Slashdot Mirror

I am only responding because you are *SO* clueless about CCTV cameras that you somehow fail to notice. Your statements that "I don't see them so they aren't there" and "78 million isn't very much money" are sad.

Please research this for yourself. The facts are - at least tens of thousands of monitored cameras - at least tens millions of pounds spent on using the cameras each year.

CCTV in Cambridge - note: estimated that each Londoner is watched by 300 cameras each day. Cambridge alone has 127 camera and spends 1/3 million per year. Nationally, 20 million+ per year for the last decade.

Wired article "British authorities have placed great faith in CCTV as a crime control device, installing an estimated 1.5 million police cameras along the country's streets, buildings and mass transport systems. Still shots taken from video feed are used to identify protesters and hooligans."

78 million pounds for 250 new CCTV monitored systems
40 million per year is currently spent on CCTV
In Jan 2000 a further 40 million was allocated to 218 public CCTV schemes.
At present, there are well over 750 local public closed circuit tv surveillance systems in operation in the UK.
Search Parliament for CCTV spending yourself

(Oh, BTW your officials are now selling footage of your cameras to the highest bidder)

e-mail your MP. Their details are here. Tell them that you are opposed to software patents and ask them to forward your concerns to the appropriate minister before the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Ministers. It's not hard, it won't take any longer than your post to /. and if enough of us do it, it will make a difference. We've already won the first round in the European Parliament. Now we just need to see this through.

Write the letter!

If you then can't be bothered to print, stamp and send it, just e-mail it.

Scottish notes are not legal tender in Scotland (in the sense that you can legally refuse them when offered as payment of a debt), let alone England. They are just advertising by private banks, but valuable since those banks will exchange them for 1 pound coins if you ask. Northern Ireland has a similar system.

Makkin yer voice heard in the Scottish Pairlament.

Full list of MPs and email addresses

Seriously people, I've mailed my mp about a few things, and had an smail reply each time. Keep it polite and sane, because you know they'll ignore an uninformed rant, and you don't want to waste your time, right?

I suggest simply dropping them a few lines to explain that Blunkett's been pushing several highly unpopular ideas and blatantly ignoring public opinion, and if he continues, well, I for one will be voting for the opposition purely to get rid of him.

The problem is that the All Party Parliamentary Internet Group has nothing to do with the UK Government. It is not even an official UK parliamentary select committee, which would at least get it listened to. It is rather more ad-hoc, and its only noticable fact is that it has members from more than one political party. Don't expect it to have any real influence.

PS. It is "The Commonwealth of Virginia" not the "State of Virginia."

Wow, does that mean it still belongs to us? Reading slashdot is just like rummaging around down the back of the sofa, you never know what you'll find, a 5 pound note, a comb, some pocket fluff, a former colony. Hang on, what's this thing?... Oh, I wondered what I'd done with that.

Nope, Parliament is not part of the government. The government is made up of all central government (run by government ministers) and local government (run by local authorities.)
Read the FAQs I put a link to in my previous post.

Firstly, it would be a .gov.uk, not .govt.uk, but anyway...
There is a reason why they use parliament.uk and not parliament.gov.uk, and that is that parliament is not government. From http://www.parliament.uk/faq/parlgov_faq.cfm
"The Government is the institution that runs the country. It is also known as the Executive. The Government formulates policy and introduces legislation in Parliament. Members of the Government are usually either members of the House of Commons or House of Lords. This enables Parliament to keep a check on their work by asking questions or debating the issues."
The job of Parliament is to make the law, the job of government is to produce draft bills to put before parliament, to implement the law and to run public services.

.... and here is what I believe to be the text of the bill.

(I know, bad form to reply to my own post - apologies..)

Q.

Because the government said so. Now shut up, and be a good little suppressed citizen,...

Reprogramming mobile phones to become illegal in the UK, currently under discussion in parliament

UK residents can contact their MP by first looking them up and then emailing them using this page. It uses a god awful web form but at least you can make your views known.

I've emailed my MP Paddy Tipping (What a name!)

As always, be polite but be firm!

I am aware that this has nothing to do with europe but it would be worthwhile to write to our democratic representitives here to make sure it stays that way. So here are the links (they're in English) Info on contacting your MP. if you live in the UK (like me) Info on contacting your MEP If someone could post links to sites that help people contact politicians in other contries that would be great.

The UK isn't much better than the US. Even though they have experience with terrorists, they are now also implementing a new counterterrorist law. Interesting that they only now feel this is necessary. Then again, have you walked around london lately? It's pretty much impossible to _not_ be recorded by CCTV, where ever you go.

In the UK, the first two rules already exist, hence there is only one 1 letter domain (x.co.uk), and a few 2 letter domains (bt.co.uk, f9.co.uk) that were allocated before Nominet came in to manage the namespace.

Also, how many anomalous names are there? www.bl.uk is one - are there more? (There's stuff like www.parliament.uk and www.police.uk which are presumably post-Nominet and deliberate, but I guess that bl.uk is a relic ... ?

(BTW, this new anti-troll device is really annoying. It blocks posts from subnets where there has been a lot of down-moderated activity in the last 24 hours. So if you have the same ISP as a lot of trolls, then you can't post (unless you log into university machines :-) I really hope they refine the bloody thing ASAP - it seems silly to block posts from people whose karma is high. Off-topic, I know, but I guess there's hundreds of people who want to say this but can't.)

if the security services here in the UK want to read my email, they will use the RIP bill to get the private key and passphrase from me

I wonder, what grounds could any government, especially one which wants digital signatures to be binding, possibly have to ask for your private key and passphrase?

I could understand the utility of a bill like that if it allowed the government access to a session key for a particular message. Without giving them your private key, they would be able to decrypt that message only, and they could get the information they were after. Hell, if they wanted to, they could even ask for the key to each and every encrypted document on your computer, and there's no reason why your crypto software couldn't provide it to them.

If you have to give up your private key, though, they have automatic access to every document which has ever been encrypted to you, or will be in the future (cancelling a compromised keypair is still one of the messiest areas of cryptography, and it gets worse with every person who gets your public key). Not only that, but the government could then use that key to impersonate you, forging any document they want and digitally signing it.

I don't know of any crypto software right now which would give you access to just the session key for a particular message... or whether lawmakers would consider restricting their power in this way... are there any UK privacy advocates out there with more insights on this law? How far does it go? Could we use something like this to get a bit of privacy back?

It's not the people, but the Prime Minister who can dissolve Parliament and thus cause a general election (in fact, it's theoretically the Queen).

I'm not sure what you mean by "proper credibility" for political parties-- AFAIK whether Members belong to a given party is not taken into account in the original design (any more than it is under the US electoral college system), though there are organisations that keep tabs on what parties are doing.

You might have meant that the people respect political parties in the UK more than they do in the US, and since I haven't lived in the US, it's difficult to say. Anyone know? Do bear in mind that we're still not under a multi-party system, though; even though the centre party have grown in the last few decades, we're still in a first-past the post system, mainly a race between the other two.

It's not the people, but the Prime Minister who can dissolve Parliament and thus cause a general election (in fact, it's theoretically the Queen).

I'm not sure what you mean by "proper credibility" for political parties-- AFAIK whether Members belong to a given party is not taken into account in the original design (any more than it is under the US electoral college system), though there are organisations that keep tabs on what parties are doing.

You might have meant that the people respect political parties in the UK more than they do in the US, and since I haven't lived in the US, it's difficult to say. Anyone know? Do bear in mind that we're still not under a multi-party system, though; even though the centre party have grown in the last few decades, we're still in a first-past the post system, mainly a race between the other two.

When this was last mentioned slashdot they claimed it was an English bill (I forgive them, they're Canadians). Otherwise it seems to be treated as a UK bill by the media but section 2 does not apply to Scotland (same state different legal system see) and the Scottish Parliament is passing their own Regulation of Ivestigatory powers bill. Not being a lawyer I don't know the difference between our section 2 and that for Wales, N Ireland and England, but I remember it differs in who can and cannae give allowance to spy on you (it won't allow Home Secreatary Jack Straw's gate keeper to let polis read your e-mails which the Westminster one could). Anyone know more of the differences and what happens when Jack Straw's bill is passed but Jim Wallace's isn't for a few months more? Jonathan Riddell

Actually, parts of the legislation may have been weakened by ammendments to the point of being unusable, judging by this excerpt from the discussions.

It seems that because of conflict with a previously enacted law, the new powers will not be allowed to touch content of communications, only traffic/transport-related information/addressing. If so, that was one hell of an ammendment.

On the other hand, the actual details of the law have never stopped those in power from doing what the hell they damn well want, regardless.

IANAL, of course, but this looks to me like presumption of guilt in some cases. If you have a key, then forget your password, this is punishable? I think it may be time to get the European Court of Human Rights involved.

Incidentally, the full text of the bill is on the UK Government website.

OK, here's the basics:

Here, we have the Bill itself as it emerged from its report to face it's third reading (last stage in parliament before Royal Assent and passage onto the statute book: it comes into force on a date to be fixed thereafter)

Thi s is the complete list of amendments, and you'll notice that Lord Bassam and chums seem to be out with their castrating knives and good on 'em, ain't it handy to have legislators who aren't going to have to face re-election.

This schweinerei is the really offensive part.

Things you ought to know about this Bill:

1. It's already been beaten back once. The really offensive stuff started out in the Electronic Communications Bill (now the Act, minus all the nasty parts and as such totally useless and unlikely ever to be brought into force)
2. On and from 2nd October 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 comes into force, it will be more or less impossible to get convictions under clause 53 (it may not retain that section number in the Act-as-it-passes) since the threat of a penalty for non-disclosure amounts to a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. This particular legal device - questioning under compulsion, a rather genteel and bloodless form of torture - resulted in the defendants in l'affaire Guinness getting judgments in their favour in the EHCR. Because compelled answers to a (non-criminal) DTI inquiry were used as evidence in their eventual (criminal) trial, they were found to have had their human rights violated.
3. The Encryption stuff isn't the big deal. It's the government's automatic right to install whatever variant of the carnivore system they want into any ISP, telecom provider, whatever so that they can monitor whenever they like without prior judicial restraint. The warrants are to be signed by the Secretary of State. And how much scrutiny is he going to give them?
4. There's a Commission going to be appointed to hear complaints. Sure, right. Fact fans, listen carefully: this is what they did last time around, when they passed the old Interception of Telecommunications Act fifteen years ago. In those fifteen years, the Commissioner has heard four (4) complaints. And rejected all of them. Can you say "dead letter?"

I could, and at very small provocation will, go on.

OK, here's the basics:

Here, we have the Bill itself as it emerged from its report to face it's third reading (last stage in parliament before Royal Assent and passage onto the statute book: it comes into force on a date to be fixed thereafter)

Thi s is the complete list of amendments, and you'll notice that Lord Bassam and chums seem to be out with their castrating knives and good on 'em, ain't it handy to have legislators who aren't going to have to face re-election.

This schweinerei is the really offensive part.

Things you ought to know about this Bill:

1. It's already been beaten back once. The really offensive stuff started out in the Electronic Communications Bill (now the Act, minus all the nasty parts and as such totally useless and unlikely ever to be brought into force)
2. On and from 2nd October 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 comes into force, it will be more or less impossible to get convictions under clause 53 (it may not retain that section number in the Act-as-it-passes) since the threat of a penalty for non-disclosure amounts to a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. This particular legal device - questioning under compulsion, a rather genteel and bloodless form of torture - resulted in the defendants in l'affaire Guinness getting judgments in their favour in the EHCR. Because compelled answers to a (non-criminal) DTI inquiry were used as evidence in their eventual (criminal) trial, they were found to have had their human rights violated.
3. The Encryption stuff isn't the big deal. It's the government's automatic right to install whatever variant of the carnivore system they want into any ISP, telecom provider, whatever so that they can monitor whenever they like without prior judicial restraint. The warrants are to be signed by the Secretary of State. And how much scrutiny is he going to give them?
4. There's a Commission going to be appointed to hear complaints. Sure, right. Fact fans, listen carefully: this is what they did last time around, when they passed the old Interception of Telecommunications Act fifteen years ago. In those fifteen years, the Commissioner has heard four (4) complaints. And rejected all of them. Can you say "dead letter?"

I could, and at very small provocation will, go on.

OK, here's the basics:

Here, we have the Bill itself as it emerged from its report to face it's third reading (last stage in parliament before Royal Assent and passage onto the statute book: it comes into force on a date to be fixed thereafter)

Thi s is the complete list of amendments, and you'll notice that Lord Bassam and chums seem to be out with their castrating knives and good on 'em, ain't it handy to have legislators who aren't going to have to face re-election.

This schweinerei is the really offensive part.

Things you ought to know about this Bill:

1. It's already been beaten back once. The really offensive stuff started out in the Electronic Communications Bill (now the Act, minus all the nasty parts and as such totally useless and unlikely ever to be brought into force)
2. On and from 2nd October 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 comes into force, it will be more or less impossible to get convictions under clause 53 (it may not retain that section number in the Act-as-it-passes) since the threat of a penalty for non-disclosure amounts to a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. This particular legal device - questioning under compulsion, a rather genteel and bloodless form of torture - resulted in the defendants in l'affaire Guinness getting judgments in their favour in the EHCR. Because compelled answers to a (non-criminal) DTI inquiry were used as evidence in their eventual (criminal) trial, they were found to have had their human rights violated.
3. The Encryption stuff isn't the big deal. It's the government's automatic right to install whatever variant of the carnivore system they want into any ISP, telecom provider, whatever so that they can monitor whenever they like without prior judicial restraint. The warrants are to be signed by the Secretary of State. And how much scrutiny is he going to give them?
4. There's a Commission going to be appointed to hear complaints. Sure, right. Fact fans, listen carefully: this is what they did last time around, when they passed the old Interception of Telecommunications Act fifteen years ago. In those fifteen years, the Commissioner has heard four (4) complaints. And rejected all of them. Can you say "dead letter?"

I could, and at very small provocation will, go on.

Sorry to burst your bubble, but the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill hasn't passed yet.

What happened is that the House of Commons discussed and accepted the amendments to the bill made by the House of Lords. No vote to accept or reject overall passage of the bill was made.

You can read the discussions for yourself.

For up-to-date tracking of the bill's progress, see the Home Office's RIP page.

• (a) sufficient evidence of that fact is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it; and

• (b) the contrary is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

OK, here's the basics:

Here, we have the Bill itself as it emerged from its report to face it's third reading (last stage in parliament before Royal Assent and passage onto the statute book: it comes into force on a date to be fixed thereafter)

Thi s is the complete list of amendments, and you'll notice that Lord Bassam and chums seem to be out with their castrating knives and good on 'em, ain't it handy to have legislators who aren't going to have to face re-election.

This schweinerei is the really offensive part.

Things you ought to know about this Bill:

1. It's already been beaten back once. The really offensive stuff started out in the Electronic Communications Bill (now the Act, minus all the nasty parts and as such totally useless and unlikely ever to be brought into force)
2. On and from 2nd October 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 comes into force, it will be more or less impossible to get convictions under clause 53 (it may not retain that section number in the Act-as-it-passes) since the threat of a penalty for non-disclosure amounts to a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. This particular legal device - questioning under compulsion, a rather genteel and bloodless form of torture - resulted in the defendants in l'affaire Guinness getting judgments in their favour in the EHCR. Because compelled answers to a (non-criminal) DTI inquiry were used as evidence in their eventual (criminal) trial, they were found to have had their human rights violated.
3. The Encryption stuff isn't the big deal. It's the government's automatic right to install whatever variant of the carnivore system they want into any ISP, telecom provider, whatever so that they can monitor whenever they like without prior judicial restraint. The warrants are to be signed by the Secretary of State. And how much scrutiny is he going to give them?
4. There's a Commission going to be appointed to hear complaints. Sure, right. Fact fans, listen carefully: this is what they did last time around, when they passed the old Interception of Telecommunications Act fifteen years ago. In those fifteen years, the Commissioner has heard four (4) complaints. And rejected all of them. Can you say "dead letter?"

I could, and at very small provocation will, go on, but it's 0025 here and frankly I want to go to bed.

OK, here's the basics:

Here, we have the Bill itself as it emerged from its report to face it's third reading (last stage in parliament before Royal Assent and passage onto the statute book: it comes into force on a date to be fixed thereafter)

Thi s is the complete list of amendments, and you'll notice that Lord Bassam and chums seem to be out with their castrating knives and good on 'em, ain't it handy to have legislators who aren't going to have to face re-election.

This schweinerei is the really offensive part.

Things you ought to know about this Bill:

1. It's already been beaten back once. The really offensive stuff started out in the Electronic Communications Bill (now the Act, minus all the nasty parts and as such totally useless and unlikely ever to be brought into force)
2. On and from 2nd October 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 comes into force, it will be more or less impossible to get convictions under clause 53 (it may not retain that section number in the Act-as-it-passes) since the threat of a penalty for non-disclosure amounts to a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. This particular legal device - questioning under compulsion, a rather genteel and bloodless form of torture - resulted in the defendants in l'affaire Guinness getting judgments in their favour in the EHCR. Because compelled answers to a (non-criminal) DTI inquiry were used as evidence in their eventual (criminal) trial, they were found to have had their human rights violated.
3. The Encryption stuff isn't the big deal. It's the government's automatic right to install whatever variant of the carnivore system they want into any ISP, telecom provider, whatever so that they can monitor whenever they like without prior judicial restraint. The warrants are to be signed by the Secretary of State. And how much scrutiny is he going to give them?
4. There's a Commission going to be appointed to hear complaints. Sure, right. Fact fans, listen carefully: this is what they did last time around, when they passed the old Interception of Telecommunications Act fifteen years ago. In those fifteen years, the Commissioner has heard four (4) complaints. And rejected all of them. Can you say "dead letter?"

I could, and at very small provocation will, go on, but it's 0025 here and frankly I want to go to bed.

OK, here's the basics:

Here, we have the Bill itself as it emerged from its report to face it's third reading (last stage in parliament before Royal Assent and passage onto the statute book: it comes into force on a date to be fixed thereafter)

Thi s is the complete list of amendments, and you'll notice that Lord Bassam and chums seem to be out with their castrating knives and good on 'em, ain't it handy to have legislators who aren't going to have to face re-election.

This schweinerei is the really offensive part.

Things you ought to know about this Bill:

1. It's already been beaten back once. The really offensive stuff started out in the Electronic Communications Bill (now the Act, minus all the nasty parts and as such totally useless and unlikely ever to be brought into force)
2. On and from 2nd October 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 comes into force, it will be more or less impossible to get convictions under clause 53 (it may not retain that section number in the Act-as-it-passes) since the threat of a penalty for non-disclosure amounts to a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. This particular legal device - questioning under compulsion, a rather genteel and bloodless form of torture - resulted in the defendants in l'affaire Guinness getting judgments in their favour in the EHCR. Because compelled answers to a (non-criminal) DTI inquiry were used as evidence in their eventual (criminal) trial, they were found to have had their human rights violated.
3. The Encryption stuff isn't the big deal. It's the government's automatic right to install whatever variant of the carnivore system they want into any ISP, telecom provider, whatever so that they can monitor whenever they like without prior judicial restraint. The warrants are to be signed by the Secretary of State. And how much scrutiny is he going to give them?
4. There's a Commission going to be appointed to hear complaints. Sure, right. Fact fans, listen carefully: this is what they did last time around, when they passed the old Interception of Telecommunications Act fifteen years ago. In those fifteen years, the Commissioner has heard four (4) complaints. And rejected all of them. Can you say "dead letter?"

I could, and at very small provocation will, go on, but it's 0025 here and frankly I want to go to bed.

The Bill has been amended in the house of Lords, and some of the worst features have been eliminated. For example, clause 51(3) now allows 'forgetten it' as a reasonable defence.

Note for non-UK readers: the House of Lords functions primarily as a revisionary chamber, where the details of Bills can be examined outside the hothouse atmosphere of the Commons. It allows the government of the day to back down on contentious issues without suffering the indignity of losing a Commons vote.

... in respect of which the world's press remains eerily silent. Go here (it's one of the documents linked from the UK legislature's pending bills page, and is entirely official) and marvel at what the media will ignore.

And yes, it does exactly what it looks like: makes it legal, but not a hundred per cent legal.

(It is, however, like all Private Members' Bills - ones not supported by a government department - almost certainly doomed.)

The bill has an explicit defence where "the tipping-off occurred entirely as a result of software designed to give an automatic warning that a key had been compromised".

Does such software exist? Or could we write it, and how would it work?

It sounds like a nifty idea.

To clarify my previous post. The relevan section of the bill seems to be (my emphasis:

49. - (1) A person is guilty of an offence if-
(a) he fails to comply, in accordance with any section 46 notice, with any requirement of that notice to disclose a key to protected information; and
(b) he is a person who has or has had possession of the key.

(2) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section, it shall be a defence (subject to subsection (4)) for that person to show-
(a) that the key was not in his possession after the giving of the notice and before the time by which he was required to disclose it; but
(b) that he did, before that time, make a disclosure, to the person to whom he was required to disclose the key, of all such information in his possession as was required by that person to enable possession of the key to be obtained.

(3) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section it shall be a defence (subject to subsection (4)) for that person to show-
(a) that it was not reasonably practicable for him to make a disclosure of the key before the time by which he was required to do so;
(b) where the key was not in his possession at that time, that it was not reasonably practicable for him, before that time, to make such a disclosure as is mentioned in subsection (2)(b); and
(c) that as soon after that time as it was reasonably practicable for him to make a disclosure of the key or (if earlier) of sufficient information to enable possession of the key to be obtained, he made such a disclosure to the person to whom he was required to disclose the key.

(4) Except in a case where there is no authorisation for the purposes of section 47, in proceedings for an offence under this section a person shall have a defence under subsection (2) or (3) only if he also shows that it was not reasonably practicable for him to comply with the requirement in the manner allowed by that section.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable-
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both;
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both.

The fine is unlimited.

IANAL so somebody else will have to comment on the details.

Authorisation of surveillance and human intelligence sources

Clause 26: Lawful surveillance etc

182. This clause provides that all conduct defined in clause 25 will be lawful, provided it is carried out in accordance with the authorisation to which it relates. Authorised conduct may cover any action taken either in the UK or abroad.

183. Furthermore, there will be no civil liability arising out of conduct which is incidental to the authorised conduct. However, this is only the case where the incidental conduct should not have been separately authorised either under this Bill or under existing legislation.

Authorisation of surveillance and human intelligence sources

Clause 26: Lawful surveillance etc

182. This clause provides that all conduct defined in clause 25 will be lawful, provided it is carried out in accordance with the authorisation to which it relates. Authorised conduct may cover any action taken either in the UK or abroad.

183. Furthermore, there will be no civil liability arising out of conduct which is incidental to the authorised conduct. However, this is only the case where the incidental conduct should not have been separately authorised either under this Bill or under existing legislation.

The RIP Bill is certainly one of the most controversial bills I've noticed in my time. For those who can be bothered reading them:

Stand.org.uk
Bills before Parliament currently

What is scary to notice is this particular set of bills, all called to the Houses of Commons (and Lords) by Mr Jack Straw (the man who seems to be getting the blame for the RIP bill):

• Regulation of Investigatory Powers [RIP]
• Terrorism Bill [T]
• Freedom of Information Act [FoI]
• Electronic Communications Bill [EC]
• Copyright and Trademarks Bill [CaT]

The [T] bill grants full powers to the police, without warrant, without "Innocent Until Proven Guilty" if they suspect you of terrorism. Terrorism now can include environmental and anti-capitalist demonstrations.

The [CaT] bill makes owning software which removes copy-protection illegal (I have no idea what this would mean to anyone with a copy of the source for DeCSS, which could be seen as a form of copy-protection).

[RIP] bill has enough people ranting about it to be ridiculous. Some people think that the government can't afford to enforce this bill (estimates of tens of millions for a year), and that the bill won't be passed. That said, the bill is already at the stage where it needs a lawyer to write a formal document to get changes made to it. I guess we'll know the truth around 4th October (unless the date has changed) which is when the bill is to come into action.

Given that list of bills that are being changed, and the changes that have come to light, it seems as though the UK government is heading towards a semi-police-state sort of arrangement? Check out this site for their latest ideas on censorship:

School Internet Access

What I think has to be borne in mind is that most countries (all of them that I've come across) do not give you "Privacy" as a right. All legal systems seem to rely on the fact that the citizens will be open about certain things - namely they will give the police access to their homes when presented with a warrant. In many ways, the RIP bill is fair in asking for you to hand over your keys. However, what are not fair, or well thought through, are the consequences for not doing so.

Stand's website already mentions one major problem with the "Give us your keys or go to jail" mentality - any hard-core terrorist group would rather go to jail for 2 years for obstruction of justice than face life imprisonment because their encrypted mails had their keys given out. This applies to paedophilia (another of the crimes that the government is trying to tighten up on), where the Department of Trade and Industry provided a "brochure" on cryptography/legislation in the UK:

Encryption and Law Enforcement

To me, that brochure summarises the way the government believes it can (and actually manages to) control its people - for the most part, the general population in this country is willing to believe that paedophilia == bad, paedophiles use crypto, terrorists use crypto, ergo: crypto == bad and we must do everything in our power to make sure that the Finally, I see two or three ways around these problems (which seem to be caused by men-in-suits who have no idea about what they are legislating):

• Ignore it - it doesn't bother me, I'll just bury my head in the sand and wonder why I'm in jail for two years when I lose a key.
• Emigrate - question is, where to? How many other countries have laws which could be construed as "backwards" in other respects? Canada seems to have sane crypto laws, but is going crazy about MP3 and copyright legislations. America seems to be following suit. Germany allows ISP's to be sued for content that isn't there own (old slashdot story - don't quote me on it!). France used to deny existance of RSA...
• Fight fire with fire - this is the solution that I believe I shall adopt. As part of my final year in University, I have to do a project. As my project I've chosen to do something a bit like the Eternity service, but with a twist: anonymity. For the first time, freedom of speech can only be stopped by a government if they cut off the internet. And if they do that, businesses will leave straight away. Granted, it doesn't get around [RIP], unless you only use session keys and destroy them after the session, but it does finally give us something that few governments are willing to: freedom of speech and privacy (in the sense that no matter who snoops our connections, they still can't prove we sent a message, let alone prove we have the key).
• Clue up - this is for anyone who has an interest in law. Clue the government up, and the best way to do that is to become the government. This is meant to be a democracy, after all, so should your views be supported, you will be able to get into power and make our voices heard. If the tide of opinion is against you (as it may well be, especially in the UK), then the only thing you can do is to accept that this is how democracy works, and maybe this is the wrong type of government system for you.

Well, that's my four-quid's worth.

-- Maz

Hear! Hear!

I notice, for example, that the Scottish Parliament's web site, and my local Council's Web site, do not yet conform. Without wishing to point fingers at specific organisations, is it your intention to cajole all sites within .gov.uk to conform to these standards? Is it appropriate for members of the public to draw administrators of these sites attention to these standards?

Oh, and, by the way, keep up the good work!

This isn't petty. It's important. Anything with a .gov domain element should clearly be in the control of the government. Party groups are .orgs, and that's that.