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Domain: trustedpc.org
Stories and comments across the archive that link to trustedpc.org.
Comments · 20
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Re:No, You're Wrong! Learn Here Grasshopper!
Note the relationship of the described encrypted files key management to TCPA (not necessarily Palladium). TCPA stores the private key on a chip and protects it (not from physical attack). The concept is to eliminate the need to keep a working copy of the private key on an external device such as a floppy. The TCPA description indicates that the Linux-boot-floppy attack would not allow access to TCPA encrypted files since the boot environment would be different.
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Re:Where are you taking this from?TCPA is really just an encryption card solderied onto the board. WIth TCPA you have a number generating chip, an encrytion chip, and a special bios. Its designed to enchance e-commerce and secure corporate desktops and is an open standard.
Pallidium was designed according to one of the founders to figure out how he coud control his bytes on someone elses computer! It was later found out that user security could also be enhanced so Microsoft is marketing this as a secure and trustworthy platform. Here is a diagram. Pallidium is not really a single pieace of hardware but a standard. A palladium certified system contains a master encryption/trust relationship chip called the nexus, a encrypted video card, encrypted sound card, encrypted hard drive, encrypted network card, encrypted memory, and maybe an encrypted cpu like the one in the xbox but I am not to sure on this. Anyway a palladium certified system also contains a special bios as well as an operating system that has an agent aka "bouncer" which communicates with the hardware and software. Bill Gates himself used the term bouncer. I find this term spooky.
Each component trusts each other so if an encryption key is discovered in one component the other components and the nexus will rencrypt it. The reason many slashdotters view palladium as more of a drm solution then TCPA is because of the following. Its a proprietary model.
1.)A trust relationship is not needed to encrypted a file
2.) Take everything with a grain of salt from Microsoft. Look at the drm already in the media player. If you upgrade your windowsXP pc you will no longer be able to listen to your wma's. On my Windows2k box the default version of media player uses very little cpu usage and I can record what I listen to. If I upgrade my version of media player my cpu usage goes up to %20 and I can not record what I hear! Media player versions 8 and above already encrypt the sound! Last when I select a wmv from kazaa I always get a dialog asking me if I "Would like to update my digital rights management in order to view this". Can we trust them not to abuse it? Think also about the WindowsXP product activation feature. With pallidium Microsoft can make sure you register and not re-install it by using your own computer.
3.)Microsoft has made its intention quite clear that yes, this is a drm solution for individuals who want to protect their work but what they do not mention that Microsoft is actively working with Hollywood to make sure that "there" content is protected as well.
4.)Palladium is a closed standard
5.) Bill Gates mentioned that this is the decade in which piracy will disapear in asia and he wants a way to make people pay.
6.) Microsoft makes money by selling your desktop space via the media player. Hollywood wants to use this market to promote their products but fears people will record songs and video's. In other words your windows pc is Bill's vending machine.
7.) It gives the signers god like powers to deactivate programs or files if they think your abusing their EULA's. Your own pc will be the judge and jury during every copyright dispute that pops up.
This is not on the list because it can't be confirmed but I have a feeling this will also happen. With things like encrypted video cards, it will be impossible to record a dvd. An encrypted file system with an encrypted hard dirve is also a bitch since files can be very will hidden. Another example is an encrypted sound card in a palladium compliant os, only media player will rip cd's and if it detects its copy protected will refuse to do so. That is unless other competing products are signed. Microsoft already has some nice copy protected technology for audio cd's in which its trying to get hollwood to adopt.
TCPA is just a way to secure a file or a connection. Microsofts approach is a whole tamper proof complex system where every object, file and peripheral is controlled. I am thinking it will be like a digital cable box scrambler. It sounds like a nightmare and last but not least we do not know who the gatekeeper will be? Hmmm let me guess. Microsoft.
THis could also be used to eliminate competition since its really Microsoft's technology and only they can decide who can and can not run on "their" platform. These are the words of Jack Valentini...If you can't control it, then yo do not own it...".
This above of course is just pure speculation but judging by Microsoft's behavior I think this is part of Microsoft goals.Its really about open vs close technology. ALso I believe hailstorm can become a reality where renting services will be the norm.
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FAQs are only FAQs... and Ross Anderson is wrong
That is why you should read a technical analysis on TCPA and not biased FAQs... even better, read the TCPA open specification at the trusted computing homesite
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Re:Passing the blame.Well the good news is that you can turn it off. The bad news is that the email from grandma may require palladium and not TCPA. TCPA is different then Palladium and has been in use since 99 on almost all IBM systems. Ask any ThinkPad owner. Also there are only 2 chips in the motherboard that make up the TCPA as well as a special bios.
In palladium each component must be certified and it uses a trust relationship to prevent tampering. To me palladium sounds like a way for Microsoft to make sure you can not upgrade more then afew components at a time without paying the piper but who knows. It sounds more stict and anti-user. Also rumours have it that Bill Gates wants to use palladium as a way to stomp out piracy in asia and they also view OOS as the bigggest competitor since os/2. Scary.
TCPA was formed to secure and enhance e-commerce as well as secure corporate desktops. In this day and age the security is greatly needed.
If hollywood wines and complains and the hollings bill passes, I prefer TCPA anyday and its a more open and industry standard solution. Linux will be supported since any thid party can sign it and no company is the "official" gatekeeper. Think SSL. The gatekeeper argument is the scariest and as long as it stays open then its not a problem. IBM has invested billions in Linux and wants it to susceed. -
Re:Get a job writing the TCPA bios for trusted linActually TCPA is not pallidium and is fully open and supported by a large consorturium who are interested in secure e-commerce and computing. Not drm and electronic enforcement of compulsive licensing.
Its not bad at all and much better then Micorosoft's patented closed alternative. The good news is that IBM supports this and they want linux to run on it. It is more strict but its more like ssl or pki in which any trusted body can sign an application. These vendors are more sympthatic to Linux.
Its the patent that Microsoft has on using drm in an OS is what really bothers me most about palladium. The dmca is also a problem. IF the dmca is ever overturned then linux could use palladium. -
Re:It's not really that surprising"Sun is basically "arming the rebels""
No. I think it this move was designed to improve Apache's security and make it a greater e-commerce tool on solaris( and unix). Sun relizes that more sun webservers use apache then Iplanet so they are donating the code to openssl since apache uses it by default. And not to just attack Microsoft. However I do question the timing since newly discovered ssl flaw recently in IIS/IE is making headline news and CIO's nervous.
Something like this may have an impact in e-commerce purchasing decisions. -
Re:DRM not that bad!
I worry about the slippery slope arguement. First off software drm which is what this arguement is about is crackable. My guess is crackers and pirates will figure out a way to circumvent this while in the meantime drm will become standard.
After it becomes standard and cracked the MPAA/RIAA/Microsoft will come up with a strict hardware version aka pallidium. With hardware based drm, the companies and not the users decide which rights you have. You will have no choice but to bend over and take it or not use audio. Extreme hardware based drm like TCPA implementation contain encypted bootsectors which will prevent linux from ever booting. Pallidium at least does not have this.
The second problem is that bad and currupted laws like the infamous DMCA prevent circumventing a hardware based device, even for fair use. This means Linux will never ever be portedto crippled hardware unless it can be dissabled. IBM's drm crippled pc's at least have this option to boot linux. For now they are only available in europe. But remember that the RIAA/MPAA/Microsoft decide and design the hardware platform so will they let you do this? Fat chance.
Remember its that they and not you decide how to use it. A standard pc today lets the user do whatever he/she pleases with it. But these chips will be hands off and if your lucky will only be particially usable by yourself. What I mean by this is that you can DRM your own documents if you please. However Microsoft and the Thompsons media(owners of mp3) will also use it.
What scares the hell out of me is that every single company out there supports this!
Every one! From Microsoft to IBM to HP to THompsons media, Intel, AMD, to the DIVX group, to the MPAA/RIAA! Like it or not drm will be here. WHat the f*ck is up with that? With all these companies around support it, its only a matter of time before its defacto standard.
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Re:Relax, everybody...Dude... chill. This isn't a personal vendetta against you.
My point is that according to the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, only motherboard manufacturers may include binary code in the protected space of a trusted BIOS.
The spec, available here in PDF, prohibits the end user from updating this code. So the question is, whose binary will run in this space? My binary compiled from the publically available shared source? Probably not.
Granted, this is not Microsoft's Palladium, but it is logical to assume that the so-called Trusted PC will be an important part of the actual Microsoft implementation.
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Re:HA HA HA HA
Is he a CS major or MS major? (Martketing Science)
British universities don't have majors as such, but Ross Anderson is a well-published and widely-respected computer scientist, specialising in security. In fact he heads the Security Team at the Computer Laboratory of the University of Cambridge. Examination of the publications on his home page will give some clue as to where he normally stands on the politics of computer security issues.
This paper argues that open and closed systems are broadly similar in the fall-off of defect rates, and then identifies some secondary issues (such as transaction cost, vendor behaviour, test focus, and defender behaviour) that can break this symmetry.
A large part of the paper is concerned with identifying negative consequences that digital rights management technology (such as the TCPA) can have on the future of open systems. In particular, he envisions a future where software vendors can readily lock their file formats, and block not only substitute products, but also selected complement products.
He gives some interesting examples: Apparently vendors are already using cryptography to detect third party batteries and memory cards in order to make them appear of lower quality; also he claims the US government encourages secrecy concerning security flaws so that law enforcement has a window of opportunity to exploit them.
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Re:This is an easy problem to solveI know you're trying to make a point with hyperbole, but this isn't far from what's been sought. Clipper with its LEAF (law enforcement access field), the Swiss with their email archiving requirements, and the PATRIOT act don't make an LE API based on XML web services (add buzzwords as needed) sound very farfetched.
Heck, I wouldn't be surprised to see it as a part of the Trusted PC specification.
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Re:It really sucks.Welcome to the age when corporate interests dominate everything dealing with technology: if something doesn't directly make money under corporate sponsorship, it's forbidden. Really, I'm surprised that general purpose computers haven't been forbidden yet. Oh, no wait, TrustedPC has come to the rescue! Between that and the impending Microsoft Conflict OSS doesn't stand a chance.
Pack it in. OSS is well on the way to being killed by regulation, and RMS will be remembered for creating an OS used by subversives. Hmm, how long until CS majors will be required to be licensed and have to use trusted compilers?
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Re:Alternatives
Read. Be afraid.
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Re:Last thing we need
Think again; AMD is just as happy as Intel with this sort of thing.
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Re:I can actually see his point...If having MS install copy-protection at the OS level means the media companies will finally make this available, then I can stomach it.
And do you feel the same way about copy-protection on your hardware? A.K.A. the end of the "general purpose" computer? If the next gee-whiz Pentium V/Athlon YQ machine will only be available with some kind of MPAA-Approved BIOS and encryption, then I guess I've bought my last computer.
The good news? I've got a bunch of old Pentium machines with CDRW's. Hopefully, I'll be able to make big dollars marketing them on auction sites as "R@R3 PR3-B@N PCs."
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Re:Made for theft.
Don't ascribe your own motives to everyone else. Are you going to be saying this same thing once non-policeware PCs get C&Dd and DMCAd? The GBA is a computer, and its owners have every right to purchase tools that allow them to develop for it, whether you believe these tools are for that purpose or not.
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Hardware copyright protection is already spec'ed
See trustedpc.org the "Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, or TCPA, formed by Compaq, HP, IBM, Intel and Microsoft.
It "trusts" the hardware from a special chip on the mainboard, which trusts the BIOS, which trusts the Harddisk bootblock, which trusts the OSloader, which trusts the OS, which trusts the software application, which trusts the stream. This is done through a "privacy certificate agency" that just identifies your pc uniquely (and really, we will not keep records of who you are, those will be destroyed after you've submitted your identity and we have checked it!)
Ofcourse, trust here doesn't mean that YOU can trust your PC, but that THEY can trust YOUR PC.
If this standard makes it, the opensource community has a big problem. -
Re:Paranoia
Have a look at TrustedPC. The technology is almost there.
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Soon, trivially with certified hardware and softwa
For a few years people have been working behind the screens to make the general purpose PC a certified hardware device.
All hardware vendors are involved in the "trusted PC" initiative. From BIOS, See www.trustedpc.org
The specification has been published in december 2001.
Certified by an additional chip on your mainboard, before your BIOS even boots. It certifies BIOS, then bootblock, then OSloader, and then the OS and its applications. They really want you not to be able to see or hear content if there is even a single piece of hardware or software not certified. Let's hope it will become a failure.
Ofcourse, it is all done as a "privavy meassure" with a "privacy Certificate Agency" that will only unique mark you as anonymous entity, and which will not "store" your information after your application. Right.
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Re:StockpilingYour post was intelligent and well-reasoned. Because of that, and because it contradicted the 'received wisdom' on Slashdot, I'm reluctant to contradict it. But I'm going to anyway.
If there really were a conspiracy here, the changes you're anticipating would be in the BIOS...
The people driving these changes are not naive, and they are not going to promote a 'secure architecture' which can be defeated by flashing the BIOS. From the TCPA FAQ:
What types of capabilities are being highlighted in the TCPA 1.0 Specification?
The FAQ is pretty mealy-mouthed about what they're really up to. The least useless document I found on the site was TCPS05 - Integrity Metrics & Authenticated Boot (pdf) - a bloated, powerpoint-derived pdf that could be summed up in 4k of text.
Anyhow, you ask for evidence that the 'Generic' ATA proposal is CPRM in sheep's clothing. I think that the big piece of circumstantial evidence is the fact that the proposal surfaced so recently after CPRM was killed. Maybe T13 is a dynamic, fast-moving group that fields a major technical proposal every day, but I somehow got the impression that they're a slow-moving tortoise which cranked out CPRM over an extended period.
If that impression is correct, then the timing is suspicious. -
Re:StockpilingYour post was intelligent and well-reasoned. Because of that, and because it contradicted the 'received wisdom' on Slashdot, I'm reluctant to contradict it. But I'm going to anyway.
If there really were a conspiracy here, the changes you're anticipating would be in the BIOS...
The people driving these changes are not naive, and they are not going to promote a 'secure architecture' which can be defeated by flashing the BIOS. From the TCPA FAQ:
What types of capabilities are being highlighted in the TCPA 1.0 Specification?
The FAQ is pretty mealy-mouthed about what they're really up to. The least useless document I found on the site was TCPS05 - Integrity Metrics & Authenticated Boot (pdf) - a bloated, powerpoint-derived pdf that could be summed up in 4k of text.
Anyhow, you ask for evidence that the 'Generic' ATA proposal is CPRM in sheep's clothing. I think that the big piece of circumstantial evidence is the fact that the proposal surfaced so recently after CPRM was killed. Maybe T13 is a dynamic, fast-moving group that fields a major technical proposal every day, but I somehow got the impression that they're a slow-moving tortoise which cranked out CPRM over an extended period.
If that impression is correct, then the timing is suspicious.