can only be prohibited if they [are obscene].

Mr. Whorley downloaded child porn at work: strike one. He would have had to transport it from his work to his house through public places where it might have been exposed to unwilling recipients or juveniles: strike two. Did I mention, he worked for the State of Virginia, at a Virginia Employment Commission office? Strike three, he's out.

Note: the following is personal speculation. There's a difference between downloading obscene porn at work and at home. At work, other people might see it. At home, that's much less likely. The only people who 'receive' the porn in a p2p download are the common carrier ISPs in between the sender and receiver. Generally speaking, the Bush administration notwithstanding, carriers aren't required to monitor the content of the bits they push, nor should they be due to Fourth Amendment policy reasons. Some do voluntarily -- that's up to them. If they do intercept the content and analyze it, they are no longer 'unwilling recipients', and since child labor is outlawed, they aren't juveniles either. Therefore, the justification in Miller for suppressing the content-based speech shouldn't apply. (And for goodness sake, ISPs already know that most of their traffic is porn anyway. It's not like they'd suddenly be taken by surprise.) Courts should be required to find some alternate reason to justify the speech suppression, or they should allow the download, despite its obvious obscenity, on First Amendment grounds.

If someone is convicted of downloading virtual child porn at home, then I'd start to worry about the Bill of Rights being eroded. Until then, I'm going to stick with guarded optimism and counting the days until January 20, 2009.

Quoting from the case:

The universe of child pornography is comprised of materials in two broad categories, those involving depictions of an actual child, and the others portraying simulated representations. The former class of materials need not satisfy the legal definition of obscene to be banned. This category enjoys no First Amendment protection because the underlying production necessary involves the sexual exploitation of children. The latter class of materials, involving simulated images of children engaged in a sexually explicit conduct, can only be prohibited if they [are obscene].

Mr. Whorley downloaded child porn at work: strike one. He would have had to transport it from his work to his house through public places where it might have been exposed to unwilling recipients or juveniles: strike two. Did I mention, he worked for the State of Virginia, at a Virginia Employment Commission office? Strike three, he's out.

Note: the following is personal speculation. There's a difference between downloading obscene porn at work and at home. At work, other people might see it. At home, that's much less likely. The only people who 'receive' the porn in a p2p download are the common carrier ISPs in between the sender and receiver. Generally speaking, the Bush administration notwithstanding, carriers aren't required to monitor the content of the bits they push, nor should they be due to Fourth Amendment policy reasons. Some do voluntarily -- that's up to them. If they do intercept the content and analyze it, they are no longer 'unwilling recipients', and since child labor is outlawed, they aren't juveniles either. Therefore, the justification in Miller for suppressing the content-based speech shouldn't apply. (And for goodness sake, ISPs already know that most of their traffic is porn anyway. It's not like they'd suddenly be taken by surprise.) Courts should be required to find some alternate reason to justify the speech suppression, or they should allow the download, despite its obvious obscenity, on First Amendment grounds.

If someone is convicted of downloading virtual child porn at home, then I'd start to worry about the Bill of Rights being eroded. Until then, I'm going to stick with guarded optimism and counting the days until January 20, 2009.

Quoting from the case:

The universe of child pornography is comprised of materials in two broad categories, those involving depictions of an actual child, and the others portraying simulated representations. The former class of materials need not satisfy the legal definition of obscene to be banned. This category enjoys no First Amendment protection because the underlying production necessary involves the sexual exploitation of children. The latter class of materials, involving simulated images of children engaged in a sexually explicit conduct, can only be prohibited if they [are obscene].

Mr. Whorley downloaded child porn at work: strike one. He would have had to transport it from his work to his house through public places where it might have been exposed to unwilling recipients or juveniles: strike two. Did I mention, he worked for the State of Virginia, at a Virginia Employment Commission office? Strike three, he's out.

Note: the following is personal speculation. There's a difference between downloading obscene porn at work and at home. At work, other people might see it. At home, that's much less likely. The only people who 'receive' the porn in a p2p download are the common carrier ISPs in between the sender and receiver. Generally speaking, the Bush administration notwithstanding, carriers aren't required to monitor the content of the bits they push, nor should they be due to Fourth Amendment policy reasons. Some do voluntarily -- that's up to them. If they do intercept the content and analyze it, they are no longer 'unwilling recipients', and since child labor is outlawed, they aren't juveniles either. Therefore, the justification in Miller for suppressing the content-based speech shouldn't apply. (And for goodness sake, ISPs already know that most of their traffic is porn anyway. It's not like they'd suddenly be taken by surprise.) Courts should be required to find some alternate reason to justify the speech suppression, or they should allow the download, despite its obvious obscenity, on First Amendment grounds.

If someone is convicted of downloading virtual child porn at home, then I'd start to worry about the Bill of Rights being eroded. Until then, I'm going to stick with guarded optimism and counting the days until January 20, 2009.

The acts specifically excluded:

A computer program which is embodied in a machine or product and which cannot be copied during the ordinary operation or use of the machine or product; or

Great job taking stuff out of context. That was from a section specifically describing "acts of rental, lease, or lending," not acts of purchasing and selling. It means that I can't rent out the copy of Windows that I got with my Dell or lend it to a buddy. If you read the section just BEFORE that, the one actually relevant to the topic at hand, you'll see that "Many state courts have also ruled that a sale of software is indeed a sale of goods under the UCC at the point where funds are exchanged for the physical copy of the software," therefore making it perfectly legal to resell it under your own terms.

Here's the most recent precedent set by the Supreme Court. The "do not resell" clause on the book in this case is practically identical to the EULA in software, and the court ruled that "The purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of it." (quote from the official Supreme Court ruling.)

By the way, this case was one of company vs. company, not company vs. individual. The publisher sued a retailer that bought many copies of the book at wholesale and resold them at a lower price, so this ruling is definitely (even especially) applicable to "the large, corporate, lawyer controlled, and sometimes silly business market." It still applies to the individual, of course, which leads me to my hero; David Zamos showed that even if a huge company like M$ wants you to give in, as long as you fight for justice when you know the law is on your side you'll be able to beat the big-wigs. W00t for rights!

California Penal code 518-527 mentions something about this. I believe that it's considered illegal in a few other juristictions, as well.

in the worst case a court will say "no, that part of the EULA is not valid".

Actually, I was pleased to read a couple years back about People of the State of New York v. Network Associates, where some of the language involved was considered deceptive, and the judge agreed. The Attorney General was asking for a fine of $0.50 per software copy sold with the language involved, which could be a major deterrant to putting unenforcable conditions into an EULA, but I can't find any reference to fines actually being assessed or the result of the appeal that Network Associates vowed to file, so I don't know if it actually amounted to anything. The potential is apparently there to have unenforcable portions of an EULA turn into a fine for deceptive trade practices, though.

We acknowledge that evidence proffered by [the marijuana users] regarding the effective medical uses for marijuana, if found credible after trial, would cast serious doubt on the accuracy of the findings that require marijuana to be listed in Schedule I. See, e.g., Institute of Medicine, Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base 179 (J. Joy, S. Watson, & J. Benson eds.1999) (recognizing that "[s]cientific data indicate the potential therapeutic value of cannabinoid drugs, primarily THC [Tetrahydrocannabinol] for pain relief, control of nausea and vomiting, and appetite stimulation"); see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 640-643 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (chronicling medical studies recognizing valid medical uses for marijuana and its derivatives). But the possibility that the drug may be reclassified in the future has no relevance to the question whether Congress now has the power to regulate its production and distribution. Respondents' submission, if accepted, would place all homegrown medical substances beyond the reach of Congress' regulatory jurisdiction.

The perponderance of Supreme Court decisions over the past couple of centuries doesn't agree with you. But don't take it personally. Few Americans these days really understand the Constitution, what rights (and responsibilities) they have, etc.

Most Americans are little children.

The GLBT folks were attempting to make use of space owned by the "big government" but made available as a (limited) public forum. This creates an easement, so to speak, against the hypothetical property rights. Thus, when the "big government" said the use was not acceptable, this makes the rights of Speech and Petition far more central than Property.

I am not a lawyer, but Pruneyard v. Robins and Lloyd v. Tanner sound more relevant than your, er... theories.

The GLBT folks were attempting to make use of space owned by the "big government" but made available as a (limited) public forum. This creates an easement, so to speak, against the hypothetical property rights. Thus, when the "big government" said the use was not acceptable, this makes the rights of Speech and Petition far more central than Property.

I am not a lawyer, but Pruneyard v. Robins and Lloyd v. Tanner sound more relevant than your, er... theories.

It is a touch more complicated than that (which is maybe why law school is 3 years...) Anyway, here is an interesting article about the UCC that includes references to British Common Law. http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Sep/1/131122.html
I got a J.D. but never bothered to take the bar. But any intro class will explain how American and British Common law are related. It isn't worth discussing here because it will degenerate into a flame war about the war for independence...

If you are thinking that it is possible to sue the Department of Defense in civilian court like any random citizen, you should check out the definition of sovereign immunity.

I really don't know what I'm talking about, but this is Slashdot, so i won't let that stop me ;)

At least you're honest. The original intent of patents was to advance science. Protecting the inventor (via a time-limited monopoly) was only the means to that end, not the end itself. From FindLaw (speaking of both copyright and patent law):

"Only the writings and discoveries of authors and inventors may be protected, and then only to the end of promoting science and the useful arts."

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

There is also some additional information on the FindLaw site for those that are curious.

I reccomend paying attention to the eBay v. MercExchange case which is currently before the Supreme Court. Basically they are deciding whehter it is proper for trial court judges to automatically issue an injunction if a party is found to be infringing a patent.

As for the "patents are bad for innovation" argument : if you come up with a way to manufacture widgets that no one else has before, and that innovation has cost you a certain amount in development costs, should you not have the right to protect that investment?

If a company comes up with a new way to manufacture widgets -- a new widget-making machine, for instance -- and you're talking about a competitor stealing the construction plans for the machine, then I think this is a different situation, and far less objectionable.

But when we're talking about business process innovation -- finding new ways to store inventory, or manage relationships with vendors and customers, or hire and retain employees, or deliver goods and services -- then I think the argument is less clear. Presumably you do these things simply to derive a competitive advantage, and the additional profits you expect to earn are incentive enough.

It used to be that the PTO wouldn't grant patents for business methods, because they saw them as abstract ideas -- this all changed with the State Street case.

Well you are completely wrong on the social security and medicare isseues. There is no garuentee that anyone is will ever see a dime of what "they put into" either program. They are collected as a tax and go into the general treasury. Your wage tax dollars (the tax is collected on "wages" as defined) are not ear-marked in any way. The only thing that keeps congress approriating the money is AARP and the anarchy that would ensue from retitreees losing benefits. Its a non-garenteed hand out.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Security_(Unit ed_States) :
Helvering vs. Davis, 301 U.S. 619., decided on the same day, upheld the program because "The proceeds of both [employee and employer] taxes are to be paid into the Treasury like internal-revenue taxes generally, and are not earmarked in any way." That is, the Social Security Tax is constitutional as a mere exercise of Congress's general taxation powers.

If you want to know more, or how to stop paying SSI & medicare, read the book in my signature.

I think you mean "Caveat Venditor"(let the seller beware). "Caveat Emptor" means let the buyer beware.

I think you mean "Caveat Venditor"(let the seller beware). "Caveat Emptor" means let the buyer beware.

Just because a government works within legal means doesn't mean it makes it moral (or just).

Nope. It helps to understand a topic you're discussing though.

If it was civil case subpeona then the US federal government shouldn't be handling these out now would they?

You could look up information about the case to find out.

You'll find out that it's not a criminal case and the government is the defendant.

Is that so?

yes

Who's being sued?

The ACLU is suing the US Government.

For what damages?

To get a law overturned on constitutional grounds.

Sure, there are "other situations" where subpoenas can be used for whatever someone likes, but is "Waaah! I can't pass my pet law so I'm going to scream and cry until I get what I want!" one of them?

I guess so. Ask the judge that allowed the subpeona.

You think it's ok if information is "safeguarded", I think that the subpoenas shouldn't have existed in the first place.

Ok. Well, then you need to do something about the judge that allowed the subpeona or the law (or rules) that he was acting under. Good luck.

I think posting uninformed rants on a message board isn't really the ultimate solution though.

But they don't - because their corporate partners are more important then their customers wishes.

Anyone have a case which shows the opposite? - inaction leads to liability? (without personal benefit ie a bribe not to enforce drug laws)

I was sure there _had_ to be a case like that, so I spent a while digging around. The closest US case I could find is CANTON v. HARRIS, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).

Canton v. Harris deals with the constitutional provision for medical care as part of Due Process clause of the 14th amendment. The policeman on duty had responsibilty for judging the arrested person's need for medical attention, and (incorrectly) did not provide it. The jury ruled that a "failure to train" the police staff properly resulted in municipal liability.

SCOTUS upheld that "under Circuit precedent, a municipality is liable for failure to train its police force, where the plaintiff proves that the municipality acted recklessly, intentionally, or with gross negligence, and that the lack of training was so reckless or grossly negligent that deprivation of persons' constitutional rights was substantially certain to result."

It seems like there must be a more clear-cut case of police inaction leading to liability in the US, but I can't find it...

There's also a case in England that's probably closer to what you were looking for. The case, [1979] 467 3 W.L.R. REGINA v. DYTHAM, involves a uniformed, on-duty police officer who watched a man get beaten to death outside a nightclub, then left the scene without summoning help or providing assistance.

was convicted for assaulting a former tenant of his while performing a "citizen's arrest" for failure to pay rent. He appealed the case pro se, and unsurprisingly lost on his irrelevent legal arguments. The man seems to be a bit nutty, if not dangerous.

Ah, good point. The restriction of free speech to not include threats against the president is merely USC, but it has been upheld by the SCOTUS for quite some time. This case helpeddefine the boundarys between actual threats and political hyperbole, which is protected speech. The history referred to in the footnotes is quite interesting.

A) Terrorism is now defined as "any action that endangers human life that is a violation of any Federal or State law."

B) A person defined as a terrorist can now have their citizenship revoked, and in essence becone an 'enemy combatant'. 'Enemy combatants', as we have seen, can be held indefinitely without a trial, and have no rights.

Good thing IANAL: FindLaw agrees more with you than with me. A quote from the page: (emphasis mine)

''The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction . . . but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute . . . . [I]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard . . . he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.'' Thus, a judge who would deny a claim of the privilege must be '''perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to incriminate.''

...and then later... (again, emphasis mine.)

What the privilege protects against is compulsion of ''testimonial'' disclosures; requiring a person in custody to stand or walk in a police lineup, to speak prescribed words, to model particular clothing, or to give samples of handwriting, fingerprints, or blood does not compel him to incriminate himself within the meaning of the clause, although compelling him to produce private papers may.

The Welfare clause was written to give people the chance for equal opportunity by preventing governments from harming their ability to provide for themselves.

Oddly enough, the Founders disagree with you, and the Supreme Court agreed re: General Welfare. I have no idea where you got your bizzare interpretation of the welfare clause, but please don't just point me to mises.org or lewrockwell.com for your justification.

Did the 21st Amendment, repealing Prohibition, require freeing bootleggers convicted under the prohibition laws? Did it dismiss all cases being tried? Did it make bootlegging performed while the laws were in effect OK? If it did have those effects, was that the legal process in effect, or the political process which made it impossible to do anything about pending cases?

Because there are separate laws and doctrines for amnesty and pardons. Amnesty is the specific legal principle we're discussing, and it seems necessary to be explicit when amnesty is granted, rather than implicit amnesty when a law is changed.

Also, the Constitution says, in Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1 (the last phrase)

"he [the president] shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."

That says the president can't pardon (or otherwise reprieve) themself in case of impeachment.

I like Article 2, Section 4:

"The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

Then Article 1, Section 2, Clause 5:

" The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."

and Article 1, Section 3, Clause 6:

" The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments."

are pretty spiffy. Clause 7 of that Section is OK, though the second half is sweet:

" Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."

considering Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1 (the last phrase):

"he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."

.

I like Article 2, Section 4:

"The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

Then Article 1, Section 2, Clause 5:

" The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."

and Article 1, Section 3, Clause 6:

" The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments."

are pretty spiffy. Clause 7 of that Section is OK, though the second half is sweet:

" Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."

considering Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1 (the last phrase):

"he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."

.

I like Article 2, Section 4:

"The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

Then Article 1, Section 2, Clause 5:

" The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."

and Article 1, Section 3, Clause 6:

" The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments."

are pretty spiffy. Clause 7 of that Section is OK, though the second half is sweet:

" Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."

considering Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1 (the last phrase):

"he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."

.