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You might try reading the opinion; virtually everything you said is factually incorrect.

The fellow had priors for obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon after having run from the cops in the past (he plead guilty to lesser charges), and was arrested on a bench warrant that (due to a clerical error) was still in existence for later unpaid tickets (which had since been paid). Neither side contested the question of whether he should've gone into the general population given his arrest (there was no other option, since he was arrested on a warrant, not merely detained for a traffic violation).

They don't argue that every inmate going into general population requires a strip search. The Court did say that deference to the judgment of jail administrators is needed in cases where they're not clearly in the wrong, and they said that a jail choosing to conduct such searches (for contraband, injury, delousing, detection of gang tattoos, and similar purposes) is not unreasonable for prisoners being put into the general population. Quite the opposite of suggesting that such a search be mandated, they did suggest that there are situations where it would not be appropriate, though in general it is up to the discretion of the officers involved.

See, for instance, Part IV:

This case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees. This describes the circumstances in Atwater. See 532 U. S., at 324 (“Officers took Atwater’s ‘mug shot’ and placed her, alone, in a jail cell for about one hour, after which she was taken before a magistrate and released on $310 bond”). The accommodations provided in these situations may diminish the need to conduct some aspects of the searches at issue. Cf. United States Brief 30 (discussing the segregation, and less invasive searches, of individuals held by the Federal Bureau of Prisons for misdemeanors or civil contempt). The circumstances before the Court, however, do not present the opportunity to consider a narrow exception of the sort JUSTICE ALITO describes, post, at 2–3 (concurring opinion), which might restrict whether an arrestee whose detention has not yet been reviewed by a magistrate or other judicial officer,and who can be held in available facilities removed from the general population, may be subjected to the types of searches at issue here.

Petitioner’s amici raise concerns about instances of officers engaging in intentional humiliation and other abusive practices. See Brief for Sister Bernie Galvin et al. as Amici Curiae; see also Hudson, 468 U. S., at 528 (“[I]ntentional harassment of even the most hardened criminals cannot be tolerated by a civilized society”); Bell, 441 U. S., at 560. There also may be legitimate concerns about the invasiveness of searches that involve the touching of detainees. These issues are not implicated on the facts of this case, however, and it is unnecessary to consider them here.

And in Alito's concurring opinion:

It is important to note, however, that the Court does not hold that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population. Most of those arrested for minor offenses are not dangerous, and most are released from custody prior to or at the time of their initial appearance before a magistrate. In some cases, the charges are dropped. In others, arrestees are released either on their own recognizance or on minimal bail. In the end, few are sentenced to incarceration. For these persons, admission to the general jail population, with the concomitant humiliation of a strip search, may not be reasonable, particularly if an alternative procedure is feasible.

He wasn't convicted.

He didn't commit any crime.

Not entirely true. From the Court brief:

In 1998, seven years before the incidents at issue, peti- tioner Albert Florence was arrested after fleeing from police officers in Essex County, New Jersey. He was charged with obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to two lesser offenses and was sentenced to pay a fine in monthly in- stallments. In 2003, after he fell behind on his payments and failed to appear at an enforcement hearing, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. He paid the outstand- ing balance less than a week later; but, for some unex- plained reason, the warrant remained in a statewide computer database.

So he was previously arrested for obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon and convicted of "lesser offenses" as part of a plea deal. He did commit a crime; I'm pretty sure that's what you agree to when you plead guilty.

It seems like there are two separate issues here: first the strip search for anyone, which I don't like as much as you and second, the bring into jail anyone, which I'm not sure applies in this specific instance. I don't see it as a violation of his rights that he was brought into jail, considering the information at hand.

Read the actual decision and Roberts and Alito's concurring opinions. The logic is that the people are being put into the population of prisons/jails with other prisoners, and thus could pose a risk (whether it be contraband, lice, disease, gang membership, etc.), and thus the jailers are justified in subjecting them to a strip search. It's not an issue where specific cause for a search is needed as is the case for those who haven't been arrested, but that the prison officials have a reasonable grounds for searching people before admitting them to the general population. Roberts and Alito wrote separate supporting statements in order to emphasize that the logic behind the decision revolves around the people being admitted to the general population of prisoners, and thus there is room for an exception in a case where someone is arrested but is not being put into the general prison population (for whatever reason).

"This case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees. This describes the circumstances in Atwater. See 532 U. S., at 324 (“Officers took Atwater’s ‘mug shot’ and placed her, alone, in a jail cell for about one hour, after which she was taken before a magistrate and released on $310 bond”). The accommodations provided in these situations may diminish the need to conduct some aspects of the searches at issue." -majority opinion (delivered by Kennedy)

"It is important to note, however, that the Court does nothold that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population." -Alito's concurring opinion. He goes on to mention people detained on minor traffic stops (rather than an arrest warrant as in this case) who could be released to their own recognizance.

As for prison vs jail semantics, the distinction is usually that the former are state or federal institutions while the latter are local (city/county) institutions; both are, by definition, places of confinement for prisoners, and the ruling would apply in either case. The due process challenge would not likely be raised in the case of a state or federal prison since they usually house only convicts and not people awaiting trial, but the distinction is immaterial here. (Quoting from the decision: "The term “jail” is used here in a broad sense to include prisons and other detention facilities.")

The case isn't nearly as simple as the summary or the full article would indicated. I recommend the following:

http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=10-945

You've clearly displayed a lack of critical thinking here by just reading the bullshit sensationalist headlines. I'm not saying that I completely agree with the Justices here in saying that strip searching should be implicitly allowed for non-indictable offenses but to rule that it's not constituional to subject anyone to those searches is just asking for trouble.

Please, everyone - read the actual judgement at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-945.pdf and don't waste your time reading The Register... a publication that made a joke about holding your genetials in the same line as linking to the opinion.

The the opinion discusses that, since it's at the heart of the case. The key issue is that natural processes and abstract ideas aren't patentable, but processes or methods applying them may be, if the application involves something significant in its own right. However they found that in this case the application consisted of basically the natural law, combined with instructions to doctors to use the natural law, which was too trivial an application. As the opinion argues:

...to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words “apply it.”

In this specific case:

Prometheus’ patents set forth laws of nature --- namely, relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm. [...] While it takes a human action (the administration of a thiopurine drug) to trigger a manifestation of this relation in a particular person, the relation itself exists in principle apart from any human action. The relation is a consequence of the ways in which thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body --- entirely natural processes. And so a patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a natural law.

The question before us is whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe these natural relations. To put the matter more precisely, do the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws? We believe that the answer to this question is no.

Incidentally, the opinion is actually pretty clear and seems to "get" it, at least on this particular point. Contrary to usual practice when reading patent-related court opinions, I did not either: 1) fall asleep while doing so; or 2) feel the need to yell at the monitor.

United States v Williams
A crime is committed only when the speaker believes or intends the listener to believe that the subject of the proposed transaction depicts real children. It is simply not true that this means “a protected category of expression [will] inevitably be suppressed,” post, at 13. Simulated child pornography will be as available as ever,so long as it is offered and sought as such, and not as real child pornography.

Hearing Elizabeth Smart being mentioned on the news and how she was there when Bush signed the PROTECT ACT into law got me searching about these things a couple days ago. Oh what interesting timing.

Would someone please answer if what is mentioned in that SCOTUS opinion is legally standing?

There is a difference between child pornography and child abuse. Child pornography is like the evidence of it, child abuse, having happened. Neither should be legal. But the term "child pornography" is expanding to include things that technically aren't. And it's being done under the guise that if we don't outlaw it, pedophiles will act on their impulses. This would be like GTA encouraging people to go out and murder, hence attempts to ban violent video games in one form or another.

I don't know what pedophiles are thinking. Some say it's about power and children are weak prey, so it's an easy target? How about spending taxpayer dollars on trying to eliminate the problem at its source. Find out if there are any red flags for these people, like when they're younger, and offer free psychological help before they can abuse children. We need to think of these pedophiles not just as perverts, but as victims of a mental disorder as well. And if it is possible to solve their mental disorder before they take action, there is hope one less child is victimized.

We may be able to educate our children to tell an adult or yell, kick, scream when being abused to attract attention, but what about human trafficking? How do we solve that problem?

While the court did rule 9-0 that the tracking was too extensive and had to be thrown out, the court split 5-4 on the reasoning and scope of the ruling. The majority opinion held that the tracking was invalidated by the fact that police used the defendant's private property (his car), in violation of the 4th amendment. This largely sidesteps the much broader questions about stake: police use of GPS tracking in cellphones, camera networks backed by face/vehicle/license plate recogniztion software, etc. The minority opinion sought to invalidate the tracking on more broad grounds such as the duration (one month), continuous nature, expectation of privacy in the modern age, etc. But, being the minority opinion, it doesn't exactly have the same force behind it. Their opinion, however, is likely to form a blueprint for how these things can get argued going forward. It is certain that these issues will come up again and again in the Court.

More information and explanation of the ruling can be found at the NYTimes, wikipedia, and the court's opinion text (PDF).

Hell, you can shoot them for looking like they are going to let the air out of your tires.

You knew that was BS when you type it, right? Nice reductio ad absurdum (however that's spelled).

In UN-civilized places, you're not even allowed to shoot the thugs breaking through your daughter's bedroom door--you aren't even allowed to have a gun in your own home! I'll take civilized San Antonio over the wilds of Detroit, DC, NYC and Chicago ANY day!

Do read Mc Donald vs. Chicago, by the way, and look at the arguments the city made: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1521.pdf

Please, please, PLEASE stop spreading this lie. We can't run a country based on false information.

The NDAA is a military spending bill. It gets passed every year. For several years it has allowed the military to detain members of Al Qaeda, and no one had a problem with this. In the latest version, this was expanded to cover members of other terrorists organizations, but it still states that it cannot be applied to United States citizens or immigrants.

What Section 1021, subsection (e), of H.R. 1540 as enrolled says is

Authorities- Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United States.

which doesn't explicitly say it cannot be applied to US citizens etc.. The question is what "existing law or authorities" say. Senator Carl Levin quoted the Supreme Court as saying "There is no bar to this nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant.", which comes from the O'Connor/Rehnquist/Kennedy/Breyer opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. On the other hand, they also say "It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.", but if active hostilities continue until we've defeated "those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons", who knows when they'll cease.

I read the transcript of the arguments, and it wasn't really clear to me what way they were leaning. Sotomayor seemed mostly in favor of the patentee, while Breyer especially was critical of the patentee. But these are oral arguments, and justices can take devil's advocate positions during these in order to tease out certain details of the case. Figuring out how the court will swing based on the oral arguments is like reading tea leaves, especially when it comes to patent law.

As for the correctness of the headline: This case is in the Supreme Court because an early summary judgment motion in the district court was granted, ruling that the patent is invalid. The case was appealed to the Federal Circuit, which reversed the ruling, and then Mayo appealed to the Supreme Court.

This case only focuses on the question of patentable subject matter under 35 USC 101, i.e., what kinds of claims should be patentable. In particular, the question here is whether the claims are directed to an application of a law of nature (the metabolism of a certain drug administered to a patient) or to the law of nature itself. Laws of nature are not patentable in and of themselves, but applications of a law of nature can be, as long as the entire law of nature is not "pre-empted" by the claim. In other words, matter-energy equivalence, E = mc^2, is a law of nature. Particular applications of that principle can be patentable, but if the claims are written such that every conceivable application of the principle is covered by the patent, then the principle is pre-empted by the claim (i.e., they might as well have claimed that entire law of nature, because the claims effectively cover it entirely).

Prometheus, and the federal government, both argue that the arguments that Mayo is making are better addressed when considering the claims against the prior art (i.e., under 35 USC 102 and 103). (This is in part because Mayo is doing a hamfisted job of arguing their case, probably because they don't want to sabotage some of their own medical treatment patents.) The issue is that prior art considerations require a time-consuming process called a Markman hearing, where the court decides how to construe the various terms recited in the claims, and usually thereafter, a jury decides whether the prior art covers the claims, which makes the process extremely uncertain. It's Mayo's hope that patents like this can be killed early on in the process by a judge, rather than putting all their money on double-zero and giving it a spin with a jury.

TLDR version: Nobody really knows what SCOTUS was thinking during oral arguments. This isn't the end of the road for this case, even if Mayo loses, because prior art still has to be considered.

Probably like this.

While your comment is meant to be humorous, the question of minors' First Amendment rights was a core aspect of the Supreme Court's recent decision striking down the California ban on violent video game sales to minors. For example, Scalia writes in footnote 3 of the decision (PDF):

JUSTICE THOMAS ignores the holding of Erznoznik, and denies that persons under 18 have any constitutional right to speak or be spoken to without their parents’ consent. He cites no case, state or federal, supporting this view, and to our knowledge there is none. Most of his dissent is devoted to the proposition that parents have traditionally had the power to control what their children hear and say. This is true enough. And it perhaps follows from this that the state has the power to enforce parental prohibitions — to require, for example, that the promoters of a rock concert exclude those minors whose parents have advised the promoters that their children are forbidden to attend. But it does not follow that the state has the power to prevent children from hearing or saying anything without their parents’ prior consent.

(In the 1975 Erznozick decision Scalia cites, the Court struck down a Jacksonville ordinance that banned drive-in movie theaters from showing films with naked breasts and buttocks. One argument was the protection of minors from such displays.)

I can see legal arguments being raised against anti-sexting laws based on this line of reasoning on the Court. There's now a pretty solid majority of First Amendment absolutists on the Court. It's not hard to imagine a law against teen sexting being struck down on the claim the both the sender and the receiver of such images have First Amendment rights.

Interesting timing. The Supreme Court is hearing oral arguments on the question of GPS tracking without a warrant on November 8th. I suspect the ruling could be applied to this kind of technology. Granted, one is "passive" tracking (the person owns the tracked device) and the other "active" (the government attaches the device to the person), but I see similarities in how the use of tracking technology in general impacts society's expectation of privacy.

Civics homework: Defend your position on how the 4th amendment protects/allows cell phone tracking of suspected criminals.

You cant agree to give up the right to sue or the right to a class action suit.

The United States Supreme Court begs to differ.

Maybe, but that has nothing to do with this case.

SCOTUS has already decided that the reason for which the trial court upheld the denial of EPIC's FOIA request is no longer valid. Unfortunately, the ruling did not come in time to help EPIC, whose attorneys apparently knew about the case before the Supreme Court but did not appeal EPIC's case in the allowed time for appeal.

See the linked decision.

No, we do not have the right to talk to children that are not our own children.

The Supreme Court disagrees (PDF).

I think the government is immune from most retaliations. The Supreme Court recently ruled that a state prosecutor could essentially act with impunity (see http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-571.pdf), and the California Supreme Court upheld similar coverage by a 1992 anti-SLAPP statute (see http://www.yeelaw.com/1.pdf). Like it or not, these people are not to be crossed. Pity the poor fools who happen to get in their way.

I agree.

I think if the subject matter to you is interesting, the supreme court opinions are really great reads. These men and women are extremely intelligent and well versed people.

Just in case you missed it in the summary: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/08-1448.pdf

"If Vermont's statute provided that prescriber-identifying information could not be sold or disclosed except in narrow circumstances then the State might have a stronger position. Here, however, the State gives possessors of the information broad discretion and wide latitude in disclosing the information, while at the same time restricting the informationâ(TM)s use by some speakers and for some purposes, even while the State itself can use the information to counter the speech it seeks to suppress."

Vermont screwed up by saying the data couldn't be used for "the wrong" reasons. What they really needed to do was ban the sale of the prescriber data in the first place. It's a messy rule and doesn't address the heart of the privacy issue it used as its basis.

That said, Justice Breyer makes some good arguments in his dissenting opinion (pages 30-53). One point from the summary:

"The Vermont statute before us adversely affects expression in one, and only one, way. It deprives pharmaceutical and data-mining companies of data, collected pursuant to the governmentâ(TM)s regulatory mandate, that could help pharmaceutical companies create better sales messages. In my view, this effect on expression is inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to regulate a commercial enterprise."

By the way, Justice Sotomayor (an Obama Supreme Court appointment) sided with the majority, so this isn't necessarily a clear-cut case of liberals vs. conservatives.

The record companies disagree with you. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd. http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-480.pdf "The record companies, my clients, have said, for some time now, and it's been on their Website for some time now, that it's perfectly lawful to take a CD that you've purchased, upload it onto your computer, put it onto your iPod."

You mean like they didn't sue the Nelson farm. Or Schmeiser. Or that they have that they should be allowed to sell seeds that haven't passed environmental safety studies, between now and when the studies are finished. Because to prohibit them from selling seeds before safety/ecological studies pass is unconstitutional.

Nope, they won't sue anyone. Just ignore the hulking gorilla with the patents, they really are friendly.

According to the SCOTUS opinion, and if their cited version of AT&T's arbitration agreement is valid (which we can assume it is), either party may bring litigation to small-claims court in lieu of arbitration:

In the event the parties proceed to arbitration, the agreement specifies... that either party may bring a claim in small claims court in lieu of arbitration; The agreement, moreover, denies AT&T any ability to seek reimbursement of its attorney’s fees, and, in the event that a customer receives an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last written settlement offer, requires AT&T to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees.3

The Concepcions refused to agree to arbitration and instead chose a class-action suit. AT&T argued that it wasn't fair, but California's Southern District court ruled against AT&T. It did however..

described AT&T’s arbitration agreement favorably, noting, for example, that the informal disputeresolution process was “quick, easy to use” and likely to “promp[t] full or . . . even excess payment to the customer without the need to arbitrate or litigate”; that the $7,500 premium functioned as “a substantial inducement for the consumer to pursue the claim in arbitration” if a dispute was not resolved informally; and that consumers who were members of a class would likely be worse off.

Why the orignial plaintiffs didn't choose the arbitration given that agreement is beyond me. However I do not know the full terms of the agreement. Just something to consider.

Unfortunately, yesterday the Supreme Court ruled that one can not seek Class Action status for cases involving Products or Services. See AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION, Slip Opinion No. 09–893 (PDF)

So that's why Sony waited a week...

Unfortunately, yesterday the Supreme Court ruled that one can not seek Class Action status for cases involving Products or Services.
See AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION, Slip Opinion No. 09–893 (PDF)

You think this is a bad thing?!

Hell yes it's a bad thing! When a large corporation can use a shrink-wrap EULA to force you into binding arbitration (read: a "court" they have literally bought and paid for), you will never again see that corporation bother with proper customer service. Remember, according to Sony you don't actually own your PS3; by signing up for the PSN, you are effectively renting that machine from Sony. From here on out, the customer is always wrong: our kangaroo court says so!

Unfortunately, yesterday the Supreme Court ruled that one can not seek Class Action status for cases involving Products or Services. See AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION, Slip Opinion No. 09–893 (PDF)

You think this is a bad thing?!

Unfortunately, yesterday the Supreme Court ruled that one can not seek Class Action status for cases involving Products or Services.

See AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION, Slip Opinion No. 09–893 (PDF)

Full transcript here.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-290.pdf

US Supreme Court started taking that away from the Corps just a few weeks ago.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1279.pdf

http://www.slate.com/id/2281715/

"The protection in FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground that it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to corporations. We trust that AT&T will not take it personally."- Chief Justice Roberts

In any case anonymous speech is mostly protected under the first amendment,

But Judge Buchanan rejected arguments to protect the Twitter data on both the First and Fourth Amendment grounds. So its looking like anonymity is out for Twitter users, petition signers, campaign contributors, etc. Likewise, SCOTUS held that the petition disclosures do not violate the First Amendment. So, what's good for the goose (Twitter users) is good for the gander (special interest politics). I'm fine with that, as long as the loss of anonymity is applied to everyone.

Isn't there a law or something like that that states that anything that can be written in 10 lines of Perl can be written in 1 line of Perl?

It was ruled unconstitutional last week.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1036.pdf

They've posted the audio and transcript of the oral argument online.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=08-1423

http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1423.pdf

One might actually learn something from the actual arguments about what the decision means. The actual decision itself is uninformative: it just declares the circuit court's decision affirmed by a 4-4 vote. It doesn't even say who voted which way, though I bet you could infer it from looking at the transcript.

They've posted the audio and transcript of the oral argument online.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argument=08-1423

http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1423.pdf

One might actually learn something from the actual arguments about what the decision means. The actual decision itself is uninformative: it just declares the circuit court's decision affirmed by a 4-4 vote. It doesn't even say who voted which way, though I bet you could infer it from looking at the transcript.

For the curious, here's the actual decision.

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/08-1423.pdf

It's two sentences long and simply states:

"PER CURIAM
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.

JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case."

The question here isn't whether she's liable. It's for how much.

Alito's dissent (starting on page 26) is interesting, and gets into just how thorny a problem it is to prove an "innocent infringer" defense under 17 U.S.C. 504. (And again, an "innocent infringer" isn't off the hook--it just reduces the minimum statutory damages that may be awarded to the rights-holder.) Basically, the girl argued that she was too young, too technically unsophisticated--not a willful infringer for the purposes of awarding damages. The judge who originally reduced the damages more or less agreed with her (his ruling can be found here. The court of appeals then looked at the argument differently. (There order is here.. They considered the innocent infringer defense directly under 17 U.S.C. 402(d) (full text available here. Basically, that says you can't be an innocent infringer if you have "access to" published recordings that have the copyright notice on them. The court of appeals pretty broadly said that this provision prevented Ms. Harper from claiming innocent infringement. Bottom line, she never disputed that she had access to such recordings (whatever that might mean).

Alito doesn't like the appeals court saying that this "access to" argument may act as a matter of law to prevent someone from being an innocent infringer. I think he's right about that--access should be a question of fact that needs to be decided on evidence, and it seems like nobody in this case really talked much about it.

Yes, actually she did. Start on page 64. She is arguing that the law DOES cover books but you don't need to worry about it because the Government has never tried to regulate books and if it did there would be grounds for a legal challenge. You'll forgive me if I don't find that argument very compelling.

I think they should sue everyone who is in violation. To help them identify people who are causing them harm by violating their patents, I have compiled this short list:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/
http://www.supremecourt.gov/
http://www.uspto.gov/

At stake: whether all federal employees can be forced to undergo open-ended background checks

Really? I don't see that in the questions being answered by the supreme court.

That would be question 2 in the link you provided.

At stake: whether all federal employees can be forced to undergo open-ended background checks

Really? I don't see that in the questions being answered by the supreme court.

No. 08-964. Argued November 9, 2009--Decided June 28, 2010

Today, the Court once again declines to impose limitations on the Patent Act that are inconsistent with the Act's text. The patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on the unpatentability of abstract ideas. The Court, therefore, need not define further what constitutes a patentable "process," beyond pointing to the definition of that term provided in 100(b) and looking to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.

Which is about the same as saying ( Justice Potter Stewart, concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 U.S. 184 (1964)),

"I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description ["hard-core pornography"]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that."

On average sex offenders serve longer terms in prison and jail than persons convicted of other felony offenses. In fiscal year 2003, the average sentence length for all felonies was 37.3 months, compared to 90.8 months for sex offenses.

Then there was the recent Supreme Court ruling that "federal officials can indefinitely hold inmates considered "sexually dangerous," even after they complete their prison terms." which you can read more about at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126887029. The case itself can be found at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1224.pdf .

That said, I read the entire opinion, and there is a nuance in what was decided that seems to have been overlooked here, at least thus far.

In the case in question, the police officer named in the suit was using his work-issue pager to send personal messages, but the initial inquiry was a result of the good-faith request of the police chief to check into whether the issue was that the number of characters per month (set at 25,000) that had been contracted with Arch Wireless was sufficient to the task. Only upon examination of the details of those transmissions did the personal nature of them come into focus.

If I read the opinion correctly, the fact that the messages were examined for a non-disciplinary reason (in this case, to ascertain if the upper limit on characters sent per month was sufficient to encompass all of the required official communications.

The oral argument at the Supreme Court hearing from both sides can be read here

MR. DAMMEIER: Well, they -- they expect that some company, I'm sure, is going to have to be processing the delivery of this message. And --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I didn't -- I wouldn't think that. I thought, you know, you push a button; it goes right to the other thing.
(Laughter.)
MR. DAMMEIER: Well --
JUSTICE SCALIA: You mean it doesn't go right to the other thing?

I also get the impression from reading it that Justice Sotomayor is the most tech-savvy judge, which isn't too surprising. Justice Alito, the second youngest, also appeared to have a decent grasp of telecommunications realities (despite the fact that he was a W. appointee).

When they get down to writing the opinions, they are all going to have clerks who are in their twenties writing drafts and doing the research. I wouldn't worry too much--about the Supreme Court.

...are the Library of Congress site and the Supreme Court site. Both of them are extremely informative, and have a massive wealth of information that is readily available.

Here's the Supreme Court's decision:

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-661.pdf

Here's the decision. Go read it, at least the first few pages. This is not a due process case. It's a states' rights case:

[The defendants] moved to dismiss on the ground [that] Congress exceeded its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 18. . . .

The Court does not reach or decide any claim that the statute or its application denies equal protection, procedural or substantive due process, or any other constitutional rights.

All the court said is that this falls within the federal government's powers, and doesn't violate the Tenth Amendment (which reserves some rights to the states). It didn't say it was okay on due process grounds. In fact, a district court did rule that the law was unconstitutional on due process grounds, and an appeals court upheld that (citations omitted):

The District Court, accepting two of the respondents’ [i.e., defendants'] claims, granted their motion to dismiss. It agreed with respondents that the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and it agreed that, in enacting the statute, Congress exceeded its Article I legislative powers. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the dismissal on this latter, legislative-power ground. It did not decide the standard-of-proof question, nor did it address any of respondents’ other constitutional challenges.

In short, the law has been struck down. The district court struck it down on two grounds. The government appealed both to the appeals court. The appeals court upheld the district court on one of the grounds without addressing the second one. The Supreme Court overruled the lower courts on that ground (legislative powers). The law is still struck down for violating due process, pending further appeals. This case has nothing to do with due process.

Here's the supremes' decision:

• United States v. Comstock

From working on the Bilski case, I've ended up reading a dozen US Supreme Court decisions, and I've found them surprisingly readable. There are times when you just have to accept that something has a meaning that you don't know, but even with these gaps, the remaining text is usually coherent.

For the job of "top 9 judges in the United States", yes, that's not enough experience.

For comparison's sake, consider that Sonia Sotomayor had been spent about 20 years on the bench before she was nominated. Diane Wood, frequently put forward as a good alternative to Kagan, has been on an appellate court for 15 years. Being a competent lawyer and being a competent judge are different skills, and I'd much rather have a pick that has demonstrated they're capable of being a judge.

In addition, there's good reason to call her competence as an attorney into question. For instance, in Citizen's United v FEC, her first oral argument of any kind, she (by her own admission) panicked when Justice Kennedy asked her about other significant First Amendment cases. (the exchange can be found on page 41)

And I'm not suggesting this rule has always been followed, but when it isn't followed, we are taking a much bigger risk that we'll end up with a justice incapable of asking a single relevant question during an oral argument for years on end.

One other thing, sorry to reply twice, but do yourself a favor and read the transcripts and ruling from the Citizens United case.

If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech. If the antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate form. The Government contends that Austin permits it to ban corporate expenditures for almost all forms of communication stemming from a corporation. If Austin were correct, the Government could prohibit a corporation from expressing political views in media beyond those presented here, such as by printing books. The Government responds “that the FEC has never applied this statute to a book,” and if it did, “there would be quite [a] good as-applied challenge.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 65 (Sept. 9, 2009). This troubling assertion of brooding governmental power cannot be reconciled with the confidence and stability in civic discourse that the First Amendment must secure.